The Historical Development of Modern Europe. From the Congress of Vienna to the Present Time.

By Charles M. Andrews, Associate Professor of History in Bryn Mawr College.

Two vols. Sold separately. With maps. 8", gilt tops, each $2.50

Part I.—From 1815 to 1850. Part II.—From 1850 to 1897.

SUMMARY OF CONTENTS.

The first volume opens with two introductory chapters upon the Old Régime, the French Revolution, and Napoleon Bonaparte. Then follow chapters upon these subjects: Reconstruction and the European System; the Restoration in France; the July Monarchy; the struggle against absolutism in Italy; the liberal movement in Germany; the history of France from 1840 to 1848; and the general uprising in France, Germany, Austria, and Italy during the years 1848 and 1849. The volume carries the subject to 1848 in France, to 1849 in Italy, and to 1850 in Germany.

The second volume employs the method adopted in the first of dealing with the separate movements and subjects as logical wholes, and after a brief statement of the condition of Europe in 1850 passes on to a consideration of the following topics: the rise of the Second Empire; European diplomacy and the Crimean war; the constitutional development of Piedmont and the final attainment of Italian independence and unity; the growth of Prussia, the struggle with Austria for the leadership in Germany, and the final attainment of German unity; the establishment of the dual monarchy, Austria-Hungary; and the progress of the Eastern Question from 1856 to the present time. The last five chapters deal with the history of the leading continental Powers, beginning in the case of Russia with 1856, of Italy with 1861, of Austria-Hungary with 1867, of France and Germany with 1871, and are designed to present in rapid survey the chief characteristics of the history of these countries to the close of the year 1897.

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS, NEW YORK AND LONDON.
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
OF
MODERN EUROPE

FROM THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA TO
THE PRESENT TIME

BY

CHARLES M. ANDREWS
Associate Professor of History in Bryn Mawr College

★★

1850–1897

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS
NEW YORK
27 WEST TWENTY-THIRD STREET
LONDON
24 BEDFORD STREET, STRAND

The Knickerbocker Press
1899
Copyright, 1898
by
G. P. Putnam's Sons
Entered at Stationers' Hall, London

The Knickerbocker Press, New York
PREFACE.

In this, the second and concluding volume on the history of modern Europe, I have resumed the narrative at the point where it was dropped at the close of the previous volume, and carried it forward to the year 1897. Employing throughout the plan and method originally adopted, I have dealt with only those countries that have been influential in shaping the history of continental Europe during the last seventy-five years, and have treated only those phases of their history that concern the historical development of Europe in the larger sense, rather than the historical development of each particular state or country. On the ground that no event can be understood in isolation, and that history is something more than a series of events chronologically considered, I have endeavoured to give logical form to my treatment of the subject, carrying each movement forward to its conclusion before turning to the others; and that due proportions might be preserved, have introduced nothing that did not seem to me absolutely necessary to an understanding of the subject, giving no more attention to any incident, however picturesque or dramatic, than its importance for my purpose warranted.

In my treatment of the various movements I have given little space to descriptions of military campaigns, not because I object to "drum-and-trumpet" history, but because I believe that the details of battles and the movements of troops belong, except in their consequences, to the student of military strategy; and I have omitted, except in a few important instances, all
discussions of a biographical nature, on the ground that a statesman’s character can be best understood by his work. Though I have not hesitated to turn aside from the narrative in order to comment upon or to interpret events, I have been able to find no place for personal judgments, which, reflecting merely the sentiments of the writer and based too often on present-day standards, are out of accord with the spirit of modern historical presentation; and while I fully appreciate the value of apt illustration, I have been limited in my use of it by considerations of space, and by the belief that much illustrative matter tends more often to confuse thought than to clarify it.

The first eight chapters of this volume deal with a period which, as productive of great results and filled with complex international and diplomatic situations, is far less simple and easy to interpret than was the period from 1815 to 1850. We are called upon to analyse personal motives, to follow intricate negotiations, to trace causes and tendencies that are often far-lying and obscure. In studying the rise of Napoleon III., the abasement of Austria, the independence of Italy, the unity of Germany, and the entire alteration of the European political system, we are confronted on one hand with the danger of exaggerating the importance of the persons concerned, giving undue prominence to single events or incidents, and taking results for granted without searching for their causes; on the other, with the equally great danger of minimising the personal equation, laying too much stress on underlying and hidden forces, and looking on the great men of the era as dominated by influences beyond their control. Though in choosing between these two extremes I have deemed it more true to a just interpretation of my subject to give the position of greatest prominence to the personal influence of Cavour and Bismarck, nevertheless no careful student of the period can fail to perceive that the events of 1859, 1866, and 1870 were but the logical outcome of those
of the earlier period or will deny that either of these statesmen notwithstanding the genius and masterful diplomacy by which he was able to hasten and give shape to the movement, would have been powerless to accomplish his object had not the forces making for independence and unity been preparing for half a century. It is taking a superficial view of the history of the nineteenth century to say that the revolutions of 1830 and 1848 and the war of 1870 were merely accidental occurrences, or that the establishment of the kingdom of Italy, the German Empire, and the Third Republic would have been rendered impossible had other men directed the course of affairs.

In accordance with my original plan I have omitted from the second volume, as from the first, all footnotes and bibliographical references, and even a general bibliography of the works which have been used. As there are very few books in English upon the period in question, such a bibliography would be of comparatively little value to the general reader, while the student can readily turn for admirable lists to Dahlmann-Waitz, Quellenhunde der deutschen Geschichte (6th edition), Debidour, Histoire diplomatique de l’Europe, Seignobos, Histoire politique de l’Europe contemporaine, and for more detailed accounts of recent works to the Deutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft. In addition to special monographs and many articles of permanent value in journals and reviews I have used the following works: for the Crimean war, the writings of Roussel, Geffcken, de la Gorce, Martin, Delord, Chiala, and Todleben; for France and Napoleon III., de la Gorce, Delord, Gregoire, Thirria, the works of Napoleon III., the memoirs of de Falloux, de Maupas, Odilon Barrot, Tocqueville, and Persigny, the special writings of d’Harcourt, Darimon, and Ollivier, and the conversations of Senior; for Italy, the letters of Cavour and the prefaces of Chiala, the histories of de la Gorce and Reuchlin, the special writings of Chiala and Bianchi, the lives of Cavour by Mazade and Massari, of Victor Em-
Turpiter Desperatur

XX LIBRIS

Prescott Farnsworth Hall.

An Dom 1901

HARVARD COLLEGE LIBRARY
The Historical Development of Modern Europe. From the Congress of Vienna to the Present Time.

By Charles M. Andrews, Associate Professor of History in Bryn Mawr College.

Two vols. Sold separately. With maps. 8°, gilt tops, each . . . . . . . . . . . $2.50

Part I.—From 1815 to 1850. Part II.—From 1850 to 1897.

SUMMARY OF CONTENTS.

The first volume opens with two introductory chapters upon the Old Régime, the French Revolution, and Napoleon Bonaparte. Then follow chapters upon these subjects: Reconstruction and the European System; the Restoration in France; the July Monarchy; the struggle against absolutism in Italy; the liberal movement in Germany; the history of France from 1840 to 1848; and the general uprising in France, Germany, Austria, and Italy during the years 1848 and 1849. The volume carries the subject to 1848 in France, to 1849 in Italy, and to 1850 in Germany.

The second volume employs the method adopted in the first of dealing with the separate movements and subjects as logical wholes, and after a brief statement of the condition of Europe in 1850 passes on to a consideration of the following topics: the rise of the Second Empire; European diplomacy and the Crimean war; the constitutional development of Piedmont and the final attainment of Italian independence and unity; the growth of Prussia, the struggle with Austria for the leadership in Germany, and the final attainment of German unity; the establishment of the dual monarchy, Austria-Hungary; and the progress of the Eastern Question from 1856 to the present time. The last five chapters deal with the history of the leading continental Powers, beginning in the case of Russia with 1856, of Italy with 1861, of Austria-Hungary with 1867, of France and Germany with 1871, and are designed to present in rapid survey the chief characteristics of the history of these countries to the close of the year 1897.

G. P. PUTNAM’S SONS, NEW YORK AND LONDON.
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
OF
MODERN EUROPE

FROM THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA TO
THE PRESENT TIME

BY

CHARLES M. ANDREWS
Associate Professor of History in Bryn Mawr College

★ ★

1850-1897

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS
NEW YORK
27 WEST TWENTY-THIRD STREET
LONDON
24 BEDFORD STREET, STRAND

The Knickerbocker Press
1899
PREFACE.

In this, the second and concluding volume on the history of modern Europe, I have resumed the narrative at the point where it was dropped at the close of the previous volume, and carried it forward to the year 1897. Employing throughout the plan and method originally adopted, I have dealt with only those countries that have been influential in shaping the history of continental Europe during the last seventy-five years, and have treated only those phases of their history that concern the historical development of Europe in the larger sense, rather than the historical development of each particular state or country. On the ground that no event can be understood in isolation, and that history is something more than a series of events chronologically considered, I have endeavoured to give logical form to my treatment of the subject, carrying each movement forward to its conclusion before turning to the others; and that due proportions might be preserved, have introduced nothing that did not seem to me absolutely necessary to an understanding of the subject, giving no more attention to any incident, however picturesque or dramatic, than its importance for my purpose warranted.

In my treatment of the various movements I have given little space to descriptions of military campaigns, not because I object to "drum-and-trumpet" history, but because I believe that the details of battles and the movements of troops belong, except in their consequences, to the student of military strategy; and I have omitted, except in a few important instances, all
discussions of a biographical nature, on the ground that a statesman's character can be best understood by his work. Though I have not hesitated to turn aside from the narrative in order to comment upon or to interpret events, I have been able to find no place for personal judgments, which, reflecting merely the sentiments of the writer and based too often on present-day standards, are out of accord with the spirit of modern historical presentation; and while I fully appreciate the value of apt illustration, I have been limited in my use of it by considerations of space, and by the belief that much illustrative matter tends more often to confuse thought than to clarify it.

The first eight chapters of this volume deal with a period which, as productive of great results and filled with complex international and diplomatic situations, is far less simple and easy to interpret than was the period from 1815 to 1850. We are called upon to analyse personal motives, to follow intricate negotiations, to trace causes and tendencies that are often far-lying and obscure. In studying the rise of Napoleon III., the abasement of Austria, the independence of Italy, the unity of Germany, and the entire alteration of the European political system, we are confronted on one hand with the danger of exaggerating the importance of the persons concerned, giving undue prominence to single events or incidents, and taking results for granted without searching for their causes; on the other, with the equally great danger of minimising the personal equation, laying too much stress on underlying and hidden forces, and looking on the great men of the era as dominated by influences beyond their control. Though in choosing between these two extremes I have deemed it more true to a just interpretation of my subject to give the position of greatest prominence to the personal influence of Cavour and Bismarck, nevertheless no careful student of the period can fail to perceive that the events of 1859, 1866, and 1870 were but the logical outcome of those
of the earlier period or will deny that either of these states-
men notwithstanding the genius and masterful diplomacy by
which he was able to hasten and give shape to the movement,
would have been powerless to accomplish his object had not
the forces making for independence and unity been preparing
for half a century. It is taking a superficial view of the
history of the nineteenth century to say that the revolutions
of 1830 and 1848 and the war of 1870 were merely accidental
occurrences, or that the establishment of the kingdom of Italy,
the German Empire, and the Third Republic would have been
rendered impossible had other men directed the course of affairs.

In accordance with my original plan I have omitted from the
second volume, as from the first, all footnotes and bibliographi-
cal references, and even a general bibliography of the works
which have been used. As there are very few books in Eng-
lish upon the period in question, such a bibliography would be
of comparatively little value to the general reader, while the
student can readily turn for admirable lists to Dahlmann-
Waiz, Quellenkunde der deutschen Geschichte (6th edition),
Debidour, Histoire diplomatique de l’Europe, Seignobos, His-
toire politique de l’Europe contemporaine, and for more detailed
accounts of recent works to the Deutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichts-
wissenschaft. In addition to special monographs and many
articles of permanent value in journals and reviews I have
used the following works: for the Crimean war, the writings
of Rousset, Geffcken, de la Gorce, Martin, Delord, Chiala,
and Todleben; for France and Napoleon III., de la Gorce,
Delord, Gregoire, Thirria, the works of Napoleon III., the
memoirs of de Falloux, de Maupas, Odilon Barrot, Tocqueville,
and Persigny, the special writings of d’Harcourt, Darimon, and
Ollivier, and the conversations of Senior; for Italy, the letters
of Cavour and the prefaces of Chiala, the histories of de la
Gorce and Reuchlin, the special writings of Chiala and Bianchi,
the lives of Cavour by Mazade and Massari, of Victor Em-
manuel by Godkin, the autobiography of Garibaldi, the memoirs and letters of Ricasoli, and Persano, and the conversations of Senior; for Prussia and Germany, the histories of Sybel, Maurenbrecher, and Oncken, the special works of Thouvenel, Bendetti, Rothan, Lebrun, the memoirs of Beust and of King Charles of Roumania, and the life of Bismarck by Hahn; for Austria, the works of Krones, Leger, and Rogge, the memoirs of Metternich, and the life of Deák by Forster; for Russia the works of Schnitzler, Rambaud, Crehanne, Makenzie Wallace, and Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu; and for England's foreign policy the lives of the Prince Consort by Martin, Stratford Canning by Lane-Poole, Palmerston by Ashley, and the Recollections of Lord John Russell. For the period since 1870 I have depended largely upon the year books and annuals: Schulthess, Geschichtskalender, Daniel, L'Année politique, Kippermann-Müller, Geschichte des Gegenwart. In addition I have used the following: Coubertin, The Evolution of France under the Third Republic; Blum, Das deutsche Reich zur Zeit Bismarcks; Simon, L'Empereur Guillaume; Holland, The European Concert and the Eastern Question; Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, The Empire of the Tsars. In general I wish to express my indebtedness to Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty, Debido, Histoire diplomatique, Seignobos, Histoire politique, and Lowell, Parties and Governments of Continental Europe. Satisfactory maps may be found in Hertslet and in Schrader, Atlas de Géographie historique (Nos. 37, 45, 47, 48, 51), while an excellent modern atlas is Andrée's Hand-Atlas.

In the preparation of this volume, as of the first, I have been assisted at every point by my wife, who has not only lightened my labour, but has criticised freely, and everywhere to advantage, the style and form of presentation.

CHARLES M. ANDREWS.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE,
June 14, 1898.
# CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I.—THE RISE OF THE SECOND EMPIRE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.—EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.—THE UNITY OF ITALY</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV.—FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON III</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.—THE RISE OF PRUSSIA</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI.—THE UNITY OF GERMANY</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII.—THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DUAL MONARCHY</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII.—THE EASTERN QUESTION</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX.—THE THIRD REPUBLIC</td>
<td>343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X.—THE GERMAN EMPIRE</td>
<td>368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XI.—THE KINGDOM OF ITALY</td>
<td>391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XII.—THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EMPIRE</td>
<td>415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIII.—THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE</td>
<td>436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDEX</td>
<td>455</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN EUROPE.

CHAPTER I.

THE RISE OF THE SECOND EMPIRE.

With the year 1850, we reach the close of an important period in the history of that political and material revolution which was to transform the Europe of 1814 into the Europe of to-day. This period had not been one of great accomplishments, nor one in which definite and far-reaching results had been attained: it had been a period of experiment in government as well as in the sciences, one in which preparations were being made, ideas tested, programmes shaped, and materials gathered for the greater movement to come. To all outward seeming, it had been a period of failure; for, although some tangible results had been obtained in Greece, Belgium, France, Prussia, Piedmont, and some of the minor principalities, and hopeful progress had been made in letters, art, education, and mechanical invention, nevertheless, on the whole, whether the point of view be that of governments or industries, the changes were slight in comparison with the transformations which were to be effected in the era that was to follow.

In material things, the discoveries and inventions that were to affect so deeply the economic and social life of the world in
the latter half of the nineteenth century had scarcely begun to exercise their influence. Machinery, it is true, was already lowering the cost of production and increasing the manufacturing output; better roads—telford and macadam—were facilitating communication, and enlarging the area of competition; and scientific processes, though still wasteful and crude, were giving commercial value to an increasing number of the products of the earth, both vegetable and mineral: nevertheless, the great inventions—those which have affected the practices of governments and the composition of society—had as yet hardly passed beyond the experimental stage; while thousands of improvements in smaller things, which were to touch most closely the comfort and convenience of every individual, were still unknown or untried. Steam, though used in machinery for many years, had been applied to locomotion for less than a decade, and had not yet penetrated deeply into the life of nations, revolutionising, as it was destined to do, the relations of city and country, by quickening travel, and turning the current of movement towards the crowded centres, where was to lie the strength of the democracy. Telegraphy, hardly yet more than an experiment, was to remain for many years a mode of communication available chiefly for governments and the richer classes, and for the mass of the people only on important occasions; the submarine cable and the other electrical contrivances had not yet made their appearance. The press, which for forty years had been a factor in disseminating ideas and provoking popular discontent, and had, in consequence, been kept to a greater or less degree under the surveillance of the police authorities, had hardly yet entered upon its great career as an educational agent; for journals were small in size, subscribers few in number, and news was old when printed and older when read: but improved machinery, telegraphic communication, and rapid postal service due to the extension of the railroad system were to revolutionise its influence.
In affairs of war, as in those of peace, system, discipline, and equipment were still those of the earlier period. Armies scientifically organised were unknown; those of 1854 and 1859 were small, badly provided with arms, ammunition, guns, carriages, and the like, sadly wanting in provision for the sick and wounded, and commanded by officers ignorant of topography and tactics. Rapid mobilisation was impossible before the days of railways and the telegraph; recruiting was for lifelong service; the needle-gun had but just been introduced into the Prussian army; the breech-loading rifle was not known to the English soldiers until 1855; the Armstrong cannon was not invented until 1854; and, of all the heavy explosives, only nitroglycerine had come into use. Increase of wealth and concentration of capital, so prominent a factor in modern economic life, and itself a consequence, as well as a cause, of industrial progress, had not taken place to any appreciable degree; vast undertakings were unusual; production, though steadily increasing, was still on a small scale; and so slight was the increase in consumption, that the articles and commodities which are deemed necessary to the life of to-day were still, in 1850, luxuries to nine tenths of the population. It is significant, that the first great exhibitions of the century were in 1851 and 1855; that the first international treaty of commerce was in 1853, and that the practice of resorting to public credit as a source of revenue by the states of Europe did not become general until after the revolution of 1848.

From this brief résumé it is evident, that the material progress which, in the ensuing forty years, was to alter the conditions of industry by substituting a world market for a local market; to alter the organisation of society by individualising the mass of the people, raising the standard of life, and substituting a new relation of labour to capital for the old relation of labour to land; to alter the practices of governments, by bringing them into closer touch with their administrative and
diplomatic agents, by giving to their policies and acts greater publicity, and by increasing their resources and extending the scope of their undertakings,—had not advanced sufficiently far to break up the political and social habits of the old régime, and to make possible its overthrow in 1848. The reaction that followed this revolution testified to the last attempt of the old ideas and methods to retain their supremacy, and to neutralise, as far as possible, notably in central Europe, the progress in political things that had been made up to this time. To this reaction we must turn our attention for a brief space.

After the restoration of the Federal Diet and the re-establishment of the Germanic Confederation, Schwarzenberg, the chancellor of the Austrian Empire, resolved to efface the last traces of the revolution, first in the Austrian provinces, afterwards in Germany and Italy. Inasmuch as at Vienna, Pesth, Venice, and Milan, the imperial authority, which had been so seriously threatened by the revolutionists, had been restored by means of the army, he felt that the time had come to reverse the situation of March, 1848, and to withdraw from the Austrian provinces all parliamentary privileges. He first attacked the imperial constitution of March 4, 1849, which, though it had destroyed the independence of Hungary, and was, as far as it related to self-government in the other provinces, a mere dead letter, denied by its very existence that absolute authority of the Emperor which he was determined to restore. Therefore, by an imperial patent signed by Francis Joseph on August 20, 1851, and supplemented by additional letters of the December following, the constitution was declared suspended, the ministers were made responsible to the Crown alone, and the imperial Parliament became a council of the Throne and not of the Empire. And Metternich, who was at this time returning to Vienna after three years of exile, encouraged by word and precept the reactionary policy.

But not content with this revival of complete autocracy in
Austria, Schwarzenberg turned his attention to the restoration of the imperial influence in Germany; and on August 23, 1851, effected the passage of a measure in the Federal Diet abolishing the fundamental rights of the German people as drawn up by the National Assembly in 1848, and adopted by many of the German states after that time. Having accomplished so much, with indefatigable activity he hunted down constitutional government wherever it still lingered. Saxony, Mecklenburg, Württemberg, and Hanover were compelled to remodel their fundamental law in the interest of the feudal classes; the constitutions of most of the lesser states were manipulated by a committee of the Diet, and, in the eyes of the reactionary leaders, rendered harmless; while Hesse, whose rebellion in 1850 against the arbitrary policy of Hassenpflug had brought to a head the crisis that had ended at Olmütz, was subjected to severe military punishment by the quartering of troops upon her soil, and in 1852 was forced to receive a new constitution modelled after the wishes of Hassenpflug. In all this Prussia co-operated, and Frederic William, though desirous of avoiding even the appearance of illegal and arbitrary interference, declared that his great wish was to cleanse the German constitutions, his own among the number, of the foulness which had come upon them in 1848,—that year of shame for Germany.

In Italy, the policy of Schwarzenberg was even more successful. The constitutional privileges of the Neapolitans were entirely suspended, and a capricious despotism, more galling, perhaps, to the pride of the intelligent classes than to the people at large, characterised the Bourbon rule. In Bologna and Ferrara, in the duchies of Parma and Modena, even in Tuscany, appeared the white coats of the imperial soldiers, guardians of reaction and protectors of the restored sovereigns. In Lombardy and Venetia, after strengthening the fortresses of the Quadrilateral, Austria once more established her authority,
and, in her effort to bind the provinces more firmly to the Empire, proposed in 1851 to bring them into the Germanic Confederation. In Rome, the reaction, though less rapid and less violent, was none the less complete. Gradually had all traces of the recent conflict disappeared, and under a government of cardinals aided by the inquisition, the police, and, above all, by the French soldiery which guarded the peace, the city had become once more a resort for travellers and artists. After the return of Pius IX., in 1850, a few reforms in administration and finance were undertaken, but in no instance was the Pope willing to abate one jot of his absolute sovereignty in the interest of the better government of his subjects. M. Behr could say to Senior with considerable justice: "Never was Austria so nearly the mistress of Italy; never were the Italian sovereigns, with the single exception of Piedmont, so irresistibly despotic, or so resolved to destroy all freedom of action, of writing, of speech, and even of thought," as during the period of reaction that followed Austria's restoration to a position of supremacy in central Europe.

Nor was France, the land of so many popular uprisings in behalf of constitutional government, to escape the reaction; for in 1851 there was erected on the ruins of the second republic an imperial government little more in sympathy with the political ideas of the nineteenth century than was that which Schwarzenberg was establishing in Austria. It seems remarkable, indeed, that after thirty years of political liberty and parliamentary rule, France should witness the rise of an empire and the imposition of a constitution that were, from the political standpoint, absolutely at variance with the events of her history since the downfall of Napoleon I. And yet this event was intimately connected with those that had gone before. That the republic was the creation of a Parisian crowd, and of a provisional government that assumed to itself unwarranted and extra-legal functions; that it in no way represented the will of the majority
of the nation, or stood for political rights denied or wide-spread popular grievances unredressed;—these facts made it inevitable that its career should be one of social disturbance and political confusion. And, furthermore, the fact that it had been founded upon principles of government more democratic than France was at the time ready for, and had represented the victory of the revolutionary, rather than of the moderate, party, made it equally inevitable that its sequel should be a monarchical reaction. Made a regular and legal government by the adoption of the constitution of 1848, it seemed to have secured for itself a permanent existence; whereas, in fact, it had hastened thereby its transformation. The constitution, impracticable and unsound, was the immediate cause of a conflict which, in any case, would have resulted in the overthrow of the republic; but the character and results of the conflict were shaped by the personality and convictions of the man who became the first president of the republic,—Louis Napoleon Bonaparte.

When the revolution of 1848 broke out in France, Louis Napoleon, third son of Louis, King of Holland, was forty years old. On the downfall of the imperial régime, the prince, then a child of eight years, had retired with his mother, first to Bavaria, then to Switzerland, and finally to Rome. But his participation as a Carbonaro in the uprising of the Romagna in 1831 had led to his expulsion from Italy. The young Napoleon was of a taciturn and meditative nature, at once a dreamer and an intelligent observer; and from 1832, when the death of the Duke of Reichstadt made him the hereditary representative of the imperial dynasty, he never wavered in his belief that he who had been born in the Tuileries, should one day, through one of those changes so common to France, return there as its head, and so fulfil the destiny that lay before him. In 1836, suddenly transformed from a dreamer into an active conspirator, and aided by an obscure army officer, Fialin, afterward the Duke of Persigny, he appeared before the French soldiers at
Strassburg with hopes of arousing them against the July Monarchy by means of the magic name of Napoleon. This attempt to raise the imperial eagle on the soil of France, resulted in the transportation of the prince to America; but in the course of a year he returned, and in 1840, undaunted by his previous failure, attempted the same thing at Boulogne. For this, he was sentenced to imprisonment for life in the fortress of Ham. But the six years of confinement were, on the whole, advantageous to him; for the works that he produced during his imprisonment kept his name before the public, and attracted to him correspondence and visitors, some of whom were leaders of the radical party whom he had won over by the socialistic doctrines and democratic opinions that he subtly mingled in his essays along with eulogies on the First Empire and patriotic appeals to the military spirit of France. Then, too, many things in France were working in his favour. The peaceful policy of the July Monarchy was rousing restlessness and dissatisfaction among the younger generation; the panegyrical history of Thiers and the stirring lyrics of Béranger were stimulating enthusiasm for Napoleon, the Emperor, and pity for his nephew, the exile; the injudicious act of bringing to Paris the Emperor's ashes from St. Helena in 1840, not only vitalised the Napoleonic legend, but also brought into prominence the misfortunes of the heir of the Emperor "groaning in confinement." When, therefore, in 1846, Louis Napoleon escaped from Ham to England, and retired into an obscurity greater than that which had surrounded him in his early days of exile, he left behind him a body of followers eager to defend a cause already partly won.

1 Idées Napoléoniennes, 1839; Question des Sucre, 1842; L'Extinction du Pauperisme, 1844. Some seventeen articles in Progrès du Pas-de-Calais, 1842-43, and three or four in other journals; L'Idée Napoléoniennne, a monthly publication of which but one number appeared, in 1840, with the motto, "Not only the ashes but also the ideas of the Emperor must be brought back."
THE RISE OF THE SECOND EMPIRE.

After a two years' sojourn in Leicester Square, the prince, in February, 1848, returned to France to offer his services to the provisional government. But unsuccessful in his suit, he returned in discouragement to London, where, at the time of the Chartists' movement in April, he aided the cause of law and order as special constable in Trafalgar Square. But by June things looked brighter; for the executive commission of the National Assembly, believing the fear of Louis Napoleon to be baseless, recommended the withdrawal of the decree of exile. To this the Assembly agreed on June 2d, and five days afterward, the supplemental elections of June 7th, which showed that Louis Napoleon had been returned from four departments, bore witness to the power of a name and to the activity of the imperialist party. The Assembly then took a second momentous step, and through a union of conservatives, republicans, and the personal enemies of the executive commission, voted to admit the pretender to the chamber, on the ground that the revolution had abrogated the decree of exile. But on June 14th, Louis Napoleon, with characteristic adroitness, resigned from the Assembly, and withdrew to London, that he might lull any fears of his ambition. This policy of advancing and then retreating, advancing anew with surer step, declaring his rights and identifying them with those of the people, disturbing his enemies and then reassuring them, but never losing ground, proved on this occasion, as afterward, eminently successful. During the summer of 1848 his cause became astonishingly strong. On September 17th he was again returned to the Assembly, not by four, but by five departments; and it was evident that the Napoleonic legend had become a factor, and Louis Napoleon a personage, to be reckoned with. To no purpose did Llerbette, Grévy, and Faucher, in the famous debate in the National Assembly, point out the dangers of electing a president by universal suffrage; and the Assembly made a vital error when, with Louis Napoleon as a candidate for the
office, it threw into the hands of the people the election of the president.

Many forces were working in favour of the Bonapartist candidate. Earnest, zealous friends, who had everything to gain and nothing to lose, were conducting the canvass with eagerness and skill. They travelled through the country distributing medals, portraits, and newspapers; promising the peasants reduction of taxes, and the veterans abatement of rents. Louis Napoleon, with much wisdom, shunned publicity and newspaper controversies, and breaking with all his socialistic affiliations, made a great effort to conciliate the religious and monarchical parties. He won over Montalembert by his support of the cause of religious and intellectual liberty; he drew to his side Thiers, Molé, and other parliamentary leaders by seeming to be a man easily influenced, an instrument in their hands for bringing back the monarchy; he gained the support of influential journals by his good nature, which pleased those with whom he came in contact, and by his taciturnity, which saved him from incriminating statements; while he reassured all by his apparent intellectual mediocrity, which made him less to be feared than was Cavaignac, his rival, who was committed to the cause of the republic.

Finally, on November 29th, just before the elections, Louis Napoleon issued his electoral manifesto, in which he promised to support the republic and to leave to his successor "the executive power strengthened, liberty intact, and a real progress made." He also made a special appeal to each class in the state. He promised the conservatives to protect religion, family, and property, and the friends of decentralisation, to restrict within just limits the number of employments dependent upon the government; to the friends of social reform, he promised reduction of taxes, the encouragement of agriculture, and the establishment of institutions for labourers in their old age; to the peasants, relief from conscription; to the press, liberty
without censorship; to the army, devotion to its interests and pensions to the veterans; while to all he promised peace, which he called the dearest desire of his heart. In a special letter to the papal nuncio he proclaimed himself the defender of the church. But it was not this proclamation that proved his greatest strength, nor yet the aid of parliamentary leaders or influential journals. To the peasantry and the poorer classes of the cities, who, since the proclamation of universal suffrage, had become the real bearers of political power in France, the name of Napoleon was a guarantee of order and prosperity, which the republic seemed unable to preserve, and a guarantee of equality, which the monarchy had put in peril. The writings of those who, like Thiers, were perpetuating the glories of the Empire, gave historical confirmation to the popular estimate of Napoleon; the act of the July Monarchy in returning the first Emperor's ashes to France; the portraits of the imperial heroes in the cottages of the peasantry; the tales of veterans lingering in the minds of the younger generation;—all sprang as if by magic to the support of the heir to the imperial name and destiny. Lamartine, the idol of the Parisians ten months before, and Cavaignac, the dictator of the June days, were both defeated by a name and a legend. On December 10th, Louis Napoleon, who less than a year before had been an obscure adventurer in England, was chosen president of the French republic by a majority of nearly two million votes. On December 20th, he took the oath to the constitution, and on this occasion said: "My duty is clear; I will fulfil it as a man of honour. I will consider as enemies of my country all those who endeavour to change by illegal means that which France has established. Between you and me, citizen representatives, there can be no true discord; our wishes and desires are the same."

The first stage in the history of the Empire was passed; and Louis Napoleon, still retaining his faith in his destiny, had in
a clear, and apparently sincere, speech identified himself with those whose oath bound them to support the republican government of 1848. Nevertheless, hardly was he in office, when the defects in the constitution began to appear, when there followed the inevitable conflict between the president and the Assembly, predicted in the debate already referred to. Such contention was bound to ensue between two such rival and co-equal bodies, when both were elected by the same constituency, and vested with powers that were incompletely defined by the constitution, when neither could in any way check the other, inasmuch as the president could not dissolve the Assembly, nor the Assembly depose the president or suspend the exercise of his functions. If the two powers could not live in harmony, it was inevitable that they should struggle until one or the other was destroyed: and harmony was impossible, for the Assembly jealously guarded its unlimited authority, while Louis Napoleon, with equal persistence, exercised to the full his presidential prerogative. In consequence, the history of the conflict is one of suspicious, annoying, and often injudicious, resistance on the side of the Assembly, and of steady encroachment on the part of the president. Notwithstanding the president's selection of his ministers from all parties, the condition of things was considerably aggravated at the outset by the Assembly's refusing to dissolve after the drafting of the constitution, though it was in duty bound to do so, and by showing itself, during December and January, exceedingly suspicious, irritable, and sensitive, and intent upon embarrassing the executive government.

But the president was to score the first victory. During the early days of January, 1849, it had been rumoured that the socialists were preparing for some kind of demonstration. This party, beaten to its knees in the civil war of June, 1848, had reorganised for the purpose of taking part in the electoral contest of December; but then, too, it had suffered defeat. It continued,
however, to exist, with the declared purpose of dissolving the Assembly, overthrowing the constitution, imprisoning the Bonaparte family, and establishing a committee of public safety. Inasmuch as there was reason to fear an uprising of some sort on account of the excitement prevailing in Paris and in certain of the departments, the government first ordered, on January 10th, the dissolution of the chief society, *Solidarité Républicaine*, and on the 26th, proposed to the Assembly two laws, one suppressing the clubs, the other dissolving the *garde mobile*, and asked that the matter be hastened, in that it was urgent. The Assembly, fearful, as usual, of a *coup de main*, declared that there was no cause for anxiety, and on January 27th refused to consider the proposition. Therefore, when the socialists, encouraged by this blow at the president, began a somewhat noisy agitation both in the Assembly and in the press, and gathered in crowds in the streets, the government took definite action. Numerous arrests were made, and, on the 29th, troops under General Changarnier were stationed at important points throughout the city. Peace and order were restored, though it does not seem probable that they had been at any time seriously threatened, either by the socialists, as the president chose to think, or by the ambitious president himself, as the Assembly was quite ready to believe. Two important advantages resulted from this incident. On February 14th, the Assembly agreed to dissolve the May following, and a few weeks afterward, when the law for the suppression of the clubs came up for debate, agreed to that measure, the urgency of which it had denied so short a time before. The president had won a double victory: he had conquered the Assembly on one hand, and the radicals on the other.

Interest now centred in the election of deputies to the new Assembly, which was to be held—and for the first time under the new constitution—on the 13th of May. At this time, two tendencies were noticeable in the country, one conservative,
characterised by a growing inclination to undo the work of the February revolution and to discredit the republic; the other radical, expressed by what may be called socialism in politics, though as Jules Favre said, socialism at this time had become "but an immense, loose-jointed hyperbole, employed by some as a cloak for their weaknesses and their obsolete philosophies, and by others, as a pretext for their conspiracies against the republic." While the conservatives organised themselves as a party of order under Léon Faucher, Changarnier, and Bugeaud, the radicals scattered pamphlets and newspapers broadcast among the soldiers in the barracks, the workmen in the factories, and the labourers in their cottages; roused the proletariat against the small proprietor, and the small proprietor against the large; and, working among the more ignorant populace of the east and south, scattered doctrines and rumours true and false, but always hostile to the republic and the conservatives. Between the two parties stood the government, impartial but not indifferent, with its president unwilling to take any personal action that might incriminate him in the future, avoiding all collusion with the party of order, and even disavowing certain of his friends who were becoming too outspoken in behalf of the Bonapartist cause.

And the country, which was kept in a constant state of turbulence by the uncertain condition of its politics, was further distressed by the spread of cholera, the repulse of General Oudinot from before Rome, the heated debates in the old Assembly upon the Roman question, and the duels resulting from these debates and from unsuccessful attempts to impeach the ministry for sending the expedition to Rome. Nor was it to experience relief until the results of the May election should make clear what was to be the character of the new Assembly. Remarkable, indeed, was the verdict of the people of France at this time. The party of order returned almost five hundred members, of whom two hundred were Legitimists; the radicals gained one
hundred and eighty seats; while the moderate republicans, who alone desired the perpetuation of the second republic, gained but seventy representatives; in other words, Lamartine, Marrast, Marie, Garnier-Pagès, Flocon, and Dupont de l’Eure, the very men who had made up the provisional government of February, 1848, were overwhelmingly defeated at the polls. On the other hand, Ledru-Rollin, the man who had led the radical wing of the provisional government, who had led the forces of anarchy and disorder during the first four months of the republic, who at this time stood as the chief of those advocating a socialistic republic, was returned from five departments. That within less than fifteen months after the revolution of February, the French nation should repudiate the men who had proclaimed the republic, and that socialism should have been able to elect twice the number of representatives that the friends of the republic could muster, were facts of momentous significance, facts destined to play an important part in the history of the events leading to the coup d’état.

After the retirement of the old Assembly in a storm of noisy and undignified debate, and the meeting of the new body on May 28th, the government showed its determination of pursuing to the bitter end the attack on the Roman Republic, by ordering General Oudinot to advance. When, however, after a victory gained on June 3d outside the walls of Rome, General Oudinot prepared to lay siege to the city, the Roman republicans, in despair of the situation, appealed to their comrades in Paris, hoping that an uprising against the French government might lead to a withdrawal of the French troops from Italy, or, at least, to a temporary cessation of military operations. And the radicals of Paris were only too ready to respond. On the ground that the constitution had been violated, and that Louis Napoleon and his ministers had become traitors to the nation and assassins of the Roman Republic, and for the purpose of purging the Assembly and of transforming the Mountain into a
national convention, they rose on the 13th of June against the state. But though the insurgents marched in bodies through the streets, built barricades, and made appealing speeches to the citizens, the government was but little disturbed: and it was not until the movement became menacing, until Ledru-Rollin and a number of deputies of the Mountain seized the Conservatory of Arts and Industries and established a new convention, that it called into action its troops. During the afternoon the national guard made an assault on the radical stronghold, overthrew the mock convention, and dispersed the rioters, securing thereby a complete triumph for the government and for the cause of public order. And the government was likewise victorious even in the provinces, at Strassburg, Toulouse, Allier, and Lyons, where, for the moment, the uprising looked more serious. This radical insurrection only led to the inevitable reaction that has always accompanied attempts of a like character. Paris was put in a state of siege, and laws were passed suppressing radical clubs and newspapers, increasing the military force, and authorising an inquiry into the conduct of the deputies of the Mountain who had taken part in the movement. Most important of all was the general law limiting the power of the press, which was at once scored by the enemies of the government as Jesuitical, and gave rise to a long and acrimonious debate. In the form in which it was passed on July 27th, it was a comprehensive measure forbidding deputies to become journalists, visiting with severe penalties all persons who should encourage desertion from the army or attempt to provoke a civil war, allowing the distribution of pamphlets only under strict prefectural supervision, and making attacks on the president of the republic a punishable crime. With this accomplished, the Assembly on August 11th adjourned until the 30th of September.

While the Assembly was endangering its popularity by such a wholesale attack upon the freedom of the press, Louis Napo-
leon was reaping the real advantages of June 13th. Ever ready to keep himself in the eye of the public by opening railway lines and expositions, visiting hospitals, reviewing troops, and distributing flags, he now undertook a number of journeys through the provinces to show himself as the saviour of France, the destroyer of anarchy. By conducting his campaign with tact, and by making it clear in his speeches, especially in those delivered at Tours and Ham, that he had no higher ambition than to act as the representative of the nation, always ready to bear any burdens that it might impose upon him, he both reassured the people and allayed the uneasiness of the deputies, who, even at this time, were fearful of some unlawful act on the part of the prince president. This intensifying of his personal importance, this posing before the French people as their sole guarantor of law and order, was accompanied with a change of attitude toward his ministry, which showed very clearly his determination to rule independently of his cabinet, and to disregard, as far as he dared, the restrictions that the constitution placed upon him. Certain disagreements in matters of appointment foreshadowed a conflict with the cabinet, but the most important indication of the presidential policy was a letter, written August 19th, to Colonel Edgar Ney of the French army, which had occupied Rome after the fall of the Roman Republic on June 30th. This letter was in reality an important diplomatic document, an ultimatum to the Pope, outlining the policy that he ought to adopt now that the Roman territory was once more under papal control. Such a communication should have been sent to the accredited minister, as was the practice in all parliamentary countries, not in a personal letter to a subordinate in the French army; and should have contained advice couched in terms of diplomatic courtesy, not recommendations which amounted to commands, as to how another sovereign should conduct his government. It is hardly necessary to say that the letter was received with surprise by diplomats and ministers.
in other countries. It seriously embarrassed the French diplomats at Rome, it disturbed greatly the religious elements in France, it led to the withdrawal of de Falloux from the cabinet, and increased the discontent and threats of the majority in the Assembly. Nevertheless, by its apparent independence of tone, by its references to a liberal government, and by its praise of the French soldiery, it was cleverly designed to win the favour of the people at large, who were not quick to appreciate the niceties of diplomatic usages.

But the estrangement between the president and his cabinet became more pronounced when, after the Assembly resumed its sitting in September, there came up for discussion a question well calculated to arouse all the animosities of the deputies against the government,—that of paying the expenses of the Roman expedition. The defence made by his ministers before the Assembly so angered the president, who thought that they were apologising for him and protecting him rather than upholding him, were retaining the real power and leaving him only the outward show, that he determined to break from their tutelage at the earliest possible moment. Before the close of October, so strained had become the relations between the president and his cabinet that many of the latter had given up the direction of affairs, awaiting the inevitable blow. On the 31st it came. Although the ministers still commanded a large majority in the Assembly, Louis Napoleon demanded their resignations; and in a declaration to the Assembly, gave his reasons for this unpatriotic act. "We need," he said, "stronger men, who are willing to recognise the necessity of a single and firm policy, who do not compromise power by irresolution—men of action rather than of words. France, restless because she sees no guidance, seeks the hand, the will of the chosen of the 10th of December." Furthermore, he outlined the presidential policy, stating that the programme which should be made to triumph was the name Napoleon, an entire programme in itself, one
guaranteeing order, authority, religion, the happiness of the people, and the dignity of the nation.

Thus, by the close of the year 1849, can be clearly seen the conditions that were to make possible the coup d'état: the strength and ceaseless activity of the radical republicans, which roused the alarm of those desiring the peace and prosperity of the state; the party divisions in the Assembly, which weakened the loyalty of the nation toward its representatives; the jealousy of the Assembly for the president, which involved it in unfortunate mistakes, and hastened the inevitable conflict that the president was in no wise inclined to avoid; and, finally, the policy of the president himself, who, intent upon substituting a personal for a parliamentary government, was ever preparing new surprises for the country, at one time cutting loose from diplomatic usage, as in his letter to Colonel Ney; at another, breaking all parliamentary tradition, as in his dismissal of the cabinet; at all times curry favour with the people by well-chosen phrases, by vague references to his liberal intentions and his regard for the national interests, and, at the same time, promoting the Napoleonic cause by his attitude toward the army, and by his subordination of his ministers to the position of agents rather than councillors. After October 31st, were formed two distinct parties, one of the Élysée, the other of the Assembly. The first was made up of men like Bassano, Walewski, Murat, Morny, Rouher, and chief of all Persigny, who, though they were without fixed opinions, were ambitious, and devoted to the cause of Bonaparte and the Empire. The plan of this party was to make the Assembly unpopular by forcing it to stand for the old doctrines of government, to burden the deputies with the responsibility for all unpopular and repressive measures, and to give the president the benefit of all liberal proposals. The second party, that of the Assembly, composed largely of monarchists, ultramontanes, and deputies who were ready to accept either a republic or a monarchy, was
huge in size, heterogeneous in character, and wanting in unity of purpose, some of its members favouring the president, others at the same time scorning and dreading him.

During the winter of 1849-50, the presidential party gained chiefly at the expense of its rival. A long discussion regarding liberty of education, called forth by the introduction of a measure to supplement the famous law of 1833, resulted in the passage of a law, March 15, 1850, which broke down the university monopoly and extended liberty of education to secondary schools. The effects of this debate were curious and suggestive. The law, perhaps more far-reaching than any other of the period, originated with the party of the Assembly, and was supported by Louis Napoleon and his ministry only because the former desired to remove, if possible, the bad impression his letter to Edgar Ney had made upon the religious element in France. But the consequences were immediately advantageous to the president. The law, a compromise, a treaty of peace arranged after mutual concessions between the temporal and spiritual authorities, became associated with the name and government of Louis Napoleon; while the men who had really borne the burden of the labour, who had been most influential in effecting the adoption of so beneficial a measure, the parliamentary leaders, Molé, Thiers, Montalembert, and others, shared the fate of all promoters of a compromise. Bitterly opposed by the radicals, and but half appreciated by the Roman Catholics, who believed the measure to be incomplete, they were loudly condemned by their own party, who resented that such concessions should be made, as they said, to priests and Jesuits. From this time, the influence of these men decreased; their triumph of March 15th was, in reality, the beginning of their downfall. As Montalembert well said, he offered as his last homage to the church his unpopularity in the state.

While the president was thus profiting from even the suc-
cesses of his opponents, he was actively advancing his own cause by more direct means. He appointed devoted friends to important diplomatic posts; constantly referred in his speeches to the stability of the Consulate and the Empire, and to the passing away of dynasties and charters; and flattered the army by medals and pensions to the veterans, and extra pay to the under-officers, the working classes by promises of credits and superannuation funds, and the people in general by frequent references to their interests and to the glory of France. In this "policy of action" the government was aided by the socialists themselves. Already had the ministry adopted as an important part of its programme an uncompromising hostility to all socialistic or anarchic disorder, partly to efface all traces of the revolution of 1848, partly to gain, under pretense of warding off social perils, a better control of the army and the police. The hostility of the radicals, which, up to this time, had exhibited itself in various interpellations in the Assembly, in agitations in the provinces, and in struggles with the police in the streets of Paris, made itself more strongly felt in the elections held March 10, 1850, to fill the places of the thirty representatives of the Mountain who had been condemned the October before for having participated in the uprising of June 13th. The results were almost stupefying to the party of order; for though the conservatives were victorious in the provinces, nevertheless, in Paris, Vidal, an old disciple of Louis Blanc, de Flotte, a partaker in the uprising of June, and Carnot, one of the most honourable of all the opponents of the educational bill, were successful. But the worst was yet to come. Vidal, who was chosen for the department of the Upper Rhine as well as for Paris, preferred to sit for the former, and a new election, which called forth great unfairness and most bitter personalities on both sides, resulted in a victory for the radicals. On April 28th, Eugène Sue, the romancer of the masses, was elected by a vote but little less than that cast for Vidal.
The first election had terrified the conservatives, the second drove them to desperation. In their madness they demanded all sorts of repressive measures: revision of the constitution, deportation of the most dangerous of the socialists, repression of the excesses of the tribune and the press. The vague desire for retaliation finally took form: the Assembly determined to scrutinise the law of universal suffrage in order to keep from the polls itinerant labourers, vagabonds, mendicants, and criminals, to whom, it was believed, were due the recent successes. That this momentous decision was actuated by a desire to minimise the influence of the president by disenfranchising his constituents, is evident from the fact that of the commission of sixty-seven deputies appointed to prepare the details of the proposed amendment, not one was a Bonapartist or a friend of the president's. The government supported the measure as a part of its policy of action, and on May 18th, the project was reported to the Assembly. A furie Francaise seemed to have seized upon the deputies, and in vain did Leon Faucher remind them that they were not passing a penal code. Rejecting all amendments, they extended the list of disqualifications, and on May 31, 1850, under the influence of great excitement, they passed the law by a majority of nearly two hundred. But when the law was put to the test, it was found, greatly to the consternation of the Assembly, to disenfranchise vagabond and poor alike, to remove from the voting list more than two million eight hundred thousand voters, among whom were many men of intelligence and honour and irreproachable morals. Thus discarding the most important doctrine laid down by the revolution of 1848, by repudiating universal suffrage, the Assembly had disenfranchised its own constituency, and had added to the number of its enemies, not only the republicans and socialists, but also thousands of the poorer classes already deeply indoctrinated with a reverence for the Napoleonic name. But it had done more: the law of May 31st gave to the president an in-
instrument of the greatest efficiency in the conflict that was about to come; it broke up the unity of the majority that had been up to this time the strength of the party of the Assembly, and it severed the last ties of loyalty to the institutions of the second republic.

The events of this summer and autumn of 1850 showed the deplorable condition into which the proclamation of the republic and the adoption of the constitution had brought the people of France. The republic was practically dead, and all the parties in the state were endeavouring to establish in its place their various political systems. The republicans were reorganising in Paris and the provinces in the interest of a radical government based on the constitution of 1793; the socialists were continuing their work among the peasant and artisan classes for the sake of spreading their ideas regarding a social republic; the monarchists, seeing the majority in the Assembly broken, and believing that the disenfranchising law had destroyed forever the popularity of the president, were pushing forward their dynastic representatives, Louis Philippe at Clairmont, and the Count of Chambord at Wiesbaden, and were proposing to unite, for the sake of strength, in a single party in support of a common pretender. But none of these attempts had as yet sufficient strength to become living issues with the people of France.

Of far greater moment were the policy and cause of Louis Napoleon. With adroitness and success he made a number of journeys through the provinces during the months of August and September for the purpose of showing himself to the country. Welcomed often as a sovereign by the people, called "prince" and "monseigneur" by those in official position, he was able to impress upon those who were gathered to greet him the fact that he was but a magistrate, with a short tenure of office, of a republic that had lost all place in the hearts of the people. After his return to the capitol, he was greeted at the reviews of the army at Saint-Maur on October 4th and at Sar-
tory on October 10th with the cries of "Vive Napoleon" and "Vive l'Empereur."

The deputies, returning November 11, 1850, entered upon their duties in the midst of an ominous calm. Some expected an immediate rupture, but the president, apparently satisfied with the progress that he had made, took no further action. "France wishes repose," he said in his opening message; and holding out to the deputies the olive-branch of peace, he denied in positive language that he had any thought of attacking the constitution. The press applauded the message, and the deputies, reassured by a tone so patriotic, cordial, and conciliatory, put aside all animosity, and entered heartily into the work of legislation. For the moment, president and Assembly discussed greatly needed reforms, and passed measures ameliorating social abuses, improving the civil law, and furthering the economic strength of the country. But the president's policy was only a means for making his own position more secure. On January 9th the storm broke. General Changarnier, commander of the national guard and general of the troops of the first division, was suddenly and unexpectedly dismissed from office, for the reason, which was undoubtedly founded largely on fact, that he was in his turn plotting to overthrow the president, and to establish a dictatorship as a preliminary step to the restoration of the monarchy. Just how far Changarnier had committed himself is difficult to determine, but after the Sartory incident, he had come out openly in defence of the Assembly. Louis Napoleon had endeavoured to win him to his side, but failing in his attempt to bribe him even with the offer of a marshal's baton, he had at first curtailed his powers and his influence, and, finally, on the pretext of a dispute over the issue of certain army regulations, had deprived him of his command. The disgrace of Changarnier was the disgrace of the Assembly. The quarrel was now open and direct; and the Assembly made a last effort to deal an effective blow at the president. But its
weapon was broken; the majority no longer existed. Instead of a vote of censure against Louis Napoleon, or a vote of confidence in Changarnier—for neither of which a majority could be obtained—it declared its want of confidence in the ministry. Nothing could have been more impotent; as Thiers said, "Henceforth the Empire is made."

From this time the movement of events was more rapid. The Assembly steadily lost ground; its members, hopelessly divided into three parties, the monarchical Right, the party of the Élysée, and the Mountain, were either indignant or sceptical, disdainful or indifferent. It had lost its chief safeguard, Changarnier; it was aware of its unpopularity with the nation, and knew that the French love of unity, the prestige of the Napoleonic name, the general weariness of party conflict and desire for repose, were working in favour of the president. Judging from appearances, the people saw on one side their representatives agitated, noisy, and suspicious, already guilty of treachery in disenfranchising nearly three millions of voters, and promising only a continuation of intrigues and useless commotion; on the other, their president, self-contained, silent, and confident, promising unity, order, and prosperity: and they were rapidly making a choice between them.

This was the situation when, in the summer of 1851, the question of the revision of the constitution came up for discussion. According to the constitution of 1848, the president, who was elected for four years, was ineligible for a second term. Louis Napoleon had been elected December 10, 1848, and in accordance with Articles 46 and 116, and the laws of October 28, 1848, a new election for president would take place in the second week of May, 1852. As the same constitution provided for the renewal of the Assembly every three years, the next election of deputies would take place on April 29, 1852, and the new body be installed on May 28th. Thus the executive and legislative bodies were to be renewed in their entirety at about
the same time, and, in consequence, the whole country looked forward with apprehension to the months of April and May of the next year. With the new Assembly chosen, but not installed, and the old Assembly in office, but about to retire; with the new president not yet invested with authority, and the old president practically powerless;—where, during the exciting months preceding the elections, would exist the authority to control factions, prevent socialistic uprisings, and guarantee order and repose? With nearly three millions of voters excluded from the polls on the day of the elections, might not a riot or even a revolution ensue? The "crisis of 1852" became a cause for general uneasiness and anxiety, and a revision of the constitution was desired by all. As early as August, 1850, fifty-two out of the eighty-five departments had declared in its favour, and in the Assembly only two groups, the republicans and the non-fusion monarchists, were opposed.

But grave difficulties stood in the way of revision. No two of the parties were in agreement as to the form that the amendments should take. The president desired an extension of his powers and, as he expressed himself in his pamphlet, Révision de la Constitution, a revision in the spirit of the institutions of the first Napoleon; the Legitimists were clamouring for the restoration once more of the eternal truths of the old régime; the Orléanists, for the restoration of a constitutional monarchy based on the middle classes; the Mountain, for a radical republic. But these were the least of the difficulties: the existing constitution required a three-fourths majority for its amendment, and decreed that all plans for revision should be submitted during the last year of the legislature; that they should be discussed at three successive meetings at intervals of a month; and that after one of these plans had been passed by a majority of three fourths, it should be then given to a constitutional convention of nine hundred members, sitting for three months, which should have power to consider but the one form submitted
to it. Amendment under these circumstances was practically impossible; and knowing this, the president turned to strengthen his cause with the people. As early as March, 1851, petitions began to pour in on the Assembly, many of them demanding the extension of the president's power; prefects and mayors, working in the interests of the president, often made use of their administrative powers to aid him; and at the same time, Louis Napoleon himself journeyed through the provinces, seeking by one means or another to curry popular favour, and to weaken the hold of the Assembly upon the nation. On June 1st, at Dijon, he said: "For three years I have always been seconded by the Assembly when it has been necessary to combat disorder by a policy of repression; but when I have wished to do good, to establish credit, to ameliorate the condition of the people, I have been confronted by nothing but inertia. If France recognises that no one has the right to dispose of her without her own consent, she has only to say so; my courage and my energy will not fail her. Whatever may be the duties that the country imposes upon me, it will find me ready to follow its will. France shall not perish in my hands." These words so bold, so manifestly unjust, and containing so evidently a premonition of a coup d'état, aroused the wrath of the Assembly. On June 19th, through a union of the extreme Left, the Left, and the non-fusion Orléanists the project for revision failed by ninety-seven votes of the necessary three fourths. To the republican Left, which blindly hoped by this means to prevent any extension of the president's power, was this result due.

Some extra-legal act was now inevitable; for the president to retire to private life in 1852 was impossible. His own convictions as to his destiny, the drift of events, the advice of his friends, and the express wish of a large proportion of the French people were all against such an action. It was now his plan to gather around himself a band of military adherents and civil
functionaries sufficiently bold and ambitious to carry out his wishes; to terrify the bourgeoisie by well-directed references to the red spectre of socialism; to blind the people to his real intentions by decrying the disenfranchising law of May 31st, and further incriminating the Assembly by endeavouring to bring about a repeal of the measure; in short, to make himself strong against the time when he should attack the constitution. From the soldiers of Young Africa he chose Saint-Arnaud, a most audacious and ambitious man, of whom Lamoricière said, "When you see Saint-Arnaud minister of war, watch for the coup d'état." For the command of the army in Paris, he selected General Magnan, old commandant at Lyons and Strasbourg, a man known to be as cautious and conservative as he was energetic and pitiless; and Colonels Fleury and Vaudry completed his military staff. For civil functionaries, he selected de Maupas, old prefect of the Upper Garonne, and de Morny, his foster-brother. These formed the nucleus of a working body of conspirators. At the same time his journals discussed the "crisis of 1852," laid bare the weaknesses of the monarchical parties, ridiculed parliamentary government, examined the old claims of all candidates for the presidency, and pictured to the people the horrors of socialism, citing as proof of their beliefs the manifestoes of the radicals, the bulletins of the revolutionary committee of Paris, the rumours of a plot at Lyons, and an outbreak of socialists at Laurac.

So well had the first part of the president's plan been carried out, that by the middle of September, during the recess of the Assembly, some of the conspirators concluded that the time had come to act. But Saint-Arnaud refused to co-operate, believing it to be vitally necessary to await the return of the deputies, lest, at the rumour of an attack on the constitution, they should gather together in the provinces, summon the generals of the Assembly, and prepare for civil war. Then, too, none of the conspirators were as yet in the cabinet, none except Magnan,
in any important office at the centre of affairs, and, above all, no pretext had as yet been given to warrant, in the eyes of the people of Paris, the overthrow of the Assembly. It would be necessary for the president to justify himself by something more than merely general principles, and to do so, he conceived the idea of provoking the Assembly to some further unwise action that would excuse his conduct and exonerate him from the charge of seeking his own interests. He found his opportunity in the refusal of the Assembly to repeal the suffrage law of May 31st. In October the president proposed to his ministers that the repeal should be made the issue of the approaching session; but they, on the ground that it would compromise their dignity, inasmuch as they had voted for the law the May before, refused to support the repeal, and sent in their resignations. The president had won his first point: with Saint-Arnaud in the department of war, and de Maupas as prefect of police, he at once formed a new ministry. On November 4th the Assembly resumed its sitting, and within two weeks the president had won his second point: by a narrow majority of seven, gained by a union of the parties of the Right, the motion to repeal the law was rejected on November 13th. Rumours of a coup d'état, which had been current for six months, were again heard with frequency throughout the city. For what was the president waiting? He had his military support, his civil functionaries, ready for action; in the eyes of the bourgeoisie he was the only defence against socialism; in the eyes of the masses, the only champion of universal suffrage. Was he waiting for the Assembly to weaken itself still further? If so, he did not wait in vain. That body, no longer in doubt as to the future, was now in duty bound to take some measure in its own defence. According to Article 32, it had the right to fix the amount of military force and to dispose of it for its own security. The proposition was therefore made that the Assembly so define this article as to remove all doubt of its meaning, and to give
to itself the authority to make a direct requisition upon the military forces of the state in case of need. But the republican Left, stricken with the same blindness that had characterised it in all its attempts to thwart the policy of the president, enraged by the recent refusal of the Assembly to restore universal suffrage, denied the need of such defence. "You have no faith in the people," cried the Mountain. "There is no danger," cried Michel de Bourges, "and if there were, there is an invisible sentinel that will protect us, and that invisible sentinel is the people." By defeating this measure for defence, the republican Left threw the game into the hands of the president; for no longer had he any fear of civil war. The second republic, which had been erected by force, was now given its death-blow by the very men who had established it.

There was now no need of delaying the attack whereby Louis Napoleon intended, as he said after the plébiscite of December 20th, "to issue from legality in order to return into right." The Assembly was hopelessly divided into factions; the president had already organised his forces, had distributed the troops in a way favourable to his own designs, had placed in command at various points men devoted to him, and had assigned to each of his agents the rôle he was to play. The attempt planned for November 20th was put off till the 25th, and then to the 2d of December, either because Louis Napoleon hesitated, or because sufficient preparations had not been made. But at last, on the evening of Monday, December 1st, after a reception at the Élysée, the president, Saint-Arnaud, de Morny, de Maupas, Persigny, and Mocquard, the secretary, withdrew to discuss the measures to be taken. There were five in number: they decided to print the decree announcing the dissolution of the Assembly, and the proclamations to the army and the people; to arrest those of the deputies most influential among the people and most popular among the soldiers; to take possession of the Palais Bourbon; to mass at dawn within the city sufficient
troops to prevent any attempt at resistance; and, finally, to replace the minister of the interior by one of the confidants of the prince, in order to obtain possession of the telegraph. Shortly after midnight the work was begun. The national printing office was seized, and proclamations, distributed sentence by sentence among the different compositors, were, after two hours, ready for posting on the city walls by bands of bill-posters under the charge of the police. While this was being done, a more delicate task was undertaken. About two o'clock de Maupas summoned to his house the commissioners who had been selected, and assigned to each his task. By seven o'clock Generals Bedeau, Changarnier, Lamoricière, Cavaignac, and Leflò, Colonel Charras, MM. Thiers, Roger du Nord, Baze, and seven members of the Mountain, Cholat, Valentin, Greppo, Nadaud, Miot, Baune, and Lagrange, were arrested either in their homes, or, as in the case of Baze and Leflò, in the rooms of the Palais Bourbon. First a battalion of infantry under General Espinasse took possession of the Assembly hall, and later two more battalions were stationed about the building. The chief part of the work was now accomplished, but more had yet to be done. General Magnan, forewarned during the night by Saint-Arnaud, was already arranging for the disposition of the troops, sending forward some to take their stand at important points, holding others in their barracks ready to march at a moment’s notice, and calling up new detachments from Versailles and St. Germain. Lastly, the cabinet itself was purged by force; de Thorigny, minister of the interior, was compelled to resign in favour of de Morny, and it was the latter who, on the morning of the 2d, informed France that there had been a revolution in Paris, and made known to the provinces that the coup d’état had been accomplished.

So quietly had all been managed that the Parisians woke next morning entirely ignorant of what had taken place. But the placards furnished them with the information. The first
of these decreed the dissolution of the Assembly and the council of state, the re-establishment of universal suffrage, summoned the people to their polling booths from the 14th to the 21st of December, and placed Paris in a state of siege. The proclamation to the people, after denouncing the perfidious projects of the Assembly, outlined as the program of the president a decennial consulate based upon the institutions of the year VIII., a senate, a council of state, and a Corps législatif; all, however, dependent upon a favourable vote of the people, "the only sovereign," said the president, "that I recognise in France." The proclamation to the army, after adroitly referring to the defeat of the soldiers in the revolutions of 1830 and 1848, closed with these words: "I count upon you, soldiers, not to violate the law, but to win respect for the only law of the country, the national sovereignty. . . . We are bound by indissoluble ties; your history is my history; there is to us in the past a oneness of glory and misfortune, in the future, a common desire for the peace and grandeur of France." The first feeling aroused by these words was, on the whole, one of approbation mingled with indifference. Some, the less intelligent of the people, were dazzled by the promise of glory and prosperity; others, angry at the Assembly, deemed the act of the president a retribution not undeserved; while the populace in general was gratified by the re-establishment of universal suffrage and the promises to preserve the republic. All failed to see that in order to overthrow liberty, the new master first promised to defend it.

But the conservative members of the Assembly, though unable, for want of leaders and military support, to offer any effectual resistance, were less disposed to take this high-handed action so quietly. Some of the deputies met in private houses, others gathered in the Palais Bourbon, while still others, two hundred and eighteen in number, held a meeting for five hours in the mairie of the tenth arrondissement, and drafted a decree deposing Louis Napoleon. But all were scattered by the police
or by companies of infantry, and some were imprisoned. Even
the high court of justice, whose constitutional function it was
to bring a charge of perjury against the president, was dispersed
in the very act of signing the warrant of arrest. It may be
safely said that by the middle of the afternoon of December 3d,
all resistance from the conservatives was over. But republic-
ans and socialists had yet to be reckoned with. Skilled in the
methods of street warfare, they met force with force. Under
the control of a committee of resistance, crowds of insurgents
gathered in the streets, and at a barricade in the faubourg St.
Antoine shots were exchanged, and a representative, Baudin,
was killed. This event gave great strength to a cause that was
hitherto wanting in leaders and definite plans, and when, as the
day drew to a close, the crowds increased and more barricades
were erected, and the movement began to assume the form of
one of those radical uprisings already so familiar to the people
of Paris, Louis Napoleon and his associates decided to take
such measures as would efficiently destroy all resistance.
During the night of the 3d, the soldiers were recalled to their
barracks, and the city was given over into the hands of the in-
surgents. On the 4th, decrees were issued putting Paris in a
state of siege, ordering all vehicles off the streets, and calling on
all crowds of people to disperse. By ten o'clock in the morn-
ing all preparations had been made, and the soldiers, refreshed
by a night's sleep, stimulated by unusual largesses of money
and wine, and excited by frequent references to their defeat on
February 24, 1848, were eager to advance. Still the order was
not given, and it was not until one o'clock that the army of
Paris was put in motion. With determination the soldiers ad-
vanced from boulevard to boulevard, pitilessly overthrowing
one after another of the barricades, which the insurgents, with
high hopes, had erected during the preceding hours of inaction
by the government. By five o'clock the struggle was over;
the insurgents had been slain, or captured, or put to flight.
This victory of the president's, won without mercy, pity, or moderation, was stained by an unfortunate episode. A troop of soldiers, while marching down the boulevard Montmartre, became excited by the hostile shouts of the bystanders, and the pistol shots from the houses, and fired, without command, for perhaps ten minutes into a crowd of bystanders. About thirty-five were killed. It was a cruel act, though in no way ordered or premeditated, and traceable, let it be charitably said, to a panic of fear that seized upon the soldiers who were already expecting attack from any quarter. Such was Louis Napoleon's remedy for saving the republic; for preserving the country from anarchy and pillage; for re-establishing the public peace. During the following week, the prisons were filled with suspects arrested on the slightest evidence, and a decree of the 8th declared that every member of a secret society or anyone who had defied the proclamations was liable to be sent to Cayenne or Algeria. Paris was cowed; strategy and force had proved effective instruments, and so far the victory was complete.

But another factor had still to be taken into account. Would the people of France support the presidential act; would they express themselves favourably to the project of the decennial consulate that Louis Napoleon had asked for in his decree? What the friends of the president desired was not merely a favourable majority, but a majority so great as to sweep away the stain of the coup d'état: a bare success, they felt, would be a half condemnation. To prevent such a result, the party of the Élysée worked untiringly, and never, perhaps, was Louis Napoleon, already much favoured by fortune, more opportunely aided by events than at this time. No sooner had peace and order been restored in Paris, than the spectre of a socialistic revolt arose in the provinces: the fears of anarchy and disorder in 1852, which the bourgeoisie had entertained and which the president had considerably increased by his message in No-
vember, seemed already realised. For two years the socialistic doctrines had been spreading through the east and south. In the provinces of the Loire and the Rhone the president’s success excited wrath and consternation, and, in some quarters, almost provoked a civil war; and in the departments of Nièvre at Clamecy, of Hérault at Béziers and Bédarieux, of Drôme, Var, and the Basses-Alpes at Valence, Luc, Manosque, and Digne, the peasant, petty merchant, and artisan, ignorant and easily led, and rendered savage by poverty and misery, rose against local officials and soldiers, and in many cases committed atrocities of the most fiendish character. With the news of each outbreak, the strength of the president’s cause increased, and, at this point, the radical party, which had so often unwittingly played into the president’s hands, rendered him a last service by furnishing him with a justification that he desired for the coup d’état. France, weary of the parliamentary war in the Assembly and terrified by the socialistic war in the provinces, turned to the president as the only one able to preserve peace and order. Not slow in seizing the opportunity, and with the pitiless thoroughness that had characterised his reduction of the city of Paris after December 2d, Louis Napoleon extended the state of siege to the departments, appointed, as local dictators, generals of the army, and countenanced arrests and confiscations “to reassure the good and to terrify the faction.” At the same time he redoubled his attentions to the army, visiting the wounded, distributing favours, and making promotions. He sought the favour of the labouring classes, by promising to ameliorate legislation, and the confidence of the clergy, by turning over to them the Pantheon, and by issuing decrees regarding the observance of Sunday. Little wonder is it, therefore, that on December 20th, the people of France, by a vote of 7,439,216 to 640,737 declared it to be their desire to maintain the authority of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, and delegated to him the power necessary to establish a constitution
upon the conditions named in his proclamation of December 2d. The republic, still existing in name, was in reality dead; the empire, concealed under republican forms, was already made.

Properly speaking, the history of the Second Empire begins with January 1, 1852; but Louis Napoleon, though possessing by the constitution almost unlimited powers, had yet to make his despotism complete by stilling all opposition, and by gaining the people’s consent to his changing his presidential title into an imperial one. To accomplish his purpose, it would be necessary for him to make impossible any further uprisings on the part of republicans and socialists, to strengthen the confidence of the order-loving classes in his disinterested devotion to the cause of peace and prosperity, to induce the labouring classes to believe in his loyalty to their interests, to bind the army more firmly to him, and to draw the church into an alliance with the new régime. No sooner, therefore, was the announcement of the victory of December 20th made known, than the new task was undertaken. To still, once for all, the opposition of republicans and socialists, the new government with brutal severity made known its will regarding the prisoners recently arrested. Of those seized during the early morning of December 2d, General Cavaignac only was set at liberty; the others were either sent to the fortress of Ham or exiled from France, the more famous parliamentary leaders being required, as the decree said, to absent themselves for the time being from the state. The two hundred and eighteen deputies who had been seized in the tenth arrondissement, were released. Especially arbitrary and severe were the decrees against all prisoners who had been found armed in Paris, and against leaders of secret societies, builders of barricades, and fomenters of insurrection, all of whom numbered some four thousand. Many, it is true, were set at liberty; but the majority were exiled from France or deported to Algeria, Guiana, or Cayenne. For judging the prisoners from the provinces, nearly twenty-
two thousand in all, mixed commissions were established, whose decrees were even more merciless than those of the government. Although many were pardoned, yet, according to the original sentences, 2804 were condemned to reside permanently in the provinces, 1545 were expelled from France, 9769 were deported, 9530 to Algeria and 239 to Cayenne. Some three thousand of these were pardoned eventually, and many of the sentences were never carried out; yet it may be said with justice that the method of destroying for the time being the opposition of republicans and socialists, was inhumanly conceived and savagely carried out. When to the judgments of the commissions be added decrees against workingmen’s associations, wholesale removals of provincial officials, the dissolution of the national guard, the creation of a ministry of police, and a general strengthening of the police system throughout the country, we can well understand why, during the period of sixteen years from 1852 to 1868, France produced no socialistic doctrines or leaders; why there were practically no uprisings of republicans or socialists against the despotism of the state, and why this period was barren of any display of those popular forces that make for social progress.

Having thus struck down those who had fought in 1848, Louis Napoleon continued his policy of reaction and despotism by attacking, first, the monarchists, afterward, the press. Acting under the influence of Persigny, and believing the Orléanists to be more powerful than they actually were, he caused two decrees to be issued on January 22, 1852, one forbidding the house of Orléans to hold property in France, the other authorising the seizure of the gift that Louis Philippe had made to his children on ascending the throne in 1830. This act of robbery, which ill-became the “defender of property and the enemy of socialism,” roused very considerable opposition; but this was stilled with the despotic determination that was beginning to characterise all the president’s acts. On
February 17th, he issued his decree against the press, re-establishing all the old censorial rights of the government, placing all newspapers under official supervision, making them liable to suspension at the least provocation, and imposing upon every journal obligations humiliating to fulfil. In order to control the elections more successfully, the government changed at will the electoral districts, put into the field its own candidates, forced the press and the prefects to work in its interests distributed placards and bulletins, and, in general, held the elections in its own hands, not only by controlling the electoral machinery, but also by so intimidating republican and Orléanist, that neither dared go to the polls. In consequence of these acts, France fell into a state of political apathy that was to continue during the ensuing decade: freedom of thought and of speech were forbidden; opposition to the government was punished without mercy; education was controlled; political progress stopped; and the parliamentary liberty that France had enjoyed for nearly forty years gave way to a centralised government which lacked constitutional check or limit, and had as its head a political despot.

And what return did France receive for the liberty so willingly resigned? She was no longer tormented by the horror of anarchy, which had been almost constantly present since 1848; she was relieved of the uncertainties of parliamentary government, which had never proved natural to France, and of the socialistic uprisings and experiments, which had threatened the country with constant municipal, if not civil, war. To this desire for rest and peace Louis Napoleon appealed. He tempered his despotism with good works, and tried to give the various classes what he believed each wished and needed, that he might bring the nation to look upon him a benefactor, as one who would never forget the welfare of his people. He endeavoured to bind to himself the official world by favours, receptions, and fêtes, and the people by fireworks, reviews, and
free displays which seemed to be endless during the summer of 1852. He thought to justify his seizure of the Orléanist estates by distributing the property: to the poor he gave a part for strengthening the mutual aid societies, for improving the dwellings of the labourers, and for establishing loan funds and the like; to the church, a fund for deserving members; to the army, an endowment for the Legion of Honour. During his journeys through the provinces he urged municipal authorities to avoid extravagant display and to give the money to charity; he showed his good will to the church by promising a credit for the construction or restoration of cathedrals, and by making gifts to chapters and presbyteries. He interested himself in railway affairs, planning to complete old routes and begin new ones; he encouraged the extension of telegraph lines, established the crédit foncier for the benefit of the agriculturists, and founded relief societies and other philanthropic institutions. At the same time he endeavoured to make popular the second empire by exalting the first: the civil code became again the code Napoléon, a committee was appointed to gather and publish the correspondence of the first Napoleon, his birthday was made a national holiday, and the date of his death was celebrated with pomp at Notre Dame.

Thus the way was prepared for the assumption of the imperial title. During July petitions demanding the empire were circulating through the provinces, and during August and September the president made a series of journeys that were as gratifying to him and as successful as the efforts of prefects and other officials could make them. Greeted as emperor, accompanied by cries of "Vive l'Empereur," regarding which the prefects and mayors had already received instructions from Persigny, the president was pleased to believe that the will of the country had been expressed. At Bordeaux he said, "France seems to wish to return to the empire"; and on the next day, the Moniteur declared that the striking manifestations made in all
parts of France in favour of the re-establishment of the empire imposed upon the president the duty of consulting the Senate. That body, with but one dissenting voice, gave its consent, and the nation was summoned to the polls for the 21st of November. By a vote of 7,824,189 to 253,145, the title of emperor was conferred upon Louis Napoleon and made hereditary in his house; on December 1st the president was saluted by the nation through its official bodies as Napoleon III.; and on the next day he made his entrance into Paris.

The causes for the overthrow of the second republic are to be found quite as much in the circumstances of its origin and in the character of its organisation, as in the acts of Louis Napoleon and his associates. Organised by a few, it was immediately placed at the mercy of the nation by the proclamation of universal suffrage. In the first exercise of its new right the nation repudiated the republic by giving to an Assembly, the majority in which were monarchists, the task of drafting a republican constitution, an act which, as might have been foreseen, endangered the very existence of the republic by involving it in parliamentary anarchy. Thereupon the people of France, wearying of parliamentary disorder, fell under the spell of a pretender bearing the name of Napoleon, and accepted, either with content or with resignation, his usurpation of power. Louis Napoleon, making the most of the opportunities that the republican government offered, accomplished the coup d'état and made himself emperor. This act was a crime—a great political crime—but it must never be forgotten that it was one in which the French nation concurred. The ignorant peasantry, receiving for the first time the voting privilege, showed that it cared less for liberty than for an increase of its wealth and its profits; and the intelligent classes, who alone appreciated political freedom, having come to look on parliamentary government as productive of quarrels and prejudicial to prosperity, supported whatever would rid France of anarchy. From
1848 to 1852 the French nation rather encouraged than hindered the cause of the man who was depriving it of the institutions it had inherited from the great Revolution.

But in the final analysis of causes, it must be said that the reaction of 1852 was but the logical consequent of the revolution of 1848; that the excesses of the one made possible the excesses of the other, the error of the one, made inevitable the error of the other. Louis Napoleon was no more guilty of a crime than were the revolutionists who had overturned a lawful government and proclaimed in its stead a system and a franchise which France did not want and to which she never gave her consent. Louis Napoleon, a man of conviction though of mediocre ability, was as sincere as were the republicans of 1848: they had their theory of government, he had his; if his methods were deprecable, so were theirs; if he was despotic, they were revolutionary. As in central Europe the victory of the radicals had made possible the reaction of 1849 and the final success of a counter-revolution, so in France the republicans and socialists of 1848, who had decreed the republic and established universal suffrage, had themselves, and themselves alone, to thank for the erection of the Second Empire.
CHAPTER II.

EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY AND THE CRIMEAN WAR.

That Napoleon III. was firmly established as Emperor of the French and his accession recognised by the Powers of Europe, were facts of no little importance in the history of European diplomacy, for into the diplomatic circle was now introduced a sovereign, the very conditions of whose rise to power required of him a foreign policy rather clever and brilliant than sound. During the period from 1847 to 1853, the diplomatic situation had been full of perplexity to those who had desired the maintenance of the European concert; for the revolution of 1848 had not only placed in danger the thrones of the absolutist princes, but it had also so far disturbed the equilibrium of Europe as to lead in many circles to a confident expectation of war. The support which Russia had given Austria in the war with Hungary, together with the reactionary movement of 1849 and the despotic rule of Schwarzenberg, had made more intense the popular hostility in the west for the eastern Powers; while the appearance of Louis Napoleon, the Roman expedition, and the inconsistent acts of the second republic made it impossible to determine whether France would maintain the old friendship with England, or would seek an alliance with Russia and Austria. The latter had been brought to the verge of war with Prussia by the events of 1850, and, though bound to Russia by ties of gratitude for her intervention at Vilagos, was likely at any time to break those ties, owing to the rival interests of the two Powers in the lands of the Danube, and to the con-
straint that the Emperor of Austria felt in holding his eastern possessions at the good will and pleasure of the Czar. Prussia, by her attitude on the Schleswig-Holstein question, had ranged against her the western Powers, who in defending the integrity of Denmark were upholding the principle of the equilibrium of Europe, and, by her attitude toward the revolution in general, had roused the hostility of Russia, through whose interference, rather than that of any other Power, she had been forced to yield to the claims of Austria. The Holy Alliance was already broken, and the eastern Powers, who had so long been united by their common views on methods of government, were far from being on friendly terms with one another. The era was, therefore, one of a general shifting of diplomatic relations, and, consequently, one of great uncertainty; for there was ever present a fear of a general conflict, which might easily come about, not because princes were capricious and diplomats obstinate or inefficient, but because the history of the preceding thirty years had not yet been worked out, because momentous historical issues had yet to be decided. From 1849 to 1852 the situation was a very delicate one, and every effort was being made to settle all disputes peaceably, that war might be prevented.

The first quarrel that arose after 1849 was a direct outcome of the war between Austria and Hungary. Even while France and England were trying to settle the Schleswig-Holstein question, their attention was diverted by the appeal of Turkey for aid against the aggressive demands of Austria and Russia for the extradition of Kossuth, Bem, and other Hungarian and Polish refugees who had escaped into Turkey. The appeal of the Sultan was heeded, and Stratford Canning for England, and General Aupick for France, urged upon Turkey the importance of resisting the Austrian and Russian demands. Palmerston supported his minister by declaring that inasmuch as Turkey was not obliged by treaty to deliver up the refugees, she ought
not, in deference to the laws of hospitality and the dictates of humanity, to do so. At the same time the British fleet was ordered to the Dardanelles and the French fleet to Malta, and the former, contrary to the terms of the treaty of the Straits of 1841, entered within the prohibited waters. The eastern Powers, although indignant at this diplomatic error on England's part, consented in November, 1849, to withdraw their demands, and war was happily averted. But scarcely had the controversy over this incident been brought to an end, when there arose a new cause of disturbance, involving the good name of England. The latter Power, angered by what she chose to consider the aggressive and high-handed action of the Greek government toward two British citizens, Finlay, a piece of whose land had been seized by the government for a park, and Don Pacifico, whose house had been pillaged by an Athenian mob, sent a fleet into the Piræus in January, 1850. Greece at once appealed to France and Russia against England, and these Powers, on the ground that England's attitude was unnecessarily aggressive, responded to the appeal of the smaller state, Russia in a letter of remonstrance, France in a demand for explanations; and when no satisfaction was to be had by these means, the French minister, Drouyn de Lhuys, was recalled from London. For the moment matters looked threatening, but the good sense of the Powers asserting itself, a compromise was effected, and England withdrew from her belligerent attitude. Such incidents as these, however, did not serve to make harmonious the diplomatic relations of the European states.

Europe next turned her attention to the question that had been troubling her for the two preceding years, that of Denmark and the duchies of Schleswig-Holstein. England offered to mediate between Russia and Denmark, and invited the representatives of the European states to London to discuss the matter. Having settled their own diplomatic differences, the
Powers were ready to compel Prussia to enter the common accord, and in the interest of peace, to recognise the integrity of Denmark. Although in so doing Prussia was making a concession to Schwarzenberg, she had no other recourse than to submit, and on July 2, 1850, signed a treaty with Denmark by which peace was established between that kingdom and the Germanic Confederation. She then joined England, France, Austria, and Russia in signing the protocol of August 2, 1850, whereby the full integrity of Denmark was confirmed and the agreement entered into, that at a later date international recognition should be given to that protocol, and the question of the succession to the Danish throne, arising from the childlessness of Frederic VII., be settled.

This treaty of 1850 marked an important step in the direction of an amicable settlement of all diplomatic disputes, but it did not bring to an end the period of diplomatic anxiety. No sooner had Austria made sure of the restoration once more of her influence in the Germanic Confederation, than she began to tamper with the delicately balanced European equilibrium by reviving at the Dresden conference (December, 1850, to May, 1851), her proposition to enlarge the Germanic Confederation by introducing into it all her non-Germanic provinces, Hungary, Croatia, Slavonia, and Lombardo-Venetia. To carry out this proposition would have been to break the treaty of Vienna, and so vigorously did England, France, and even Russia protest against it, that even Schwarzenberg was finally compelled to yield. In this piece of diplomacy it is interesting to note that it was Prussia who checkmated Austria, by agreeing not to bring into the Confederation her own non-Germanic provinces, although the privilege of doing so had been granted her by the Federal Diet in March, 1848. Trouble was again avoided, although the mobbing of General Haynau in London on September 15, 1851, and the welcome given to Kossuth by the English populace during the months of October and No-
member of the same year, had cooled decidedly the friendship between Austria and England.

But the hopes of peace aroused by the great Exhibition in London in 1851, and by the happy solution, up to this point, of all troublesome diplomatic problems, were seriously disturbed by the coup d'État of December 2d, and Europe was thrown once more into a state of commotion. What would the new dictator do? Would he, as many feared, follow in the footsteps of the first Napoleon, and throwing to the winds all regard for the state system of Europe, begin an aggressive campaign for the aggrandisement of France? Had he designs upon Belgium, Switzerland, and Piedmont? A Carbonaro, a republican, an ally of socialists in the past, Louis Napoleon inspired but little confidence in the minds of the Powers, while in England, the mention of the name Napoleon was enough to create a popular panic. Frederic William IV. even suggested reviving the Holy Alliance, and only too glad of an opportunity of distracting attention from the humiliation to which he had been subjected at Olmütz, proposed to the courts of St. Petersburg and London that a coalition be formed to act in case of emergency against France. But this plan found no support. England, taking her stand firmly on the doctrine of non-intervention, rejected the Prussian proposal; Russia welcomed the new autocrat as an ally in the work of stamping out the last traces of the revolution; while Austria, rejoicing in the downfall of the second republic, expressed only admiration for the man whose policy was so much like her own. When, therefore, Louis Napoleon made known his determination to labour for the maintenance of peace and for the preservation of the friendliest relations with the Powers, apprehensions were calmed, and harmony was again restored.

Between Austria and Prussia the old rivalry now broke out in a new form. Schwarzenberg, though thwarted at Dresden, was determined to accomplish his end in another way, and if
he could not bring all Austria into the Confederation, resolved to bring it into the Zollverein, and so gain the supremacy for which he sought. Inasmuch as the treaty of the Zollverein, renewed in 1841 for only twelve years, would expire in 1853, the opportunity was favourable; and he hoped by means of his influence over the South-German states to make the continuance of the Tariff Union dependent upon Austria's admission to it. But in this he failed. Prussia, knowing that the withdrawal of certain states, notably the two Hesses, would destroy the commercial unity between her central and western provinces, had so far succeeded, by bringing Hanover into the Zollverein in 1851, in making herself commercially independent of the action of the other states, that she rejected Austria's demand. What the outcome would have been is uncertain, for Schwarzenberg was a man of many resources, and his expectation of eventual success was great; but on April 5, 1852, he died in the prime of life with his reactionary program only partly carried out. With his death the situation underwent a decided change; for although the impulse that he had given to the movement of reaction was sufficient to maintain Austria for another year in the position that he had won for her, nevertheless, when his task fell into weaker hands, the power of the Habsburg house began to decline. His death marked the beginning of the end of that policy which had controlled the affairs of central Europe since the congress of Vienna; and Count Buol-Schauenstein, his successor, an arrogant, pompous man, energetic but tricky, and wanting in diplomatic sagacity, was destined to find himself outwitted on one hand by Bismarck, on the other by Cavour.

At this juncture, notwithstanding the fact that Austria's commercial relations with the Confederation were still in dispute, the Powers came together at London to settle amicably, if possible, the question of the Danish succession. The withdrawal of certain claimants had already prepared the way for
a speedy settlement of the difficulty.¹ The princes of Hesse Cassel, whose claims came through their mother Charlotte, aunt of Frederick VII., gave up their rights; the Czar, who was the head of the elder branch of Holstein Gottorp through his grandfather, Peter III., resigned all his pretensions, and compelled his kinsman, the Duke of Oldenburg, to do the same; and the Duke of Augustenburg of the elder Sonderburg branch, for whom the duchies had fought in 1848, signed for himself and his descendants a renunciation of his claims to Holstein, Schleswig, and Lauenburg for 2,225,000 Danish thalers. This left as the only remaining claimant Christian, of the younger Sonderburg branch, who had married Louisa, the daughter of the Charlotte mentioned above. Christian of Sonderburg-Glücksburg was therefore recognised by all the Powers as the successor, in default of issue to Frederic VII., to the throne of the united Denmark. The treaty was signed at London May 8, 1852, and, although two Danish parliaments were dissolved before it was finally ratified by the Danish government, its acceptance by the majority of the states of the Germanic Confederation, during the ensuing months, completed the requirements, and it became a recognised part of the public law of Europe.

With the signing of the treaty of London, the last of the questions raised by the revolution of 1848 was satisfactorily settled, and the promises of international harmony that the exhibition of 1851 had made, seemed fulfilled. Peace had at last come to Europe, and seemed so firmly established, that even the assumption of the imperial crown by Louis Napoleon did not seriously disturb the placidity of the diplomatic waters. Moreover, the new Emperor, wishing to have his title recognised by the Powers, made solemn promises to respect the territorial boundaries of Europe as established by existing treaties. In April of the next year, 1853, the ques-

¹ See Appendix.
tion of Austria's relations to the Zollverein was settled by a commercial treaty, in which mutual concessions were made. Frederic William IV., supported by Bismarck, whose boldness was already beginning to attract the attention of European statesmen, vehemently opposed the admission of Austria into the Zollverein, and carried his point. The treaty of 1853 marks not only an important step in the history of commercial agreements, but also the turning point in the history of the relations between Austria and Prussia. For the first time Prussia had succeeded in carrying a point contrary to the wishes of Austria, and that, too, at a time when other events were about to take place which were to strengthen the position of Prussia, and, by altering completely the relations of the Powers, to revolutionise the public law of Europe.

Thus far, from 1815 to 1853, this public law had been that established at the congress of Vienna; one guaranteeing peace so long only as the terms of the treaty drafted by that congress and the terms of treaties subsequently made and agreed to by the chief Powers, should remain unimpaired; so long only as the equilibrium, established by those treaties after many wearisome negotiations, arguments, and compromises, should remain undisturbed. To maintain this equilibrium had been the guiding principle of European statesmen for nearly forty years. That this nicely adjusted balance should not be disturbed, Greece and Belgium had submitted their demands to a congress of the Powers, England and France had protested against the annexation of Cracow, and all the governments had upheld the integrity of Denmark, and had forbidden Austria to bring her non-Germanic provinces into the Germanic Confederation. It was out of respect for this system, that England, in recognising the Second Empire, had felt obliged to explain her apparent breach of the declaration of Vienna, by saying that the new Napoleon did not come within the terms of that declaration, because he drew his authority from the consent of the French.
people, and not from any hereditary right; that Frederic
William IV., at first seeing in Napoleon only the Revolution
incarnate, was eager to revive the military alliance of 1814,
and to treat with the allied Powers for the maintenance of
order.

But this public law and the diplomacy based upon it had
not taken into account those changes that were now threaten-
ing to alter the whole European situation. The treaty of
Vienna had made no provision for the unity of Germany and
Italy; it had declared that no Bonaparte should sit on the
throne of France; and it had not in the slightest way admitted
that the Turkish question might become a menacing European
problem. The course of events was, therefore, in all these re-
spects, threatening the permanence of the old law. The people
of Germany were growing conscious of a desire for national
unity that could be gratified only by the destruction of the old
Confederation; Italy, whose self-respect required that she re-
new with Austria the struggle for independence and unity, was
merely waiting for a competent leader; a Bonaparte was sitting
on the throne of France, and, moreover, one who was destined
to play an important part in overthrowing the very treaty that
had excluded his dynasty from the throne; while the Eastern
Question, already a century and a half old, had given rise as
early as 1852 to the fatal controversy that was to bring on the
struggle which all had been striving to avoid.

The systematic dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire be-
gan with the treaty of Carlowitz in 1699, when, after a war with
Austria, Venice, Poland, and Russia, the Sultan was deprived
of parts of Hungary, Slavonia, and Transylvania, and territory
about the sea of Azov. But with Russia this effort was pre-
mature; for it was not till the reign of Catherine II., when the
Russian territory extended south-westward little farther than
the Dnieper, and southward was entirely cut off from the Black
Sea, that territorial extension in that direction became a fixed
part of the Russian policy. The treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji in 1774, which marks the definite beginning of the Eastern Question, gave to Russia important strongholds on the Black Sea at the mouths of the Dniester and Don, and in the Crimea; allowed her merchants to navigate freely Turkish waters; and conceded to her the right of protectorate over the Christian subjects of the Sultan, whom Russia desired to liberate from the tyranny of the Turk. This famous treaty increased Russia's power and influence in the Ottoman Empire, and prepared the way for a speedy acquisition of all the territory to the north of the Black Sea. From 1774 to 1783, though dreaming of a partition of Turkey which should equal that of Poland, Catherine was forced through the opposition of England, Holland, and Prussia to limit herself to driving the Tartars from the Crimea and the Kuban, and in forcing the Porte in the treaty of Constantinople (1783) to recognise her right to these territories.

Then it was that she began to transform the northern coast of the Black Sea into a powerful military frontier, of which Sebastopol, destined from this time to be a constant menace to Ottoman independence, was the chief stronghold, and, in the war terminated by the peace of Jassy in 1792, to extend her boundary westward to the Dniester. England, whose commercial expansion demanded the integrity of the Ottoman state, and France, whose alliance with the Turks dated from the reign of Francis I. and Solyman, were already deeply involved in affairs in the west, and though Pitt and Frederic the Great had been able to thwart the grander schemes of Catherine, they had not been able to hinder Russia's advance. The catastrophe of the French Revolution and the death of Catherine checked for the time the progress of dismemberment, and it was not until 1806 that Alexander I., himself a participator in the coalitions against France, made an effort to extend still further the Danubian frontier by seizing portions of Wallachia and Moldavia. So little was Napoleon bound by the traditions of French diplo-
macy that at Tilsit in 1807 he consented, so it is said, to the
seizure of the Danubian principalities, on condition that Alex-
ander would consent to his own plan for the occupation of
Spain. In this agreement, the Emperors utterly disregarded
their treaty obligations; for Turkey was a faithful ally of France,
and the seizure of the border provinces would be a breach of
the treaty of Jassy. In 1812 the Sultan made his peace with
Russia by giving up Bessarabia—a part of Moldavia,—thus ac-
cepting the Pruth as the dividing line between the two empires,
while Russia recognised the principalities as still being under
the protectorate of Turkey.

The advance of Russia was now rapid, and a war springing
out of the Greek revolution left the Turks so helpless before
the might of the Czar, that had it not been for the protest of the
western Powers, there could have been little doubt that in the
treaty of Adrianople (1829) the Sultan would have been further
despoiled of his territory. As it was, he was compelled to open
the Bosphorus and Dardanelles to all the merchant ships of the
Powers, to grant full freedom of trade and navigation in the
Black Sea, to destroy the fortresses on the left bank of the
Danube, and to pay the expenses of the war. By the latter
concessions, Turkey recognised the independence of Wallachia
and Moldavia, saving only the annual money tribute, mark of
her legal suzerainty, and also bound herself financially to
Russia, as her own treasury was empty. But a worse blow was
still to fall. In 1833, when Mehemet Ali was threatening to
overthrow the Ottoman Empire, the Sultan sought the aid of
Russia, and in the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi gave to the Czar
so extensive a control over her affairs as to reduce her to a con-
dition of complete dependence. This action led to a vigorous
protest from the west, and in the treaty of the Straits (1841)
the Powers, in conference at London, closed the Bosphorus and
the Dardanelles to all foreign ships in times of peace, hoping
thereby to prevent any armed interference of Russia in the
affairs of Turkey. England was so far aroused as to declare, that if the stipulations of this treaty should be broken, she should consider herself at liberty to act as the exigencies might demand, meaning that should Turkey’s independence be threatened, she was ready to maintain it by force of arms. The first application of this policy has already been noted in connection with the controversy over the extradition of the Hungarian refugees.

Thus far the relations between the western Powers and Russia had been eminently friendly, no question of serious import having arisen to disturb the outward harmony. Each had, however, marked out its sphere of influence, for France was making herself felt in Egypt and Syria; Austria, in Bosnia and Servia; while England and Russia were quarrelling about Turkey, the latter advocating the dismemberment, the former the integrity, of the Ottoman Empire. In 1852, however, a difficulty, in itself insignificant, though destined to lead to momentous consequences, presented itself to Europe. This was the quarrel between the monks and the priests of the Greek and Latin churches regarding the control of the Holy Places in the East. The claims of the Latins dated from certain treaty stipulations of the sixteenth century, whereby they were given exclusive possession of certain venerated spots—the great church of Bethlehem, the grotto of the Nativity, the Holy Sepulchre, and the tomb of the Virgin at Gethsemane. During the two centuries that had followed, the Greeks had encroached upon these rights. But notwithstanding the fact that the old privileges had been restored in 1740 to the Latins, they continued these encroachments, growing bolder as Russia’s power increased; for, since 1701, when Peter the Great had assumed the spiritual as well as the temporal sovereignty of Russia, they had been able to count upon the support of the Czar. During the period from 1740 to 1850 the Latins had had no such champion, for, owing to the many revolutions and governmental
changes in France since 1789, to the indecisive conduct of the
July Monarchy, and, above all, to the unfortunate discrediting
of France in Eastern affairs when the European Powers con-
cluded the treaty of 1840 against France, the chief representa-
tive of the Latin church in the East had been unable to act. But
when Louis Napoleon became president of the republic, the
French government under his direction took a firm stand, and in
1850, having called to the attention of the Porte the solemn
stipulations of the agreement of 1740, demanded reparation for
the Roman Catholics. The Sultan was placed in an awkward
position in being thus called upon to mediate between two
Christian communions which Mussulman law commanded him
to denounce. For two years the controversy raged. Threat-
ened by Russia, who demanded the maintenance of the status
quo, and urged by France, who insisted on having the old privi-
leges restored, the Sultan finally resorted to duplicity. On
February 9, 1852, he published a firman granting the French
demand, and a few days afterward issued a secret decree with-
drawing these concessions, and recognising the status quo in
favour of the Greeks and of Russia.

In itself the question of the Holy Places was unworthy of the
consideration of the diplomatic world, and had it not involved
other questions which concerned the most vital interests of
Europe, would have been left for settlement to the ecclesiastical
authorities. But the rivalry between the Greek and Latin
churches had now become a rivalry between their respective
champions, Nicolas I. and Napoleon, and between the races
that they represented; and by his wavering and intriguing
policy, the Turk, as arbiter of the controversy, reopened, in a
form more than ever dangerous, the question of the relations
between Russia and Turkey, at a time when conditions seemed
wholly favourable to the policy of despoliation that Russia had
unremittingly pursued for eighty years. In its turn, Russia’s
renewal of her old policy brought before Europe a diplomatic
problem of first importance, and one that was to prove impossible of solution except by a resort to arms: for not only were the Powers, because of their clashing interests, unable to preserve diplomatic harmony, but also the various peoples of the west, whose anger against Russia had been increasing steadily for the past four years, were only too eager to give expression to their hatred of her for the part she had played in preventing a successful issue of the revolution of 1848. Thus, it is clear, that the controversy over the Holy Places led to the Crimean war, not merely because it brought about events that affected the equilibrium of Europe and the commercial supremacy of England, but also because it aroused the bitter feelings of the west against Russia as the autocratic supporter of doctrines of government and methods of aggrandisement such as characterised the old and not the new régime. In other words, the causes which led to the war did not spring into being in 1854; they were bound up with the progress of European history since 1815; and the issues of the struggle were to no small degree a victory for those principles of racial unity and independence that were being worked out in other parts of Europe.

Nicolas I., the Czar of all the Russias, lived in a political world that had been singularly untouched by the movements that had made for progress in the western world. Neither Renaissance, Reformaion, nor Revolution had wrought any part of their beneficent work upon Russia, and during the uprising of 1848, the political structure had stood undisturbed by the forces, intellectual and political, that were stirring the rest of Europe to its depths. The Czar's authority was a strange mixture of Asiatic despotism and Christian theocracy, of administrative omnipotence and military absolutism, which made him supreme over his people and dictatorial to the world outside. His position as the semi-deified head of a vast empire and a powerful church, made practically impossible the development of high qualities of statesmanship; for the Czar had
but one argument to employ, the argument of an imperious will. Opposition or disobedience at home was followed by severe and cruel punishment; contradiction or affront abroad, where recent events had given him a disdainful confidence in his own power, roused his hostility and stirred his pride.

The thought of completing the work of his predecessors by some coup de main against Turkey, had probably been in his mind for some years. He had allowed the opportunity of 1848, when central and western Europe would have been helpless to resist his advance, to pass without action, and he still seemed to sanction the doctrine of the equilibrium of Europe, of which any attack upon Turkey would have been a distinct breach. But after 1852, many reasons were urging him to give body to his inner thoughts. He was probably approaching the close of a long and successful reign, for none of his family had attained old age; he was annoyed by Turkey's resistance to him in the matter of the refugees, and by the disorders within the Ottoman Empire, which Stratford Canning was vainly endeavouring to check; and as head and champion of the Greek church, he shared the anger of the faithful at the Sultan's duplicity in the controversy over the Holy Places. Above all, he felt sure of Russia's position in Europe, and proud of the influence of her diplomats; he had every reason to be sure of the support of Austria and Prussia, and was confident that England, whose prime minister, Lord Aberdeen, had seemed in the past friendly to his plans, would not oppose any project that he might undertake for the solution of the Eastern Question.

After 1852 there is no doubt that Nicolas had determined on his course; indications of such a determination became more frequent, and his tone was more irritable and less conciliatory. He showed intense displeasure at the assumption by Louis Napoleon of the imperial crown; he began to speak of the doctrine of equilibrium as admirable for other states, but as inapplicable to his own; he hazarded suggestions, vague indeed,
but sufficiently definite to rouse the anxiety of those who had watched the uncertain course of European diplomacy since 1847, and knew with what difficulty peace had thus far been preserved; and finally, he dispelled all illusions by the famous interviews with the English representative at St. Petersburg, Sir Hamilton Seymour, in January, 1853. "We have a sick man on our hands, and must prepare for his demise," he said. "As long as Russia and England are in accord, I do not fear the rest of Europe. I have not inherited the policy of Catherine II., for my empire is sufficiently vast; but there are many millions of Christian subjects whose interests I must preserve. I will therefore occupy Constantinople as a gage for the future, and England may take Egypt and Crete." The suspicions of England were at once aroused, for the ambassador naturally inferred from these interviews, that the Czar with the co-operation of Austria, Prussia, and England desired to begin the final dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. The policy thus secretly made known to England did not long remain hidden. On February 10th, Prince Menchikoff, one of the highest dignitaries in the Russian Empire, left St. Petersburg on a secret mission, the object of which was not even known to Nesselrode, and much less to the political circles of the capital. Passing southward, he made ready the naval force in the Black Sea, visited the army corps stationed on the borders of Bessarabia, and in company with the vice-admiral of the fleet and the chief of staff of the army, entered the Turkish capital on March 1st.

What meant this extraordinary embassy and these elaborate naval and military preparations? Simply the settlement of the question of the Holy Places, or was there an ulterior motive? The issue was soon known. In the name of the Czar, Prince Menchikoff, in an insolent and menacing manner, made demands of the Porte at first secretly, afterward openly, which threatened the independence, if not the existence, of the Ottoman Empire. Not only did he ask for a settlement of the difficulties regarding
the Holy Places, but he went further. He demanded guarantees for the future in the form of an addition to the treaty of Kainardji, whereby the Greek church should be placed entirely under Russian protection, whereby the rights and privileges of the orthodox Christians in Turkey, by an act equivalent to a treaty, should be conveyed to Russia alone. This demand, as Stratford Canning said, was not amputation, it was the infusion of poison into the entire Turkish system. It meant that Russia, passing the limits of spiritual surveillance, would subtly extend her influence until the Ottoman authority should be threatened with destruction, the sovereignty of the Sultan reduced to nothingness, and he become a dependent on the will of Russia. Such were the logical inferences from the ingenious scheme of the Czar. The question of the Holy Places was no longer in dispute, that difficulty was easily settled through the skilful mediation of Stratford Canning; but the larger question had now taken its place. The Eastern Question in all its fatal simplicity confronted the Powers, and with Turkey herself lay the first decision. Would she grant or reject the demands of the Czar? On May 18th, after many negotiations, she gave her answer; strengthened by the advice of the English ambassador she determined to resist the Russian request in whatever form it was made, and refused to accept the proposal for a treaty. This act completed the rupture with Russia; Prince Menchikoff withdrew from Constantinople, and ten days afterward, the Russian minister, Nesselrode, sent in the ultimatum of the Czar. Turkey should immediately accept Menchikoff’s note, or the Russian troops would cross the Turkish frontier.

This piece of arrogance on the part of Russia turned the Powers of Europe against the Czar, and brought about a change of relations. Europe as a whole judged the conduct of the Czar severely. Austria declared herself ready to oppose the Muscovite pretensions; Prussia, more reserved and at first inclined to believe that Nicolas would disavow the acts of his ministers,
rejected without hesitation the project of a protectorate; France who had already so far divined the purpose of the Czar as to send a fleet to the Levant, remained on the whole calm, absorbed in the events that had followed the erection of the new empire; while England, hitherto skeptical and hesitating, but now stirred with anger at the presumption of Russia and believing herself deceived and set at nought by a friendly Power on whose good faith she had relied, adopted the policy of France, and dispatched her fleet from Malta to Besika bay. Thus, by his aggressive policy, Nicolas had turned Europe against him. His old friends were struck with consternation; Nicolas, the upholder of the Holy Alliance, had become the disturber of the peace, and, strange to say, a Napoleon had become the protector of the European equilibrium. A new European situation was developing.

In this crisis Turkey's attitude was admirable. Encouraged by Stratford Canning, she received the Czar's ultimatum without excitement, and on June 17th, while promising to respect all the privileges of the Greek Christians, once more rejected Russia's demand. In his turn, the Czar issued a manifesto, in which he declared that he was entering on war with no idea of conquest, but only for the purpose of securing the desired guarantees; and on July 3d, the Russian troops crossed the Pruth. Though from the Russian standpoint active war was not yet begun, yet, in fact, the peace was broken; and now had come to pass that which Europe had for four years warded off by means of so many compromises—the European equilibrium was threatened with destruction, and threatened by one who had been among its chief supporters.

But the Powers undaunted undertook the task of settling by the old method of notes and protocols, this, the most difficult question since 1815, and accepted Austria's invitation to meet in conference at Vienna to discuss the matter. Austria, standing half-way between the east and west, was well qualified for the
office of mediator, and so conflicting were her sympathies and interests, that she was not likely to commit herself to either side. The quarrel about the Hungarian refugees, the attack on Haynau in London, the hearty reception given to Kossuth by the English people, had made less cordial her relations with England; while it seemed reasonably certain that her old hostility for the first Napoleon would prevent her from becoming intimate with his nephew. Furthermore, even though she felt drawn to Russia by their old relations in the Holy Alliance, by her respect for the Czar, whose name still had great weight in Vienna, and by her gratitude for the assistance given in the struggle with Hungary, yet she was the rival of Russia in the south-east, and was bound to resist any attempt that the Czar might make to gain control of the mouths of the Danube, or to exercise an undue influence in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire. It therefore happened that from June, 1853, to February, 1854, Vienna became the centre of an exciting diplomatic conference which was vainly attempting to solve this most perplexing problem in accordance with the principles of compromise and diplomacy.

There is no need of inquiring into the history and fate of the eleven plans proposed by these wise European statesmen between June and October, 1853. Everyone had a scheme. "We find," says Lane-Poole, "M. Drouyn de Lhuys full of his scheme in June, while Lord Clarendon is simultaneously dispatching his rival project to Constantinople, where it arrives just as Lord Stratford's own plan is leaving for Vienna, where this is received at the very moment when M. Drouyn de Lhuys's note, after emendation, has been formally adopted by the great Powers." The latter note, which really originated with Napoleon III., and was afterwards known as the Vienna note, was adopted July 27th, and duly transmitted to the Czar, who, to the gratification of the conference, accepted the terms without comment. The diplomats were confident that the Czar was
pacified and that peace was once more restored to Europe. But, unfortunately, the note, prepared with such great care, received a thorough scrutiny at Constantinople, where it was discovered that it had entirely failed to take into account the question of the sovereignty of the Sultan, and so had sacrificed the essential point of the controversy. Notwithstanding Canning's official support of the note, which personally he opposed, the Grand Council of the Porte, by refusing to accept the note until it was amended, again threw the whole question open for discussion.

For the moment this action of Turkey's turned from her the sympathy of the Powers; France, England, and Austria expressed to Russia their profound regrets, and Turkey seemed abandoned. But European diplomats, who with a profound misconception of human nature had so often during the century disposed of peoples and nations as one would the passionless pieces in a game of chess, were now forced to recognise the hopelessness of the game they were playing. On September 7th, when the Czar rejected the Turkish amendments to the Vienna note, he issued an Analysis in which he stated, in the simplest and barest form, that no matter what the diplomats might wish to do, they could not deter him from the determination to obtain such a right of intervention as would give him the desired guarantees in Turkey. Then, at last, it dawned upon the representatives at the conference that the Czar, interpreting the note in terms entirely different from their own, was, in reality, entirely unwilling to submit the question to diplomatic settlement. Immediately the tide of sympathy turned again toward Turkey, who, all the while, had been the only one to discover the ulterior motives of the Czar, and, with an instinct born of danger, to discern the weakness of the diplomatic missive framed to protect her. With a temper characteristic of the old days of her military greatness, she now took matters into her own hands. Weary of the efforts of the Powers, and growing daily more animated with the warlike, even fanati-
cal, spirit that was seeking to arouse the Mussulmans against the infidels, to unfold the Crescent once more against the Cross, the Turk, in the face of financial bankruptcy and administrative corruption, took the initiative, and trusting in the foreign fleets lying in Besika bay, decided to act for himself. He ordered General Gortchakoff to evacuate the principalities, with the understanding that war would immediately follow his refusal to obey.

But even now, with preparations for war already made, with the Russians and Turks facing each other in the principalities, and with the allied fleets lying just outside the prohibited waters of the Dardanelles, the Powers still clung to the hope that this war might be averted, that this conflict, which threatened to involve all Europe, might be arrested on the very brink of hostilities; and though one event after another had shown the impotence of the European concert, they could not bring themselves to believe that the system which had as its raison d'être the settlement of disputes between states and the preservation of the equilibrium, and which had maintained the peace successfully for forty years, must now, in the presence of the greater crisis, admit that it had failed.

But the control of the issue was already passing out of their hands. Even while France and England were entering into an agreement to take the part of mediators, a report was brought to the west that on November 2, 1853, the Turks had defeated the Russians at Oltenitza, and that a few days later, as a response to this opening of hostilities, the Russian fleet, setting out from Sebastopol, had destroyed a Turkish squadron that had taken refuge in Sinope bay. Russia's action, which was wholly defensible from the view of military operations, had an extraordinary effect upon Europe. The spirit of the people of the west was, as the Prince Consort said of the English, "furiously Turkish and anti-Russian." Public opinion, for so many years outraged by Russia's autocratic and reactionary policy,
now construed every Russian act an aggression, every Turkish act a defence, made Lord Palmerston and Napoleon III. its heroes, and losing sight of the true proportion of events in its excitement over Prince Menchikoff’s mission and the occupation of the principalities, refused to see in this last act of Russia anything but an odious attack by a strong Power upon a weak one, a fleet destroyed without mercy, a village burned to ashes—in short, an allied Power bullied and maltreated in the very presence of the fleets of the maritime governments. No arguments of Cobden, Bright, and the peace party could check the desire for war prevalent among the English, for their moral sense was outraged, their pride and their honour were at stake; and when, toward the end of the year, France, whose people had not at first looked with favour on the war, proposed that the allied fleet enter the Black Sea for the protection of Turkey, England met her more than half-way. Lord Aberdeen, to whom the doctrine of equilibrium was a dogma, was obliged to defer to the opinion of Palmerston, who, if he had consulted merely his personal wishes, would have sent the British fleet at once into the Black Sea, shut the Russian fleet in port, and informed the Czar that there it would remain until the principalities were evacuated. For a moment the English cabinet hesitated, and Palmerston resigned. But in ten days he was recalled in triumph, and was henceforth the inspirer of the national policy. Before the end of December the allied fleets had entered the Euxine, and the Czar had learned, that as the Turks had been driven from the principalities by the Russians, so the latter, in their turn, were to be driven from the Black Sea by the allied Powers.

The situation was an extraordinary one; no one desired war, no rational cause for war existed, all the participants were acting in a measure on the defensive, the Czar was in the principalities to defend the Greek Christians, and the allied Powers were in the Black Sea to defend the Turks. Again the
conference used its influence to effect a compromise, but by February, 1854, it had given up its work in despair, for the Czar rejected Turkey's terms, and insisted on others that the Sultan could not accept. Thereupon the western Powers, whose warlike attitude gave to their opinions exceptional value, made a final attempt to settle the matter. Napoleon III. sent a personal letter to the Czar, stating that the time had come for a decision, for either an entente définitif or a positive rupture, and he added that unless the evacuation of the principalities were made one of the conditions of peace, France and England would resort to arms. The reply that arrived on February 13th was characteristic of the man who had refused to call Napoleon mon frère. With haughtiness Nicolas replied to his bon ami refusing to treat upon the terms proposed, and saying that Russia would show herself to be in 1854 what she had been in 1812. Such a pointed reference to the Moscow campaign destroyed all hopes of peace, and at once the western Powers prepared for war. On the 27th of March, Napoleon III. and Queen Victoria simultaneously announced, one to the Corps législatif, the other to Parliament, the opening of hostilities. The next day war was officially declared.

Inasmuch as it was confidently expected that the scene of the war would be the valley of the Danube, where the Turks had already been unexpectedly successful in the winter defence of the principalities against the forces of the Czar, the generals in command of the allied troops, Raglan and Saint-Arnaud, turned their attention to the western coast of the Black Sea as the most suitable point from which to make the attack. By May 20th, over thirty thousand French and twenty thousand English soldiers had been landed in Gallipoli, a small Turkish town at the eastern extremity of the Dardanelles, selected as the first place of occupation because of its nearness to Constantinople and its available character for purposes of defence. In the meantime the Czar, mortified at the inactivity of his
troops during the winter, had determined to prosecute the campaign with greater vigour; and, sending the Russian troops across the Danube into the Dobrudscha, with the evident design of forcing the passage across the Balkans, attacking Adrianople, and perhaps advancing to Constantinople, had begun in May the siege of Silistria. When the allies heard of this move, they at first decided to go to the aid of the Turks by way of Shumla; but soon perceiving the rashness of this plan, had decided to go to Varna, not for immediate operations, but simply to approach the seat of war. In the meantime, while more troops were on their way from England and France, and while the generals were discussing the plan of campaign, the surprising news was spread abroad that on June 22d the Russians had withdrawn from before Silistria, and were evacuating the principalities and returning to Russia. The report was true. By the 1st of July the last Muscovite had crossed the Pruth, and the principalities were free.

To understand this remarkable move, one must examine further the diplomatic relations between the Powers. During the early months of 1854, when war with Russia had seemed a certainty to England and France, it became a matter of tremendous importance to know what would be the attitude of Austria and Prussia. Would a quadruple alliance be formed, or would England and France carry on the war alone? Such an alliance was desired by the maritime Powers, not only because of the advantages that would accrue from such a combination, but also because of the apparent necessity of attacking Russia by way of the upper Danube, a movement demanding the co-operation of Austria. Before, however, any agreement could be reached, England and France had declared war, and had decided to make the attack from the side of Turkey. In this emergency Austria’s policy was wholly characteristic; Count Buol, casting aside all feelings of gratitude for Russia, played a clever, but essentially selfish, game of strategy. Believing Russia’s pro-
gress southward to be a menace to Austria, he made a great show of military preparation, assumed a warlike tone, and declared that he was ready to aid the western Powers if the Czar should refuse to evacuate the principalities. But underneath this bellicose exterior he concealed a more subtle purpose. Unwilling to commit himself to a positive alliance until it had become evident that England and France had gone too far to retreat, he determined to remain in the rear, and to leave the actual work of fighting to the other Powers. His scheme, which was not unlike that of Metternich's in 1813, was to push France and England to the front as a first line of attack, while Austria, Prussia, and the Germanic Confederation were to form a second line sufficiently imposing to enable Austria to interfere at the proper moment in the capacity of mediator, and in this way to gain the control of the situation, and the right to act as the arbiter of Europe at a general congress. This plan, however, involved the consent of Prussia, and the recent relations between that state and Austria made it wholly uncertain what Prussia's action would be.

Many forces were at work at this crisis in affairs to influence the decision of Frederic William IV. The Prussian liberals, who saw in the Czar an enemy to German unity, and the Prussian statesmen, who sympathised with the liberal party, urged upon the king an alliance with England; the conservatives and the feudalists advocated the position of friendly neutrality that the Czar had offered to both Austria and Prussia the January before; while a third party, of which Bismarck was the chief representative, influenced neither by liberal sentiments nor by conservative prejudices, argued that as the war offered no advantages for Prussia, her position should be one of strict neutrality, as that alone could save her from incriminating herself in the eyes of Russia, whose good will would some day be desirable. Bismarck used his influence to prevent the king from adopting any entangling policy, and especially opposed an
alliance with Austria, on the ground that Prussia would be playing into the hand of that Power without compensation.

On the whole, Frederic William inclined toward neutrality, for much as he admired the Czar as the protector of the Christians, he could not ally with one who was disturbing the peace of Europe, nor could he join with England even though she were a Protestant Power, because he objected to her support of the infidels and her alliance with Napoleon III. Yet he dared not stand alone, for he was as fearful as ever of the "Tiger of the West," and believed that in taking a neutral stand, Prussia would be throwing down her defences and inviting attack from France. So, notwithstanding Bismarck’s opposition, he listened with favour to Austria’s proposal for an alliance, and on April 20th signed a guarantee treaty promising to protect the Austrian territory in case that state entered the war against Russia. However, by obtaining the addition of a clause stating that the treaty should not become operative until agreed to by the states of the Confederation, Bismarck entirely altered the situation; for as he foresaw, and later events were to prove, the states of the Confederation had no sympathy for Austria’s warlike policy, and were strongly in favour of neutrality. Therefore, should England and France demand the co-operation of Austria, and should that Power demand the co-operation of Prussia, the latter could say that she could not move without the Confederation. In short, Buol found himself checkmated by the despised Prussian government, with his plan, which was solely to the advantage of Austria, to all intents and purposes successfully frustrated.

But the treaty of April 20th contained two clauses supplemental to those named above. In the first place, Austria was to demand of the Czar the evacuation of the principalities. This was but a repetition of the agreement into which all the Powers had entered, and which they had reaffirmed on May 23d, when the actions of the Czar had become more than ever
menacing. In the second place, Prussia promised to take the offensive in case the Czar refused Austria's demands and crossed the Balkans. A test of these clauses was soon made. On June 2d Buol notified the Czar that he was to evacuate the principalities, and in reply Nicolas promised to do so if Austria would guarantee him against further attacks from England and France, whose troops had already landed at Varna. But as Austria could not give any such guarantee without the consent of the Powers concerned, she sent an inquiry to London and Paris and enclosed Russia's proposal. In the meantime she continued her preparations for war, and on June 14th made an agreement with Turkey for a joint occupation of the principalities, in case Russia should withdraw her troops, and urged Prussia and the Confederation to come in line with their contingents. But at this point it became evident that Prussia was not interpreting the supplemental clauses to the treaty of April 20th in the same way as was Austria; for in answer to the latter's request, she expressed herself as satisfied with the Czar's reply, and declared that she was exempt from the second clause, which bound her to take part in the war; while the Confederation, acting with annoying slowness, showed unmistakably that it, too, was resolved to remain neutral. While chafing under this rebuff, Count Buol received the reply from England and France. The allied Powers, ignoring entirely the proposition of the Czar, which they could not accept because they had already decided to continue the war in order to humiliate Russia, demanded of Austria point blank that she enter into an offensive and defensive alliance against the Czar. Buol was in a sorry predicament. His plan for retaining the leadership without war had failed, because Prussia and the Confederation refused to second him, and now the western Powers were demanding the very thing that he was most assiduously avoiding, the declaration of war against Russia. Fortunately, in this crisis, the Czar, fearing that Austria would join in a triple
alliance against him, and preferring to fight his enemies in a less vulnerable spot than the region of the Danube, decided to accede to Austria’s demands without any conditions. To this end he issued the order, the execution of which had caused so much astonishment among the allied forces at Varna. The principalities were cleared, Turkey was relieved, and the pretext for war was removed.

But the Czar was not to escape with so light a penalty. Already had the maritime governments decided upon the continuation of the war, and selected Sebastopol in the Crimea as the most available field of operations; already were the allied troops at Varna preparing for embarkation upon the Black Sea for the purpose of destroying the fortress whence had gone forth the fleet that had destroyed the Turkish squadron at Sinope. Yet even while this embarkation was taking place, between July 14 and September 7, 1854, the Powers were once more considering plans for peace. England and France drew up, and submitted to Austria as the mediator, the terms according to which alone peace could be preserved. In this new conference Prussia had no part, for she had practically committed herself to a position of neutrality, and in so doing had called down upon herself the wrath of France, and of England to such an extent that the Prince Consort wrote on July 29th, very unjustly: “Prussia’s conduct is truly revolting, and the king is looked upon by all political men here with profound contempt.” The terms adopted by the three Powers on August 8th were four in number, and have become famous under the name of the Four Points. They declared first, that the imperial court of Russia should give up its right of protectorate over the principalities of Wallachia, Moldavia, and Servia, while the privileges accorded to these provinces by previous sultans should be placed under the collective guarantee of the Powers; secondly, that no obstacle should be opposed to the free navigation of the Danube, and that the rules laid down at
the congress of Vienna regulating the navigation of rivers should be applied henceforth to the Danube and its mouths; thirdly, that the treaty of the Straits (1841) should be revised in the interests of the European equilibrium; and, fourthly, that Russia should resign any pretensions to the right of protectorate over the subjects of the Porte, to whatsoever religion they belonged, while the great Powers should assist in obtaining from the Ottoman government the confirmation and the observance of the religious privileges of the different Christian communities, without trespassing on the dignity of the Sultan. These terms were, however, disdainfully rejected by the Czar; and in consequence the western Powers made no further attempt to effect a reconciliation. The embarkation of troops continued, and the invasion of the Crimea began.

The war thus undertaken for the purpose of destroying Sebastopol is almost unique in history. Springing from a dispute over merely abstract questions of influence and political equilibrium, entered into without hate, as far as the feelings of the peoples for each other were concerned, and undertaken without any idea of conquest or of material advantage to those taking part in it, it became a battle to the death, a duel between two gigantic champions. It was a war possessing few of the characteristics of wars in general; it was one which, from the beginning to the end, all desired to avoid; which became more bitter as the diplomats redoubled their efforts to preserve peace; which seemed to be forced on by influences beyond the control of governments or their representatives; which was due to causes more deeply hidden than those alleged; and which was more intimately connected with the events of the preceding forty years than students of mere diplomacy are willing to concede. It was, in fact, a war which found its inspiration in the irreconcilable hostility between the liberalism of the west and the despotism of the east, a war for an idea, as it was called, a war bound up with events dating from the French Revolution. To
those who had taken part in the reform movement in England, or in the war against personal and class government in France, or in the struggle for constitutional privileges in Germany, the Czar’s assault upon Turkey had seemed not merely an attack upon the vaguely understood political dogma of the equilibrium, but part and parcel of that series of acts which, from 1820 to 1850, had characterised the efforts of the absolutist governments, whose desire it was to check the progress of liberal ideas. This high-handed attack by a strong state upon a weak one called for something more than the drafting of notes and protocols; the outraged sentiment of the west demanded a positive humiliation of Russia, and that, too, not for the purpose of preserving the independence of Turkey, or of guaranteeing her against further aggression, but for the purpose of weakening the power and humbling the pride of the autocrat of the reactionary policy. In this crisis, something more irresistible than the traditions of England, or the desire of Napoleon III. to turn public attention from his coup d’état, was thwarting the efforts of the diplomats in conference at Vienna. Popular opinion, whether for right or wrong, was demanding that the abasement of the Czar be effected by peaceful means if possible; if not, by force. The invasion of the Crimea was to no small degree the revenge taken by western Europe for its failure in the uprising of 1848, and for the hated reaction of 1849; and it was no accident that those who suffered most from the issue of the war were Russia and Austria, the Powers who had been the leaders of that reaction.

After leaving Varna, the allied troops landed on the northwestern coast of the Crimean peninsula, for according to the first plan Sebastopol was to be attacked from the north. On September 20th Prince Menchikoff was defeated in the battle of the Alma, and the way to Sebastopol was open; but when the heights above the city were reached, it was found that an attack from the north, with the open roadstead between the
allies and the fortress, was beyond the strength of the forces and resources at command. It was then decided to undertake a regular siege, and by a flank movement the armies were transferred to the southern extremity of the peninsula. The death of Saint-Arnaud on September 29th threw the command of the French into the hands of Canrobert, and under his supervision, in conjunction with the English and Turkish commanders, the siege was regularly begun on October 17th. Through the natural strength of the fortress, and the magnificent defence of Tödleben, the Russian general, the struggle was one of the most bitter and obstinate in the history of warfare. The battles of Balaklava on October 25th, and of Inkermann on November 5th, showed stubborn fighting on both sides, but advanced little the cause of the allies. The winter of 1854 and 1855, because of rains, hurricanes, bad housing, and insufficient provisioning and equipment, proved an object lesson for Europe in the inadequacy of the existing commissariat and hospital systems. This experience, though disastrous at the time, had a most salutary effect; for the management of these matters improved, and strenuous efforts were made throughout the west to remedy the fatal defects. And Russia suffered no less; her soldiers had been beaten, her fleet in the Black Sea had been destroyed, and the troops that had been sent from the north had suffered fearfully in the steppes of southern Russia; while within Sebastopol the distress increased with each day of the siege, and as the summer of 1855 drew near, sickness, fire, and loss in battle depleted the garrison at a terrible rate. To Russia, the Crimea became a veritable quicksand engulfing her men and supplies; for the demand for ammunition and provisions constantly increased, and, shut out, as they were, from the waters of the Black Sea, the Russians could receive their stores and transfer their wounded by the land route only, a method entailing a toilsome journey of wearisome stretches over wretched roads.
The victories of Balaklava and Inkermann had an immediate effect upon the course of diplomatic negotiations. England and France, becoming more and more angry because of the neutral attitude of Prussia and the inactivity of Austria, demanded for the third time, in November, 1854, that the latter Power join the alliance, and aid in bringing the war to a close. But as Austria refused to act without Prussia and Prussia without the Confederation, and as Count Buol could not get from Berlin or Frankfort sufficient support to warrant his attempting to carry out his plan of mediation, it seemed as if the demand would be refused again. But at this juncture there appeared a new factor that Austria was bound to consider. Piedmont, who for five years had rejected all of Austria's advice, now entered definitely into negotiation with the allies with the object of taking part in the war; and Austria, already alarmed by the growing strength of the young state along commercial, industrial, and military lines, and by its ability to maintain its spiritual and political independence in the face of great odds, saw that she must act quickly and forestall Victor Emmanuel and Cavour, or lose caste in Europe. Therefore, on December 2, 1854, she signed a treaty with France and England promising neither to depart from the terms of the Four Points nor to negotiate separately with Russia, but to defend the principalities which she was already occupying in accordance with the terms of her treaty with Turkey of June 14th; and, in case peace were not made by January 1, 1855, to deliberate with the others as to the most desirable means of attaining the end for which the alliance had been formed.

Buol was at last driven to do what he had so long avoided; he had committed himself to a treaty with England and France, and had promised to take part, under certain conditions, in the war against Russia. Yet he was determined not to fight, and had in consequence drafted the terms of the treaty in a manner sufficiently vague and elastic to insure much diplomatic discus-
sion and delay. He had signed the treaty to thwart the project of Piedmont, to flatter England and France, and to intimidate Russia; and he still hoped to see realised his dream of an armed mediation. But his diplomacy was at fault. Russia, who had already sent Gorchakov to negotiate with Austria on the general basis of the Four Points, was enraged at her ingratitude; England and France, at first accepting the treaty in good faith, became thoroughly angry as week after week went by and Austria, offering one excuse after another, refused to take an active part in the war; the Federal Diet, which had been making certain friendly advances in November, took alarm, and instead of yielding to Buol's demand for war contingents, passed a resolution on January 30th refusing to mobilise the troops, and on February 8th, yielding to Bismarck's influence, agreed to put the troops on a war footing, but only for defence against France; Prussia, winning the gratitude of Russia by her neutrality and advice to the Federal Diet, grew suspicious of Buol's crafty methods, and flatly refused to assist Austria in any warlike demonstrations; and, lastly, Sardinia, her despised neighbour, accepted Cavour's plan of an alliance with the western Powers, signed on January 10th a treaty binding herself to take part unconditionally in the war, and on April 21st fulfilled the conditions of the treaty by dispatching 15,000 men to the Crimea, where they fought bravely side by side with the French and English. Austria was preparing herself for a day of reckoning, and to Bismarck on one side and Cavour on the other was it to no small extent due that her selfish scheme for retaining the leadership in Europe was effectually frustrated.

From January to March, 1855, the fortress of Sebastopol under the skilful management of Todleben so successfully resisted the attack of the allies, that the latter redoubled their efforts to effect a peace which, with honour to all concerned, would close the war. But Russia, who had agreed to the Four Points as the basis of discussion the December before for no
other purpose than to alienate Austria from the west, now showed a marvellous power of delay by putting off the conferences from week to week, in order to prevent Austria from carrying out the terms of the treaty of December 2d. But on March 2d, an event took place which greatly hastened the movement making for peace. Nicolas I., to whose obstinacy and pride the people of the west attributed the origin of the war, died, broken down with the cares that he had brought upon himself and the burdens that he brought upon his country, and was succeeded by his eldest son, the Grand Duke Alexander. The latter, though declaring in his manifesto to his people that he would preserve the integrity of his Empire and follow the traditions of his ancestors, was nevertheless very desirous of putting an end to the war. On March 10th he announced through Nesselrode to the courts of Europe his wish to re-establish peace. The western Powers, especially France, hoping to bring the ruinous expedition of the Crimea to an end, urged that the conferences be opened at once at Vienna; and on March 16th, the representatives of France, England, Austria, and Russia met to discuss the four conditions that had been laid down as the basis of a permanent peace.

Little difficulty was experienced in settling the first two points; for Russia agreed to resign the protectorate of the principalities, and to throw open the mouths of the Danube to free navigation; but when, on March 26th, the revision of the treaty of the Straits came up for discussion, many difficulties presented themselves. The western Powers insisted that the maintenance of Turkish integrity could be obtained in no other way than by the suppression or diminution of the Russian fleet that lay in the Black Sea; and so important did they deem this question to be, that England sent Lord John Russell and France, Drouyn de Lhuys as special envoys to Vienna. At first the envoys advised that all vessels be excluded from the waters of the Black Sea, but to this proposition Austria would
not agree, knowing that Russia would not. Then Buol, in private conference, proposed a system of "counter weights," according to which the ships in the Ruxine belonging to the allies should be increased proportionally whenever Russia added to the number of her vessels; but to this proposal the western representatives objected, on the ground that it involved no humiliation for Russia. In default of agreement, the conference came to an end on June 14th, and this last attempt to solve the problem by diplomacy alone proved, as had all previous attempts, unsuccessful. Then it was that Austria resigned her office of mediator, and declaring that she was no longer bound by the terms of the treaty of December 2d, returned to a position of neutrality. Francis Joseph discharged his reserve forces, reduced the number of his officers, dispersed the army drawn up on the frontier, and stopped all further military preparations. Thus Austria closed her career as a leader among the Powers of Europe. She had played her game and had lost. The supremacy which the revolution of 1848 had not been able to overthrow was now threatened with destruction, because Austria had been outwitted in the diplomatic contest.

War alone could now decide the issue, and the siege of Sevastopol, which would have been raised had the diplomats at Vienna succeeded in their mission, was prosecuted with even greater vigour than before. During March, April, and May, at the very time when the negotiations were in progress, the besiegers had been able to accomplish but little, largely because the English and French were not working in perfect harmony. For this state of affairs Napoleon was largely responsible; for having been dissuaded with difficulty from taking the field in person, he was endeavouring to control the movement of his troops by telegraph, and was hampering Canrobert, whose efficiency was injured by his own want of decision, as well as by the commands from the Tuileries. But
the succession of Pélissier, a man who did not hesitate to disobey the imperial orders whenever it seemed necessary to do so, resulted in the adoption of a more vigorous policy; and on June 18th a general attack was made upon the fortress, but without success. The failure of this attempt, followed by the death of Lord Raglan on the 28th, checked for the time being the forward movement, and during the months of July and August the troops were engaged merely in advancing the lines of attack, and in cutting off the besieged from outside aid. On August 15th, an attempt of the Russians under General Gorchakov to take the offensive and dislodge the French and Sardinians from their position on the Fedioukine heights, resulted in the victory for the allies of the Tchernaya, and prepared the way for a second and final assault. On September 5th the bombardment began: the batteries of the allies opened a veritable fire of hell upon the fortress, and for two days poured a continuous stream of shot and shell into the beleaguered city. On the 8th the assault was made. The English under Codrington attacked the great-Redan; the French hurled themselves on the Malakof, the little-Redan, and the central Bastion. The defence of the Russians was long, brave, and in large part successful; but the capture by the French of the Malakof, which had long been recognised as the key to the fortress, destroyed all hope of longer defending the city, and consequently, on the night of the 8th, the surviving Russians, crossing to the northern side of the harbour, abandoned the southern stronghold, which they had so bravely defended.

From a military point of view this victory, won with so much heroism and courage, with so much loss and suffering on both sides, was in no way final. The Russians were safely intrenched on the northern side of the harbour, opposite the allied armies, and out of the reach of the allied fleets; while as far as other parts of her vast empire were concerned, Russia remained prac-
tically intact. What the allies really had accomplished was this: they had driven Russia from the Black Sea and had captured the most important part of Sebastopol; they had won a victory at Kinburn, opposite Odessa, and cut off an important source of supplies for the troops in the Crimea; they had taken Bomarsund on the Åland islands in the Baltic, and had destroyed the arsenal of Swaborg in the gulf of Finland. But they had failed in the attack on Cronstadt, and were to lose the fortress of Kars in the Caucasus, which though bravely defended by the English general, Williams, was captured by the Russians on November 24th. Therefore, with the single exception of Sebastopol and Swaborg, Russia had come out of the struggle uninjured, and, from a military standpoint, might well have been considered, at the close of 1855, as formidable as ever. But by the people of the west, the taking of the Malakof with the consequent fall of the fortress of Sebastopol, was deemed a noble and heroic achievement. The losses of the Russians, the victories of the allies, and the dismantling of the stronghold that had threatened the independence of the Turks, satisfied their amour propre and their national pride, and seemed to them the rebuke that the Czar had richly deserved. It was felt that this war, which had been largely political in origin, and had been continued without hatred and national rivalry, had gained its end in humiliating, without dismembering, the great autocratic state of the east, and that further bloodshed would be not only unnecessary, but brutal.

For the moment, however, the governments thought differently. Napoleon, who was dreaming of further conquest, wished to drive the Russians from the Mackenzie Farm and the north side of the harbour; to push them even to Simferopol and the steppes extending to Perecp; and instead of destroying Sebastopol, to hold it in a state of defence as a guarantee for the future. And England was even more determined than France to continue the struggle, for her troops had gained less
glory than those of France, and she had accomplished less than her resources should have enabled her to do. Though unprepared when the war had broken out, she had gradually remedied the defects of her military organisation, and was naturally desirous of making further use of her costly armaments, improved system, and full ranks. She wished to destroy Cronstadt as she had destroyed Sebastopol, to operate in Circassia and Finland and the Persian border provinces, and, above all, to prevent the conclusion of a peace that she felt sure would be to the advantage of the Czar, in case no further measures were taken to cripple Russia. Nor did Russia show a disposition to withdraw from the war. On the contrary, the Czar declared that he would never abandon the Chersonese "where Vladamir had been baptised," and at the reviews of his troops in the Crimea, gave every indication of a determination to make still further requisitions on the resources of his country.

But the warlike zeal of France was only on the surface. The French people desired peace, and were beginning to murmur at the excessive military charges; the speculators and dealers in stocks, many of whom were officials or men of influence at the Tuileries, opposed the continuation of the war, because it was injuring their prospects of gain; the financial condition of the country forbade further sacrifices; while a political magnanimity began to dominate the journals, the salons, private conversation, and public discourses. Napoleon himself, despite his warlike projects, was ready for peace; he had reaped great military glory from the war, his position as an influential monarch in Europe was firmly established, and he was unwilling to expend further the resources of France except for French aggrandizement. Russia, too, was in reality far from ready to continue the struggle that had already cost her dear, if only a reasonable peace could be arranged. She was embarrassed both as to her military forces and her finances, the larger part of the educated and middle classes, already in revolt against the autocratic system of
Nicolas, was demanding the adoption of economic and social reforms, the extension of education, the building of railroads, and the reorganisation of the state government; while the fall of Kars soothed Alexander's wounded pride, and made him the more disposed to listen to peace proposals. Hoping to gain more favorable conditions by drawing France from the coalition, the Russian government, through its agents in Paris, and some of the minor princes and diplomats in Germany who wished to effect a reconciliation between France and Russia, made overtures at the Tuileries, and let it be known that Russia was willing to treat on condition that neither indemnity nor cession of territory should be demanded. Napoleon was wholly inclined to accept this proposal, if Russia would concede the neutrality of the Black Sea, though at the same time he let England know, that whatever might be said by the "peace at any price" party in the interests of the stock-jobbers on the Bourse, he would not agree to any peace of which England did not approve.

This statement of Napoleon's had been called forth by the attempt of Austria to regain the position she had lost after the close of the conferences in June, 1855. No sooner had Sebastopol fallen than Buol formulated certain conditions that were to be presented to Russia as an ultimatum; and these he transmitted to Napoleon, whose alliance Austria especially desired, inasmuch as she viewed with alarm the interest that the French Emperor was showing in the affairs of Italy. But Austria's cause did not prosper. England, who was not consulted, was highly indignant at such a method of diplomacy; and Palmerston, declaring that he did not mean to have Austria dictating terms of peace to which England was to agree without discussion, asserted that he would, if necessary, continue the war alone, with Turkey as his only ally. England's warlike tone was very acceptable to Turkey, and to Sardinia and Sweden also; for Sardinia hoped to gain by prolongation of the war a further claim to the amity of the allies, while
Sweden, already in treaty with England, November 24th, and thankful to her for the bombardment of Bomarsund, which had freed the Baltic, was desirous of annexing Finland. Furthermore, though Napoleon had accepted Austria's proposal, he did not hesitate to receive Victor Emmanuel and Cavour in December with demonstrations of friendship, and to remark that he would see what could be done for Italy.

Then Austria, changing her tactics, presented to all the Powers a general ultimatum, and promised to break off diplomatic relations with Russia if that Power did not accept the ultimatum by January 18, 1856. The terms of this ultimatum were simply the Four Points, somewhat extended to allow for a rectification of the Moldavian frontier,—a change which would entail a loss of territory upon Russia,—and for a fifth clause, which stated that the Powers would discuss at the peace congress other matters of general European interest. In Austria's plan all concurred, though England expressed herself as dissatisfied because the ultimatum did not provide that Russia should never again fortify the Åland islands. But when it was explained, that the question of these islands could be discussed under the fifth clause, she yielded, and the ultimatum was dispatched to St. Petersburg. The Czar, enraged that Austria should demand the cession of territory, at first rejected all the conditions not included in the original Four Points. Public anxiety increased, and in Paris the stocks fell and stock-jobbers became desperate. But the position of the Czar was untenable; for Austria had now committed herself to act with the western Powers, England was determined to make the peace conditions as hard as possible for Russia, and Napoleon was ready to stand by his ally. Therefore, when Frederic William IV., fearing lest a continuation of the war should draw him from his position of neutrality, wrote a personal letter to Alexander urging him to accept the proffered terms; and when in the council held at St. Petersburg, January 15th,
the ministers were almost unanimous in thinking that to reject the ultimatum would be to range against Russia England, France, Austria, Sardinia, Turkey, and Sweden, to make possible the loss of Poland, Finland, the Crimea, and Circassia, and to bring about the complete bankruptcy of the state; and especially after it was hinted that, by yielding, Russia might be able to regain in the end all that she would now lose, the Czar gave his assent, and on the 16th sent dispatches to Vienna and the western capitals announcing that Russia accepted the Austrian ultimatum without reserve. Peace was thus practically assured.

In consequence of this decision, there gathered at Paris, February 25th, the representatives of England, Austria, France, Russia, and Turkey, the Powers that had taken a leading part in the Crimean war. Sardinia also was admitted, notwithstanding Buol's desire that she be excluded; for the presence of Cavour at the council table on terms of equality with the representatives of the great Powers, was a source of constant worry and annoyance to the Austrian statesman. Sweden, though by treaty an ally, did not ask to be admitted; and Prussia was not at first invited to participate in the doings of the congress. This exclusion of Prussia, which roused the feeling at Berlin that she was losing caste among the Powers, and becoming isolated in Europe, was insisted on by Austria, Russia, and England on the ground, as the Prince Consort wrote, "that it would be a most perilous precedent for the future to admit the principle, that Powers may take part in the great game of politics, without having first laid down their stakes." In truth, England, knowing that her course in regard to the peace had not been popular abroad, wished to prevent any increase in the number of representatives at the congress who would be friendly to Russia and hostile to herself. But the exclusion of Prussia was only temporary. After the preliminary meetings, it was felt that the presence of Prussia was
necessary for any revision of the treaty of 1841, to which she had been a party; and as Napoleon, in a spirit of generosity that was especially courteous to the man who had called him the common enemy of Europe, wished to spare her further humiliation, an invitation was extended; and on March 16th the representatives of Prussia took their places with the others. This act was an indication of Napoleon's unwillingness to emulate England's hostile attitude toward the Powers that had gained her ill will, and showed that he wished to be on good terms with Prussia and Russia, without giving up his friendly relations with England, and to strengthen still further the position of France as the arbiter of European peace. This transferrency of prestige from Austria to France, in part indicated by the fact that the congress was held in Paris instead of Vienna, was little calculated to please a man of Buol's ambition. His own attempt at mediation had failed, and his position at Paris was far from pleasant. Russia was hostile, England dissatisfied, France studiously courteous, Prussia inclined to be jubilant, and Sardinia, preserving a grave demeanor, was seeking by a manly and straightforward course to gain further diplomatic advantages, which, if won, would be to Austria's discomfort. In this spirit the work of drawing up the treaty was conducted.

The terms of the treaty of Paris were based strictly upon a modified form of the Four Points as expressed in Austria's ultimatum. Russia made no objection to the clause excluding all ships of war from the Black Sea, and forbidding the re-establishment of any maritime arsenal. The position of the Christians within the Ottoman Empire had already received the attention of the Porte, who, in a hatti humayoun of February 18th, had not only conceded to each communion the free exercise of its worship, but had promised a series of reforms, which, had they ever been carried out, would have revolutionised the administration of the Turkish state. In consequence of this decree,
the crowning work of Stratford Canning, the contracting Powers admitted the Porte to participate in the advantages of the public law and system of Europe; they promised to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and in the famous Article IX. declared, that the Powers had no right "to interfere either collectively or separately, in the relations of his Majesty the Sultan with his subjects, or in the internal administration of his empire." By this clause, than which none was more fatuous or had less historical warrant, the Powers handed over to the government that for ten years had proved false to the promises it had made over and over again to Stratford Canning, the absolute right to treat as it pleased the Christians in its territory, whom by Mussulman law it was bound to destroy. If the Christians by the Crimean war had been deprived of Russian protection in order to preserve the independence of Turkey, they were now given over, without any reservation except for worthless promises, to the greed and fanaticism of Turkish pashas and Turkish priests. Morally speaking, this act of the allies was an affront to the civilisation of Europe.

A better deed of the congress was the abolition of the Russian protectorate over the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, which were granted entire independence under the suzerainty of the Porte, and thus became the first of those independent states, the construction of which is the most important feature of the history of southeastern Europe during the last forty years. The question of the navigation of the Danube was settled without troublesome debate, and that river was placed among the free rivers of Europe, and made subject to the principles laid down at the congress of Vienna governing the navigation of rivers. One question only excited an animated discussion. The proposal to rectify the Russian frontier, so that no part of it should be contiguous to the Danube, touched the Muscovite pride very keenly. The Russian representatives,
trying in every way to avoid the slight humiliation involved in the insignificant cession of territory, made substitute proposals, but in vain. The allies considered this grant of territory as but an equitable compensation for the sacrifices entailed upon them by the Crimean war; and Austria, in particular, who first made the suggestion, supported it as vigorously as if she had been a victorious participant in the war. Russia was deeply offended by Austria's attitude. "The Austrian plenipotentiary," said Count Orloff to Cavour, "does not realise how much that rectification will some day cost his country in blood and tears."

After the settlement of the chief questions and the discussion of certain minor matters, among which was the neutralisation of the Åland islands, which England greatly desired, the congress passed on to the consideration of a number of topics of general European interest. Of these one, which had been the cause of considerable bitterness of feeling in those earlier days when England was threatening the balance of power at sea, was agreed to by all, and, as embodied in a special protocol, which nearly all the states in the civilised world, except Spain, Mexico, and the United States, had before the end of the year promised to support, became a part of international law. Privateering was abolished; a neutral flag was made to cover an enemy's goods except contrabands of war; neutral merchandise, contrabands of war excepted, was declared not seizable when under an enemy's flag; and it was agreed that a blockade to be binding must be efficient—that is, must be sustained by a force really sufficient to prevent access to an enemy's coast. England, whose defiance of these principles had aroused against her the armed neutralities of 1780 and 1800, had agreed with France to respect neutral flags and not to issue letters of marque and reprisal at all during the Crimean war; and this concession had prepared the way for the work of the Congress. Though the new declaration left undefined the words "pri-
vateering" (la course) and "contraband," an omission that has still to be supplied in the dictionary of international law; though the United States refused to be a party to the protocol, on the ground that the congress ought to have gone further and have entirely exempted private property at sea; and though occasionally English statesmen regret the surrender of maritime rights as likely to cripple England's sea power in the event of another war; nevertheless, in spite of all its defects and disadvantages, the new decree marked an advance in the development of an equitable maritime law, and went far in bringing about more amicable relations between nations.

The other questions that arose did not pass beyond the point of discussion; but they are of special interest as showing the desire of Napoleon to further the cause of nationalities, and to bring about, if possible, the calling of a new congress to amend the treaty of 1815 in the interests of the smaller states. Napoleon had frequently talked with the English representative, Lord Clarendon, upon the subject, but without making much impression. Now, however, at the instigation of Cavour, who addressed a note to him on March 17th protesting against the occupation of Italy by French and Austrian troops, and against the absolutist policy of the Pope, the Emperor's representative, Count Walewski, who was presiding, had presented the matter to the congress. The questions discussed concerned the amelioration of the political condition of Greece, the evacuation of Rome, the promotion of reforms by the Pope, the suppression of the absolutist reaction in Naples, and the violence of the newspaper press, notably in Belgium, where the attacks on Napoleon III. had been especially violent. Regarding most of these subjects the congress was agreed; but against all that affected the condition of Italy.—and in the discussion of this question England and Sardinia supported France.—Austria opposed protest, declaring that the matter was not one which concerned the congress. No action was taken: Cavour's
letter of March 27th and another of April 16th remained unanswered; and the name of Italy was nowhere officially mentioned: but the Italian question had been solemnly placed before a European congress as a matter of general European interest; it had aroused no protest except that of Austria; and it had come before the world with powerful protectors as a question to be solved. The diplomatic advantage of all this for Piedmont cannot be overestimated.

The Crimean war and the diplomatic negotiations attending it, if judged strictly by the conditions of the treaty of Paris, can be said to have contributed but little to the progress of European civilisation. The less conspicuous matters, such as the opening of the Danube and the alterations in maritime law, were, it is true, important, in that they served to increase commercial activity and freedom; and the freeing of the principalities was of consequence, in that it set a precedent for determining the attitude of the Powers toward the subject nationalities of the south-east. But that which stands as the most important result of the work of the congress, that which was made the subject of a special treaty between England, France, and Austria, on April 15th,—namely, the maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire, the admission of that state into the concert of Europe, and the solemn renunciation of all right of control over the internal affairs of the Empire itself,—was probably the most ill-advised and suicidal diplomatic action that has ever been taken by a body of representatives discussing international questions. To guarantee the integrity of the state that for two centuries had been suffering steady but certain dismemberment, was to ignore all the lessons of the past, to invite war, and to insure anxiety for the future. In attempting to make a European of the Sultan, to teach the Turks the principles of good government, to transform a state that was corrupt and decayed, and by its very law hostile to Christian religion, into one that was healthy,
progressive, and tolerant, without retaining the right to com-
peI the carrying out of the reforms, the representatives of Eng-
land, France, and Austria made an absurd and costly political
experiment, were guilty of a gigantic political blunder. The
charter of reform, which had been secured from the Turk with
much diplomacy and skill by Lord Stratford, became "a life-
less paper, valuable only as a record of sound principles";
because, instead of being followed up by that persistent pres-
sure from without which alone could compel the enforcement
of its decrees, it was left to the mercy of the indolent and
treacherous Turk, who rejoiced to be free from this surveil-
ance of the foreign Powers. No wonder that Lord Stratford
could say that he would rather have cut off his right hand than
have signed that treaty, and could mournfully write to Lord
Clarendon that when he heard the politicians of the country
remark that the troubles of Europe, with respect to the Otto-
man Empire, were only beginning, he knew not how to reply.
The treaty of Paris not only postponed indefinitely the settle-
ment of the Eastern Question, but it increased tenfold the
difficulties of the problem.

If this was the treatment of the state for which so much
blood had been shed and so many sacrifices made, what was to
be done with Russia, whose aggressive policy had brought on
the war? To all appearances she had come out of the struggle
iner - she had, it is true, lost the control of the Black Sea, and
had been forced to submit to a slight rectification of her fron-
ter - but these were comparatively trivial losses. Her position in
the congress was far from that of a defeated enemy: she was
not as a great Power whose brave resistance and glorious
defence had gained for her the respect of her antagonists. She
came out from the conflict with new allies: for though
austrian Austria her tone was hostile, and for England she
experienced a increasing if feeling that time alone could wear
away yet she was in terms of intimacy with Prussia and of
friendship with Sardinia, and was daily growing in the favour of France, with whom she seemed to have come to some sort of understanding. Her position in Europe seemed to be but little impaired. But morally Russia had suffered a signal defeat. Her policy of aggrandisement had received a permanent check; she had lost control of the Black Sea, and the right of protectorate over the Christians; she had been forced to give up her hope of conquest in the south-west, and of dominion over Turkish territory, and to see herself baffled after two centuries of uninterrupted success. Furthermore, the prolongation of the war had seriously impaired her resources, decimated her troops, injured her trade and husbandry, and thrown into confusion her finances; and though still powerful enough to command a hearing in diplomatic affairs from 1860 to 1870, yet in order to recover from her injuries, she was forced to retire, at a time eventful in the history of Europe, from an active participation in the affairs of the west.

But for central and western Europe the war was an agency of pre-eminent importance in furthering the movements for national unity that had been an organic part of the history of the preceding forty years. The diplomacy of the Crimean war effected a veritable revolution in the relations existing between the European Powers. The influence of England, which for nearly forty years had been exerted in behalf of liberalism, now began to decline; and England, finding herself forced into a position of isolation, largely because of her determination to carry on the war against the wishes of the other Powers, turned her attention to her own affairs, and for the next twenty years withdrew more and more from continental politics. But it was Austria whom the war chiefly affected. Autocrat of central Europe in the days of Metternich and Schwarzenberg, she, rather than Russia, issued from the conflict the conquered Power. Aiming to maintain for selfish ends her old position of supremacy without sharing the burdens of the war, she was
forced to see her leadership wrested from her, her prestige impaired, her political influence gone, and herself discredited and without a friend, unless England might be so considered, among the Powers of Europe. Her effort to force her reactionary doctrines upon the states within the sphere of her influence, had roused against her, no less than against Russia, the ill-will of the peoples of the west, and had encouraged Prussia and Sardinia to thwart her policy at every opportunity, and to destroy the power that she had so long wielded. And in this work Napoleon III. was to aid them. Victor in a war that had redounded to the glory of France, head of a congress that had met in his own capital to declare the peace; the recipient of the homage of the plenipotentiaries when peace had been finally proclaimed; it is little wonder that he began to exalt himself as the favoured son of destiny, the chief among sovereigns and princes. The birth of an heir during the sittings of the congress strengthened his hold upon the throne of France, and seemed to bind him more closely to the French people. Secure at home and influential abroad, he now thought to carry out his long-cherished plans for aiding the lesser states; and in his desire to humiliate Austria, from whom for the moment he had snatched the leadership in Europe, he prepared to aid the national movements in Italy and Germany, the future importance of which he hardly appreciated. He did not realise that in helping to create two states of first rank on the other side of the Alps and the Rhine, he was preparing the way for his own overthrow and for the abasement of France.

The real victors, when we consider the ultimate issue of the war, were not Austria, France, or England, but Sardinia and Prussia. The war did not create the forces that led to the national unity of Italy and Germany, but it gave rise to a diplomatic situation which destroyed for the moment the power of Russia and the influence of Austria, and gave to Cavour and Bismarck the opportunity that each was seeking. It cannot be said that a war with such issues was fought in vain.
CHAPTER III.

THE UNITY OF ITALY.

The revolution of 1848-1849 resulted in Italy in the failure of the moderate party to free the country from the Austrian yoke, and the reaction that followed seemed to bind the Italians more firmly than ever to the narrow and conservative policy that Austria and the petty princes had up to this time pursued. Throughout the peninsula but one state could point to any definite result of thirty years of political agitation and revolution; but one state could boast of having preserved its constitutional form of government; but one had made political progress: in Piedmont alone lay all the hopes of Italy. On the morrow of the day made memorable by the battle of Novara and his father’s abdication, Victor Emmanuel found himself as king of Piedmont confronted with the difficult task of choosing between the two policies that lay open to him: of deciding whether to set aside the Statuto, substitute the blue flag of Savoy for the tri-colour, disappoint the hopes of those who looked upon him as leader of the Italian nation, and follow the reaction that was becoming general throughout Europe; or manfully to take up the cause of Italy as well as of Piedmont, preserve the Statuto and the tri-colour flag, bear the displeasure of Austria, Russia, and central Europe, and even at the cost of personal ease and the internal repose of the kingdom, sacrifice the present gains for the sake of a brighter future. The choice was difficult and the responsibility great, for the future of Italy to a large extent depended upon that
decision. Yet Victor Emmanuel never hesitated. Though confronted by a victorious enemy, from whom it was necessary to gain terms that would leave the state and the constitution intact; though obliged to meet at home a radical party and a radical parliament that were unwilling to consider any compromise with Austria, and were ready to reject the monarchy and establish committees of public safety to continue the war; though England and France were inclined to discourage further affronts upon Austria, and Europe as a whole was against him; nevertheless, Victor Emmanuel, largely on his own responsibility, and depending less upon his advisers than upon his own good sense and honesty, rejected the policy of reaction and of submission to Austria, and took up the cause of the constitution and of Italy.

But the king’s position was stronger than it seemed. Although prejudiced by all the traditions of his house and the experiences of his early training in favour of the aristocracy and the church, Victor Emmanuel was ever ready to sacrifice his personal inclinations in the interests of his people and his state; and though ignorant of the arts of diplomacy and government, was imbued with a spirit of bravery and truth, and possessed judgment and tact and a frankness of manner and speech that stood him in excellent stead during the important crises of his career. Furthermore, his advisers, d’Azeglio, de Ravel, Balbo, and others, though men of varying opinion, all supported a constitutional form of government and were devoted to him and his dynasty; while the hardy and well-disciplined people under his sway, Savoyards, Piedmontese, and Sardinians, accustomed to a simple and frugal life and to a healthy activity, were, though faithful to the church, more faithful to the house of Savoy, and formed a compact social element, which, in certain emergencies, proved a source of ammunions strength to the king and his government. Then, too, the situation of European equilibrium aided the king and pre-
served the kingdom from dismemberment at the hands of Austria; for as early as July, 1849, Louis Napoleon had expressed his interest in the affairs of Italy, and had informed Schwarzenberg, that any attempt to endanger the integrity of the Piedmontese territory, or to threaten in the least the independence of the Sardinian government, would bring France at once to the defence of the Italian state.

After his return to Turin, Victor Emmanuel’s first task was to embody in the form of a permanent treaty the preliminaries of peace that he had himself gained from the Austrian general, Radetzky. But the difficulty was not only with Austria; Radetzky, hard and merciless as he had so often proved himself to be, was not so great a menace to the cause of Italy as was the Piedmontese Parliament, which, in its determination to refuse any terms that Austria might offer, was endeavouring by a revolution in Genoa and cries of treachery in Turin to thwart the king’s policy. But Victor Emmanuel was as determined to resist revolution as he had been to resist reaction; and having dissolved the first Parliament, he summoned on July 30, 1849, a second, which he hoped would confirm his treaty with Austria. Though his people were showing themselves unskilled in parliamentary methods, and as yet wanting in appreciation of the parliamentary form of government granted them by his father; though the second Parliament, elected by the war party which monopolised the polls, voted to reject the peace; and though Austria, growing weary of delay, was urging the king to dispense with what she considered the unnecessary formality of gaining the consent of the representatives of the people; Victor Emmanuel showed his firmness of purpose by dissolving on November 17th the second body, and issuing a proclamation to his people. The appeal was successful; for the new elections, in securing for the government a firm and stable majority, showed that the masses of the people had little sympathy with the radicals of Turin and
Genoa. The treaty with Austria, in spite of its severe burden of a war indemnity amounting to seventy-five millions of livres, was at last adopted; and the government was ready, under the leadership of d'Azeglio, to apply itself to the work of strengthening Piedmont's position at home and abroad.

The policy adopted by d'Azeglio, though never so vigorously and audaciously pursued, was the same as that which Cavour made so effective in the period after 1852: the plan of both men was to bring the state, by one means or another, before the eyes of Europe; to turn defeat into victory by discrediting the position of Austria; and, at the same time, to reorganise and strengthen the internal affairs of the state along military, economic, and religious lines, not only that the people might be benefited, but also that there might exist a striking contrast between progressive Piedmont and the reactionary states around her. The beginnings were small but significant. D'Azeglio, ignoring the fact of Piedmont's defeat, spoke in the manner of a victor of the necessity of uniting Parma and Modena to Piedmont, of forming a tariff league with Tuscany, and of preventing Austria from cutting off Piedmont from the centre and south of Italy. Through their own press and the foreign correspondents, the Piedmontese liberals strenuously opposed Austrian intervention in Italy, and denounced her for her interference in the duchies and in the affairs of the papacy, and especially for her audacity in trying to take Lombardo-Venetia into the Germanic Confederation. But in this national policy the little state did not dare to go too far; for such conduct aroused the greatest indignation at Vienna, and might have resulted in consequences dangerous to Piedmont, had she not used great tact and caution. Fortunately for her, Prince Schwarzenberg, whose diplomatic skill and audacity might have proved a serious obstacle to her progress, died on April 5, 1852, and Piedmont's most dangerous enemy was removed from her path.
But while it was to be left to Cavour to carry out, in the main, the foreign policy of the state, d’Azeglio initiated another line of action which combined internal reorganisation with the assumption of the leadership of Italy, and marked the beginning of a controversy with Rome, which, lasting openly for twenty years, is hardly yet finished. Politically speaking, Rome was Piedmont’s only rival in the peninsula, and for more than a year Victor Emmanuel had been endeavouring by friendly negotiations with the Pope to bring about a reform of the ecclesiastical conditions of Piedmont. In this he failed, and, consequently, in 1850, the Sardinian government, finding that it could not have Rome for an ally, decided to force the issue and to treat her as an enemy. In order, therefore, to accomplish the double purpose of weakening a rival state and perfecting an important constitutional improvement, the ministry brought forward in February, 1850, a measure abolishing the privileges of the ecclesiastical tribunals, which as defined by old custom and re-affirmed by the concordat of 1831, gave to the church the control of cases relating to betrothals and marriages, and to the clergy, special exemptions in matters of debt and imprisonment that were deemed to be out of accord with the spirit of the constitution. The law was passed on April 9th and duly ratified by the Senate. At once a great outcry arose; complaints were circulated; the papal nuncio demanded his passports; the archbishop of Turin forbade the clergy to accept the jurisdiction of the civil courts; and as a last piece of unnecessary bigotry, the rites of the church were refused to the minister of commerce, Santa Rosa, an act which aroused the hostility of the devout Piedmontese. The government pursued the matter to the bitter end, and having arrested the archbishop, first confined him in the citadel of Turin, and afterward banished him from the kingdom. Then, feeling that it had gone far enough, it opened negotiations with the Pope; moderated the operation of the law, reserving to the church certain
of its original rights; and demanded only such concessions as the papacy had made to France. But notwithstanding this attempt to moderate the effect of the law, the indignation at Rome was intense, for the Pope appreciated the fact that those who had framed this measure meant, not only to benefit Piedmont, but also to humiliate him, to furnish the statesmen of Europe with an illustration of papal obstinacy.

The policy of the government, so far successful in the secret struggle with Austria and the open struggle with Rome, represents the work of Massimo d'Azeglio. But d'Azeglio was not the man to carry such a policy to its logical conclusion. He was too upright, too strictly honourable to employ doubtful or deceitful means, or to adopt those measures that the times demanded of one who would be the leader of a new Piedmont. He had already gone as far as he could; he was already not a little concerned at the results of his controversy with Rome, and of the encouragement which he seemed to be giving to the radical elements in the state, and to the cause of demagogues, whom he hated. Not even for the sake of Italy could he ally himself with the revolutionists. Furthermore, he never desired the unity of the entire peninsula, nor did he foresee the importance of securing for Italy the sympathy and co-operation of the European Powers; and lacking the qualifications needed for the larger task, he shrank before its greatness, and failed to discern the means whereby it could be accomplished. But he had done a noble work for his country, one which prepared the way for the greater achievements of a man who, in no way his superior in honour, probity, and love of Italy, was gifted with those qualities of energy and diplomatic genius that made it possible for him to become the artisan of a new Italy. Cavour built upon the foundations that d'Azeglio had laid, but he enlarged their scope, and made a grander structure than d'Azeglio had dreamed of. He was the man fitted by disposition and experience for the difficult task of reconstruction.
From his early childhood Camillo de Cavour had given evidences of keen powers of observation and inquiry, showing always a decided preference for the exact sciences, and an independent spirit that resented, and was impatient of, restraint or coercion. When but a lad, he had looked upon his appointment as page to Prince de Carignan as an insult, and as a young man of twenty-one,—but a young man of liberal convictions and very decided opinions,—he had resigned his commission in the army, fancying that some disgrace was implied in his being transferred from one fort to another. But ambitious and restless, Cavour could not remain idle; and in 1835 he had travelled in England and France, satisfying his intellectual curiosity by studying the commercial and economic interests of these countries, and by unearthing and collecting documents, for which, as far as he knew, he should have no use. On his return to Italy, he had retired to his farm at Leri, near Vercelli, where, as Mazade says, "he lived for years, syndic of his village and farm; himself directing all the details of a vast system of cultivation, seeking aid in the discoveries of science, introducing new measures and machines, thus converting a dilapidated estate into a model property. It was his work, his conquest—a prelude to many other conquests. To this he owed much of what made his peculiar originality and his weight in politics, his familiar experience of things and men, his practical acquaintance with all special interests, and his ability and judgment in the management of the country's wealth." Although aware of his own ability, Cavour did not at first inspire confidence in the minds of strangers. He was short of stature and stout, near-sighted, and careless in his dress, on the whole a rather commonplace-looking person; but his unfailing good sense, his marvellous power of work, his clearness of vision, and his knowledge of men and ability to take advantage of every instrument that came to his hand, whether peer or common workman, friend or foe,—these qualities soon won
for him the respect and admiration of all who worked with him, or who watched him, first as a member of the Piedmontese Parliament in 1848, and, after the death of Santa Rosa, as minister of agriculture, commerce, and the navy in the cabinet of d'Azeglio. With the expansion of his powers, Piedmont became a world too narrow for him, the ministry of commerce a sphere too confined, and, at the same time, a certain sense of mastery, and a growing conviction that Italy's future depended upon her relations with the Powers, aroused in him a determination to become president of the council and minister of foreign affairs. With each duty he became more prominent and influential, until finally, in 1852, he was able to bring about a shifting of party lines and a change of leaders, in consequence of which he took his own place as master of Piedmont.

During the period from 1849 to 1852, the control of the government had been, in the main, in the hands of the conservatives, who had made up the majority which had accepted the peace after the overthrow of Novara. However, in the course of d'Azeglio's ministry, this majority began to break; and the extreme conservatives, or the Right, not only opposed the law abolishing the ecclesiastical privileges, but also showed a disposition to thwart the national and liberal policy of the government, though still remaining loyal to the constitution. In this crisis, d'Azeglio did not have the courage to take the step that a progressive policy demanded. He could not bring himself to break from the extreme conservatives,—from men like Balbo, de Revel, Menebrea, his friends in the past,—who had represented the party of reform during the period from 1840 to 1848, when doing so would involve a union with the more moderate of the radicals, who up to this time had been opponents of the government. But Cavour, who was bound by no ties or traditions, by no sentimental considerations of old friendships, had already begun to urge upon the government the necessity of a union with the Left Centre of the Chamber, of which Ratazzi
was chief. The election of Ratazzi to the presidency of the Chamber, chiefly through the influence of Cavour, marked the definite breaking with the Right, and consummated an alliance between the Right and Left Centres, which later became Cavour's main support. Satisfied with this victory, Cavour submitted to a temporary exclusion from the cabinet, and journeyed to England and France for the purpose of making new friends and of extending his ideas regarding the reconstruction of Piedmont. But he was not long to remain away: d'Azeglio was weary of governing, and with that heartiness of appreciation which had always characterised his conduct, made way for his friendly, but more brilliant, rival. On November 4, 1852, Cavour was summoned by the king to form a new ministry. His opportunity had now come. Drawing to himself the moderates of all parties, but never for a moment yielding the supremacy of his own, the Right Centre, he formed a liberal-conservative ministry, and with a parliamentary majority, which grew stronger as the years passed, he put into operation the political program that he unremittingly pursued for nine years, a program admirably explained by his own words. "It is impossible," he said, "for the government to have an Italian or national policy outwardly, without being inwardly reforming and liberal; just as it would be impossible to be inwardly liberal, without being national and Italian in all external relations."

This policy was not original with Cavour; but the form that it took under his hands was new. No one before him had so fully appreciated the desirability of transforming the Piedmontese question into one that should be European; of effecting the reorganisation of Piedmont, that Europe might be impressed with the fact, that at least one of the Italian governments was not given over to misrule, that one was conducted according to ideas essentially modern, and was showing itself in legislation, economic activity, and financial solvency, a model for all the
smaller, and for some of the larger, states. In other words, Cavour strove to bring Piedmont out of the old régime into the new, to modernise her, in order to remove the taint of revolution that still clung to her, and to rouse confidence among European statesmen that her reforms were to be permanent. During the years from 1852 to 1855 his one idea was to extend the economic and commercial interests of the country, partly to increase the productivity of the state, that the financial burdens might be met without an excessive economy that would have necessitated Piedmont's withdrawing from the rôle he meant her to play in Europe; partly to bring his country into closer touch with the world beyond the Alps, that through a community of economic interests, closer political and diplomatic relations might be possible. Treaties of commerce were negotiated with France, England, Belgium, and Switzerland, and every encouragement was given to private enterprises. Numerous railways were built within Piedmont, from Turin to Genoa, Lake Maggiore, Novara, and Savoy; and plans were made for securing a closer relation with France by tunnelling Mt. Cenis, and with Germany, by tunnelling the Luckmanier or Mt. St. Gotthard. Delegates were sent to London to study the economic institutions of England, and at the exposition of 1855 in Paris, Piedmont made every effort to be represented with honour. The plans for arming the fortresses and increasing the military resources, which had originated with d'Azeglio, were carried out by his successor. The army was reorganised, military discipline was improved, and fortresses were strengthened or repaired. At the same time every effort was made to avoid indiscretions: all revolutionary speeches were rigorously suppressed, and debate in Parliament was in the main confined to economic and social questions.

And Piedmont lost no opportunity of making her work of reform known to the world. Through refugees from other of the Italian states, who were welcomed at Turin, and through clever
writers with a knowledge of language but no money, who became correspondents of the foreign journals, every petty reform was published throughout the western world, every successful undertaking was commented on in terms of praise. Furthermore, the same pens that lauded the work of Piedmont, did not leave unchronicled the least of the despotic, arbitrary, or foolish deeds committed in Naples, Tuscany, Rome, or the Austrian provinces, with the inevitable consequence, that as the Italian question became known throughout Europe, Cavour was able to strengthen his own position in Piedmont by making use of the comments of the European press based on documents that he himself had furnished. At the same time, he gave every opportunity to diplomats at the court of Turin, to visiting statesmen, even to tourists, to see the progress of Piedmont, to study its administration, to compare it with the bureaucracy, the formalism, the neglectful and arbitrary government beyond the Ticino or the Apennines. Notwithstanding that the burdens this policy imposed frequently aroused the opposition of the radicals, it was on the whole popular. Proof of this was given in various ways, but especially by the reception given to utterances of Cavour. On one occasion, when, in replying to an attack made by Brofferio of the extreme Left, he said: "We are a people small in the force and the physical resources at our disposal, but great in that we faithfully represent the idea of progress and of modern liberty, ideas which must be extended," he was greeted with applause in the Chamber and with praise in foreign journals.

While the industrial and administrative conditions of the state were thus undergoing reorganisation, a question left unsettled by d'Azeglio—that of Piedmont's relations with the church and with Rome—became pre-eminently important. In 1854, Victor Emmanuel entered into negotiations with the Pope regarding a reduction of the number of dioceses, the secularisation of certain ecclesiastical estates, and a more equitable distribu-
tion of the ecclesiastical revenues; but Cavour, confident that an understanding with Rome could not be reached, brought matters to a crisis by introducing a law—famous as the conventual law—which aroused intense excitement in the Piedmontese Parliament, and completed the estrangement between himself and the conservative party. This law provided that all religious communities should be suppressed, except those of the Sisters of Charity and other orders especially mentioned; and that the revenues from their endowments should revert to the state, to be kept apart from the other public monies for the increase of the salaries of the poorer priests, and the payment of certain religious services and certain life annuities granted to members of the secularised orders. Bitter was the opposition that this measure provoked in the Chamber of Deputies, and from January to March, 1855, the debate raged fiercely. While this discussion was taking place in Parliament, the king lost in rapid succession his mother, his wife, and his brother, losses which, to the superstitious, seemed to be but the divine rebuke for the warfare against the church. But under the masterful leadership of Cavour, the Chamber, unshaken by the terrors which the deaths in the royal household caused among the people, passed the measure by a considerable majority, and turned it over to the Senate. In this more conservative body the combat was even fiercer; for the struggle was not only for a law, not only for a parliamentary majority, but, above all else, for the constitutional independence of Piedmont. Cavour, thinking the Senate to be against him, resigned; but his opponents could not form a ministry, and the king once more summoned him to take office. In thus recalling Cavour and pledging himself to adopt his minister's policy, Victor Emmanuel made one of the greatest sacrifices of his life; for his act was equivalent to a public admission that he was willing, for the sake of country, to lay aside all that tradition and training had made dear to him, to make any concession of personal feelings that would in
any way benefit Piedmont or Italy. The effect upon the Senate was immediate: the law of convents was ratified May 22, 1855.

The passing of this law marks the beginning of a new history for Piedmont; for it gave the victory in Parliament to the moderate party, which was committed to a liberal program, and enabled Cavour to show that his policy in opposing concordats did not disturb ecclesiastical independence in matters concerning the regimen of souls,—in short, allowed him to make good his famous saying, "a free church in a free state,"—and inaugurated a régime that soon made Piedmont recognised as one of the most progressive of the constitutional states of Europe. It is an interesting fact, that during the very period when Piedmont was developing her liberal political system, Austria was growing more despotic and reactionary; and that within three weeks after the passage of this law which made Piedmont independent of the papal authority, Austria should have bound herself more closely than ever to Rome by the concordat of 1855, which made the bishops the autocrats of education and masters of the intellectual life of the people, and placed the state, in many matters purely secular, under the control of the Roman Catholic Church. It is not surprising, that statesmen and tourists visiting Austria and Piedmont should have contrasted the intellectual torpor of the one with the intellectual activity of the other, and should have made known their views to western Europe.

But the transformation from the old to the new system was not accomplished without uneasiness, discontent, and even distress. The new economic policy imposed heavy financial burdens upon the people, often ran counter to old ideas and methods of industry, and brought about temporary panics. During the years 1853 and 1854, a great scarcity of grain and wine, and a general insufficiency of the harvests aggravated the situation. The government was accused by the reactionary papers of leading the country to schism, anarchy, and destruction; and the
minister himself was charged with oppressing the artisan and the labourer, and with supporting sacrilegious measures that were bringing upon the country the vengeance of Heaven. But his confidence in the economic soundness of his measures, his belief that the distress would be only temporary, and his natural elasticity of nature, made it possible for Cavour to bear these attacks with equanimity. And time alone was needed to prove the justness of his conclusions. By degrees, Piedmont responded to his efforts; and as she began to feel the benefits of a system that was increasing her wealth and enlarging the scope of her economic activity, she quickened with new life and energy. Her commercial ventures, her public works, and her reorganised army gave her new dignity and stability; while her regard for peace and order, and her rigorous suppression of all revolutionary movements, increased the confidence of the European governments, and gave her an honourable name among European statesmen. "The Piedmontese government has given many proofs of its devotion to social order," wrote Drouyn de Lhuys in 1854; and to Cavour redounded the glory. Success at home inspired him with confidence and self-reliance, and raised him in the esteem of his own people; while his ability to strengthen the relations between Piedmont and the Powers of Europe, and to make his own state the most prominent of all the governments of second rank, raised him in the esteem of foreign statesmen, and caused him to be regarded as a diplomat of no mean parts. The time had come when, with safety, he might apply his foreign policy, when he might step beyond the bounds of his little state and enter the field of European diplomacy; he meant to take his part in the settlement of the vexatious Eastern Question.

The importance of the Eastern Question for Italy had already been appreciated by political writers in Piedmont; and when, in 1853, war actually broke out between Turkey and Russia, Count Balbo, who had written the Hopes of Italy in the decade
before, believed that the time had come when Austria would exchange the crown of Lombardy for possessions on the Danube. But Balbo died the same year, and his speculations found little place in the plans of the greater statesman, who had no faith that Austria would voluntarily withdraw from her possessions on the Po. As early as January, 1854, Cavour had formulated a different scheme, whereby the Eastern Question might become of advantage to Piedmont. "Does not your Majesty think," he said one day to Victor Emmanuel, "that we ought to find a way of participating in any war that the Powers may wage against Russia?" "If I am not able to go," said the king, "I will send my brother." From this time the idea of co-operating with the western governments became fixed in Cavour's mind. But his opponents took another view of the matter; for they saw in his plan for securing the support of France and England nothing but a mad enterprise and a piece of folly that would merely impose new sacrifices on the country, without any adequate compensation. What, they asked, has Piedmont to gain from a war in the east; and how would co-operation in a struggle with Russia, further the cause of Italian independence and unity? But Cavour was encouraged by a new incident. In 1853 the relations with Austria had been strained to the breaking point by an uprising in Milan, which had led the imperial government, notwithstanding the protests of the court of Turin, to sequestrate the lands of the Lombard emigrés residing in Piedmont. The western governments had been troubled by this event, because it was rumoured, that Austria's unwillingness to join in the Crimean war was due to the fact that she could not employ her military forces against Russia, as long as there was danger of a war with Italy. These rumours had led to some diplomatic correspondence with Piedmont, in course of which both Drouyn de Lhuys and Sir James Hudson, minister of England at Turin, encouraged Cavour in his plan of joining the western alliance. "The Eastern Question is without doubt,"
said the former, "of importance to all Europe; and that is why Piedmont, in whom the French government and especially the French Emperor has a great interest, would find it worth her while to take an active part in the war." A little later Hudson said: "Why do you not yourselves put a corps of troops at the service of the allies? That will be the best way of depriving Austria of all opportunity for turgid speeches." To this Cavour had replied, that he personally was ready to advise the king to send fifteen thousand men to the East, if only such co-operation would not injure Piedmont's interests.

This decision, which represented at the time only Cavour's personal opinion, was not concurred in by the other councillors of the king. If Austria was using her fear of Piedmont as a pretext for refusing or postponing indefinitely the alliance with the western Powers against Russia, the Piedmontese ministers, especially Dabormida, minister of foreign affairs, were equally afraid that Austria would take advantage of the absence of the best of their troops in the East to injure Piedmont; and refused, for that reason, to accept Cavour's plans of an alliance without conditions. Therefore, during the summer and autumn of 1854, Cavour was obliged to await the issue in patience; but early in December, 1854, a proposition from England to employ Piedmontese troops in her service in the Crimea, followed by a formal demand on the part of both England and France, that Sardinia should join the alliance that these Powers had made on April 10th, brought the matter officially before the Piedmontese council. The first of the proposals the ministers rejected without hesitation, as humiliating to the state, adding that Piedmont's pride would not allow her to send soldiers to the Crimea as mercenaries of England; that she desired no subsidy; that her general must be in no way subordinate to the generals of the allied armies; and that all she would accept of England was a loan of two million of livres, to be paid under certain specified conditions. As to the second part of the pro-
posal, the ministers were equally decided; they could not enter into the alliance with England and France, unless the Powers would give written guarantees, first, that Piedmont should be admitted to the congress or to the conferences at which a treaty of peace should be signed; second, that England and France, at the close of the war, should promise to take into consideration the bad condition of Italy; and third, that the Powers should use their good offices to persuade Austria to restore the sequestrated lands of the Lombard refugees.

But Cavour, who had mastered the diplomatic situation, knew that the Powers would accept no such conditions, and for the excellent reason, that the guarantees would be an affront to Austria, whose army of 200,000 men was of far greater importance to them at this moment, than was Piedmont's small contingent, especially now that the alliance of December 2, 1854, had been signed, and the Powers had every reason to believe that Austria would actually join in the war. The situation was very perplexing to Cavour. The Powers would not agree to an alliance with the guarantees; while Rattazzi, La Marmora, and especially Dabormida, would not consent to a treaty without them. To reject these proposals was to retire into obscurity, to lose all that had been gained since Novara; and to such a course Cavour could not, for a moment, consent. But he did not hesitate. By his masterful will he practically forced Dabormida to resign from the cabinet, and persuaded the king to appoint him in Dabormida's place as minister of foreign affairs. Then hastening to the ambassadors of France and England, he accepted the alliance without guarantees, and promised to dispatch fifteen thousand men to the Crimea. This act of Cavour's, which, in the ordinary course of political events, would have been without apology, seemed to belie the good statesmanship that had thus far guided the affairs of Piedmont. Conservatives and radicals alike condemned it, the former, as a bold revolutionary manœuvre, the latter, as a piece of criminal im-
becility. "This is not a war of principles, of civilisation, of progress," cried Brofferio; "I see in it nothing but covetousness and ambition, and unbridled longing for riches and power"; and Mazzini wrote to Cavour: "You have taken a step toward an alliance with Austria; the moral degradation of the only principality upon which Italy's hopes have rested, is monstrous." But Cavour, fully aware, as he wrote to the Countess Oldofredi on the morning after the signing of the treaty, that he had assumed "a tremendous responsibility," never showed greater statesmanship than when he sought, by an unconditional acceptance of the invitation of the allies, to outwit Austria, and to gain the good will of the western Powers. Looking into the future, and seeing in the treaty but the first step in a long course of diplomatic manoeuvring that would, in the end, serve Italy better than would revolutions and conspiracies, he felt convinced that the sacrifices of 1855 would be recompensed a hundred-fold, when the united kingdom for which he was working should become an assured fact. And as he was unable at this time to disclose his larger plans, it is to the honour of Piedmont that her representatives in Parliament bravely supported him. In the Chamber of Deputies he was able to carry his proposal by a majority of fifty; and aided by d'Azeglio, who spoke for him loyally in the Senate, he secured in that body a favourable majority of thirty-six.

The policy, which after many discouraging attempts Cavour had made to prevail, received its first test on April 31st, when Piedmont's troops set out for the Crimea. Yet the crisis was by no means over; for before any results were to be obtained, there was to intervene a long period of anxious waiting, during which new incidents were to rouse his further uneasiness, and to increase the scepticism and coldness of his political opponents. Austria was bitterly angry; an unfortunate dispute between La Marmora and Lord Raglan regarding the rank of the Sardinian general threatened to make trouble with England;
THE UNITY OF ITALY.

heavy losses by cholera among the Sardinian soldiers in the Crimea added to the griefs of the people; while the inactivity of the troops for three months without share in the glory of the siege, roused uncertainty and disappointment at Turin.

But the long delay finally had its reward. In August a dispatch from La Marmora announced the victory of the Tchernaya, in which the Piedmontese soldiers received their first baptism of fire. "We have repulsed the Russians," said the dispatch, "to the cries of 'Vive le roi' and 'Vive la patrie,' and the Piedmontese displayed great bravery." "This news," wrote Cavour, "has raised the public pride, and has reconciled the world to the policy of the treaty"; and a few weeks later, when he heard of the capture of the Malakof, he added: "The fall of Sebastopol is a complete justification of our policy, against which all eloquence is now powerless." Greatly encouraged, he urged Victor Emmanuel to visit Paris and London to take advantage of his new prestige in an act of courtesy, and to increase the number of the friends of Sardinia. The visit lasted from November 23d to the end of the year, and showed Victor Emmanuel to the people of the west as a loyal ally and a constitutional king. To Cavour it offered an opportunity of seeking the aid of either England or France in a war against Austria. In the former country he received little encouragement: "You have acquired enough glory," said Clarendon. But from France he expected more; for Napoleon III. had already expressed deep personal sympathy for Italy, and in 1849, in 1852, and again in 1853, had spoken significant words regarding the part that France might play in Italian affairs. Nor was Cavour disappointed. At a dinner at the Tuileries on December 7th the Emperor said to him, "Write confidentially to Walewski whatever you believe I can do for Italy." Immediately Cavour, following this suggestion, drew up a statement containing the minimum of Italy's grievances and demands. For the moment nothing more was said or done; but the gain, though slight,
was to Sawyer a promise of better things to come, for the time
was now adequate return for all his labours.

The Powers were in the meantime had been discussing the
question as to whether or not to continue the war, were deciding on favour of peace. But peace Cavour did not desire. In
the prolongation of the war, for which Sardinia was now eager, he saw Italy's only chance of actual gain. He could discover no advantages in a peace congress held at this stage of the
situation, before the war had really been fought out, and before
the Parmaese troops had been able to win for their country
the military preponderance that he desired. As Piedmont had
not been admitted to the peace conferences the spring before at
Terna, there was no reason to suppose that the grievances of
Italy would be noticed if the final congress were held before
further conquests had been made. In fact, there was every
reason to think otherwise: for the part that Austria was taking
in furthering the cause of peace, would make it impossible for
the Powers, however much they disliked the Austrian policy,
not to have a congress to discuss the
Italian question. And if this question were not considered,
what asked Cavour, could the congress aid the cause that he
held so near? When, therefore, he heard that Russia had ac-
cepted the ultimatum, and that a congress was to be summoned
at February with he wrote to La Marmora, "Under the pres-
cent circumstances we can hope for little"; but, at the same
time, he made every effort to gain a place for Piedmont on an
equal footing with the other Powers, and to strengthen his in-
fluence over Napoleon III., from whom he expected some
advancement of interest in Italy. In both particulars he was suc-
sessful. Piedmont took her place at the council board at Paris
and the discussion equal of the other allies; and at the famous sit-
tings at April 29th, at the instigation of the Emperor, the subject
of trade was introduced.

In that session, immediately after a few preliminary words
by Walewski, Lord Clarendon discussed, in detail, the condition of Italy. He declared that the presence of foreign troops upon Italian soil was a menace to the European equilibrium, and that the government of the Pope was the worst in Europe; and he denounced the king of Naples for his cruelty, and the petty Italian princes for their uselessness and inefficiency. "No Italian statesman," said Cavour in his dispatch to Cibrario, "could have formulated a more energetic or true act of accusation, than did the minister of foreign affairs of Great Britain." Buol, greatly offended, replied that the subject was foreign to the object of the congress, and one upon which he had no instructions; and Russia and Prussia upheld him, though in no way thereby committing themselves to the support of Austria. Then Cavour spoke, with moderation indeed, because, as he wrote to d’Azeglio, it seemed to him that he ought to be as calm in speaking as he meant to be bold in acting, when the opportunity should offer. He repeated the grievances of Italy, and after enumerating the evils of the Austrian occupation, showed that it was contrary to the treaties, destructive of the political equilibrium of the peninsula, and dangerous to Sardinia. No action was taken by the congress, for Buol opposed the drafting of a protocol upon the subject, and Cavour willingly acquiesced, knowing that a half-way measure at this time would tie his hand for the future.

He had gained his point, for Austria, who had entered the congress as the mediator, would now go forth accused and discomfited. Buol’s obstinacy had annoyed the Emperor of the French, and made him the more amenable to the arguments of Cavour; while France and England had openly admitted that Italy’s wretched condition was a matter of European interest, even though England was by no means convinced that the situation would be improved by enlarging Piedmont. Furthermore, Russia and Prussia were more in sympathy with the policy of Cavour than their official declarations seemed to indicate; and
the people of the west were strong in their loyalty to the Italian cause, not only because they admired Piedmont for her devotion to constitutional government in the midst of the reactionary influences that surrounded her; but also because they hated Austria, even more than they had hated Russia, as the enemy of political and religious liberty. Thus after April 8, 1856, Italy was a reality to Europe, a factor to be reckoned with in the diplomatic arrangements of the future; and the world knew that she had as her leader a statesman of tried ability, a diplomat without his peer, and a daring intriguer and adventurer in the field of international politics, who was ready to break the peace, or to violate any rule or tradition of European diplomacy, if only Italy might be united and free.

And Austria recognised the gravity of the situation. Although enraged by the humiliating treatment to which she had been subjected at Paris, she resolved to change for the moment her policy toward Italy, and to try the effect of moderation and concessions. Acting upon English advice, she modified the rigour of her police system in Lombardo-Venetia, pardoned political criminals, and promised a speedy amnesty; in 1856-57, Francis Joseph visited Milan, granted the promised amnesty, restored the sequestrated lands of the Lombard refugees, conceded unusual privileges to the towns, the churches, and public institutions; and, that this policy might have a guarantee for the future, appointed his own brother, Archduke Maximilian, the kindest and most lovable of the Habsburgs, viceroy of the kingdom. But to Cavour this policy was even a greater menace to the freedom of Italy than would have been a lukewarm protocol from the congress of Paris. He had returned to Turin convinced that war with Austria must come; and with this one end in view, had taken up the burden of government. In his determination that war should come, he made use of every means to thwart Austria's peace projects, and to encourage whatever would provoke her wrath. He not only built a naval
arsenal at Spezzia, urged the completion of the Mt. Cenis tunnel; but that his enemy might be induced to lose her temper, he opened in Austrian territory at Milan and Venice subscriptions to the cannon fund for the fortress of Alessandria, and accepted the Milanese proposal to erect a monument to the Sardinian army of the Crimea, "as the symbol of a common faith and a gauge for a better future." Piedmontese journalists revelled unrestrained in their attacks upon despotism and their caricatures of the Austrian policy, and, unchecked, flaunted their journals in the face of Francis Joseph when he visited Milan. Not even the royal compliments customary on such an occasion were exchanged; and when finally in Parliament, Cavour, in definite and even menacing language, threw down the gauntlet of war, crying: "Italy has been considered as a beautiful woman, oppressed by a barbarous and tyrannical husband, made for eternal subjection because inapt to govern herself. But this is no longer so; Italy is now marching toward independence and liberty;"—Austria's patience gave way, and on February 10th, Count Buol issued a note denouncing Piedmont and demanding satisfaction. This Cavour refused, and the Austrian envoy was recalled.

All was now to Cavour's liking. Buol had made a serious blunder, and by playing directly into Cavour's hands, had shown himself to be the diplomatic inferior of his Italian adversary. The national movement, which had been momentarily checked, took on new strength, and henceforth the policy of toleration grew more than ever unpopular, and all the good intentions of the Archduke Maximilian counted for nothing. The sympathy of the foreign Powers, for an instant with Austria, was once more with Piedmont; and Cavour hastened to profit from his successes. He sought to rally the old revolutionary elements to the Sardinian cause, to gather the most moderate of Mazzini's followers into an organisation that would work for the cause of Piedmont, and of Italy; to ally with the
Left, as he had done in 1852 with the Left Centre, for the purpose of checking fruitless insurrection and of strengthening his own policy. Through the efforts of La Farina, a National Italian Society was formed in 1857, which working openly in Piedmont, but secretly throughout the rest of Italy, had for its object the development of the idea of unity among the people, and the preparing of the way for the consolidation of the states of Italy when the time should come.

But Cavour's path was by no means without its obstacles and its terrors. Mazzini and his associates were enraged at the attempt to tamper with their organisation; the clergy and reactionists were opposing, by every effort in their power, the national liberal policy; while the people, suffering from a succession of bad harvests, were grumbling at the heavy taxation that the recent military expenses had imposed upon them. It is little wonder, therefore, that the elections of 1857 showed important gains for the aristocracy and the clergy. But this was not all: the open quarrel with Austria made assistance from without imperative. Russia, won over by Cavour's diplomacy, was ready to take the position of a sympathetic neutral, but could not be counted on to furnish military aid; while England, from whom Cavour had at first hoped for much, and for whose co-operation he had laboured long, was wholly unwilling to break her traditional policy, and to endanger the European equilibrium by aiding Piedmont to extend her territory at the expense of Austria, however willing she might have been, in the interests of that same public law, to aid Piedmont if attacked. Only France remained, a state whose organisation and policy were the reverse of those of Piedmont; whose government was absolute, not parliamentary; whose troops were already in Rome upholding the papacy; whose empress and clergy were opposed to the Italian policy on the ground that it was a menace to the Holy See; whose ministers wished to avoid all entanglement with Italy; and whose legislative
bodies had pointed out in unmistakable terms the dangers to France of a strong power on the south-eastern frontier. Was France to be counted on for aid in this crisis?

Italy's hope centred in Napoleon alone, whose authority, practically unchecked by constitutional limitation, gave to his personal wishes extraordinary weight. For a year Napoleon had been dreaming of a revision of the treaties of 1815 in the interests of the smaller nationalities. He had hoped to gain for France her natural boundaries, the Rhine and the Alps, by aiding Prussia on one hand and Sardinia on the other against Austria. His wish to deprive Austria of her mastery in Italy did not spring entirely from his interest in Italy's independence; at heart he desired to strengthen the smaller states that he might humiliate the larger, aggrandise France, and finally dominate Europe. But he dreamed of greater things. Gioberti's plans, as set forth in his work On the Civil Redemption of Italy, published in Paris in 1851, appealed to the imagination of the Emperor. He liked the idea suggested in this work of placing Italy under the double protection of France and the Pope, and by means of an alliance of France and Italy, of bringing about a union of all the Latin races with Norman England, in opposition to the Baltic league of the Slavo-Germanic peoples of the north. But for the consummation of this irrational scheme there was necessary the establishment of an Italian state and an Italian nationality, for which he had so strong a predilection.

But this was not all that led him to act in this instance; he was influenced by his early associations, by the solicitations of his Italian friends, by the advice of Prince Napoleon, who wished to be king of a reorganised Tuscany, and by his conscience, which told him that because of his sending the expedition to Rome, he was considered a traitor by his old allies, a person worthy of death, if one were to judge from the attacks of Pianori, who, to avenge the fall of the Roman Republic, tried
on April 28, 1855, to assassinate him. Above all, he was influenced by Cavour, who played upon every sensibility, appealed to his ambitions, his memories, his sympathies, and his fears, encouraged his dreams, flattered him with the promised gratitude of a nation, and, at times, even subtly alluded to the dangers that might ensue from conspirators, if he did not repair the wrong that he had done to Italy. Furthermore, Europe seemed favourably disposed to his intervention in Italian affairs. Frederic William of Prussia had been in a measure appeased by Napoleon's mediation in a controversy with Switzerland over the king's hereditary rights in Neuchâtel; Bismarck, already announcing that the duel between Prussia and Austria was inevitable, was encouraging Napoleon's schemes for the reconstruction of Europe, and was so successful in persuading Frederic William to exchange courtesies with the Emperor, as to lead the latter to believe that Prussia and the Confederation would remain aloof in case of war with Austria; and the Czar, who since the congress of Paris had been on excellent terms with France, was further pleased by Napoleon's consent to the proposal made in 1858 to unite Wallachia and Moldavia, which Russia, Prussia, and Sardinia supported, and Austria and Turkey opposed. At this time, Austria stood practically isolated among the great Powers, save for the advice that England might see fit to give her.

But the hopes thus aroused by Napoleon's evident sympathy for Italy, were for the moment dashed by an event, which seemed to destroy all prospects of military aid from France. On January 14, 1858, an Italian refugee, Orsini, made a frightful attempt upon the life of the Emperor; but this, strangely enough, instead of alienating Napoleon, only convinced him the more of the need of supporting the Italian cause. The exact character of Orsini's influence has never been satisfactorily explained; but the appeal which, as an Italian patriot, he made from the prisons of Mazas and Roquette, begging the
Emperor to make Italy free and the Italians united, had the desired effect. Napoleon showed himself to be more than ever devoted to the cause of Italy. In March, 1858, Orsini expiated his crime upon the scaffold; and in May of the same year Dr. Conneau appeared at Turin to inform Victor Emmanuel and Cavour of the Emperor’s intention of visiting Plombières in the Vosges. “The drama approaches solution,” wrote Cavour to La Marmora; “pray Heaven that I do not blunder at that supreme moment”; and on July 21st Cavour entered the imperial presence.

Without preliminary or preface, Napoleon broached the subject for which they had come together. He promised to aid Sardinia in the war against Austria, if only a justifiable pretext could be discovered; declaring that his object was to drive Austria from Italy, to make upper Italy a kingdom under the house of Savoy, and to reorganise the peninsula as a confederation of four states, the kingdom of Upper Italy, Tuscany, the Papal States, and the kingdom of the Two Sicilies. In return, he demanded the cession of Savoy and Nice, and during a drive in the afternoon, proposed a marriage between Clotilde, daughter of Victor Emmanuel, and his cousin, Prince Napoleon. To all this Cavour agreed, saving the grant of Nice and the marriage, which were put off for further consideration. After a brief discussion regarding certain other matters, military and financial, Cavour took his leave, returning to Turin by way of Baden, where a conference with Prince William of Prussia satisfied him that Prussia would not compromise herself for Austria. Thus ended an interview famous in history; an interview not between an emperor and a minister, with the usual diplomatic form, but between two conspirators, mutually distrustful of each other, even when they were most confidential, who were secretly planning an audacious scheme of attack upon a neighbouring Power. The meeting at Plombières initiated a series of events that under Cavour’s guidance made possible the
unity of Italy, and encouraged Napoleon to pursue that visionary and ill-fated plan of revising the map of Europe according to the principle of nationalities, which haunted him to the end of his career.

No sooner had Cavour returned to Piedmont than with feverish haste he began to make all necessary preparations for the coming struggle. He won over Italian notables, Pasolini, Minghetti, and others; sent Piedmontese agents to prepare the people of the peninsula for a spontaneous uprising, when war should be declared; urged La Farina to extend the National Society, and to win recruits not in the north only, but in the centre and south as well. With Garibaldi he discussed the advisability of recruiting volunteers to aid the regular army. To conciliate the conservatives, he proposed a monument to his father, Charles Albert, and to win over the revolutionary party, he offered another in honour of Daniele Manin, who, during the latter days of his life, had supported the policy of Cavour. His energy was boundless: he made suggestions and received advice; he was indefatigable in forming plans and persistent in carrying them through; he missed no opportunity of disciplining his troops, encouraging his followers, and assigning to each the part he was to play; and while closely scrutinising the course of diplomatic affairs in Europe at large, let nothing within his own country escape his attention. Judging from his actions, one would have said that war was to open on an assigned date; and so he believed that it would. "We will force Austria to begin hostilities," he said to Odo Russell, the English ambassador, "and that, too, in April or May, 1859." With this supreme confidence, born not of intuition but of keen diplomatic observation, he continued his intrigues and his warlike preparations. Yet he was not without his anxious moments. "Dear Marquis," he wrote December 30th to Villamarina, "I augur well for the new year; may it crown the efforts of our king and our country to establish an Italy grand, independent,
and happy, such as we dreamed of in our youth. Let us accomplish that great undertaking, then truly we can rest."

The year 1859 opened upon a diplomatic world expectant, and troubled with rumours of war. The interview at Plombières was no longer a secret, for in his negotiations with Prussia, Napoleon had mentioned the probability of a war beyond the Alps; and in a conference between Prince Napoleon and the Czar at Warsaw, the war had been freely discussed. Furthermore, the war agitation in Italy, the incessant intrigues of Cavour, and the unconcealed efforts of the Piedmontese press and Parliament to provoke the wrath of Austria, all pointed in one direction. It is not surprising that with Europe in a state of expectancy, the Emperor’s words to Baron Hubner, the Austrian ambassador at Paris, spoken in the presence of the other diplomats on January 1, 1859, should have received an interpretation not intended by their author. "I regret," said Napoleon, "that our relations are no longer as good as in the past, but I beg you to assure the Emperor that my personal esteem for him remains unaltered." The remark was probably a thoughtless, unpremeditated one, but the market felt the shock: stocks fell and credit shrank. And scarcely had Europe recovered from this blow, when there came a second in the form of an address made by Victor Emmanuel to the Piedmontese Parliament on January 10th. "Strong in the experiences of the past," he said, "we will march resolutely forward to meet the events of the future. That future will be happy, for our policy rests upon justice, upon love of liberty and country. Our state, though small in territory, has increased in credit in the councils of Europe, because it is great in the idea which it represents, in the sympathy which it inspires." And he closed his address with these significant words: "Our situation is not free from peril, for while we respect treaties we are not insensible to the cry of grief that comes to us from every part of Italy. Strong in union, trusting in our good judgment, let us await
with prudence the decrees of Divine Providence.” Indescribable was the enthusiasm that followed this speech so full of promise and hope; and intense was the excitement and joy among the Italian émigrés gathered at this time in Turin, when a few days later Rattazzi, by repeating the same words, showed that the opinion of the king was that of his ministers also.

Events marking the inevitable approach of war now followed in rapid succession. Piedmont negotiated a war loan of fifty millions of livres, ostensibly for the defence of Piedmont; Prince Napoleon, in company with General Niel, visited Turin on January 13th for the purpose, so it was said, of inspecting arsenals, reviewing troops, and examining strategic points; though the real object of the visit was disclosed when, on the 30th, the marriage of the prince with Princess Clothilde was solemnised, and immediately afterward, the verbal agreement of Plombières was embodied in the form of a treaty, which was, however, kept a secret. On February 4th appeared the brochure L’Empereur Napoléon III. et l’Italie, written by de la Guérònnière after notes furnished by the Emperor, and containing, besides a re-statement of the relations existing between Italy and each of the Powers, and an arraignment of the reactionary governments of Italy, the assertion, that Italian independence would not disturb the equilibrium of Europe. These indications of hostility toward Austria on the part of France and Sardinia, following each other thus rapidly in the presence of a general peace, seemed to be foreshadowing a war which had no cause, one which was threatening to destroy treaties and to disturb the existing social order. Would not Europe intervene to prevent such a war? Would she not seek to settle the difficulty by resorting to the arts of diplomacy?

Of all the Powers, England only was ready to intervene. The Derby government was out of sympathy with France and on friendly terms with Austria; and now that Austria was about to be attacked, and France was in a fair way to disturb the
European repose and perhaps extend her own territory at the expense of the lesser states, England offered her mediation. Turning to Piedmont, she sought by the memories of the past, by the friendship of England for Italy, by her love for liberty, to dissuade that state from war. She urged Napoleon to remember his pacific promises of 1852, and the fact that the governments of Europe were committed to maintain the peace; and having pictured to him the perils that a war would bring upon Europe, she begged him not to let himself be dragged into it by a state of secondary rank. To Austria she recommended moderation and prudence, and with a well-feigned care for her welfare, besought her to be patient, to consent to light sacrifices, and above all to avoid furnishing her enemies the desired pretext for war. For the moment it seemed reasonable to believe that her efforts might prove successful. Many in the Piedmontese Parliament were bitterly opposed to the war, and such men as Solaro della Marghereta and Costa de Beauregard spoke strongly against it; many in the country were fearful lest the experiences of 1848 should be repeated; while, with Savoyards particularly, the war was unpopular, because of the report regarding the separation of Piedmont and Savoy. In France the financial panic consequent upon the rumours of war, the complaints of manufacturers, the state of unrest in the provinces, the objections raised by the bishops and the clergy, and, what was of the greatest importance, the opposition of the legislative bodies to Napoleon's plan of aiding Italy, all these manifestations showed how vigorous was the protest against war, how strong the wish for peace. And for the moment Napoleon seemed to yield to this general desire. With his consent Lord Cowley was sent by the Derby ministry to Vienna to treat on a new basis: he was to ask for the withdrawal of the troops from Rome, the abrogation of the special treaties with Modena and Parma, and the reform of the government of central and southern Italy. The outlook was hopeful;
assumed responsibility to test: as Murat the Egyptian imitated in
the Mediterranean sea would seem dangerous only if she were
united, and that she preferred the more aggressive would end
ingratitude and in the end, to unity amongst them in Paris that
assumed responsibility to be a means of becoming the aggressor,
but never the less a means of Sarum's victory at Tancrède.
While, the emperor was conservative, she knew the security of his
position was not by respecting Sarum or Russian.

But the English war or revolution was threatened in the very
act of its consummation. Just at the time that Joaquin was com-
mitting the war, the British proposed that a congress of the
Powers should be called to settle the question of the
agreement by means of negotiations with Napoleon and was probably
at Brussels. A session of the congress was set against
her the other Powers. If she insisted on accepting the condition of
the treaties, would be in agreement with Russia, France, and Prussia
against her. When in March 13th England and Prussia ac-
cepted the proposal, Napoleon announced that she had agreed to
it, nor on the condition that Sarum would not assent. Though
secretly repented, she decided to assent thinking that by
accepting Sarum's terms of respect, she should be able to bring
about the fall of Sarum.

For a month Joaquin had been working night and day to
maintain the same in power. His speeches had been more aggres-
sive than ever he had organized the national guard; estab-
lished committees in recent, spare, and near the volunteers;
given his support to increases authorizing the formation of free
military revolutionary groups under Car każdy: drawn the re-
guer's resolutions and the volunteers in Muszyn more closely to
the cause of Muszyn and, in general, had made ready, not only
was in war with the war, but in the coming struggle. Meanwhile,
the condition in Sarum had been increased by the Emperor's
assumption of the position of the peace negotiations, "Do
you know what this will mean in nothing"; yet now Russia
was proposing to call a congress. Filled with the thought of a free Italy, and convinced that if the congress were held, Piedmont would have no place in it, Cavour made another rapid journey to Paris, March 29th. The nature of the March interviews has ever remained a secret, but their character can be inferred; for it is not likely that Cavour's eloquence deserted him on this occasion, or that his sagacity failed to suggest to him powerful weapons at hand. Had not Napoleon given many indications of loyalty to the national party of Italy? Was it not to his advantage to save Piedmont, and have Italy for a friend instead of a mortal enemy? Had not Victor Emmanuel held rigidly to the conditions agreed on at Plombières, and might not he, Cavour, in case Napoleon deserted Italy at this important crisis, disclose these conditions and incriminate the Emperor? But whatever arguments he may have used, and whatever promises he got from Napoleon, he returned to Turin, continued his preparations for war, and informed England that Sardinia would not disarm, and that she would not appear at the congress at all, unless admitted on an equal footing with the others. There was a general impression in Italy that Cavour's mission had been successful.

England having been baffled in her first attempt at mediating, now tried another plan. In consequence of a conversation with Count Buol, the idea of a general disarmament occurred to Lord Loftus, the English ambassador at Vienna. England welcomed his suggestion and at once communicated it to St. Petersburg, Berlin, and Paris. On April 18th, Napoleon telegraphed to Lord Malmesbury to know if England, in case of disarmament, would support the admission of the Italian princes to the congress; and on receiving a reply in the affirmative, immediately sent a telegram to Turin practically commanding Piedmont to acquiesce in England's plan, and to put her army on a peace footing. The effect was most pitiable. Already worn out by his labours, Cavour was now brought face to face with failure.
He saw his plans, dependent as they were on war with Austria, shattered at a blow; saw all hope of a united Italian kingdom vanish like a mirage. Yet he did not dare disobey the summons, and on the 19th notified France and England of his acceptance of their proposals. Peace now seemed to be assured, for Italy had again been prevented from throwing off the Austrian yoke, and Italian unity seemed to be as far off as ever. For Cavour the moment was the darkest of his life. But quite unknown to him, and on the very day when he notified the European Powers of his submission, the Austrian government was drafting the ultimatum that brought on the war Cavour so ardently desired.

This act of Austria's was no mere accident, no mere stroke of luck for Cavour. During these months devoted to negotiations, but one statesman in Europe had any definite ideas regarding the solution of the Italian question, but one was advancing a policy possessed of any real vitality. While European diplomacy, blundering and inconsistent, was trying to arrive at some settlement of the question; while European diplomats were vaguely trying to counteract the influence of the mind that was dominating them; Cavour, unswerving and determined, with but one end in view, was using every available means of forcing Austria into war. The efforts of the Powers to preserve peace were but trifling when compared with those of Piedmont's minister to break it. And in this crisis Austria was no match for her small, but clever, adversary. Without a moment's hesitation she fell into the trap so well prepared, and at one stroke undid all that England had been able to accomplish. Weary of the intolerable position in which the strategy of Cavour and the political vacillation of France had placed her, financially embarrassed because of the excessive armaments she was forced to maintain, confident that if the issue were raised, Prussia and the Confederation would not desert her, and burning with the desire to crush Sardinia before
France could complete her arrangements for war,—Austria at this supreme moment allowed herself to be mastered by the ecclesiastical and military parties at Vienna. For the second time she blundered in dealing with Italy, for the second time, lost the sympathy of Europe at a critical juncture. On April 19th, even against the advice of Count Buol, the Austrian cabinet drafted an ultimatum, declaring that inasmuch as Sardinia had refused to conform to the peace proposals of France and England, she must put her army on a peace footing and disperse the volunteers in three days, or war would follow. That the war party and the Emperor of Austria were ignorant of Sardinia's submission is evident; but Buol, when informed of it, made clear that the reason assigned in the ultimatum was a pretext, by saying, regretfully indeed, that the decision was irrevocable, as Austria was weary of Sardinia's insults. When the ultimatum reached Turin, Cavour's joy was as excessive, as had been his dejection a few days before. At once he rejected Austria's demands and applied to France for the promised support. On April 26th, Napoleon informed Europe that he would not desert his ally, that he was obliged to respect an appeal from a nation to whom he was bound by common interests and sympathies, by the alliance of 1855, and by the matrimonial union of 1859. On the 29th, Victor Emmanuel issued an appeal to the people of the kingdom and of Italy; and on May 3d, Napoleon, in a proclamation to the French, declared that he was entering upon the war, not to make conquests, but to maintain his national and traditional policy; not to threaten the territory and rights of a neutral power, or to disturb the authority of the Holy Father, but to remove the foreigner from the peninsula, and to free Italy from the Alps to the Adriatic.

In the war thus begun the advantages were all on the side of Austria, for with 200,000 men in the plains of Lombardy, she had only to cross the Ticino, disperse the Sardinians, and capture Turin. Had she done so, she would have been able to
intercept the French communications between Susa and Alessandria, and to prevent the junction of the allies. But Austria supplemented the diplomatic error of the ultimatum by putting the command of her forces into the hands of an inefficient general, Giulay, who seemed to be hampered by timidity, and by a fear of the name Napoleon. He permitted the allies to make their junction in good order, and then, convinced that their plan was to invade Lombardy by way of Plaisance, remained inactive between the Lesia and the Ticino in the Lomelline. The struggle at Montebello, May 20th, between reconnoitring bodies only confirmed him in this belief; while an attack by Victor Emmanuel on an Austrian corps at Palestro on May 30th and 31st, which was undertaken to facilitate the movement of the allies northward, did not arouse his suspicions that the entrance to Lombardy was to be made by way of Novara, and not by way of Plaisance. It was not until June 1st that he discerned the plans of the enemy. Then, in feverish haste, he hurried northward, only to suffer a complete defeat at Magenta on June 4th. The road was now open to Milan, and on June 8th, amid the rejoicing of the inhabitants, Napoleon and Victor Emmanuel entered the Lombard capital. The Austrians first withdrew to the Adda, and finally evacuated Lombardy altogether.

But Napoleon found the difficulties of his position increasing, for the rôle of liberator involved not a few disquieting consequences. Cavour's intrigues were beginning to tell. The Romagnols refused to submit longer to the papal government; the Tuscans, under Boncompagni, after a successful revolt against the grand duke, made Victor Emmanuel dictator, a position the king was willing to accept with Boncompagni as extraordinary commissioner; the Duke of Modena thought it wise to withdraw to Vienna; and though the Duchess of Parma remained, it was only to see Piedmont encroach upon her soil at Pontremoli, and her authority over her subjects entirely
gone. Propitious as these events were for Italian unity, they displeased the Emperor. What would the Roman Catholics of France say? Was not Cavour passing beyond the stipulations of Plombières? Disturbing news came of discontent in France, of hostility in Germany, of Prussia’s indecision and England’s displeasure. All these rumours influenced the irresolute Emperor, and began to awaken a doubt as to the feasibility of the task he had undertaken. But the outlook seemed bright and encouraging, when on July 11th the allied armies set out from Milan to complete the conquest of northern Italy, and to drive the Austrians out of Venetia. By the 23d they had crossed the Chiese, and were drawn in a line from Lake Gard to Carpnedolo with the Sardinians on the left. In the meantime Giulay had been relieved of his post, and the troops placed under the command of Emperor Francis Joseph; but the young monarch, wholly unskilled in the affairs of war, had been unable to decide whether to defend the Chiese or to await the attack behind the Mincio. At first the former plan was tried; later the troops were recalled and sent into Venetia; but on June 23d, at the very time when the allied armies were advancing from the west, the old plan was revived, and the Austrians, having crossed the Mincio, advanced toward Solferino. The armies were ignorant each of the approach of the other, so that when on the 24th an advance movement was begun, a meeting was inevitable. Then ensued a battle, which beginning quite by accident as a skirmish between two reconnoitring parties, soon engaged 250,000 men and lasted without intermission from eight o’clock in the morning till the setting of the sun. The French made the attack at Solferino, the Sardinians at San Martino, and all fought bravely and well; but to the successes of the French the victory was in the main due. Before midnight the Austrians had retired within the Quadrilateral; but a lack of provisions prevented the allies from making a rapid advance to take advantage of the victory. However, by the
6th of July, all preparations had been made for a decisive battle at Verona. All were ready for the attack, when suddenly, on July 7th, came the astounding news that an armistice had been concluded between Napoleon and Francis Joseph at Villafranca. And the news was true.

The causes which led the Emperor of the French to take this decisive and very unexpected step are not difficult to discover. Ever since the victory of Magenta his fears had increased, and certain indications, unnoticed at the time, disclose to us his disquietude. He disapproved of the growth of the revolutionary spirit in central Italy, which foreshadowed consequences foreign to his designs; he viewed the battle-field of Magenta with feelings of revulsion, for he possessed little of the cruel insensibility of the first Napoleon; he shrank from the demands of war, for he was neither young nor active, nor possessed of military genius; and the news from Germany greatly disturbed him, for as he advanced into Lombardy the tone of the Confederation became more warlike, and that of Prussia, glad enough to see Austria defeated but fearful that continuous French victory along the line of the Alps might be but the prelude to a campaign along the Rhine, was anything but cordial. Already had Napoleon asked England to take the part of mediator between himself and the Emperor of Austria; but Palmerston, once more in office after the fall of the Derby government on June roth, did not like the terms proposed as falling "far short of the wishes and expectations of the Italians," and rejected the offer. After the battle of Solferino, these objections to continuing the war were made more cogent by others arising from recent events. The spirit of nationality in Italy, which had been still further aroused by his own imprudent manifesto from Milan, was passing beyond his control; the reports from France showed increasing discontent, and Walewski and the empress were picturing to him with the most vivid detail the hostile feeling of Europe; and Prussia,
deeming that the time had come for an armed mediation, was directing her troops toward the Rhine quite as much, it must be said, to win for herself the military leadership of the Confederation, as to attack France. The Emperor was face to face with difficulties. Before him was the Quadrilateral, demanding, as he afterward told Cavour, a besieging army of 300,000 men. And where were these to come from? Not from France, for he was unwilling to weaken further the military forces at home; not from Italy, for he had already roused Italy too far, and dared not embroil himself with the Pope; not from Hungary, though he had negotiated with Kossuth to that end, for that would rouse against him the Czar. Then, too, the extreme heat of the July days, together with the sight of the bloody battle-field of Solferino and his anxiety over the epidemic of cholera and typhus which was attacking the soldiers, told on his nerves, and made him all the more eager to conclude a peace with the Emperor of Austria and to bring the war to a close. The downfall of Buol some weeks before had simplified the problem, and on July 11th the armistice of Villafranca was signed. By it, Lombardy was ceded to France to be handed over to Sardinia, but Venetia was retained subject to the Crown of the Emperor of Austria. Italy was to be made into a confederation, that should consist of all the Italian states including Venetia under the honorary presidency of the Pope; the Dukes of Tuscany and Modena were to return to their thrones and to grant a general amnesty; while the Pope was to be requested to introduce certain indispensable reforms.

The withdrawal of Napoleon from the war, leaving Venetia still in the hands of Austria, roused against him the bitter feelings of the Italians, and led Cavour, who was unable to conceal his wrath, to resign his post. But Victor Emmanuel with greater insight and political sagacity, discerning the real gains of the war, accepted the situation, and signed the preliminaries of peace, saving the rights of all except himself, the rights of
the people of Modena, Parma, Tuscany, and the Romagna. Then having formed a new ministry with Rattazzi in the place of Cavour, he accepted the consequences of the half-victory, and prepared to carry out the terms of the agreement. He recalled the Piedmontese commissioners from the central states, Farini from Modena, d'Azeglio from the Romagna, and Parelli from Parma, confident that in the end the conditions of the Villafranca armistice would be but a slight obstacle in the way of the national movement in Italy. And he was right. Even while arrangements were being made for a meeting of the diplomats at Zürich, and while the terms of the armistice were being embodied in a treaty, the people of Tuscany, Modena, Parma, and the Romagna were rendering its provisions null and void. In Tuscany, Ricasoli, who had been chosen head of the provisional government after the withdrawal of Boncompagni, summoned a parliament, which decreed the deposition of the house of Lorraine and voted for annexation to Piedmont; in September, a month later, Farini, who when recalled by Victor Emmanuel had resigned his commissionership and remained at his post, effected the same result in Modena. Parma followed in the footsteps of Tuscany and Modena, and the Romagna, though not a separate state, but the province of a still reigning sovereign, declared through a constituent assembly summoned for the purpose, that it desired to throw in its lot with Victor Emmanuel.

By November an extraordinary state of things existed. Even before the treaty of Zürich was signed, its provisions were already abrogated. Three Italian states had deposed their legitimate sovereigns, formed provisional governments, elected constituent assemblies, and, by decrees of annexation, thrown themselves upon the protection of Piedmont. Here was a grievous violation of the old law of treaties, which bit by bit was falling into disuse. The right of people to dispose of themselves had not been recognised at Vienna, yet here were three
members of the European system, sovereign states, whose independence Europe was bound to respect, acting independently of treaties and congresses, deciding for themselves, and declaring it to be their desire to merge their sovereignties, to tear away their boundaries, and form one united state. So far as the principle was concerned, it did not matter that the states were small; the fact remained that three sovereign states had already ceased to exist, and that a fourth was already rapidly becoming dismembered.

For the moment Europe was astounded, and looked to Zürich for a reconstruction of the old law. But events had moved rapidly while the diplomats, in their usual deliberate way, had been discussing the terms of peace. How to check the Italian movement was a perplexing problem. It was suggested that a confederation be established, but no one desired it; that the Italian states be reformed, but four of them were reforming themselves; that the dispossessed princes be restored, but that was now impossible. Even while the representatives of Austria and France were agreeing to make every effort to organise the confederation mentioned in the terms of Villafranca, the states in whose interests they were so zealously labouring were taking matters still further into their own hands. When their delegates who came to Victor Emmanuel to propose annexation learned that he could only promise to present their case at the approaching European congress, they formed themselves into a defensive league with an army of thirty thousand men, for the purpose of resisting any attempt of the princes to recover their thrones. At first Garibaldi was elected as their head, but this choice savoured too much of revolution; then the Prince of Carignan, of the house of Savoy, but this was too suggestive of a Piedmontese protectorate. Finally Boncompagni was chosen as governor-general, and at the very time when he set out to take the headship of the league, the plenipotentaries returned from Zürich. As between the two, where lay the real strength?
The plenipotentiaries, supporting the old law of treaties, of legitimacy, of the preservation of the status quo, had agreed upon the restoration of the princes and the establishment of a confederation. But the princes could not be restored, and in place of the confederation, which was already dead, was a league, founded upon the will of the people, tingling with life, the forerunner of a national Italy.

But Europe had yet to be consulted before so violent an affront to the old system of equilibrium could be officially sanctioned. Of intervention in Italian affairs there was no danger; for already had Napoleon declared that he would not suffer the dispossessed princes to be restored by force, and Austria, in January, 1860, had announced officially that she would not interfere. This was a great triumph for the doctrine of non-intervention. Russia, though certainly unwilling to commit herself to this doctrine, was not unwilling to declare herself disinterested, and to remain outside the affairs of western Europe. Prussia, as yet, hardly realised the importance for her own future of the events in Italy, and her prince regent was too much attached to the doctrine of legitimacy to sanction the overthrow of sovereign princes or to recognise non-intervention as a principle; but even had she wished to act without Austria, she would not have dared, for the recent mobilisation of her troops had disclosed so many weaknesses and defects that she found it necessary to retire for the moment from any active co-operation in European affairs. And the English government was again in sympathy with the cause of Piedmont, and strongly in favour of annexation; for owing to its friendly attitude toward Austria, the Derby ministry had been overthrown the June before, and Lord Palmerston and Lord Clarendon were again in power, and ready to defend Italy against Austria in any congress that might be called to settle the Italian question.

But with Russia standing aloof, Prussia not disposed to support Austria's cause, and England prepared to counterbalance
Austria's influence, it was evident that a congress if called could accomplish little; and besides, the calling of the congress depended on Napoleon III., whose attitude at this time was most uncertain. Having but just signed the treaty of Zürich, he had committed himself to peace with Austria and to the plan of an Italian confederation; and at the same time, he was desirous of making Tuscany a separate kingdom for his cousin Prince Napoleon, and of maintaining the integrity of the papal dominion, that he might not alienate the ecclesiastical party of France. It seemed hardly probable that under such circumstances he would support the cause of Italy in a congress. It is possible that the clear expression of popular feeling shown by the vote of the central states for annexation had influenced him, and recalled to mind his own doctrine of the sovereignty of the people; but whatever the cause, he made a decision toward the close of December which showed that his sympathies had been all the time with Italy. Through a brochure _Le Pape et le Congrès_, written by de la Guéronnière, Napoleon informed Europe that he had determined to break with the Catholic party, and to accept the new public law that the Italian movement had forced upon Europe; that he approved of the sovereign power of the Pope, but convinced as he was that the smaller the territory under papal control the greater would be that power, he would suggest leaving to the Pope merely the city of Rome, and making his power dependent, not upon the extent of his territory, but upon the protection and devotion of the Roman Catholic states. In a letter of December 31st he counselled the Pope to accept the facts, and consent to the loss of the Romagna; and on January 4th, in order to give official expression to his decision, he removed Walewski, who was inimical to Italy, and placed in his stead Thouvenel, whose sympathetic interest in her was well known. There was now no need of a congress; for though the Pope refused positively to give up any part of his patrimony, England and France had decided to
accept the situation that the Italians had created; and Italy, having nothing to fear from the Powers, had only to make complete her victory at home.

On the 20th of January Cavour was recalled to power, and it soon became evident to Italians and French alike that his aggressive policy was to be pursued. "The first ministry of Cavour," said the "Epinon," "signified independence; the second signified annexation." Though confident that Europe would not interfere, the Sardinian minister entered upon his work with great caution. Having announced in his first despatch that the restoration of the Italian princes was now no longer possible, he declared that the right of the people to establish a government to their liking was incontestable, and proposed that the states should be called upon to vote a second time on the subject. If this vote should favor annexation to Piedmont, the last obstacle would be removed, he declared, and Europe would have nothing else to do than to sanction what the Italian people demanded. He sent Nigra and Arese to France to get the consent of the Emperor to this plan; six with sixty thousand troops in Lombardy. Napoleon had the power to throw all his plans into hopeless confusion. But it was difficult for Napoleon to violate an oath solemnly sworn only three months before, and he opposed many objections and suggested many compromises, only to succumb in the end to all the powers excepting that regarding the annexation of Parma and Piacenza, this he positively refused to sanction. But on December 31, 1859, the negotiations rested; the Emperor had not answered the imperial message. In accordance with saying the Sardinia would make concessions not exceeding the limits of the former possessions. Cavour having returned to Turin with Parma, Piacenza, Pistoia, Pistoia, and Modena. For this reason the above date is the decisive in the political events which had taken place. The second known to the que of France, a convention, 12th Emmanuel we{-}m-

...
September before, and on March 23rd took formal recognition of the new union. Immediately the polls of Piedmont, Lombardy, Parma, Modena, Tuscany, and the Romagna, were again opened for the election of parliamentary deputies, and on April 2d, the members of the first legislative body of an enlarged Piedmont convened at Turin.

Napoleon, having been unable to check the progress of the national movement, now claimed his reward, the cession of Savoy and Nice, which had been agreed to in the discussion at Plombières, and later embodied in the treaty of January, 1859. But the failure of the Emperor to free Italy from the Alps to the Adriatic, as he had agreed to do, would seem to have made this condition null and void; and there is no doubt that for the moment Cavour hoped that Napoleon would not press his claim, although he had no real reason for thinking it would be passed by or forgotten. After Tuscany had been annexed contrary to his wishes, Napoleon in a letter of February, 1860, had declared that if a kingdom of central and northern Italy were formed under the house of Savoy, he should consider it a matter of simple prudence to demand a rectification of his south-eastern frontier for the security of France. When this news got abroad England was indignant. "We have been made regular dupes," wrote Queen Victoria to Lord John Russell; and in the minds of the English ministers, the war for an idea had simply cloaked the policy of spoliation. But England expostulated in vain: from the other European Powers she got neither sympathy nor satisfaction. Prussia contented herself with virtuous protestations, though she saw that the natural boundaries of France included the Rhine as well as the Alps; Russia remained indifferent; and Austria, feeling that the annexation of Savoy was no different from that of Tuscany, was rather pleased than otherwise by England’s discomfiture. Switzerland alone supported England. But in spite of protestations Napoleon persisted, knowing how popular the cession was in France; and
Cavour, though he hoped to the last to save Nice, finally yielded, and on March 24th signed the treaty of cession. The popular vote in the provinces was by a large majority favourable to annexation to France; and while it is undoubtedly true that pressure was used to obtain so favourable a result, there is no evidence to show that the annexation was forced upon the provinces. For the future of Italy the loss of Savoy and Nice was undoubtedly beneficial; for Savoy was strongly legitimist and sacerdotal; she had taken exception to the innovations of her king in his rôle of constitutional sovereign; and through her deputies in the Piedmontese parliament, had persistently opposed the policy of Cavour. Unable to accommodate herself to the new régime, and foreign in interests and language to the new Italy that was in process of formation, it is wholly reasonable to suppose that her inclusion in the new Italian state would have been a source of constant trouble and irritation, and, as Cavour said, might have forced Italy to employ a policy of repression as rigorous as that used by Austria in her government of Venetia.

If Napoleon and the European diplomats flattered themselves that the Italian problem was now happily solved, they had reckoned without a true appreciation of Cavour’s ambition. The cession of Savoy was not only a reward for the past; it was also a pledge for the future. Demanded by the Emperor to please the people of France and to strengthen his position at home, it bound him to follow, even against his better judgment, the course that Cavour was already mapping out for the further extension of the power of the house of Savoy. "Now we are accomplices," Cavour is reported to have said to Baron Talleyrand after the treaty of March 24th had been signed; and he felt that henceforth Napoleon must follow where Italy led. For Napoleon nothing could have been more disastrous. Drawn on step by step to at least a tacit acquiescence in the new schemes of aggression, he seemed to have become, as
Cavour said, an accomplice in the task of establishing that very Italian unity which he did not desire, and that, too, by measures which alienated his people from him and weakened his influence in Europe. Up to this time, the old law based upon the inviolability of treaties and the sanctity of sovereign states had been broken only by the force of popular uprisings, as in Greece, Belgium, and the states of central Italy; but now it was to be attacked and overthrown, on one hand by a revolutionary expedition, which was to effect the downfall of a legitimate government, the kingdom of Naples; on the other, by a violent invasion and dismemberment of a second legitimate government, that of the Pope, the integrity of which Europe, by its doctrine of equilibrium, was bound to defend. Such a violation of European tradition was possible only because good government and the rights of peoples were becoming of greater moment than the legitimacy of kings or the integrity of states.

During the period of the Crimean war and the annexations, the governments of Naples and Rome had shown themselves uncompromisingly hostile to Piedmont's policy, and deaf to all persuasion from England and France in behalf of reform and reorganisation. In 1856, the western Powers had withdrawn their representatives from Naples; but, after the succession in 1859 of Francis II., had resumed diplomatic relations, hoping to effect a change in the character of the government. But despite Napoleon's efforts, England's warnings, and Sardinia's threats, Francis II. declared that he meant to adhere to his father's methods for assuring the safety of the monarchy. And in Rome the situation was no better. Ever since 1848 Napoleon had been urging the Pope to consider the needs of his subjects, offering in return the support of the Catholic Powers; but under the astute and diplomatic Antonelli, every suggestion had met delays, counter-suggestions, and sarcastic references to the liberties of France. In 1860, the policy of
Antonelli, who had been in power since 1849, gave way to the more warlike program of de Merode, and Rome prepared to resist attack. Money, under the name of Peter’s Pence, poured in from outside, and General Lamoricière, an old opponent of the Coup d’état, undertook the task of forming a papal army and of introducing a better discipline. Napoleon, thoroughly annoyed by the obstinacy and blindness of the papal authorities, now proposed through Gramont, his minister at Rome, to withdraw the French troops, and on May 11, 1860, the arrangements to this end were completed. But just at this time came the report that the expedition of the Thousand under Garibaldi had already set out from Genoa southward, and Napoleon, fearing that the dreaded revolution was at last set loose, not only retained his troops in Rome, but increased their number.

The new agent that had come to the aid of the Italian cause was as old as Young Italy itself, and was, in a sense, its representative. For two years the followers of Mazzini had been planning to rouse an insurrection at some point on the western coast of Italy, and in 1859 had invited Crispi, a Sicilian refugee, to co-operate with them. But the undertaking had been postponed, and it was not until October of the same year that the plan had been revived. Then Crispi and Farini, the ex-Piedmontese commissioner in Emilia, proposed to Rattazzi, prime minister of Sardinia after the armistice of Villafranca, that such an expedition should be sanctioned by the government; but the latter answered that the time was too perilous and the position of Piedmont too insecure to justify any such action. In the meantime Garibaldi, with nothing to do after the close of the Austro-Sardinian war, was being dissuaded with difficulty from invading the Roman states; and when in April, 1860, news came of an uprising in Palermo, and Crispi urged upon him the importance of going to the aid of the Sicilians, Garibaldi, after some hesitation, consented, and hurried to Genoa to make the necessary preparations. But Cavour,
who had been recalled to office in January, 1860, realised that the revolutionary party, though useful as an ally, might be dangerous if given too loose a rein, and feared lest the Italian cause should be injured by an enterprise as rash and impolitic as this of Garibaldi’s. The king, however, whose friendly advances had been recently rejected at Naples, had more confidence in the expedition, and at this crisis stood firm, and forced his minister to yield. Cavour consoled himself with the thought that Garibaldi’s attack could be disavowed if it failed, and when, on the night of May 5th, Garibaldi with 1085 men started in two steamers from Genoa, Cavour, as minister of marine, forbade the expedition, but in such terms that the Piedmontese admiral, Persano, at Cagliari, understood that he was not to be too obedient. Unchecked, therefore, the steamers touched Sicily at Marsala on the 11th, and landed the men in safety; and by the 15th, Garibaldi had won a victory at Castelfi, and was pushing on to Palermo. Protests now poured in from Russia, Prussia, and Austria; but Cavour denied that Piedmont had anything to do with the movement. With the entrance of Garibaldi into Palermo on May 30th, Sicily was all but conquered; and the Neapolitan government, which had been stunned by the suddenness of the blow, sent its envoys first to Paris, where Napoleon, greeting them with the word, “Why have you not listened to my advice?” offered them counsel, but declared that he would adhere to a policy of non-intervention: then to London with no better results, for Palmerston was pitiless; and finally, in humiliation, to Turin, but Cavour said that it was too late. On July 20th the Neapolitan troops met Garibaldi at Milazzo, and the defeat here lost Sicily to Francis II.

Cavour was now in a perilous position: he was in danger of losing his control over the new revolutionary forces, of seeing them commit indiscretions that would alienate Napoleon, rouse the Roman Catholics of Europe, turn from Piedmont the sym-
the people of Modena, Parma, Tuscany, and the Romagna. Then having formed a new ministry with Rattazzi in the place of Cavour, he accepted the consequences of the half-victory, and prepared to carry out the terms of the agreement. He recalled the Piedmontese commissioners from the central states, Farini from Modena, d'Azeglio from the Romagna, and Parelli from Parma, confident that in the end the conditions of the Villafranca armistice would be but a slight obstacle in the way of the national movement in Italy. And he was right. Even while arrangements were being made for a meeting of the diplomats at Zürich, and while the terms of the armistice were being embodied in a treaty, the people of Tuscany, Modena, Parma, and the Romagna were rendering its provisions null and void. In Tuscany, Ricasoli, who had been chosen head of the provisional government after the withdrawal of Boncampani, summoned a parliament, which decreed the deposition of the house of Lorraine and voted for annexation to Piedmont; in September, a month later, Farini, who when recalled by Victor Emmanuel had resigned his commissionership and remained at his post, effected the same result in Modena. Parma followed in the footsteps of Tuscany and Modena, and the Romagna, though not a separate state, but the province of a still reigning sovereign, declared through a constituent assembly summoned for the purpose, that it desired to throw in its lot with Victor Emmanuel.

By November an extraordinary state of things existed. Even before the treaty of Zürich was signed, its provisions were already abrogated. Three Italian states had deposed their legitimate sovereigns, formed provisional governments, elected constituent assemblies, and, by decrees of annexation, thrown themselves upon the protection of Piedmont. Here was a grievous violation of the old law of treaties, which bit by bit was falling into disuse. The right of people to dispose of themselves had not been recognised at Vienna, yet here were three
members of the European system, sovereign states, whose independence Europe was bound to respect, acting independently of treaties and congresses, deciding for themselves, and declaring it to be their desire to merge their sovereignties, to tear away their boundaries, and form one united state. So far as the principle was concerned, it did not matter that the states were small; the fact remained that three sovereign states had already ceased to exist, and that a fourth was already rapidly becoming dismembered.

For the moment Europe was astounded, and looked to Zürich for a reconstruction of the old law. But events had moved rapidly while the diplomats, in their usual deliberate way, had been discussing the terms of peace. How to check the Italian movement was a perplexing problem. It was suggested that a confederation be established, but no one desired it; that the Italian states be reformed, but four of them were reforming themselves; that the dispossessed princes be restored, but that was now impossible. Even while the representatives of Austria and France were agreeing to make every effort to organise the confederation mentioned in the terms of Villafranca, the states in whose interests they were so zealously labouring were taking matters still further into their own hands. When their delegates who came to Victor Emmanuel to propose annexation learned that he could only promise to present their case at the approaching European congress, they formed themselves into a defensive league with an army of thirty thousand men, for the purpose of resisting any attempt of the princes to recover their thrones. At first Garibaldi was elected as their head, but this choice savoured too much of revolution; then the Prince of Carignan, of the house of Savoy, but this was too suggestive of a Piedmontese protectorate. Finally Boncompagni was chosen as governor-general, and at the very time when he set out to take the headship of the league, the plenipotentiaries returned from Zürich. As between the two, where lay the real strength?
The plenipotentiaries, supporting the old law of treaties, of legitimacy, of the preservation of the status quo, had agreed upon the restoration of the princes and the establishment of a confederation. But the princes could not be restored, and in place of the confederation, which was already dead, was a league, founded upon the will of the people, tingling with life, the forerunner of a national Italy.

But Europe had yet to be consulted before so violent an affront to the old system of equilibrium could be officially sanctioned. Of intervention in Italian affairs there was no danger; for already had Napoleon declared that he would not suffer the dispossessed princes to be restored by force, and Austria, in January, 1860, had announced officially that she would not interfere. This was a great triumph for the doctrine of non-intervention. Russia, though certainly unwilling to commit herself to this doctrine, was not unwilling to declare herself disinterested, and to remain outside the affairs of western Europe. Prussia, as yet, hardly realised the importance for her own future of the events in Italy, and her prince regent was too much attached to the doctrine of legitimacy to sanction the overthrow of sovereign princes or to recognise non-intervention as a principle; but even had she wished to act without Austria, she would not have dared, for the recent mobilisation of her troops had disclosed so many weaknesses and defects that she found it necessary to retire for the moment from any active co-operation in European affairs. And the English government was again in sympathy with the cause of Piedmont, and strongly in favour of annexation; for owing to its friendly attitude toward Austria, the Derby ministry had been overthrown the June before, and Lord Palmerston and Lord Clarendon were again in power, and ready to defend Italy against Austria in any congress that might be called to settle the Italian question.

But with Russia standing aloof, Prussia not disposed to support Austria's cause, and England prepared to counterbalance
Austria's influence, it was evident that a congress if called could accomplish little; and besides, the calling of the congress depended on Napoleon III., whose attitude at this time was most uncertain. Having but just signed the treaty of Zürich, he had committed himself to peace with Austria and to the plan of an Italian confederation; and at the same time, he was desirous of making Tuscany a separate kingdom for his cousin Prince Napoleon, and of maintaining the integrity of the papal dominion, that he might not alienate the ecclesiastical party of France. It seemed hardly probable that under such circumstances he would support the cause of Italy in a congress. It is possible that the clear expression of popular feeling shown by the vote of the central states for annexation had influenced him, and recalled to mind his own doctrine of the sovereignty of the people; but whatever the cause, he made a decision toward the close of December which showed that his sympathies had been all the time with Italy. Through a brochure Le Pape et le Congrès, written by de la Guérònnière, Napoleon informed Europe that he had determined to break with the Catholic party, and to accept the new public law that the Italian movement had forced upon Europe; that he approved of the sovereign power of the Pope, but convinced as he was that the smaller the territory under papal control the greater would be that power, he would suggest leaving to the Pope merely the city of Rome, and making his power dependent, not upon the extent of his territory, but upon the protection and devotion of the Roman Catholic states. In a letter of December 31st he counselled the Pope to accept the facts, and consent to the loss of the Romagna; and on January 4th, in order to give official expression to his decision, he removed Walewski, who was inimical to Italy, and placed in his stead Thouvenel, whose sympathetic interest in her was well known. There was now no need of a congress; for though the Pope refused positively to give up any part of his patrimony, England and France had decided to
accept the situation that the Italians had created; and Italy, having nothing to fear from the Powers, had only to make complete her victory at home.

On the 20th of January Cavour was recalled to power, and it soon became evident to Italians and French alike that his aggressive policy was to be pursued. "The first ministry of Cavour," said the Opinione, "signified independence; the second signified annexation." Though confident that Europe would not interfere, the Sardinian minister entered upon his work with great caution. Having announced in his first despatch that the restoration of the Italian princes was now no longer possible, he declared that the right of the people to establish a government to their liking was incontestable, and proposed that the states should be called upon to vote a second time on the subject. If this vote should favour annexation to Piedmont, the last obstacle would be removed, he declared, and Europe would have nothing else to do than to sanction what the Italian people decreed. He sent Nigra and Arese to France to get the consent of the Emperor to this plan; for with sixty thousand troops in Lombardy, Napoleon had the power to throw all his plans into hopeless confusion. But it was difficult for Napoleon to violate so openly a treaty signed only three months before, and he interposed many objections, and suggested many compromises, only to concede in the end all the points except that regarding the annexation of Tuscany; and this he positively refused to consider. Here, in February, 1860, the negotiations rested; but Cavour, knowing his own power, answered the imperial ultimatum on March 1st by saying that Sardinia would make no exceptions in the matter of the annexations. Cavour, having at once communicated with Farini in Emilia (Parma and Modena), and Ricasoli in Tuscany, hurried the people to the polls; and when by the middle of March the vote was known to be overwhelmingly in favour of annexation, Victor Emmanuel accepted the proposal which he had been obliged to reject the
September before, and on March 23d took formal recognition of the new union. Immediately the polls of Piedmont, Lombardy, Parma, Modena, Tuscany, and the Romagna, were again opened for the election of parliamentary deputies, and on April 2d, the members of the first legislative body of an enlarged Piedmont convened at Turin.

Napoleon, having been unable to check the progress of the national movement, now claimed his reward, the cession of Savoy and Nice, which had been agreed to in the discussion at Plombières, and later embodied in the treaty of January, 1859. But the failure of the Emperor to free Italy from the Alps to the Adriatic, as he had agreed to do, would seem to have made this condition null and void; and there is no doubt that for the moment Cavour hoped that Napoleon would not press his claim, although he had no real reason for thinking it would be passed by or forgotten. After Tuscany had been annexed contrary to his wishes, Napoleon in a letter of February, 1860, had declared that if a kingdom of central and northern Italy were formed under the house of Savoy, he should consider it a matter of simple prudence to demand a rectification of his south-eastern frontier for the security of France. When this news got abroad England was indignant. "We have been made regular dupes," wrote Queen Victoria to Lord John Russell: and in the minds of the English ministers, the war for an idea had simply cloaked the policy of spoliation. But England expostulated in vain: from the other European Powers she got neither sympathy nor satisfaction. Prussia contented herself with virtuous protestations, though she saw that the natural boundaries of France included the Rhine as well as the Alps; Russia remained indifferent; and Austria, feeling that the annexation of Savoy was no different from that of Tuscany, was rather pleased than otherwise by England's discomfiture. Switzerland alone supported England. But in spite of protestations Napoleon persisted, knowing how popular the cession was in France; and
Cavour, though he hoped to the last to save Nice, finally yielded, and on March 24th signed the treaty of cession. The popular vote in the provinces was by a large majority favourable to annexation to France; and while it is undoubtedly true that pressure was used to obtain so favourable a result, there is no evidence to show that the annexation was forced upon the provinces. For the future of Italy the loss of Savoy and Nice was undoubtedly beneficial; for Savoy was strongly legitimist and sacerdotal; she had taken exception to the innovations of her king in his rôle of constitutional sovereign; and through her deputies in the Piedmontese parliament, had persistently opposed the policy of Cavour. Unable to accommodate herself to the new régime, and foreign in interests and language to the new Italy that was in process of formation, it is wholly reasonable to suppose that her inclusion in the new Italian state would have been a source of constant trouble and irritation, and, as Cavour said, might have forced Italy to employ a policy of repression as rigorous as that used by Austria in her government of Venetia.

If Napoleon and the European diplomats flattered themselves that the Italian problem was now happily solved, they had reckoned without a true appreciation of Cavour's ambition. The cession of Savoy was not only a reward for the past; it was also a pledge for the future. Demanded by the Emperor to please the people of France and to strengthen his position at home, it bound him to follow, even against his better judgment, the course that Cavour was already mapping out for the further extension of the power of the house of Savoy. "Now we are accomplices," Cavour is reported to have said to Baron Talleyrand after the treaty of March 24th had been signed; and he felt that henceforth Napoleon must follow where Italy led. For Napoleon nothing could have been more disastrous. Drawn on step by step to at least a tacit acquiescence in the new schemes of aggression, he seemed to have become, as
Cavour said, an accomplice in the task of establishing that very Italian unity which he did not desire, and that, too, by measures which alienated his people from him and weakened his influence in Europe. Up to this time, the old law based upon the inviolability of treaties and the sanctity of sovereign states had been broken only by the force of popular uprisings, as in Greece, Belgium, and the states of central Italy; but now it was to be attacked and overthrown, on one hand by a revolutionary expedition, which was to effect the downfall of a legitimate government, the kingdom of Naples; on the other, by a violent invasion and dismemberment of a second legitimate government, that of the Pope, the integrity of which Europe, by its doctrine of equilibrium, was bound to defend. Such a violation of European tradition was possible only because good government and the rights of peoples were becoming of greater moment than the legitimacy of kings or the integrity of states.

During the period of the Crimean war and the annexations, the governments of Naples and Rome had shown themselves uncompromisingly hostile to Piedmont's policy, and deaf to all persuasion from England and France in behalf of reform and reorganisation. In 1856, the western Powers had withdrawn their representatives from Naples; but, after the succession in 1859 of Francis II., had resumed diplomatic relations, hoping to effect a change in the character of the government. But despite Napoleon's efforts, England's warnings, and Sardinia's threats, Francis II. declared that he meant to adhere to his father's methods for assuring the safety of the monarchy. And in Rome the situation was no better. Ever since 1848 Napoleon had been urging the Pope to consider the needs of his subjects, offering in return the support of the Catholic Powers; but under the astute and diplomatic Antonelli, every suggestion had met delays, counter-suggestions, and sarcastic references to the liberties of France. In 1860, the policy of
Antonelli, who had been in power since 1849, gave way to the more warlike program of de Merode, and Rome prepared to resist attack. Money, under the name of Peter's Pence, poured in from outside, and General Lamoricière, an old opponent of the Coup d'état, undertook the task of forming a papal army and of introducing a better discipline. Napoleon, thoroughly annoyed by the obstinacy and blindness of the papal authorities, now proposed through Gramont, his minister at Rome, to withdraw the French troops, and on May 11, 1860, the arrangements to this end were completed. But just at this time came the report that the expedition of the Thousand under Garibaldi had already set out from Genoa southward, and Napoleon, fearing that the dreaded revolution was at last set loose, not only retained his troops in Rome, but increased their number.

The new agent that had come to the aid of the Italian cause was as old as Young Italy itself, and was, in a sense, its representative. For two years the followers of Mazzini had been planning to rouse an insurrection at some point on the western coast of Italy, and in 1859 had invited Crispi, a Sicilian refugee, to co-operate with them. But the undertaking had been postponed, and it was not until October of the same year that the plan had been revived. Then Crispi and Farini, the ex-Piedmontese commissioner in Emilia, proposed to Rattazzi, prime minister of Sardinia after the armistice of Villafranca, that such an expedition should be sanctioned by the government; but the latter answered that the time was too perilous and the position of Piedmont too insecure to justify any such action. In the meantime Garibaldi, with nothing to do after the close of the Austro-Sardinian war, was being dissuaded with difficulty from invading the Roman states; and when in April, 1860, news came of an uprising in Palermo, and Crispi urged upon him the importance of going to the aid of the Sicilians, Garibaldi, after some hesitation, consented, and hurried to Genoa to make the necessary preparations. But Cavour,
who had been recalled to office in January, 1860, realised that the revolutionary party, though useful as an ally, might be dangerous if given too loose a rein, and feared lest the Italian cause should be injured by an enterprise as rash and impolitic as this of Garibaldi’s. The king, however, whose friendly advances had been recently rejected at Naples, had more confidence in the expedition, and at this crisis stood firm, and forced his minister to yield. Cavour consoled himself with the thought that Garibaldi’s attack could be disavowed if it failed, and when, on the night of May 5th, Garibaldi with 1085 men started in two steamers from Genoa, Cavour, as minister of marine, forbade the expedition, but in such terms that the Piedmontese admiral, Persano, at Cagliari, understood that he was not to be too obedient. Unchecked, therefore, the steamers touched Sicily at Marsala on the 11th, and landed the men in safety; and by the 15th, Garibaldi had won a victory at Castefimi, and was pushing on to Palermo. Protests now poured in from Russia, Prussia, and Austria; but Cavour denied that Piedmont had anything to do with the movement. With the entrance of Garibaldi into Palermo on May 30th, Sicily was all but conquered; and the Neapolitan government, which had been stunned by the suddenness of the blow, sent its envoys first to Paris, where Napoleon, greeting them with the word, “Why have you not listened to my advice?” offered them counsel, but declared that he would adhere to a policy of non-intervention: then to London with no better results, for Palmerston was pitiless; and finally, in humiliation, to Turin, but Cavour said that it was too late. On July 20th the Neapolitan troops met Garibaldi at Milazzo, and the defeat here lost Sicily to Francis II.

Cavour was now in a perilous position: he was in danger of losing his control over the new revolutionary forces, of seeing them commit indiscretions that would alienate Napoleon, rouse the Roman Catholics of Europe, turn from Piedmont the sym-
pathies of those who disliked revolution, and perhaps endanger the whole future of Italy. He feared that if the movement were not checked, it would reach Naples, then the Roman States, and, in so doing, excite against Piedmont the wrath of France and Austria. Furthermore, Garibaldi was neither an organiser nor an administrator: he could destroy, but he could not reconstruct; and he would accept no advice. He even refused to obey when Victor Emmanuel, alarmed by the excesses of the Sicilian revolutionists, forbade him to cross the straits. At this point Thouvenel, the French minister of foreign affairs, proposed that French and English fleets intervene, and when England refused, saying that the affair was an Italian one only, Cavour himself planned a counterplot to forestall Garibaldi at Naples. Notwithstanding the fact, that a project for an alliance between the kingdoms of Sardinia and the Two Sicilies was already under consideration, he sent Admiral Persano with a part of his fleet to the bay of Naples to conspire with Villamarina, the Piedmontese representative, for the purpose of winning over the Neapolitan cabinet and fleet, and of forcing the king to withdraw from the city. This outrageous scheme of gaining control of the administration of an independent kingdom, with which Piedmont was on terms of diplomatic amity, failed, because Persano was unable to influence the king to leave his capital. Cavour, baffled in this attempt, commanded Persano to make sure of the Neapolitan fleet and force, and awaited the coming of Garibaldi's army, which was triumphantly advancing towards Naples. The confusion in the city increased; and Francis II., unmourned by his people, deserted by his ministers and soldiers, and abandoned by his fleet, left Naples for Gaëta on September 6th, the day before Garibaldi entered the city.

If Cavour's position had been perilous in August, in September it was doubly so. The revolution, which had met with success in Sicily, was now successful in Naples also; and Garibaldi, hating Cavour and all the diplomats of Piedmont,
was planning to push on to Rome, then to Venetia, and with all these provinces liberated, to lay his sword at the feet of Victor Emmanuel. But his obstinacy and his vigorous opposition to annexing any state to Piedmont until Rome and Venice should be free, made it inevitable that if he failed, he would in his fall drag down the young kingdom of Victor Emmanuel; or if he succeeded, would rouse again the reactionists by his administrative follies and his inability to govern. Having failed to anticipate him at Naples, and satisfied that the only way to save Italy was to be beforehand at Rome and seize in Italy’s name the eastern provinces of the Pope, Cavour determined to take the initiative, and to crown his many audacities with one final audacity by invading the pontifical territory.

Public opinion was in his favour, for in the eyes of the Italians the provinces of Umbria and the Marches had become already national territory, not papal, and to seize them was restitution, not robbery. One Power alone could frustrate this plan, and that Power was France, whose clergy, nobility, parliamentary leaders, and government were exasperated by Cavour’s “impudent sophistries.” But final authority lay not in the hands of Gramont, Thouvenel, or Persigny; it lay in the hands of Napoleon, who at this time was in Savoy away from the influence of his advisers. “Act and act quickly,” he is reported to have said to the Piedmontese envoys who met him at Chambéry, August 28th; and having spoken, he left Savoy for Marseilles. The papal authorities grew alarmed; for it seemed that France, who had her troops in Rome to defend the Pope, was about to allow his territory to be invaded. Antonelli questioned Gramont, but Gramont knew nothing and asked Thouvenel. Thouvenel was no wiser, and communicated with the Emperor at Marseilles. “Tell Piedmont,” replied Napoleon, “that if without cause her troops enter Roman territory, I shall be obliged to withdraw my envoy from Turin.” Thouvenel begged the Emperor to send this statement to Turin in the form of an
ultimatum; but Napoleon was unwilling to do so, and toned down Thouvenel's draft until it became such a humble request that it was hardly likely to turn Cavour from his course. With his army and navy Cavour advanced to the papal frontier; and as a pretext was wanting, sent an ultimatum to the Pope on September 7th bidding him disarm the pontifical corps, on the ground that, inasmuch as it was composed of recruits from all nations, it was "an offence to the public conscience of Italy and of Europe." On the 11th, Antonelli rejected the ultimatum; on the same day the Piedmontese entered the provinces, and the fleet a few days later appeared before Ancona. Notwithstanding Lamoricière's preparations the defence was weak. Beaten at Castelfidardo, the papal forces made a stand at Ancona, but after a ten days' siege, this fortress fell before the combined attack of Admiral Persano and Captain Fanti. Now that the way was open to Naples and Garibaldi was powerless, Cavour had no longer anything to fear from the revolutionary forces.

But this last of the long series of affronts to the diplomatic conscience of Europe, of infringements upon the treaty of 1815, touched the religious feeling of the Catholic Powers. France was stirred to the depths; Austria and Spain seriously thought of intervening; Prussia protested, but without breaking off her diplomatic relations; and Russia, doubly aggrieved by the unjustifiable violence to pontifical territory and the disgrace of her old ally, the king of Naples, recalled her envoy from Turin. A meeting of the Czar, the Emperor of Austria, and the Prince Regent of Prussia at Warsaw, October 22d-26th, seemed to portend a revival of the Holy Alliance against France; but nothing came of it, and England, who was ready to take the lead in sanctioning the new law of nations, sent to Turin, on October 27th, a message of cordial sympathy. Thus Cavour, supported by Napoleon, though not by the French nation, by England, and by Prussia though not openly, felt justified in giving his adventurous policy one more trial by
taking advantage of all that Garibaldi and the revolutionists had accomplished. On October 21st, a vote of the people of the Two Sicilies was taken, but under such close surveillance of the official representatives as to make negative voting almost impossible. As might have been expected, the result was entirely in favour of annexation.

It now remained for the Piedmontese army to complete the work of conquest begun by Garibaldi. On November 2d, Capua fell, and on the 7th, Victor Emmanuel met Garibaldi in Naples. The meeting was a memorable one. Garibaldi, emboldened by success, and believing himself to be the master of the destinies of Italy, asked that he be appointed lieutenant of the Two Sicilies for a year, a request that Victor Emmanuel, because of his wish to bring order at once into the new provinces, positively refused to grant. Thereupon the great revolutionist showed the real nobility of his character. Declining the honours and gifts that the king would gladly have bestowed upon him and his companions, he resigned the dictatorship, only regretting that he was obliged to give it over into the hands of Cavour and his friends, and withdrew to his island home, Caprera. The place of lieutenant general was given to Farini. There now remained to be taken only Gaeta, where the young king, Francis II., surrounded by the last of his soldiers and his friends, had taken refuge. But at this point Napoleon interfered, and blocking the port with a French fleet, saved the king from capture by the Piedmontese, though a successful attack from the land side reduced the town to submission, and forced Francis II. to flee to Rome. With the exceptions of Venice and Rome, Italy was now conquered, and the establishment of a united Italian kingdom was assured.

When on February 18, 1861, there met at Turin representatives from all Italy constituting the first Italian Parliament, and when these representatives by their vote changed the title of the King of Sardinia into that of the King of Italy, a mo-
mentous period in the history of Europe came to an end, and a new nationality, young indeed and unskilled, but none the less vigorous, took its place among the other nationalities of Europe. But Cavour, who had been chiefly instrumental in winning this place for Italy, who had wrought into one the discordant elements of which it had been composed, was not destined to reap the real benefits of his labours. Scarcely had he been relieved of the burden of old anxieties when he was confronted with problems more difficult of solution than any he had yet met, problems of national rather than provincial importance, requiring a master mind. From one point of view his work was done, and well done; yet never were his boldness, his clear insight, and his sound judgment more needed than in the decade from 1860 to 1870, when the young state was called upon to complete her unity by the acquirement of Venice and Rome, and to steer her way past the dangers to which the policy of Bismarck and the struggle for the unity of Germany gave rise. And Cavour would gladly have been at the helm in this crisis; but worn out by his emotions, his labours, and his cares, the great statesman, at the crowning point of his career, passed away. On June 5, 1861, a date memorable in Italian history, Cavour died.

Italy’s attainment of national independence and unity is the mightiest event that the student of European history has to reckon with between 1815 and 1861; mightier even than the revolution of 1848, and more far-reaching in its results than the Crimean war in 1855. For the first time in the history of Europe the principles of the inviolability of treaties and of hereditary sovereign rights were forced to give way to the doctrine of the rights of a nation; for the first time, those supporting the narrow and illiberal theories of the old system were forced to acknowledge themselves conquered by those who were putting into practice the more enlightened methods of government and administration that characterised the modern or new
régime. In its character and results the struggle in Italy was essentially different from the movements that had established the independence of Greece and Belgium. The Italians had won a victory over Europe, whose traditions, maxims, and prejudices, were all against them; over Austria and the petty princes, who had sought by every means in their power to oppose them; over the Roman Catholic Church, whose fundamental doctrines regarding the temporal power of the Pope were hostile to the cause they had at heart; over the revolutionary leaders, who in 1860, as in 1849, would gladly have snatched the fruits of success from those whom they had called the moderates, and have fought on to eventual defeat for an idea; and, finally, over Napoleon himself, who though he had aided the Italian cause, had no intention, as is evident from his brochure *Napoléon III. et l’Italie*, and from the terms of the treaty of Zürich, of allowing Italy to become anything but a *union fédératif*. But the victory was also that of their king, who had conquered himself, his traditions, and his prejudices, and had sacrificed his daughter and his birthland for Italy; and of Cavour, who by the sheer force of his genius had compelled Europe to recognise a new international principle based on the affinities of peoples, and had inaugurated, not only a new régime for Italy, but also a new public law for Europe.
CHAPTER IV.

FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON III.

The elevation of Louis Napoleon to the headship of the French nation brought to an abrupt close the political progress that France, notwithstanding many governmental changes, had experienced for thirty-eight years. The people, weary of the struggles of parties, and frightened by the spectre of a "horrible Jacquerie," cleverly conjured up for the crisis of 1852, consented to the overthrow of parliamentary government; and in the interest of peace and material prosperity, allowed themselves to be mastered by a ruler whose doctrines were those of an intelligent despot, whose model was the government of the Consulate and of the Empire, and whose self-appointed mission was to complete the work of the first Napoleon. This act of France, committed in a moment of fear and excitement, and involving a complete change in her system of government, postponed the solution of all the political problems that for seventy years had been before the French people; for the new government, though intensely active in promoting the social and industrial welfare of the people, ignored, by virtue of the very principles upon which it was founded, the great question of 1793 and 1848, the question of the republic.

When, in January, 1853, Louis Napoleon stood as the crowned emperor of the French and made his opening address to the assembled deputies of the nation, he had reached, after much disappointment and labour, the goal toward which his eyes had long been turned. He had not come to power without de-
literation, nor had he grasped the sovereignty for the mere purpose of satisfying base desires and personal ambitions. To understand the Emperor's career, one must look beyond those inconsistencies of character and action that seem to mark him as a charlatan and an adventurer, and try to get a true appreciation of the system of government which he conceived, not on the spur of the moment, but after years of brooding in exile and in prison, and which he sincerely believed would be best for France.

Napoleon III. was by nature a fatalist; his every act was performed in the firm belief that he was predestined by Providence to bring the people of France out of a state of chaos into one of order and security; to rescue them from economic distress and bestow upon them happiness and prosperity; to bring into the disordered world of European nations, national symmetry and political harmony. "Above the efforts of science and reason," he said in 1852, "there exists a Supreme Will which rules the destinies of individuals as well as of nations"; and ten years later in his *Vie de Jules César*, he set forth most pertinently his doctrine of the providential elevation of men for the performance of a definite work. Sensible of an obligation to the name he bore, and confident that he should reach the foreordained end in spite of all obstacles that circumstances might throw in his path, he never hesitated or despaired. And this persistent catering to one idea made him, who was by nature timid and irresolute, appear bold and audacious, rash, and fond of that which was sensational. In spite of himself he became a conspirator; for having conspired to gain power, he was compelled to conspire to preserve it; and dreamer, as well as practical politician, he often appeared to be deceiving others intentionally, whereas, in fact, he was himself deceived. But all his acts cannot be excused on these grounds; for possessed of no scruples of conscience, devoid of moral principles in political affairs, and convinced that his mission required that he master
events rather than be mastered by them, he would frequently act with total disregard of every code of political ethics, speak of his devotion to the republic and the constitution even while plotting against them, and present matters in a manner always favourable to his own purpose and program. The government of the Empire was one which in no way represented an historical progress; which owed its being to a clever manipulation of circumstances, and its maintenance to a persistent concealment of its weaknesses; and which was dominated by a man of mediocre ability, whose ideas were a strange medley of the philanthropic, the despotic, and the revolutionary. It is not a cause for wonder that such a government should have shown signs of decay before it had run half its course, and, in the end, should have fallen an easy victim to the attack of an outside power.

Napoleon's political opinions, as first formulated, were expressed in the *Idées Napoléoniennes* in 1839, and afterward were fully worked out in his various speeches and manifestoes dating from 1849 to 1870. Convinced that parliamentary rule as a principle of government was injurious to the welfare of the French, and as a social guarantee, a lasting cause of disorder, he declared that unity, peace, and the security of the country could be obtained only by the revival of the governmental system of 1799, 1802, and 1804; that the concentration of the executive power was necessary, if the happiness of the people and the prosperity of the state were to be increased, and if the state were to be established upon firm foundations. He believed that after so many revolutions, France needed, not a constitution, but a system; and above all the firm hand and the firm will of an absolute prince, who, rising superior to the passions of party, would work for a single end—the prosperity of France. To this thought he gave expression in 1839, and repeated it in the well-known message of October 31, 1849. "An entire system triumphed on the 10th of December," so the message ran;
"for the name Napoleon is a complete program in itself; it wishes to say: within, order, authority, religion, the welfare of the people; without, national dignity." But he had no desire to wield tyrannical or arbitrary power, he was not a reactionist in the sense in which that term applied to the Bourbons of the Restoration; for he recognised progress and gloried in it, and believed that a government to be successful must be progressive, that one based on immutable forms could not last. Convinced that national conglomerations of people were the divinely appointed form that all states were destined to take, he made nationality the basis of his empire. He constantly spoke of himself as a democratic chief, the chosen of December 10th, upon whom the people might impose new burdens. "Faithful to my origin," he wrote in 1861, "I do not consider the prerogatives of my Crown either as a sacred trust which no one can touch, or as a heritage of my ancestors which it is necessary to leave intact to my son. Chosen by the people, and representing their interests, I will always abandon without regret every prerogative useless to the public weal, just as I will preserve unshaken in my hands all power indispensable to the tranquillity and prosperity of the country." Of his sincerity in this statement later events were to give the proof.

But liberty he refused to place among the foundation stones of the imperial edifice, because, as he said in 1853, he was convinced that the exercise of political liberty had weakened every French government since the fall of the first Napoleon; in fact, that liberty had never helped to form any durable political system. He deemed it necessary first to establish order, to organise and consolidate all departments of government, and after placing the empire on a firm foundation, to crown it with liberty,—as the first Napoleon would have done, so said his nephew, had not "the statesmen of Europe in the name of liberty—but rather of licence—roused the nations of Europe, and defeated the Emperor, first at Leipzig, and then at Water-
loo." It was the mission of the great Emperor's heir, Louis Napoleon believed, to finish the work so well begun, first by re-establishing a Napoleonic system without liberty, and gradually, by voluntarily limiting his own prerogatives, to give the people a share in the government, and so to identify his régime with principles of liberty and progress. And he was given courage for his work by a firm belief that France wished to see put into practice the plans of the first Napoleon, and that upon himself, as the bearer of the Napoleonic name, devolved the sacred duty of restoring, in all its efficiency, the Napoleonic system.

But Napoleon III. interpreted the idée Napoléonienne in terms, not of war, but of peace. His was to be an Augustan, not a Cesarian, era, an era of peace and happiness following one of military activity. "It is not an idea of war," he wrote in 1839, "but a social, industrial, and commercial idea—an idea of humanity." On October 9, 1852, he expressed this thought at Bordeaux in a more elaborate form, in what has not been inaptly called the manifesto of the empire. "Some say, in a spirit of defiance, 'the empire is war'; but I say, 'the empire is peace.' It is peace, for France desires it; and when France is satisfied the world is tranquil. . . . I have, however, like the Emperor, conquests to make. Like him, I wish to draw into the stream of the great popular river those hostile side-currents which tend to lose themselves without profit to anyone. I wish to conquer to religion, to morality, to prosperity, that still numerous part of the population which, in the midst of the country of faith and belief, knows little of the precepts of Christ; which, in the midst of a land the most fertile in the world, can scarcely enjoy the chief necessities it produces. We have immense uncultivated territories to clear, routes to open, harbours to excavate, rivers to render navigable, canals to finish, our network of railroads to complete. We have opposite Marseilles a vast kingdom to assimilate to France; we have to
bring all our great ports of the west nearer to the American continent by the more rapid communications, which have hitherto failed us. Finally, we have everywhere ruins to re-construct, false gods to overthrow, truths to make triumphant. This is how I understand the empire, if the empire ought to be re-established. Such are the conquests that I meditate, and you who surround me, you are my soldiers."

This was the imperial program, this the policy outlined in fullest sincerity, that Napoleon III. placed before himself at the beginning of his reign; and to it he faithfully adhered in all but one particular. He made economic conquests; he crowned the edifice with liberty; but he did not avoid the issue of war, and that destroyed him. Naturally irresolute, accustomed to pursue a tortuous and secret path in diplomacy, and wanting in directness of purpose, he was never master of events either at home or abroad. In internal affairs, he was controlled to no inconsiderable extent by Persigny during the earlier years, by Rouher, Prince Napoleon, and Drouyn de Lhuys during the later; and in foreign affairs he became an instrument in the hands, first of Cavour and then of Bismarck, the sport of national forces which he had helped to create but which he was powerless to control.

To comprehend Napoleon's influence, and to understand what made it possible for him to carry out, without hindrance, his ambitious plans, one must turn to the constitution which he himself had drafted, and which he had promulgated by virtue of the authority given him in the plébiscite of December 20, 1851. Intentionally modelled after the constitution of the Consulate, and, as revised in 1852, after that of the Empire, it gave first place to the chief of the executive power. Louis Napoleon, first as "president for ten years," and afterward as Emperor, was vested with the command of the army and the navy; and had the right to declare war, to arrange political and commercial alliances, to conclude treaties of peace, and to issue
rules and decrees for the execution of the law. In his name justice was to be rendered, and he held in his own hands the pardoning power; he could declare any department in a state of siege after referring the matter to the Senate; and upon him the ministers depended absolutely. He alone could initiate legislation, sanction and promulgate the laws; he alone could assemble, adjourn, prorogue, and dissolve the *Corps législatif*, as the popular body was called, and he need not summon another for six months; he alone could convene the High Court of Justice; and, furthermore, he could name those members of the Senate who were raised to that dignity from the rank of ordinary citizens. He could appoint and remove all members of the Council of State, was himself the president of the latter body, and could name the president and vice-president of both the Senate and the *Corps législatif*. And finally all employees of the government were required to take an oath of obedience to the constitution and of fidelity to the chief executive. In the exercise of all these important functions, the executive was responsible to no one save to the people, and to them his responsibility was a mere name. As president for ten years or Emperor for life, his tenure was secure against any attack through popular suffrage. He could be brought to trial by the High Court of Justice for plots against the internal and external safety of the state; but inasmuch as that body could be convened only when the executive so decreed, he could neither be dismissed nor brought to trial without his own consent.

The legislative functions were in the hands of the executive, the Senate, and the *Corps législatif*, while the Council of State performed certain supplemental and deliberative duties. But none of these bodies was able, in reality, to offer any serious resistance to the executive will. The *Corps législatif*, though elected for six years by universal suffrage, was for the first decade a practically powerless body. Deprived of all means of protest, as the address to the throne was abolished, and all in-
terpellations and petitions were forbidden; with no opportunity of introducing a new policy by overthrowing or censuring the ministry, as the members of the cabinet were not allowed to be deputies, and were prohibited from appearing on the floor of the Chamber; and with no means of influencing public opinion, or of making their eloquence known to the people, as the minutes of the proceedings were issued through the president, an appointee of the executive, in but one, and that the official, form; —under all these circumstances, it was inevitable that the deputies should lose their interest in the government, and should make scarcely any attempt to emancipate themselves from the control of the Emperor. Usually they voted all laws submitted to them without murmuring, and during the greater part of the reign were merely a deliberative body, expressing the will, not of the people, but of the executive. Such were the essential characteristics of the constitution of 1852, a constitution which was founded, not on tradition and experience, but on theory; which never worked in entire harmony with the theory according to which it had been constructed; which bore trace of the handiwork of the Abbé Siéyès, that arch constitution-maker of the Revolution; which, though simple in conception, was cumbersome and complicated in its workings; and which, though intended to give sovereignty to the people, in reality wrested it from them, destroyed for the time being all popular interest in political affairs, did nothing to strengthen the principles of democracy upon which it was supposed to be based, created a régime that had all the marks of a despotism; and in the name of the people of France, granted enormous powers to Louis Napoleon Bonaparte.

The chief characteristic of the internal history of France from 1852 to 1857 is a steady development in the strength of the Empire. The opposition to the new régime was slight, for so effectual had been the coup d'État that few voices were raised, few acts committed, against the Napoleonic supremacy. The
republicans who remained at home were held firmly in check, and denied liberty of the press, of reunion, and of association; and the republicans who had fled abroad, and were living in Nice, the Pyrenees, Geneva, the cities of Germany, and especially those in Belgium and England, vented their wrath to no purpose at meetings in cafés and private houses, through pamphlets, which were with difficulty smuggled into France, and through societies, which made vain efforts to stir up insurrection in that country. Toward the other parties the government acted with characteristic adroitness. Though Louis Philippe was dead, and the Orléanists had made but few attempts to support the cause of his grandson, yet between them and the Empire there was perpetual war; for Napoleon, never for an instant forgetting their scornful epigrams and speeches, and the intensity with which they had warred against him in the National Assembly, did not rest until he had driven every Orléanist or Orléanist sympathiser from political office, and even from political life. With the Legitimists, however, it was different; for the Count of Chambord, though immovable in his convictions, was not the man to fight for a throne that he thought should be his by prescriptive right. Napoleon, knowing this, and believing the Legitimists to be useful allies, because of their connection with the church, and ornaments, by virtue of their rank and relation to the old régime, pardoned their indiscretions, and contented himself with reproving their most zealous sympathisers. They, in turn, accepted the situation, almost ceased to exist as an active party, and sank year by year into a deeper oblivion.

Over against this policy of threats, punishments, and intimidations for the republicans and Orléanists, and of tolerance for the Legitimists, Napoleon placed another of kind acts, favours, and rewards for the nation at large, which had condoned his crime and accepted his leadership. Repression and progress, the one necessary in order to make the other possible, became
the catchwords of the Empire: first to establish the Empire and then to reform it, was the plan ever uppermost in the imperial mind. To raise France socially and materially, to make use of all that modern science and invention could furnish for improving the condition of the people, was the aim of the Emperor, and in 1852 he began to put into execution this plan, which took but little account of the ethical and intellectual needs of France. Bodily comfort and material gain were given by Napoleon as a solace for the loss of liberty; and, for the time being, a promising economic activity concealed the serious want of moral and religious strength.

The Emperor, first of all, turned his attention to works of charity and philanthropy. Asylums and maternity hospitals were opened, and at Vincennes and Versailles, hospitals for injured labourers; the number of mutual relief societies, the first of which had been founded in 1850, was increased, and their influence extended; and public assistance was given for the improvement of the houses of workingmen, both in the cities and in the country. These excellent undertakings were supported in part from the sale of the Orléanist estates, in part, from the private purse of the Emperor. But Napoleon had larger projects in mind, and in carrying them out he showed profound sagacity; for he made the economic forces, which were bringing about an industrial revolution in other parts of Europe, work, not only to the advantage of France, but especially to that of his government and himself. With full allowance for the many evils his scheme entailed, and notwithstanding the fact that in operation it lacked unity and completeness, it was most beneficial to the country, and did more to ameliorate social conditions than had all the reform measures of the two preceding governments.

For the benefit of landed proprietors who desired to increase their working capital or improve their land, there were established in 1852 credit banks, whence could be obtained loans
upon first mortgages, bearing five per cent. interest, and payable in easy, yearly instalments. This crédit foncier for the improvement of agriculture favoured, on the whole, the larger proprietors, but was less advantageous to the small farmers, for whom originally it had been intended; it benefited the proprietary interests of the cities, but did little to hasten the actual improvement of the country lands. This effort to stimulate agricultural pursuits in France was supplemented, in the same year, by the establishment of the crédit mobilier, which was designed to increase the public wealth by the encouragement and promotion of great undertakings. The railway system, which had been left in a very incomplete condition by the July Monarchy, was extended until, in 1856, the number of miles of constructed railways had increased from two to nearly six thousand. Steamboat lines were established, and the extension of the telegraph was begun. Perhaps the greatest achievement of the period was the opening of telegraphic communication between the Tuileries and the French camp in the Crimea, by means of a cable, which was sunk in the Black Sea on April 25, 1855. The Emperor, relying on the support of public opinion, encouraged all enterprises that promised to be successful and beneficial, in the hope that many of them would come to be associated with the Napoleonic name; and in this he was not disappointed. The people, welcoming the new inventions that doubled their exchanges and increased their profits, paid homage to the imperial name, praised the Emperor for his good works, and gave signs of satisfaction that seemed to guarantee to the Empire a security that it probably never possessed.

But side by side with these evidences of economic activity, there existed, during these early years of the Empire, conditions productive of great want and misery to the people. Insufficient harvests in 1853 and 1854 raised the price of wheat at home, while the war with Russia cut off an important source of
supply from without. Cholera appeared, and destroyed, it is said, 150,000 people; and the miserable condition of the people was still further aggravated by inundations, which were due to the rising of the rivers, notably of the Rhône and of the Garonne. Yet, to all seeming, money was never more plenty, the life of the court never more magnificent. Speculation became the business of the day. Capitalists, who had been timid during the disturbed period of the war, were eager to invest money in the new enterprises, and business was made even more brisk by the rumours of newly discovered gold in California and Australia. Rapid gains were expected, money easily made was quickly spent, and luxury increased. All the nation was at the Bourse. Rich and poor, men and women, those in official circles,—even those in the antechambers of the ministry,—were engaged in the fascinating pursuit of buying and selling. The opportunities for amassing wealth were numberless. The stocks and securities of railway lines, gas companies, mining companies, and various agricultural organisations, and government, municipal, and departmental bonds, due to the many loans made necessary by the extensive public works and, above all, by the Crimean war, were sold, bought back, and sold again. The excitement, naturally aroused by such conditions, was increased by the rumours, true and false, from the seat of war; while the telegraph enlarged the field of speculation, by carrying these reports from Paris to the provinces. The condition of France was becoming unhealthy both financially and morally, and the illusion of wealth thus created was increased by the policy of the court. The Tuileries set an example of luxury that was alluring to those of lower rank. Fêtes, receptions, entertainments of all kinds, which were given to the empress at the time of her marriage in 1853, and continued by her afterward, gave to the life in Paris the appearance of a perpetual carnival. Even while the people were in want, while cholera and the war in the Crimea were claiming new victims,
the splendours of Paris were maintained, defended by the spe-
cious argument that "a fête was a rain of gold that watered all
industries." In consequence, even as early as 1856, the people,
attracted by the luxury of the court life, and seeing it copied
by all those who came within the area of its magnetic influence,
drew false conclusions, and forgetting misery and want, forget-
ting the evils of war and the losses by flood, began to believe in
sources of wealth that did not exist.

Nor is it surprising that the nation should have come to be-
lieve that a period of prosperity was at hand: Baron Hauss-
mann's grand scheme for rebuilding Paris in 1853, and the
great exhibition of Paris in 1855, in themselves would have
warranted such a belief. According to Haussmann's plan, Paris
was to be remodelled first, by the destruction of many
 dingy quarters and streets, that the space about the greater
buildings might be increased, and the sanitary conditions of the
city improved; and then, by the construction of great boule-
vards, in order to admit light and air, to make easier the move-
ment of troops, to allow freer circulation to the crowds of
Paris, and to make more accessible the railway stations that
communicated with the provinces. Though the original plans
were never carried out in all their detail, the work accomplished
was of lasting benefit to France: the "great cross of Paris," with
its arms intersecting at the tower of St. Jacques, will ever
stand as a monument to the ability and perseverance of the
famous ædile. And the work was of immediate, as well as
ultimate, value. Like the promotion of railway building, the
speculations of the Bourse, the fêtes of the Tuileries, the splen-
dours of the exhibition, and the war in the Crimea, it diverted
the mind of the people, it drew their attention from the coup
d'État and the loss of political liberty, and it added to the glory
of Napoleon and the Empire.

In the year 1856 Louis Napoleon had reached the zenith of
his career. For four years the internal condition of France
had been one of peace; revolution and disturbance had been checked; happiness and content had again come to the nation; good works had been undertaken, and public improvements made;—on all sides were signs of material prosperity. The people, though suffering, seemed appeased in their discontent as they saw the Emperor concerned for their welfare, founding hospitals for those stricken with the epidemic, visiting the inundated districts, giving of his bounty to the homeless, and relieving the misery caused by bad harvests. Those who were in office, with increased salaries and numberless opportunities of making money, recognised the value of attachment to the government, and lauded the imperial name; the moneyed classes paid homage to the man who had increased their opportunities of gaining wealth, and had quieted disorder, that capital might be productive; the army, after winning glory in the east, returned to France proud of the distinction that it had won under the banner of the Emperor; and the clergy, little recking of the clouds that were soon to gather, eulogised Napoleon as the defender of the Pope, the benefactor of the church, and the protector of the state. Only the intellectual class was silent: in the salons and the Academy the opposition to the Empire found refuge.

In foreign relations good fortune had with equal persistence favoured the Emperor. In less than two years and a half after the coup d’état, his government had been recognised by all the European Powers; as an ally of England he had engaged in war against Russia; in less than four years, because of the victories of his troops in the Crimea and especially of the taking of Sebastopol, he had gained the reputation of having the finest army in Europe; and he had received the highest honours that diplomacy could bestow, in having his capital selected as the meeting place of the peace congress. In his beautiful city of Paris he entertained his guests with that lavish hospitality for which the Tuileries had already become famous;
and acting as the head of the European concert, courted by Russia on one hand and by Piedmont on the other, and on friendly terms with England and Prussia, he seemed to hold in his grasp the power to shape the future of Europe. And then, that Providence might not seem to have exhausted its gifts, he was gladdened at this, the crowning point of his career, by the birth of a son, heir to the destinies of the Empire.

Yet even during these first happy years there appeared signs full of bad omen for the future. Increasing expenses required frequent loans; while to the casual observer Paris seemed all life and happiness and prosperity, for him who cared to listen there was a low murmur of discontent among the people, wrung from them by their want and misery; popular support, which had been granted the Emperor, not because of any real devotion to his régime, but rather because of his generous interest and gifts, could be retained only by continued interest and benefactions; the forcing of the material development of France, too often at the expense of the religious and intellectual development, was encouraging an unsymmetrical growth; while the Emperor's secret diplomatic methods, and his want of decision and a fixed plan, displayed his fatal defects as a ruler, and made it questionable whether, in the presence of greater diplomatic crises, than those which had thus far arisen, he could preserve the reputation for statesmanship that his clever management of the coup d'état had won for him. All these indications, however, were too far below the surface to attract any general attention, in the midst of the many excitements and diversions that attended the new reign.

But in 1857, when were held the first general elections since 1851, a slight re-awakening of public opinion was noticeable. The time had come for a renewal of the members of the Corps législatif, and preparations for that event were made throughout the country. In consequence of interference on the part of prefects, of the manipulation of election districts, of the in-
difference of the public, and of the prestige acquired by five
years of successful rule, the candidates of the government were,
in nearly every case, returned by considerable majorities, and
the new legislature was, therefore, little different from the old,
was little more than a willing tool in the hands of the Emperor.
Yet there was one notable difference between the Chamber that
had assembled in the summer of 1852 and this which met in
December, 1857. The former, to a man, had supported the
imperial policy; but in the latter there existed an extreme
Left, composed, at first, of three men, Hénon, Darimon, and
Ollivier, and, after the election of Picard and Jules Favre in
April, 1858, of five, Les Cinq, as they were called, who became
the advance guard of a true constitutional opposition. The
number, at first insignificant, increased with each new election,
until finally the party of opposition, aided by the press, and
by those who were desirous of restoring to France some measure
of parliamentary government, was able to make the first break
in the solid Empire.

At this point, when political life in France was as yet but
little disturbed, an event occurred that carried in train conse-
quences most disastrous to the Empire. On the 14th of January,
1858, four days before the members of the new Corps législatif
assembled, an Italian, Orsini, and two accomplices attempted
to assassinate the Emperor as, at half after eight in the even-
ing, he was about to enter the opera house with the empress.
As if by a miracle, both escaped injury; but eight persons were
killed outright, or died afterwards, and about one hundred and
forty were wounded. Immediately a great outcry arose against
all revolutionists and revolutionary projects. Piedmont, Bel-
gium, and England were accused of harbouring exiles, and
were called hatchers of plots, because, as the French government
claimed, these countries had not only offered asylum to con-
spirators but had allowed them to form there their plans of assas-
sination. On January 20th, Walewski sent a vehement despatch
to the French ambassador in London, stating that Pianori, Tibaldi, and now Orsini had prepared their schemes in that city, and declaring that England had no right "to protect that class, which, by its flagrant acts, placed itself outside of common justice and under the ban of humanity." Having made this protest, the government prepared repressive laws for France. On January 27th a decree was issued dividing the state into military districts, and the "law of general security," which was put before the Chamber on February 1st, was, on the 11th of the same month, adopted by a vote of 217 to 24.

Thus a law was passed that conferred upon the government the right to proscribe without judgment those whom it suspected to be its enemies, to forbid them the country, to confine them in France, or to deport them to Algeria. It was a vaguely expressed measure, granting arbitrary and dictatorial powers out of all proportion to the crime committed, a measure confusing executive and judicial functions, capable of ready extension in the hands of the Emperor, of application to any movement, small or great, that seemed dangerous to the imperial policy. While it is true that only Ollivier and a few others in the Corps législatif opposed the law, and that in the Senate General Mac-Mahon alone spoke against it, it is equally true that the people in general condemned it. A feeling of dismay spread throughout France, of wonder that the imperial power should feel so insecure as to need this military protection, this instrument of proscription; that the government which could boast of having maintained order for six years, should now admit that such legislation was needed to preserve it. But the ministry, recovering a little from its fright, and fearing that the new law was rousing discontent instead of stilling it, weakening confidence instead of strengthening it, and exasperating friends and foes alike instead of winning supporters to the government, tried to mend matters by restricting the operation of the law to seven years, and by making its application, in any given case,
depend upon the combined consent of a prefect, a general, and a procureur-general. Notwithstanding this effort, "the law of general security," known among the people as "the law of suspects," weakened greatly the loyalty of France and strengthened the cause of the opposition, proof of which fact was given at the time of the supplemental elections in April, when Paris, to show its disapproval of the obnoxious law, elected, by a good majority, Jules Favre, the defender of Orsini.

And the attempt to assassinate the Emperor not only affected the internal political condition of France; it also led to trouble with England, with whom the relations had been none too good since the signing of the treaty of Paris. The English people were enraged at the too outspoken expressions of the French press, and of certain French generals and colonels who seemed to be charging England with complicity in the attack; and on the other hand, the French were equally indignant, when on February 19, 1858, Parliament, as an answer to the "addresses of the colonels," overthrew Palmerston, who had just brought in a conspiracy bill; and when an English jury acquitted an accomplice of Orsini, Bernhard, of whose guilt, so the French believed, there was ample proof. Fortunately, the sovereigns of the two countries did not share the popular ill-will, and in a meeting at Cherbourg the August following, made every effort to efface all traces of the unpleasant episode.

It would seem that Napoleon had already suffered enough at the hands of Orsini; but like a sinister fate, the spirit of the Italian pursued him, and drove him to his ruin. Orsini paid for his crime with his life; but his testament, in which he appealed to the Emperor to make Italy free, worked upon Napoleon's mind, and caused him to adopt a policy that in the end destroyed him. We have noted how Napoleon, instead of abandoning Cavour, as he might have done with reason after this attempt upon his life by an Italian patriot, only prosecuted more diligently his plan of going to war with Austria for the
cause of Italy; and how, in July, 1858, he summoned Cavour to meet him at Plombières, and before a third of the year 1859 had run its course, was at the head of his troops helping Italy to drive the Austrian white coats from Lombardy. And there is no need of our mentioning again the incidents of the war, the terms of Villafranca, or the events leading to the annexation of the various states to Piedmont. What we are here chiefly interested in discovering is, why the Italian policy was so injurious to the imperial cause; why, in Italy, the fate of the Second Empire was decided.

Until the year 1858 Napoleon had pursued his course with due regard to the interests of the nation of which he was the head; but with his entrance into the Italian war, he adopted a policy, in forming which he had consulted, not the needs and traditions of the nation, as sound statesmanship should have prompted him to do, but his own personal sympathies, his own sentimental and humanitarian views. At Plombières, he for the first time committed himself to a policy based upon his theory regarding nationalities and races, which, though never very clearly formed even in his own mind, he persistently tried to carry out, and in so doing used all the forces that France by the constitution of 1852 had placed at his disposal. Little did he dream that the consequences of this act would work nothing but harm for him: he did not foresee that the Italian war, while winning freedom for Italy, would weaken his own position both in France and Europe; that the expedition to Mexico would ruin him financially and morally; that his attitude toward Prussia would bring about the destruction of his Empire. Standing at the congress of Paris as the most influential man in Europe, he overestimated his own power to manage and hold in check the national movements, both in Italy and Germany, which he honesty desired to aid. But once embarked upon the Italian adventure, he found himself borne along on the current far beyond the point that he had set
for himself. At first desiring only a north Italian kingdom as one member of an Italian confederation, of which the Pope should be the head, he was led on, at one time resisting, at another consenting, to sanction the overthrow of the sovereign state of Naples, the seizure of the lands of the Pope, and the establishment of a single greater Italy composed of all the states of the peninsula. It was inevitable that under these circumstances he should appear vacillating and inconsistent. To sign the treaty of Zürich and then to sanction acts that rendered its provisions null and void, was a policy that roused the distrust of Europe; to agree to the overthrow of Naples and the attack on Rome, was enough to rouse the enmity of the eastern Powers, and to bring against France a new coalition; to annex Savoy and Nice, after disclaiming all idea of conquest, was sufficient to destroy England’s confidence in him, and to endanger their friendly relations. From the close of the Italian war his influence declined, and by 1863, in consequence of his wavering policy, he had forever lost his dominant place in European politics, and had forfeited the trust of the Powers. Even Italy, whose cause he had supported, began to mistrust the man who had signed the armistice of Villafranca, had protected Francis II. at Gaète, and was upholding the Pope in Rome.

Nor was the Emperor’s Italian policy of any advantage to him at home. It so thoroughly annoyed Legitimists, Orléanists, liberal Catholics, and constitutionalists of all grades of opinion, that the good results of the early attempts at reconciliation were undone, and the country was once more divided into parties. The Legitimists were thrice wounded: as upholders of the doctrine of legitimacy, they resented the overthrow and despoliation of legitimate sovereigns; as Bourbons they keenly felt the downfall of the Bourbon king of Naples; as Roman Catholics who made their religious creed a part of their political creed, they were outraged by Napoleon’s views regarding the temporal power of the Pope as expressed in his pamphlet Le
Pape et le Congrès. The old alliance with the clergy was at an end, and war between the clerical party and the government almost at once broke out. When, through episcopal mandates and the press, the clerical party sustained vigorously the rights of the Pope, and violently condemned the conduct of the government, the latter, in reply, suppressed the clerical paper L'Univers and confiscated the ecclesiastical pamphlets, returning war for war. The constitutionalist leaders, who had never ceased to oppose the imperial policy, because they considered the erection of a strong state on the south-eastern border harmful to the welfare of France, strongly disapproved of the manner in which the Emperor conducted his diplomatic business, deeming him forgetful of the interests of his advisers as well as of France. The democrats,—such as Jules Favre,—who favoured the cause of Italian unity, were aggrieved that the armistice of Villafranca had stopped the movement half way, and had driven the Emperor over to the side of Austria; in short, the imperial policy satisfied no one except the Emperor's immediate supporters. Then, too, the Italian campaign and the events that followed betrayed, as nothing had done hitherto, the real inability and weakness of the Emperor himself, his underhand methods, and his powers of intrigue. Many began to say, as did Lord Palmerston, that the "Emperor's mind seemed to be as full of schemes as a warren is full of rabbits," and to doubt whether, after all, there lay under that taciturn and sphinx-like exterior, the genius that had been ascribed to him.

Such were the results of this unfortunate Italian policy. Napoleon himself appreciated the changed situation, and in 1860 made many attempts to counteract its bad effects. In order to increase the prosperity of France, he gave his support to certain measures touching the economic relations with other countries. The negotiations that had been under way with England since 1852 for a treaty of commerce on the basis of a reduction of duties, were, after considerable delay, due in part to
the Emperor's entanglement in Italian affairs, in part to a great deal of opposition at home, finally brought to an end by a treaty signed on January 23, 1860. This treaty fixed for ten years the commercial relations between France and England, suppressed old tariffs, and introduced a system of moderate duties. A great outcry at once arose: protectionists declared that French interests were being sacrificed for English, just as in the war with Italy they had said that French interests were being sacrificed for Italian; constitutionalists were amazed at the secrecy with which the negotiations had been conducted; and the whole country was stirred by the debate that arose upon the subject in the Corps législatif. That body confirmed the treaty, but the controversy regarding it was ominous for a long continuance of the personal government of the Emperor. A little later, in August, 1860, an expedition was undertaken in conjunction with England, for the purpose of compelling China to adhere to the treaty of Tien-Tsin of June 27, 1858. After defeating the Chinese at Palikao, the allies obtained a renewal of the treaty and of certain important articles whereby eleven Chinese ports were thrown open to the western Powers. This notable step in the history of international commerce, which brought China and Japan into touch with the western world and added an important colonial territory to France, was not without its evil consequences for the Emperor. Not only was it an exceedingly expensive expedition calling for new loans, but it led to no little unpleasant and unjust comment in France to the effect, that the privileges conceded by the Chinese were less to the advantage of France than to that of England, who was almost exclusively mistress of commerce in the east.

A new incident now disclosed even more clearly the difficult position in which the Emperor was placed. In the spring of 1860, the Druses, Mussulman agriculturists of the Lebanon, attacked and massacred many of the Maronites or Syrian Christians; and in July, a mob of fanatical Mussulmans
assaulted the Christian quarters in Damascus, murdered two-thousand Christians, and destroyed the consulates of France, Austria, Russia, Holland, Belgium, and Greece. Napoleon at once proposed to the Powers that they should interfere for the purpose of restoring order, and on August 3d, a convention to discuss the matter was held. On September 5th, a treaty with the Porte was signed, according to which France was to send 6,000 men to Syria, and England was to co-operate with the fleet for the purpose of stopping the massacres in Syria, and of establishing order and peace in the Turkish territory. The French occupation proved to be entirely successful; but as six months, the term set by the Powers, was found to be too short a time in which to restore order satisfactorily, France kept her troops in Syria beyond the date agreed upon. The distrust of England was at once aroused: English statesmen, mindful of the annexations of Savoy and Nice, and fearing the loss of British influence in the east, maintained that the French Emperor was planning to obtain a protectorate over Syria, and on this ground, demanded that the troops be recalled. This eagerness of England to discover an unworthy motive for Napoleon’s conduct was partly justified by the Emperor’s change of attitude toward Turkey since the Crimean war; but it was due, in the main, to a selfish determination to prevent France from gaining a foothold in the east. It is wholly probable that the Emperor had advocated the cause of the Syrians, partly from instincts of humanity, partly from a desire to win again the favour of the clerical party in France, for the Jesuits and Lazarists had already established schools among the Maronites. This England would not believe, however, and although the occupation was prolonged by the common consent of the Powers to June 5, 1861, it was brought to an end because of England’s insistence, before its object had been fully attained. Ever on the alert for something to criticise, the people of France now condemned the Emperor for yielding too easily to the wishes of England.
Thus with the year 1861 the straight path, which, in his manifesto of 1850, the Emperor had promised to follow, had become a winding and devious course, turning sometimes to the right, sometimes to the left, sometimes passing underground only to appear again in an unexpected quarter. Yet, meanwhile, he had not forgotten his original promises. In July, 1860, he had written to Persigny: "I said at Bordeaux—and I am still of the same mind—that I have great conquests to make; but they are to be made in France. I have still to organise this country morally and socially; I have still to develop her internal resources, which even yet are in a languishing condition; and those objects present fields for my ambition vast enough to more than satisfy it." That he might prove his sincerity, he had negotiated commercial treaties first with England, and later with Belgium, Prussia and the Zollverein, Holland, Spain, and Austria, which inaugurated a new era in the commercial history of Europe; he had increased the number of commercial privileges of the French colonies, opened three lines of steamers to America and Africa, established steamship service in the Mediterranean, and encouraged de Lesseps to carry through the work on the Suez Canal.

Nor was he unmindful of the fact that he had promised to resign some of his own prerogatives that the people might have a share in the government of France. Forced by the events of the Italian war and by the breach with the clerical party to turn toward the constitutional liberals, he made his first attempt to draw the latter to his support by issuing on September 24, 1860, a decree that restored the address to the throne and allowed the deputies in the Chamber to interrogate freely the commissioners of the government on all matters pertaining to the internal and external policy of the state. The immediate effect of this act was almost startling: the sessions of the Corps législatif increased enormously in interest; the public again crowded to hear parliamentary debates; and when, in March,
1861, the first address under the new decree was presented in the Chamber, oratory of a high order was heard once more in France. But of greater importance was it that some of the ablest orators were in the opposition, criticising freely the imperial policy, denouncing the law of general security, the law limiting the press, and the various financial measures which had been passed up to this time; and that when the address was finally voted, it was found, to the consternation of the imperialists, that ninety members of the Right—the clerical and monarchical party—had voted against the government, as an emphatic reply of the advocates of the temporal power of the Pope to the Emperor's policy in Italy.

From this time the constitutional opposition steadily increased. Notwithstanding the fact that Ollivier, influenced by the concession of the address, was beginning to favour the cause of the liberal Empire, Les Cinq, becoming bolder, proposed in 1862 a number of amendments to the address of a most audacious character. They demanded liberty of the press, freedom of elections, right of reunion, and direct nomination of the mayors by the citizens; and the next year, 1863, on the eve of the elections, embodied these demands and others in the form of a program for the liberal party. This party was rapidly taking on an organised form, and its cause was strengthened by the growing hostility to the Emperor on the part of the bishops and many of the men of letters in France. In celebrating with pomp the services of the martyrs of Castelfidardo, the bishops did not hesitate to liken the Emperor to Pontius Pilate, and to echo the Pope's charge that Napoleon III. had persecuted the church while pretending to protect it. And again, when the minister of public instruction transformed the old chair of Hebrew in the College of France into one of comparative philology and appointed Romain to fill it, a veritable battle raged between the Roman Catholics and the government, in which the latter was finally worsted. In the conflict with the men of letters, Victor
de Leprade was removed from his professorship at Lyons for verses full of unpleasant allusions to the Emperor; the editor who published the letter of the Duke of Aumale "upon the history of France," defending the Bourbons and attacking the Bonapartists, was sentenced to fine and imprisonment; and certain conferences and courses of lectures that were organised in Paris for a more liberal study of history, literature, and geography, were suspended or forbidden, because it was known that the promoters of them were hostile to the government. So the war went on, while the country was awakening to a new political life.

The test of the situation was soon made; for on May 31, 1863, were held the general elections for the renewal of the Corps législatif. Both sides were determined to win, and neither left anything undone that might seem to promise success. Persigny acted with an ardour worthy of a better cause. Administrative pressure was applied by every functionary from minister to mayor: prefects intimidated voters, promised, favoured, and arrested; electoral districts were changed, opposition placards mutilated, opposition manifestoes confiscated in the post. This was a disgraceful display of governmental interference; and though it may not be just to hold the Emperor responsible for the doings of Persigny and the prefects, nevertheless he was blamed at the time, and their methods were a damning commentary upon his pretensions of liberal government. Democrats and clericals alike voted with the opposition, and it early became evident that important results would be obtained. Thanks to its policy of favouritism and intimidation, the government was victorious in the provinces; but in Paris and the larger cities, where liberal ideas had spread with greater rapidity, it was defeated; in all, thirty-five deputies opposed to the government were returned. The meaning of this was significant: the spirit of revolt stirring in the labouring people in the cities, had tended to separate them from the peasants of the
country; in other words, the Napoleonic legend and name had lost their influence, and Paris had broken with the Emperor. And Napoleon at once appreciated the importance of the lesson. Dismissing Persigny from office, he reorganised the ministry, and gave the minister of state the power to defend the acts of the entire cabinet before the Chamber; and in so doing, made not only an important concession to the constitutional liberals, but also a distinct advance in the direction of parliamentary government.

While these acts of Napoleon's, which seemed to be a pledge of greater constitutional changes to come, were winning for him some measure of praise and support at home, the foreign relations of France were becoming more complicated and unsatisfactory. Every new political and diplomatic crisis showed the Emperor's lamentable inability to master the situation; and his position was steadily becoming worse instead of better, largely because of his failure to hold to any fixed purpose. Annoyed and disturbed by certain threatening statements made by the Italian Parliament in 1861 regarding Italy's right to Rome, and by Garibaldi's attempt in August, 1862, to seize that city, he turned from the alliance with Italy, dismissed Thouvenel from the ministry on October 15, 1862, and summoned Drouyn de Lhuys as an indication that he had determined to adopt a conservative policy and one friendly to Austria. This attempt to conciliate the ecclesiastical party in France resulted in utter failure. The Pope resisted every attempt of the Emperor's to effect a reconciliation between him and the Italian government, and indignant that in the convention of September, 1864, Italy should have agreed to become the protector of Rome if Napoleon would consent to the removal of her capital to Florence, issued the encyclical Quanta cura and the Syllabus or catalogue of the errors of the age which Napoleon would not allow to be published in France, on the ground that it contained propositions contrary to the
principles upon which the imperial constitution rested. Just at this time, when the Italians were disturbed by the Emperor's change of attitude; when the relations between Napoleon and the Pope were on the worst possible footing; and when the bishops in France taking up the papal cause were protesting against the interdiction of the Syllabus and making bitter attacks upon Duruy, the minister of public instruction, as the promoter of infidelity and materialism, the relations with Russia and England were changing for the worse. The uprising of the Poles in 1863 against the authority of the Czar effected a veritable diplomatic revolution in Europe. Napoleon, who had been on excellent terms with Russia since 1856, influenced by his own doctrine of nationality, and by his minister, Drouyn de Lhuys, who hated Russia's ally, Prussia, and carried off his feet by a wave of popular feeling in France, took up the cause of the Poles, and by so doing forever lost the friendship of Alexander. Furthermore, in his effort to form an alliance for the defence of the Poles, he was so enraged by England's refusal to co-operate, that when, the following year, Palmerston asked for his assistance in upholding the integrity of Denmark, he refused, and by so doing, completed his estrangement from England, and abandoned Denmark to the aggressions of Germany. But the most disastrous of all Napoleon's foreign undertakings, the most illegitimate, fatuous, and ruinous, was the ill-fated expedition to Mexico.

In 1859 the Mexican congress had voted, and the president approved, a law suspending for a few years the payment of all foreign debts. In consequence of this act, England, France, and Spain, the three Powers chiefly concerned, broke off diplomatic relations with Mexico, and on October 31, 1861, signed a treaty at London, whereby they agreed to act together for the purpose of enforcing the claims of Mexico's European creditors; but at the same time they expressly renounced all plans of conquest, and all designs against the existing Mexican govern-
ment. On December 8th, the Spanish fleet appeared before Vera Cruz, and a month afterward, the French and English fleets followed. In a joint note to President Juarez, the Powers again declared that they had no intention of meddling in the internal affairs of Mexico, and in a convention, held at Soledad, February 19, 1862, they recognised Juarez, and agreed to open negotiations with him on April 15th. But already it had become evident that the French had other views in mind than the settlement of the indebtedness, and these became known officially when, in February, General Almonte, a bitter enemy of Juarez, arrived with new instructions from Napoleon to the effect that he disapproved of the convention of Soledad as "contrary to the dignity of France." Almonte, asserting that he was in the full confidence of the Emperor, announced that he purposed transforming the republic of Mexico into an empire, and placing Maximilian of Austria upon the throne. England and Spain, claiming that France was distinctly breaking the terms of the treaty of October, withdrew from the alliance, and began to treat separately with the Mexican government. By the end of April they had entirely withdrawn from Mexico, and that which had begun as intervention for the purpose of securing the payment of a debt, ended as a war for the overthrow of the Mexican Republic. So successful had been the French troops under General Forey that, by the middle of the year 1863, a provisional government of notables had been established, and an invitation sent to Maximilian to take the Mexican throne. The young prince hesitated long; but urged by Napoleon, and by his wife Carlotta, daughter of the king of Belgium, he decided to accept, if the necessary guarantees could be secured. These were given by Napoleon and the Pope; the former promised to leave 25,000 men in Mexico, and to furnish 270,000,000 of francs, of which 66,000,000 were to be paid on account, and 25,000,000 yearly until the whole was paid; the latter blessed the new enterprise, and promised to
send a special nuncio with full powers to reconcile the religious parties in Mexico. Thus equipped, Maximilian set sail for Mexico on April 16, 1864.

There is much that is still obscure in the history of this sad, but famous, expedition; but it is not difficult to discover, in part at least, the motives that prompted Napoleon III. to originate it and give it his support. For years he had been interested in the internal affairs of Mexico and the countries of South America, but his knowledge of the former state, derived largely from the reports of Mexican aristocratic and clerical émigrés, was necessarily incomplete. In his desire to rescue Mexico from a state of civil war, he overestimated the strength of the conservatives and monarchists, and, in consequence, concluded that he could restore order to the country and peace to the nation by erecting there, as he had done in France, a strong imperial government. But besides wishing to bring peace to Mexico, he also desired to further the interests of the commercial classes in France, by opening in the west a new field for their activities and their profits; and hoped to appease the ecclesiastical party at home, if only he could overthrow the existing anti-clerical government in Mexico, which had established freedom of worship, had taken away the privileges of the clergy, and had confiscated the ecclesiastical lands. In this plan he was encouraged by the empress, the Mexican refugees, and the clergy in France; but also the very grandeur of the scheme attracted him, for in the event of success, the flag of France would float victorious over the walls of Mexico as it had just done over the walls of Pekin. How far he was influenced by his desire to give unity to the Latin race, may be inferred from his letter to General Forey, dated July 3, 1863. "In the actual state of civilisation of the world, the prosperity of America cannot be a matter of indifference to Europe. . . . We are desirous that the republic of the United States be powerful and prosperous, but we are not desirous that she
should make herself mistress of the Gulf of Mexico, dominate the Antilles and South America, and so be the sole dispenser of the products of the New World. . . . If, on the contrary, Mexico preserve her independence and maintain the integrity of her territory, if a government be established there with the assistance of France, we shall have rendered to the Latin race on the other side of the ocean its strength and its prestige; we shall have guaranteed security to our colonies and those of Spain; we shall have established our beneficent influence in the centre of America; and that influence, in creating immense outlets to our commerce, will procure for us the materials indispensable to our industry. To-day, our military honour, the exigencies of our politics, the interests of our industry and our commerce, demand that we march upon Mexico, plant boldly our flag, and establish there even a monarchy, if that be not incompatible with the national sentiment of the country, or at least a government that promises some stability."

This expedition, which in 1865 Napoleon declared would form one of the most beautiful pages in the history of his reign, and which Rouher called "a grand thing, by which France would conquer a great country to civilisation," was destined to do more than any other of Napoleon's ventures to drag the Second Empire down to ruin. Not only did it involve an attack upon a sovereign state, which even in the midst of war and political chaos was showing itself competent to solve, without foreign aid, the problem of its national unity; but it also required that such attack be made in the face of the determined opposition of the United States, who, victorious in the war with the Confederacy, was ready in 1865 to forbid the further intervention on the part of the French Emperor, and to drive out his troops by force of arms, if necessary. Then, too, it was ruinous in that it increased the French debt, weakened the French army and military resources, strengthened the opposition of the liberals in France to the government, and
further alienated from their sovereign the people of France, who though ready to fight for the honour of their country, had no sympathy with the Emperor’s dream of a Neo-Latin league. Such an aggression on the part of France imperilled her old friendship with the United States, which was already impaired by the unconcealed sympathy of the Emperor for the cause of the Confederacy, and by the equally unconcealed sympathy of the United States for the cause of the Mexican republicans; and besides, the repulse of the French army before Pueblo in 1862, as the first defeat that the troops of the Emperor had suffered, injured his military prestige; the character of the undertaking damaged his moral influence; and the failure, which eventually came, destroyed men’s faith in his political judgment and foresight. But the expedition worked its greatest harm to Napoleon in the part it played in compelling him to remain neutral at a time when the political opposition to him in France, his isolation among the Powers, and the uncertainty of affairs in Mexico, placed him at a disadvantage, and enabled Bismarck, already victorious in the struggle with Denmark, and looking forward to the conflict with Austria, more easily to carry on those negotiations so fatal to Napoleon that occupied the attention of Europe in the year 1866. Entanglement in Mexico and the danger of war with the United States were not the only causes that led the Emperor to be neutral during the Austro-Prussian war; but they must always be considered as contributing, to a very considerable degree, to that result.

At the same time the internal condition of France was daily growing worse. The management of the finances, which had been the subject of the severest criticism since 1861, had brought matters to a crisis in 1865, when the Corps législatif positively refused to vote a request for further loans and for a sale of state forests. The minister of finance found it impossible to get any appropriation from the deputies for large expendi-
tures, especially for the army. With each session the constitutional opposition became more exacting. In 1866 forty-five members of the majority signed a petition for an amendment to the address, asking that the privileges of December 24, 1860, should be extended. Though the amendment was rejected, it obtained sixty-one votes, and when the next year a second amendment of the same character was offered, it received sixty-six votes. These gains, though small, were significant; for they showed that the old majority, under the pressure of public opinion, was breaking down, and that a new party was in process of formation. This, the tiers parti, to which Ollivier, as the advocate of the liberal Empire, attached himself, stood opposed on one side to the conservatives, who wished to maintain intact the constitution of 1852, and on the other, to the Left, who wished to destroy the constitution entirely. So violent did the debates become that in 1867 the address was abolished, and there was substituted the interpellation, or right of a deputy to question from the tribune the ministers of the government regarding the affairs of state. This important concession broke down the opposition of the tiers parti, and was the cause of Ollivier's separating entirely from his old comrades of the Left, and becoming a loyal supporter of the government.

At this juncture a moment of peace came to Europe, due to the Universal Exposition which was opened April 1, 1867, at Paris. Crowds flocked to the capital and exhibits to the number of sixty thousand revealed the discoveries of art and science, the progress of invention and industry. The splendours of the city were never more dazzling, the fêtes never more elaborate, the amusements never more numerous and alluring. King William of Prussia with Bismarck and Moltke, Alexander of Russia, Francis Joseph of Austria, the King of Portugal, the Sultan of Turkey, and hosts of minor princes, laid aside political cares, and gave themselves up to the enjoyment of the pleasures that Paris furnished. And Napoleon, by nature
tactful and courteous, proved a delightful host. Nothing was left undone that might add to the enjoyment of his guests and make more cordial the relations of France with the other Powers. To all appearance there was nothing in France but content and prosperity, nothing but harmony and good will; yet how specious it all was! In fact, the strength of the Empire was already decaying: its debt was enormous, its army was half demoralised from neglect, its administration was without vitality, its standards were sensual, and its morals a byword and a reproach. And in the midst of all the gaiety, just when the official fêtes at the Tuileries were at their height, there came that ominous report, a veritable death's-head at the feast, the sign and token of a criminal foreign policy, that the ill-fated Maximilian had been executed in Mexico.

From the beginning of his reign Maximilian had shown a spirit of conciliation. He had summoned liberals to the ministry, had abolished the censorship of the press, had created a landwehr, and had promised religious freedom. Nevertheless, he had estranged from himself the ecclesiastical party by refusing to restore the confiscated church lands, and had maddened the Mexicans by executing, on October 16, 1864, two officers of Juarez, under a decree which provided that whoever continued to fight under the name of Juarez should be treated, not as a soldier, but as a brigand. His government had never been anything else than bankrupt, its constitution anything else than a paper document, and its local administration had no efficiency whatever. At last, with the victory of Appomattox, April, 1865, which closed the civil war in the United States, the Union government had taken decided action. At first unofficially, through private intermediaries, Schofield and Morton, afterward by act of Congress, December 16th, the United States had demanded of Napoleon the withdrawal of the French troops from Mexico. The Emperor, unable to refuse, had endeavoured to save the imperial government by offering to withdraw if the
United States would recognise Maximilian; and even as late as October 16th, he had hoped that this course would be followed. But Secretary Seward had positively refused, saying that the erection of an empire upon Mexican soil was the very thing to which the people of the United States objected. Then in March, 1866, Maximilian had persuaded his brother, Francis Joseph, to send 4,000 Austrian soldiers to Mexico, but Seward had checkmated this move before the troops left Trieste. In desperation Carlotta had immediately hastened to Europe, and besought Napoleon to fulfil his promises, but had received only sympathy and the advice that her husband would better leave Mexico; and finally, when her last hope had failed her, when the Pope had refused her either encouragement or help, the unfortunate empress, worn out with the fearful strain, had become hopelessly insane. But even after this last blow, Maximilian had refused to desert his followers, and had made strenuous efforts to maintain his position, until the gradual departure of the French troops from January to March, 1867, had deprived him of the main strength upon which he had depended. The liberals, who had been steadily gaining ground, had then driven from the northern and southern provinces the followers of Maximilian, and had forced the Emperor to Queretaro, where on May 15th he had been captured, and four weeks later on June 19th had been shot, because he had brought war and desolation to Mexico and had shed Mexican blood. This was the news that came to Europe during the festivities of the exposition.

Thus despite the outward evidences of prosperity and peace, the condition of the French Empire was pitiable. The Mexican expedition had cost thousands of lives, immense quantities of ammunition and stores of all sorts, had sunk enormous amounts of money without the slightest return, and had ruined scores of capitalists, large and small, who, trusting in the government, had subscribed to the Mexican loans. Nor was this all. It added a new humiliation to the many that France had already
suffered, and resulting, as it had, in the insanity of Carlotta and the death of Maximilian, it struck Europe with horror, and branded the French government with a stain of dishonour. Aware of his precarious position, and confronted as he well knew, and as the most intelligent men in France well knew, with the greater crisis created by the defeat of Austria by Prussia at Königgrätz, Napoleon now began to consider those military and political reforms for which preparations had already been made. In 1868 three measures were presented to the Corps législatif. The first of these concerned the reorganisation of the army, which, owing to the untimely economising on the part of Fouill, the minister of finance, and the expedition to Mexico, found itself wanting in both men and equipment. The law, passed on January 14, 1868, increased the time of service and provided for the establishment of a reserve and a garde mobile that was to be employed in France only. But even this poor plan of substituting mere numbers for those improvements in arms and service that enlightened military leaders declared indispensable, failed because of the bankruptcy of the government; for not only could no money be obtained for cannon and repeating rifles, but when, after Marshal Niel's death, General Lebeuf tried to obtain an appropriation for the garde mobile, the Corps législatif refused to grant it. The situation was still further aggravated by a special provision of the law which gave to the Emperor the right to name the officers, and resulted in the introduction of incapable men into the army, who proved inefficient when the great crisis came. The second law, which was passed on March 9th, made possible the establishment of new journals without the authorisation of the government, and had the effect of furnishing to the enemies of the Emperor weapons against him, in that it increased the number of journals opposed to him. The third law, which granted the right of re-union under certain conditions, was passed on March 25th.
Partly in consequence of these liberal measures, which undoubtedly helped to undermine the strength of the Empire, the opposition became more outspoken and violent. The Left now numbered more than a hundred, and though many of its members had followed Ollivier into the ranks of the supporters of the liberal Empire, there still remained an implacable minority, which, led by Jules Favre, Jules Simon, Picard, Lajuinais, had carried on the war in the Chamber during the years 1867 and 1868, not only against the Emperor, but against the imperial régime. And in the latter year a new ally appeared. Socialism, silenced but not destroyed by the brutal measures of 1852, revived once more in France when the doctrines of Lassalle and Karl Marx, which had already become influential in Germany, were introduced through the members of the International Association of Workmen. This society, which had been organised in England in 1864 as a mutual assistance society, had taken on a socialistic and revolutionary form at the meeting in Lausanne, when, with Garibaldi as its president and Karl Marx as its guiding spirit, it had proclaimed war on the papacy and on monarchy, and had declared in favour of the nationalisation of lands, mines, quarries, forests, and telegraphs. From 1868 to 1870 it became in France the agent of a new socialism, more precise than that of 1848, more logical, pitiless, and revolutionary. Its French members, few in number, but actuated by intense hatred for the imperial government, passionately took up the cause against the imperial institutions, and in the name of liberty and social reform, aided the republicans in the war against the government.

And many indications testified to the strength of the radical cause. In 1863, Grévy, one of those who in 1848 had objected to the Roman expedition, and had declared himself a democrat and the representative of the revolutionary principle, was elected to the Assembly by a considerable majority. In the same year, Henri Rochefort started a new journal, the Lanterne,
with the express purpose of combating the Empire; and so brilliant, witty, and scurrilous was it, so interesting to the general public because of its scathing personalities, the scandals, the disgraces, and official misdemeanours in which it dealt, that fifty thousand copies of the first number were sold in a few hours. But it was seized by the government, and in August, 1868, Rochefort was sentenced to fine and imprisonment. Shortly after this episode, another incident showed the tendency of events. In November, certain democrats met at the cemetery Montmartre to celebrate the death of Baudin, who had been killed in 1851, and to open a subscription for the purpose of erecting a monument to this, the first victim of the coup d'État. Again the government interfered, and brought the promoters of the undertaking to trial; but the procès Baudin gave an opportunity for the enemies of the Empire to rally to the cause of the accused, and the courtroom, which was crowded with spectators, became a battle-ground for the defenders and the opponents of the coup d'État. Gambetta, one of the advocates for the defence, in a speech full of passion and eloquence, likened the attempts of the government to apologise for the crime of December 2d to Lady Macbeth's efforts to efface the stain of murder. "Every act has its consequences," he cried; "December 2d will be avenged." And a few weeks later he was returned from Marseilles to take the seat of the illustrious Berryer. But even more significant than this expression of public approval were the results of the election of 1869. In addition to the methods that the government usually employed, it tried to conjure up again the red spectre of socialism, and to revive the Napoleonic legend by announcing the celebration of the centenary of the birth of the first Napoleon. But the Napoleonic name had lost its magic; and notwithstanding the fact that the government had made extensive preparations for these elections, and that the liberals and the uncompromising radicals were unable to agree upon candidates and so scattered
their votes; the government suffered heavy losses in the provinces, and its candidates were signally defeated in Paris. Equally disquieting were the results of the supplementary elections of October; for Rochefort was returned from Belleville as the representative of the Irreconcilables, a party organised by Gambetta for the purpose of reviving the political ideas of 1793 and 1848.

The events of the year 1869 furnished unmistakable evidence of the decay of the imperial institutions, of the crumbling away of all the supports of the imperial structure. The Emperor, who was suffering from a disease with which he had for some years been afflicted, began to lose heart. No longer confident of his power to control the course of events, and dominated by the old spirit of fatalism, he was acting according to the impulses of the moment, and allowing the ship of state to drift almost without guidance. This was the more serious in that the men upon whom he depended for advice, Drouyn de Lhuys, Gramont, Prince Napoleon, Lavelette, Ollivier, and others, could not agree upon a common policy, some favouring an Austrian alliance and war, others a Prussian alliance and compromise, while a third party demanded peace, on the ground that it was indispensable for France at this juncture. Furthermore, the empress and the Ultramontanes were daily increasing in influence, and were controlling nominations in the army as well as in the cabinet; and, what was most significant of all, the majority that had so long sustained the Empire was gone. In place of a body of deputies voting solidly in accordance with the wishes of the Emperor, party groups appeared, royalists, voting with the republicans, imperialists or Arcadiens, hating liberal concessions and desiring war with Prussia, constitutional liberals or the tiers parti, desiring peace and the liberal Empire, republicans, opposed to the whole imperial régime, and a few Irreconcilables, advocating a radical republic. The mere presence of these parties not only augured ill for the existing
franc_ under napoleon iii.

régime, but was suggestive of conflicts to come, should the Empire be overthrown. It was a strange time for the government, already in decay, to select for the crowning of the political edifice with liberty. When the International was extending the area of its activity, and was stirring up dissension between workmen and their employers; when the people of Paris were roused to the white heat of excitement by the fiery speeches of Gambetta, by the sentencing of Rochefort to six months in prison, and by the shooting by Pierre Bonaparte of Victor Noir, a young journalist, in consequence of a wretched newspaper controversy; when the religious and intellectual world, and the government as well, were distracted by the debates in the Vatican Council over the question of papal infallibility;—then it was that Napoleon, influenced by the results of the elections of 1869, decided to lay aside his absolute authority, and to inaugurate a new and liberal régime.

In the summer of 1869, one hundred and sixteen deputies of the tiers parti and the old majority had agreed to a plan, which became the basis of an interpellation demanding a responsible ministry and a share for the Corps législatif in the management of public affairs. In response to this interpellation the government submitted to the Senate a measure providing for the revision of the constitution. It proposed to establish a responsible ministry, which, though still depending on the Emperor, was to be subject to impeachment by the Senate; to give to the Corps législatif a share in the initiation of laws, a larger right of interpellation, the right to pass the order of the day, to vote the budget, to discuss amendments by sections, and to name its own president and secretary; and to transform the Senate into a deliberative body with the right of interpellation, of voting the order of the day, of making its own regulations, and of making its sessions public. These changes did not establish a complete parliamentary system; but as representing true political reform, and as guaranteeing other measures which, in time,
would complete the transformation of the absolute into the liberal Empire they gave satisfaction to all those who were not declared enemies of the existing government. On January 2, 1870, Émile Ollivier, now leader of the tiers parti, was entrusted with the responsibility of forming a ministry; and in face of distrust, agitation, and hostility, in a France already weary of the Empire, yet fearing revolution more, he undertook the difficult task of reconciling, by means of further reforms at home and a policy of peace abroad, the nation and the imperial government. And Napoleon, true to his principles, and wishing to strengthen the remodelled structure, and to bind the nation once more to him and to his dynasty, decided to appeal to the people, and on May 8th summoned them to the polls to cast their votes for or against the changes that had been made in the constitution since 1860. "The Empire," so read the circular of the ministers, "addresses a solemn appeal to the nation. In 1852 it asked for power to assure order; with order assured, it now asks in 1870 for power to establish liberty." The mass of the people, comprehending very imperfectly the meaning of the forty-five constitutional articles presented to them, and fearing socialism and revolution, voted in favour of the amendments by a majority of nearly six millions. This would seem to signify that they desired the continuance of the imperial régime; and yet, when four months after the plébiscite of 1870, the Emperor and the imperial army were captured at Sedan by the victorious Prussians, scarcely a hand was raised in defence of the Napoleonic dynasty. With the loss of its army, the Empire fell without resistance, and on its ruins there arose the government of the republic.

Thus an outside war, which in no way was organically connected with the history of the Second Empire, checked the course of events in France, and at one blow destroyed an institution that was slowly, though unmistakably, destroying itself. That the Empire could have long continued to exist is in-
credible, if for no other reason than that a reaction cannot be permanent. It had been founded on violence, and accepted by the French people as a safeguard against anarchy. Its fundamental principle, the personal supremacy of one man, was contrary to the doctrines for which the people of Europe had been struggling since 1789; its policy of repression, its control of the press, its denial of public liberty, were at variance with those rights for which France herself had fought in 1830, and again in 1848. Therefore the Empire in no way stood for the forces that make for progress, that are inseparably bound up with the development of human society. It had been able to establish and maintain itself in no other way than by chaining, by military force, that republican and socialistic element which in 1848 had driven the nation, caring more for prosperity than for political liberty, to confer upon Louis Napoleon despotic powers. But the republicans and socialists who had been suppressed in 1852 and were only awaiting the time to revenge themselves for the coup d'état, arose with a new strength and greater numbers in 1870. The serious illness of the Emperor foreshadowed a regency during the minority of the prince imperial which was sure to bring a reactionary and ultramontane element into power, and so to hasten the inevitable conflict. Even a long reign, while it might have postponed the issue, could not have prevented it; for the causes of decay were too organic for a recovery to have been effected by constitutional changes and liberal measures. The Emperor, irresolute when he should have had the will of a Cæsar, had been unable during his eighteen years of supremacy to establish an imperial system, or to create a body of imperial institutions, strong enough to resist revolution. Even his social and economic reforms, which have left a deep impress on France, added nothing to the strength of his Empire, because they were initiated and carried out by him alone, and were not an expression of the popular will, or an indication of the power of the nation to rely on, and to help, itself.
The Empire was, therefore, nothing but an adventure out of accord with modern highly developed civilisation, and one which not only exhausted the resources of France, but checked for eighteen years the education of the people in matters of government and in habits of self-reliance. This defect the Emperor recognised and strove to remedy by increasing the powers of self-government in the departments and communes, and by admitting the people to a share in the government and the initiation of laws. But such reforms, carried to their logical conclusion, in the end would have destroyed the Empire itself, not because an imperial form of government is inconsistent with popular privileges, but because the power of Napoleon III. depended on the maintenance of his absolute supremacy. Had this been broken down, the forces of revolution, which were only waiting for an opportunity to re-establish the republic, would certainly have overthrown him, and destroyed his Empire.
CHAPTER V.

THE RISE OF PRUSSIA.

The Germany of 1851 gave little promise of its brilliant future, for in every part lay the shadow of reaction. Austria had established a thoroughly centralised and military system, exceeding in its disregard of provincial and racial distinctions the worst phases of the absolutism of Metternich. Prussia, following her example as closely as possible, was restoring to the nobility their proprietary and police privileges, granting more extensive liberties to the priest and the Jesuit, and conceding to the clergy, both Protestant and Roman Catholic, greater control over matters of a purely secular character. Under the guidance of the two Powers, the Federal Diet was removing all such evidences of liberalism as electoral laws, right of publication, freedom of association, and the like, which they deemed contrary to "the common safety," "the highest welfare" of the Confederation. To all outward appearance the three years of earnest striving and hopeful enthusiasm, of popular commotion beyond anything that had been known in the recent history of Germany, had resulted in a further curtailment of constitutional and political privileges than had been the case before the revolution began.

But such a condition could not be lasting. The individual states were not likely to accept without protest a further increase in the power of the Diet; Prussia and Austria, upon whose co-operation the whole system depended, were not likely to remain on terms of cordiality, inasmuch as the events of forty
years had been tending to increase their rivalry. Changes in the government of either Austria or Prussia might, at any time, impel one to adopt a policy of which the other would not approve; events in Europe, leading to a rearrangement in the relations of all the Powers, might make it necessary for one of these German states to act without the other; while the pressure of public opinion and of economic interests, ineffectual though it had been during the revolution, was destined to become greater, rather than less, in the years that were to follow.

During the period from 1851 to 1856 appeared significant indications of the future. In August, 1851, Bismarck took his place in the Diet at Frankfort, prepared to defend the honour and rights of Prussia, even if so doing should cause a rupture in the Federal system. In 1852, when Schwarzenberg demanded the admission of Austria into the Zollverein, the Prussian government, influenced to no small degree by Bismarck's representations, made a counter-proposal for a renewal of the Zollverein without Austria, and refused to grant her request. The death of Schwarzenberg, the desire of Francis Joseph to be on friendly terms with Prussia in case Louis Napoleon should threaten the peace of Europe, and the urgent request of the Czar for a reconciliation, prevented Austria from resisting Prussia's demand. In 1853, a commercial treaty was negotiated between Austria and the Zollverein; and although it was agreed, as a kind of compromise, that the question of Austria's admission should be taken up again in six years, yet to have postponed the issue for so long a time, was a victory for Prussia.

Still more significant was the influence of the Crimean war, for it not only lost to Austria her leadership in Europe, and so ruined her diplomatic standing; but it provoked a situation which disclosed very plainly the fact that Austria was not in reality a German state, that because of her proximity to the Danubian principalities and the Ottoman Empire she was pos-
sessed of interests which concerned, only to a very slight degree, the welfare of the other states of the Confederation. Had Louis Napoleon threatened the balance of power, Austria, Prussia, and the lesser states would have stood shoulder to shoulder in resisting him; but that the disturber of the peace was the Czar, and the territory threatened the region of the Danube and not the Rhineland, entirely altered the situation. Frederic William IV, and Bismarck decided to remain neutral, and refused to follow Austria; and the lesser states did the same; for though they were willing to join Austria in defending the Confederation, they would not send a soldier to aid her in a war against Russia. For the first time on a question of first importance, Austria found herself outvoted in the Diet. But of even greater importance was it that the Crimean war injured the prestige of the Confederation in Europe. Not only had Austria's vacillating and time-serving policy thrown the first place among the Powers into the hands of Napoleon III., but Prussia's neutrality, necessary as it was, angered the western Powers, and almost led to her exclusion from the congress of Paris. The insinuation that Germany had ceased to be of importance in the regulation of the affairs of Europe; that the proud state, which for so many years had been the head of the European system, had sunk to insignificance as a factor in European diplomacy, and was looked upon with scorn by the statesmen of the west, was enough to rouse popular indignation in Germany to a high pitch. Why, it was asked, was Germany in disgrace? If because of her inefficient federal system, then it was high time that this system were reformed, that a national government were established which should show itself strong in the presence of Europe; that a consistent policy were adopted that should make impossible the bickering and quarrelling of states. After five years of political inactivity, the people of Germany began to awake to the evils of the existing régime. The various parliaments and newspapers discussed, and un-
sparingly condemned, the reactionary movement in general, and Austria's diplomatic policy in particular. Buol's attempt to reply to these attacks only hurt Austria the more; for they showed how narrow was his view of that which was best for Germany, how determined he was to carry out his own selfish schemes, and to further the interests of Austria rather than those of Germany as a whole. Consequently, Austria's position at the close of the Crimean war was not an enviable one: the war had cost her 160,000,000 of florins without a single compensating advantage; her Oriental policy had been checkmated by Prussia and the lesser states; her ideas on government had been condemned by the German people and statesmen alike as injurious to Germany; she had been defeated once in the Diet; and her leading statesman and chancellor, by his inability to conceal his anger, was rapidly losing influence among the princes of Germany. Certainly the policy of Schwarzenberg in the hands of Count Buol-Schauenstein was costing Austria dear. Prussia, on the other hand, had come through the war with comparatively little expense; she had kept the friendship of Russia; had gained, for the moment at least, the friendship of the South German states, and had become the real leader in the Federal Diet.

But as long as Frederic William IV. remained her king and Manteuffel her leading minister, there was no assurance that these successes would be permanent. The king was too strongly committed to the Habsburg house to be willing to break completely with Austria; and Manteuffel, who made it a cardinal principle never to oppose the king's will, was not the man to turn the existing situation to the advantage of Prussia. When, however, in October, 1857, it became evident that the illness of the king, which had already affected his earlier acts, had reached a stage that warranted the appointment of a deputy, his brother, Prince William, assumed that office, first for three months and then for ten; and in Septem-
ber, 1858, after considerable opposition on the part of the feudal, or Kreuzzeitung party, both within and without the ministry, was summoned to take the regency. As deputy, he had been obliged to adhere to the policy of his brother; but as regent, he was able to formulate a policy of his own: and when one realises the importance of this change, and takes into consideration the attitude of the prince in the years preceding his regency, one can readily understand the opposition to him on the part of the conservatives. Since the reaction of 1849, he had shown himself out of sympathy with the government: he had supported the war policy in the controversy regarding Hesse Cassel in 1850; he had resented the humiliation that Prussia had suffered at Olmütz; he had opposed the restoration of the feudal party to power in 1851; in 1853 he had favoured the project of alliance between Prussia and the western Powers, because he considered Russia the aggressor in the attack upon Turkey, and desired her humiliation; and so outspoken had become his opposition to the king's plan of an alliance with Austria, consummated April 20, 1854, that he was given leave of absence from Prussia, and was even threatened with confinement in a Prussian fortress.

But it must not be inferred that Prussia had at her head a man in any way identified with the liberal or progressive party of his time. On the contrary, Prince William was a thorough conservative in politics and in religion, and an admirer of the house of Habsburg; but he was preserved from the faults of his predecessors by a strong attachment to Prussia and the Fatherland. His devotion never showed itself to better advantage than when he consented to assume, at an advanced age, the burdens of a kingly rule, which he would gladly have resigned in favour of his son, had he not felt that Prussia needed him in this crisis; and when, in the years to come, he showed his unwillingness to follow any tradition or accept any political dogma that threatened Prussia's independence or honour. He
did not believe that the unity of Germany was to be attained by parliamentary decrees; and though fully aware that popular representation and constitutional government were essential to the life of modern states, was inclined to be conservative in his estimate of the part that the people should play in politics. Above all, was he a vehement opponent of all revolutionary measures; and was always ready to take the field, as he had done in the case of the Baden republicans in 1849, to put down by force of arms radical uprisings. He believed that Prussia was destined to be the future leader of Germany, and was prepared to await the occasion when should be fought the inevitable war that alone could overcome Austria's opposition and the jealousies of the lesser states. He did not anticipate that the victory would be won in his day. "I did not say," he wrote at a later time to Sir Andrew Buchanan, "that neither I nor my son nor my grandson would see a united Germany; I said that probably I should not live long enough to behold such a thing, but that I surely hoped the unity would be realised in the time of my son or my grandson." He was not a great statesman, nor was he a man without political blemish; but he had strength and moderation, faith in Prussia, trust in her people, an unlimited capacity for work, and those qualities much needed in Prussia, decision, firmness of will, a regard for prompt obedience, and an appreciation of the importance of an efficient army in winning respect for the Hohenzollern dynasty.

On becoming regent, Prince William at once dismissed Baron Manteuffel, and all those of the feudal party who had hitherto been responsible for the policy of Prussia, and summoned a new cabinet under the leadership of Anthony von Hohenzollern and Rudolph von Auerswald, statesmen who, though opposed to reaction, were devoted to Prussia and in no way inclined to advocate the inauguration of an extremely liberal policy. The people, however, greeted with joy this "ministry of a new era," when they saw it begin the elimination of old abuses, particu-
larly in ecclesiastical and police affairs, stop the reactionary interpretation of the constitution, and endeavour to raise the moral tone of the Prussian administration. So much enthusiasm did this policy arouse in Prussia, that even though many of the liberals still remained suspicious of the new ministry and the prince regent was not at all confident that the popular joy would be lasting, the elections of 1838 in Prussia resulted in the defeat of the feudal party as well as the radicals, and the return of a majority favourable to the government.

At the very outset of the regency, the government was confronted with the prospect of Austria’s going to war with Italy and France; and the question arose as to what attitude Prussia would take. Would she support Austria in this emergency? Would she permit the old enemy, France, the inspirer of revolutionary doctrines, who had won the victory at Austerlitz and Jena and had dismembered German territory, to threaten once more, under a new Napoleon, the integrity of the Confederation? The southern states made clear their determination to aid Austria in this patriotic war; but Prussia was actuated by different motives. Not only had her people never forgotten the arrogance of Austria after 1849 and were sincerely and strongly in sympathy with the cause of Italy; but the government also meant to avoid war if possible, partly because it desired peace, and partly because it wished to reorganise its army before putting it to an actual test. Prussia, therefore, set sentiment aside, and at first declared that neither she nor the Confederation had anything to do with the matter; and even after war had been declared, deeming Austria to be in the wrong in sending her ultimatum to Sardinia, stated that she would put her troops in readiness for the defence of the Confederation, but would otherwise remain neutral. When, however, the news came of Napoleon’s promise to free Italy from the Alps to the Adriatic and of Parma’s revolt against her sovereign ruler, Prince William’s attitude changed; for he had no sym-
pathy with the war which gave loose rein to the forces of revolution, which threatened the independence of princes and the integrity of states, and which put in danger the treaties of 1815. Without a moment's hesitation, he decided to assume the position of armed mediator as soon as the French army should have advanced sufficiently far into Lombardy to make a French attack by way of the Rhine impossible; and in order to effect this mediation, he demanded of Austria the entire command of the Confederate troops. The court of Vienna, which had three times before scornfully refused a similar demand, again refused, except on terms that Prussia could not possibly accept. But the defeats at Montebello, Magenta, and Solferino, caused her to moderate her tone, and it is not unreasonable to suppose that Prussia would have gained her point had not the peace of Villafranca removed all necessity for her mediation. Certain it is, that in this crisis Prussia was the controlling influence in bringing about that famous armistice; for her proposal to throw 400,000 men upon the Rhine, in case Napoleon continued his advance, was one of the causes that sent the Emperor of the French to Villafranca; while her motion in the Diet that all the Confederate troops be placed under her command, made Francis Joseph more ready to accept the terms of peace. Prussia's importance was steadily increasing in Germany, and the relations with Austria were becoming decidedly less friendly.

The national character of the Italian movement stirred again in the German people the spirit of 1817 and 1848: popular enthusiasm revived; demands for the reform of the Confederation increased in number; and following the example of the National Association in Italy, a National Association of Germany was organised at Frankfort in September, 1859, after preliminary meetings had been held at Eisenach and Hanover for the purpose of arousing public interest in a stronger central authority, a national assembly, an imperial constitution, and
THE RISE OF PRUSSIA.

an empire under Prussia's leadership. Although the association was strongly condemned by many of the German governments, and persecuted by parliamentary decrees and stringent police regulations; and although the people of the South German states compelled it to drop from its program the clause providing for Prussian leadership; nevertheless, it gained sympathy under oppression, and the ideas for which it stood spread rapidly through Germany. Supported by the liberal press, and encouraged by a series of national festivals, the most important of which was that held in honour of the one hundredth anniversary of Schiller's death, it made the poet's words, "we will be a nation of brothers," once more the battle-cry for German unity. By taking part in the elections held in the various states, by winning seats in parliaments, and by influencing the policy of ministries, the association, though never numbering more than twenty thousand members, became, after 1860, a political power of importance. Once more Germany rang with the cries of 1848, once more the German liberals boldly supported the rights of the people in Hesse and Schleswig-Holstein, where the old quarrel had again broken out, and demanded the erection of a German national state with a strong executive and a national parliament, that prosperity and power might come again to the divided and disordered country.

But Prussia was not to have a part in furthering the work of the National Association; for not only was Prince William convinced that with Napoleon at the height of his power, annexing Savoy and Nice, possibly threatening Switzerland, Belgium, and Holland, permitting Piedmont to overthrow the kingdom of Naples and forcibly seize the lands of the Pope, it was no time to press the demand for German unity, and to weaken further the Confederation by sowing dissension among its members. But also he strongly disapproved of the method employed by Bennigsen and his associates. He had no faith
in the attempts to attain unity through the formation of associations of any kind; and though he admitted that such might be of service in preaching the gospel of unity, he contended that they were utterly powerless to solve that most momentous of all problems, of who should stand at the head of the newly united state and wield the authority of the central government. In his own mind there was no doubt that in Prussia alone the solution of this problem was to be found. As early as 1849 he had written to General Natzler, "God alone knows when German unity will be attained, but that Prussia is one day to be the head of Germany is borne out by the course of her entire history"; and he was quick to see that if Prussia were to be successful in the work planned for her, she would be obliged, not only to make secure her relation with the Powers abroad, but also to raise from its low estate, and entirely remodel, the army, her instrument of power.

Therefore, while Germany was ringing with the enthusiasm of the many German associations that had recently come into existence, Prince William and his coadjutors were turning their attention to the military system of Prussia. For many years it had been evident that this system, as well as that of the Confederation, was unsatisfactory, and unsuited to the needs of Germany; but it was the attempt to mobilise the army in 1859 that had brought out its many weaknesses and defects. Prince William, who had been for forty years a soldier, was convinced that it would be necessary to reorganise each of the divisions into which the Confederation was divided, to revise the soldier lists, to improve the equipment, to make more thorough and frequent inspection, and to effect sweeping changes in tactics, before the Confederation should be able to act in its own defence. Unable, however, to carry out the larger plan, because Austria vehemently opposed any act looking to Prussia’s leadership in military affairs, he turned his attention especially to Prussia, and by means of two laws, proposed in the House of
THE RISE OF PRUSSIA.

Deputies, February 10, 1860, tried to effect the desired reform. The difficulty was as follows. The law of 1814, upon which the Prussian military system was based, had established the principle of universal obligation to serve for three years in regiments of the line, two years in the reserves, and fourteen years in the landwehr. In other words, a young man entering the army at twenty, served with the colours until he was twenty-three, and with the reserves until he was twenty-five. He was then discharged from active service, but became a member of the militia or landwehr until he was forty. During the first seven years of this period, he was liable, in case of war, to be called out to serve at the front as part of the actual army; but during the second seven years, he was liable to nothing more than garrison work in the fortresses. Two forms of abuse had arisen. In the first place, in consequence of the long period of peace, the term of service with the colours had fallen from three to two years; and in the second, the recruiting system had not kept pace with the growth of population in Prussia, for although the latter had increased from ten to eighteen millions, the number of recruits received into the regiments remained the same as it had been in 1815, namely, forty thousand. The result was, that as no increase had been made in the number of regiments, some twenty-five thousand young men were owing service to the state who each year escaped this obligation, while the married men and men with families were bearing the burden of military duty. This state of affairs was injurious, because it tended to disturb business and home life during a period of war, and to make the landwehr practically useless, in that its rank and file were out of military training, its officers unacquainted both with their men and their duties, and its energy, activity, discipline, and knowledge of tactics far inferior to those of the regiments of the line.

These were the defects that the prince regent endeavoured to remedy; and that he might have advice upon which he could
rely, he called to be war minister, in 1860, General Lieutenant von Roon, a man of thorough knowledge, a writer on geographical matters, a soldier of extraordinary boldness and iron will, and an organiser of pre-eminent ability. At his suggestion the prince regent proposed to restore the three-year term of service, to increase the number of yearly recruits from forty to sixty-three thousand, to increase the regiments of the line by forty-nine, and to call to active service at the front only the younger men of the landwehr, that is, those from twenty-five to twenty-seven years of age. When these proposals were made to the House of Deputies, a great outcry at once arose throughout the country, particularly against those portions of the plan that provided for a removal of part of the landwehr from war duty and increased the term of service. Von Patow, minister of finance, assured the deputies, however, that any measures now passed would be only provisional, and asked for a grant of supplies. The deputies, thinking that another year they could control any military arrangement not to their liking by refusing to appropriate funds, granted 9,000,000 thalers for the increase of the army. The reorganisation of the army was at once effected according to the plan of the prince regent and General von Roon, and the thoroughness of the work showed clearly that in the minds of the military leaders, there was no thought of its being temporary. When in January, 1861, Prince William, now king of Prussia through the death of Frederic William IV., consecrated the colours and standards of the newly formed regiments, the new military organisation was complete.

When it was clearly understood that the new arrangement was intended by the government to be permanent, and not provisional, the wrath of Parliament and the country broke forth. The opposition, feeling that it had been basely deceived, and that the promise of a temporary army increase had been but a trap to inveigle the deputies into a grant of supplies, girded themselves for the encounter, and, in the election of the follow-
ing December, returned enough of its members to insure a bitter struggle in the next Parliament. With the sitting of 1862 the conflict came: the deputies refused to vote a second appropriation bill, asserting that Prussia should not talk about increasing the military burdens of the state, but should come out boldly for German unity. An inevitable deadlock ensued, the Parliament exercising its right to refuse the necessary supplies, and the government declaring that what it had done was authorised by the law of 1814. To put an end to this unprofitable discussion, the king dissolved the Parliament on March 11th, and when a few days afterward the Hohenzollern ministry resigned, summoned a conservative ministry under Count Hohenlohe to take the management of affairs. This act made the issue definite; for it showed that the struggle in Prussia was but part of that larger conflict everywhere present in Germany between the governments and the people, in which the former were endeavouring by diplomacy, compromise, or force to reform the federal system without regard to the wishes of the people; and the latter, reviving the methods of 1817, 1832, and 1848, were seeking to bring about unity by means of speeches, associations, and parliamentary resolutions. When in January, 1862, the new Parliament came together, the liberal element was in the majority, thoroughly convinced that the end of the "new era" had come, and that the government, which had already lost its popularity, would never decide upon any bold or warlike policy. Therefore, for seven months the deadlock continued, the deputies refusing to vote supplies, and declaring that any attempt to raise money without their consent would be unconstitutional. The king, placed in a difficult position by his oath to the constitution and by his conviction as to the military needs of Prussia, turned to the only man who could help him in this emergency; and on the resignation of Prince Hohenlohe, called Bismarck to be president of the ministry. The new era for Germany had in reality begun.
Otto von Bismarck-Schönhausen was at this time forty-seven years old, a Junker of the narrowest type, a representative of the statesmen of the reactionary party. He had first come into prominence in 1849 as a member of the second United Diet of Prussia, and had shown himself to be in all matters rigidly conservative, devoted to Prussia, opposed to liberal movements, and a relentless enemy of all who attacked the Prussian policy. In debate he was bold and pitiless, striking down opponents without mercy, yet withal a man attached to no tradition, no party, no policy of the past, a man of clear understanding, definite views, acute powers of observation, and great decision of character, combining, as Maurenbrecher says, the qualities of the lion and the fox. Since 1849 he had been frequently consulted by the king, and after his entrance into the Frankfort Diet in 1851, had begun to formulate his own political views. While there he learned to know the organic weakness of the Confederation, and the selfishness of Austria, the lukewarmness of the lesser states, and had become convinced that the future of Germany depended, not so much upon her relations with foreign Powers as upon the ability and determination of Prussia alone. "Austria is not a German state," he said at Frankfort, "she is cosmopolitan; Prussia is entirely German, the only great German Power." He believed that Prussia was destined, both by the events of her history and by the geographical location of her territory, to take the first place in Germany; and he had himself seen a favourable opportunity for her doing so, first at the time of the Crimean war, and again at the time of the war in Italy. Then he had not been listened to at court; but now, in 1862, with the example of Cavour and of the policy that had made a united Italy before him, and with power in his hands as the head of the ministry, he was prepared to shape the Prussian policy in the mould of his own thoughts.

The appointment of Bismarck increased the hatred of the parliamentary opposition, or party of progress, as it was called,
and made the parliamentary struggle tenfold more bitter. In the mind of the liberals the fight was no longer for the defeat of the military bill, but for the defence of the constitution against the attack of an absolutist and autocrat. What Bismarck was going to do was unknown; for before he entered into high office he had made no public announcement of his discontent with Prussian conditions, his hatred of Austria, or his desire for German unity, and his speeches in the Federal Diet had never reached the public ear. His famous answer to a resolution of Parliament a week after his entrance into the ministry did not mend matters; for though it disclosed the innermost secret of his thoughts, it impressed his opponents with its brutality rather than with its wisdom. "Our blood is too hot," he said in reply to Forckenbeck's resolution, September 30, 1862; "we are too fond of wearing an armour too large for our small body. . . . Prussia must consolidate her might, and hold it together for the favourable moment, which has been allowed to pass unheeded several times. Prussia's boundaries, as determined by the congress of Vienna, are not conducive to her wholesome existence as a sovereign state. Not by speeches and resolutions of majorities the mighty problems of the age are solved,—that was the mistake of 1848 and 1849,—but by blood and iron." To those of the opposition who advocated a cosmopolitan liberalism this language was so objectionable that their leaders, Simson, Vincke, and others, refused to co-operate with Bismarck, when, in his desire to effect a compromise, he tried to persuade them to enter his cabinet. The conflict was resumed. The Lower House passed an appropriation bill without a clause providing for the reorganisation of the army; the Upper House amended the bill to include such a clause; and the next day, October 12, 1862, the Lower House declared the act of the Chamber of Peers unconstitutional, and consequently null and void. In this quarrel between the two houses the government saw its way of escape.
Declaring that under the Prussian constitution a money bill was binding only when both houses concurred in its passage, and that in case of disagreement, for which there was no provision in the constitution, it fell to the government to provide for the necessary expenses, it made known its intention of conducting the administration without a parliamentary grant. For three years the bitter controversy continued; but meanwhile the army in the hands of Roon, Moltke, and their military associates, was undergoing the transformation that in the end made it the model of all the armies of Europe. The world saw only the parliamentary war; but few saw the forging of the new weapon, or knew of the policy that had already shaped itself in Bismarck’s mind.

While all this was taking place in Prussia, a wholly inconclusive controversy was going on among the princes, as well as among the people of Germany, regarding the reform of the worn-out federal system. All concurred in the opinion that the existing system was as bad as possible; but no two of those interested could agree as to what remedy to apply. Austria was refusing to accept any proposal that did not provide for her leadership in the Confederation; Prussia was stipulating for her old plan of a restricted Germany, and the smaller states were supporting her; while the lesser states, jealous of Prussia, and in a sense of Austria also, would do no more than increase the strength and popularity of the Diet by extending its power and authority. But all arguments ended where they had begun, and this controversy was little more than an eddy in the great current of German history.

Other incidents of the time were, however, more suggestive of the future. When the quarrel between the elector and the people of Hesse Cassel broke out in 1862, and the former issued a decree making the right to vote dependent upon taking the oath to the hated constitution of 1860, Prussia sent General Willisen to Cassel to demand the withdrawal of the order. The
elector, confident of the support of the Diet, refused the demand in a manner easily construed as insulting; and immediately King William ordered that two army corps be prepared for action, whether with the intent of war or merely as a threat is uncertain. This vigorous and unexpected act had its effect. Instead of supporting the elector, the Diet passed a motion to abolish the existing constitution and to re-establish that of 1831, which was a distinctly liberal document. Thus Prussia won her first important political victory in defending the rights of the Hessians against an arbitrary elector and a hesitating Diet; and no sooner had she gained this advantage, than she again showed her determination to act without regard to Austria. After Napoleon III. had made his famous treaty of commerce with England, he proposed to Prussia and the Zollverein to enter into similar commercial relations with them; but as any alliance of this character had, of necessity, to be on a more or less free-trade basis, Austria, who was bound by her economic conditions to maintain a protective policy, vigorously protested, alleging that such an alliance would make impossible her entrance into the Zollverein. The new question as to whether the commercial interests of Prussia and the Zollverein were to be sacrificed for those of Austria, divided Germany, and it was significant that in the course of this controversy, Saxony and Bavaria, enemies of Prussia in political affairs, should have declared themselves in favour of the treaty with France. In the crisis that followed, Prussia did not hesitate an instant; on March 29, 1862, the treaty was drafted, Austria's demand of July for admission into the Zollverein was positively refused, and on August 2d the treaty was signed. And Prussia not only supplemented her political victory in Hesse by this economic victory in the matter of the commercial treaty with France, but she went further, and in the name of the Zollverein, even in the face of Austria's displeasure, signed a similar treaty with Belgium. In the meantime, as if to make
all the more clear her disregard of Austria's opinion, she took official recognition of the young kingdom of Italy, partly that she might keep in close touch with Russia, who had already done the same, and partly to gain a new ally, in case of a struggle with Austria.

The policy thus inaugurated contained no trace of the old vacillation, no indication of deference to Austria's superior position or historical claims, no regard for the old doctrines of the divinity of kings and the integrity of states. On the contrary, it betrayed a sympathy for popular rights, an appreciation of the growing economic needs of the nation, and a willingness to ally with that which the reactionists called the revolution, if doing so would only strengthen Prussia; it revealed the existence of a master mind which was to shape Prussia's career; it guaranteed firmness and audacity, which Prussia had not known since the days of Frederic the Great; and it gave promise of a future from which the men of the old régime would have shrunken with horror.

But of the new policy, now definitely under the control of Bismarck, no part is more deserving of praise for its shrewdness, political foresight, and statesmanship, than that which concerned the foreign relations of Prussia. In 1862 Napoleon III., driven by the obstinacy of the Pope and of Cardinal Antonelli to give further evidence of his sympathy with the cause of Italy, prevailed upon Russia to recognise the new kingdom, and Prussia soon after followed Russia's example. The relations between France, Russia, and Prussia, were, therefore, eminently friendly. England, on the other hand, in consequence of the Crimean war and the events that followed, was not on good terms with Russia nor yet with the Prussian government, inasmuch as she favoured the cause of the Prussian parliamentary liberals. Thus, in 1862, the Powers of Europe were divided into two groups: on one side were France, Russia, Prussia, and Italy; on the other, England and Austria; while
Napoleon III. was still considered the most powerful and most ambitious of the sovereigns of Europe. But in 1862–63 two events occurred which disturbed this arrangement. In 1862 Garibaldi made an attempt to seize Rome, which resulted in his defeat at Aspromonte and the dispersion of his followers by the Italian government; and this was followed by the issue of a circular from Turin which declared, that though the government would oppose any attempt to take Rome by force, nevertheless, as that city was the natural capital of Italy, it would support any demand of the whole nation to obtain it by diplomatic means. The effect of this statement upon Napoleon's variable temperament was important. Fearing that this action on the part of Italy would involve him more deeply in Italian affairs, and wishing to gain again the support of the ecclesiastical party in France, he changed his policy toward Italy, dismissed Thouvenel, and called Drouyn de Lhuys to be minister of foreign affairs. The relations with Italy at once ceased to be friendly; for Drouyn de Lhuys, following his customary policy, sought close relations with Austria, even at the risk of breaking with Russia. The second event completed the diplomatic re-arrangement. In January, 1863, the Poles, maddened by the brutal policy of Nicholas I., and deeming the conciliatory acts of his successor, Alexander II., insufficient to compensate them for the loss of their national independence, rose in revolt, and for the moment braved the authority and might of Russia.

This last struggle of the Poles for the independence of their fatherland roused the enthusiasm of Europe for their bravery and their heroic resistance, and created a situation of pre- eminent importance in the diplomatic history of the Powers. When the uprising began, England expressed her sympathy for the Poles; and even Austria, allowing her hatred of Russia to overcome her inherent dislike of all revolutions, adopted a policy that seemed to favour Poland, not for the purpose of en-
couraging national feeling, but in order to avenge herself on Russia, to give support to England, to preserve amicable relations with the Pope, and to gain the good will of Napoleon. The latter found himself in an embarrassing position, for he was unwilling to offend the Czar, and determined not to entangle himself with another national movement after his recent experience with Italy; yet his own scheme for the reconstruction of the map of Europe included an independent Poland. Besides, in France the democrats, the press, and even the clergy, were shouting "Vive la Pologne"; and as the elections of 1863 were approaching, he felt that he must do something to win popular favour. Therefore, early in the year, he addressed a letter to the Czar urging him to re-establish the kingdom of Poland in favour of his brother Constantine. The answer of the Czar, a rather haughtily worded refusal, chilled the friendship of the Emperor for Russia, and drove him over to the side of his minister, Drouyn de Lhuys, who was ever urging an alliance with Austria.

Napoleon, now having broken with Russia in committing himself to an aggressive policy in favour of Poland, strove to build up a new alliance, and made every effort to persuade England and Austria to join him in sending a note of protest to the Czar. The three Powers at first despatched separate notes in which they protested in strong language against Russia's actions in Poland, with the sole effect of arousing the indignation of the Russian people, and of bringing upon the Poles, who were considerably encouraged by the sympathy of the Powers, most brutal punishment. The harsh methods now used by Russia to suppress the revolution called out another protest, this time in the form of a common note, sent June 17, 1863, which demanded for the Poles a general amnesty, national representation, nomination to public office, liberty of conscience, the use of the Polish language in official business, and a regular system of recruiting. Three days after this note had been
despatched, Drouyn de Lhuys disclosed the real designs of the French government by inviting the two Powers to enter into a closer agreement with France, in order to make good the six points in case the Czar objected to them, as it was evident that he would. But this they refused to do: and all that the Emperor could obtain, was a second series of notes, issued in August, in which the western Powers declared that they would hold Russia responsible for the consequences, in case she prolonged the struggle with Poland.

Thus though the Polish revolution had cemented more firmly the friendly union between Russia and Prussia, and alienated Russia from France, it was not sufficiently influential to cause England and Austria to lay aside their distrust of Napoleon and to form with him a strong western alliance. Both the Powers, deeming Napoleon the most ambitious of European kings, feared that any alliance with France would be followed by a demand for Belgium or for the Rhine as a boundary. England had not forgotten the seizure of Savoy and Nice, and the treacherous management of the Mexican question was still fresh in her mind. Austria had been on bad terms with the French Emperor since 1856, but at this time, thinking to frighten Prussia, who he feared would not agree to his plans for reforming the Confederation, Francis Joseph had entered into negotiations with Drouyn de Lhuys. How far the matter went is not yet known; but Bismarck failed to be moved by the threat of an Austro-French alliance, and persuaded his king to refuse to attend a meeting of the princes at Frankfort, which was called by Austria in August, 1863, to consider the reform of the Confederate system. This refusal, followed by an earnest entreaty from England that Austria should break off negotiations with France, caused that Power to reject an alliance that inevitably would have involved her in war with Russia. Napoleon now felt that he had been trifled with and tricked; but he made one more effort, and proposed to Europe the November
following that a general congress should be called to settle difficulties pending between the Powers. Bismarck, who was doing all in his power to avoid alarming France, declared that he had no objection to the congress; but England refused to have anything to do with it. The counter-alliance had failed.

Meanwhile, Prussia with almost all the peoples and the governments of Europe against her, had the audacity to turn from an alliance with the western Powers, and to take the side of Russia against the Poles.

At the outbreak of the insurrection, King William had expressed to the Czar his conviction that both governments should combine against the Poles as a common enemy, and should consider the revolution as inimical to the interests of both Russia and Prussia. On February 8, 1863, a compact was signed: Prussian regiments were at once put in readiness, and Bismarck made known his intention of interfering, if necessary, to put down the revolt. This act, to all appearances a fling in the face of the liberals of Europe, was interpreted as a further exhibition of the Prussian government's defiance of the wishes of the Prussian people, as an indication that the Prussian government had made an alliance with absolutism, and approved of beating down an enslaved nationality that was struggling to free itself from its oppressor, and as an act contrary to the spirit of European civilisation in the sixth decade of the nineteenth century. Notwithstanding this, in entire disregard of public opinion, Bismarck adhered to the alliance, and took no part in the protests of the other Powers, which were arousing the indignation of the Czar. The contrast is a striking one. Napoleon, by his Polish policy, had lost forever the friendship of Russia, and at the same time had failed to gain new allies in the west; by his Austrian policy he had angered Italy, and he could not count on England, who twice had refused to cooperate with him; in fact at the close of 1863, he found himself
without an ally in Europe: his prestige was impaired, he was himself fallen from the high state of 1856. Prussia, on the other hand, issued from the conflict diplomatically strengthened; for she had gained Russia's good will, which was destined to be of the utmost value to her in the events of the years that were to follow, while she had in no way made impossible the establishment of closer relations with the other Powers. Above all else, Bismarck had seen demonstrated for the second time the impotence of the western Powers to prevent encroachments upon the treaty arrangements of 1815; and he realised that if Cavour and Alexander II. had with impunity trampled under foot the so-called binding pledges, there was no reason why he could not do the same.

The situation in 1863 was an extremely interesting one. To the world at large it seemed that if Germany were ever to succeed in gaining unity, she must look for help to the liberal party, and not to the Prussian government, which with its army, its rigid administration, and its Junker minister, was to all appearances aping the methods that Austria had so often used in the interest of absolutism. A reorganised army, a defiance of parliamentary majorities, and a disregard of the rights of the nation, seemed sufficient to warrant the belief, that Prussia in her desire to supplant Austria in Germany was to be as brutal in her methods, as reactionary in her policy, as had been the house of Habsburg. It is little wonder that to the people of Prussia the "new era" seemed to have come to an inglorious end, and that they should have felt that their only help lay in obstinately adhering to the letter, as well as to the spirit, of their constitution. Not even the statesmen of Europe understood the policy of Bismarck; and never in the history of recent events has prophecy gone so wide of its mark, never have political writers and thinkers been so baffled and misled. Yet every important act from the beginning of King William's reign had been one of a series leading to the unity of Germany,
an inseparable part of a plan, which though simple in its leading idea, demanded for its successful accomplishment the genius of a far-sighted statesman. A weaker man would have failed; but the Prussian statesman knew his strength. Firm in his convictions, fertile in his resources, matchless in his diplomacy, he met every obstacle, won over his enemies wherever he could, struck them down with brute force when logic and persuasion failed, and by dint of threatening to resign, prevented the king from making concessions that would have endangered all his minister's calculations. During the excitement of these three months one mind led all the rest, one policy was fixed, one purpose was unchanging, one scheme was practical. The measures proposed by the Prussian parliamentary leaders might have furthered the progress of parliamentary government in Prussia, but they would never have won for that state the headship of Germany, or have solved the problem of German unity; reforming the federal system in accordance with the ideas of the German princes would never have effected the transformation of the Confederation into a national state; the National Association and all the popular societies, though invaluable in promoting unity of thought and interest, would never have overcome the centrifugal tendencies, the rivalries, and the jealousies present in Germany. Like Cavour, whose success had been an inspiration to the German statesman, Bismarck was convinced that a spontaneous popular uprising, such as had been that of 1848, could be of no permanent value. He based his hopes upon the strength of an established monarchy which should wield a weapon of tried efficiency at a time when, a legitimate pretext having been given, and fear of interference from the Powers abroad having been removed, the problem could be settled, as Clausewitz had said fifty years before, by the sword. The monarchy existed, Prussia; the weapon was already forged, the army; the time was favourable, for Prussia was diplomatically strong; and there had already arisen the
quarrel over the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, which was to furnish Bismarck with the desired pretext.

At the treaty of London, in 1852, the Powers, by establishing as a part of the public law of Europe the integrity of Denmark and making Christian of Glücksburg heir to the throne, had recognised the full independence of the duchies, except that the Danish king was to be, as he had been for centuries, the hereditary lord. As a gauge for the future, the Powers had accepted a manifesto issued by Frederic VII. on January 20, 1852, in which he agreed to grant independent assemblies to the three provinces. But the promise had been badly kept; for wishing to break the spirit of nationality that had been growing among the inhabitants since 1848, and to destroy their German institutions and affiliations, the Danish government had adopted from 1852 to 1855 a policy of petty tyranny, and in the latter year had issued a constitution that was so distinctly contrary to the spirit of the earlier agreement, so unmistakably intended to effect the eventual abolition of all self-government, and so thoroughly pro-Danish in its essential features, as to arouse great wrath in Germany. But the time had been well selected, for Europe was occupied with the Crimean war, Prussia and Austria were at enmity with each other, and the Confederation was fearing an attack from France; and it was not until 1857 that any action could be taken. But on February 11th of that year, the Diet had passed a decree declaring that it would prevent, by force if necessary, any attempt that should be made to enforce this constitution in the duchies that were members of the Confederation, that is, in Holstein and Lauenburg. This decree, intended as a reply to King Frederic's constitution, had been, at best, but a half-way measure; for it had left Schleswig wholly out of account; but the Diet, unable to make the treaty of 1852 the basis of its action, because the Confederation had not been a party to it, had been powerless to do more. To the letter of this decree Denmark had promised to conform; but
at the same time she had taken advantage of the Diet's failure to mention Schleswig, and had made preparations that seemed to indicate a determination to incorporate that province into the Danish kingdom. But as such an act would have been contrary to the London treaty, not only had the people of Schleswig protested against being separated from their Holstein brothers, but Prussia and Austria, and finally England, who had just begun to learn from Prussia the true inwardness of the Danish policy since 1852, had entered objections. On September 11, 1862, England had presented a scheme for the granting of complete autonomy to Schleswig, but this had only aroused the more the wrath of the ultra-patriots, (the Eider-Danes, as they were called, who were determined to carry the boundary of the consolidated states to the Eider, the river between Schleswig and Holstein,) and led to the indignant rejection of England's plan. In the winter of 1862–63, in order to remove all doubt on the subject, the Danish Parliament, in the heat of excitement, had proposed to the king to issue a new constitution legalising the incorporation of Schleswig, and to draft a charter for Holstein to be imposed upon her without her consent, both of which acts were a direct defiance of the London treaty. In the March Patent, or royal proclamation, of 1863, which had brought the whole matter prominently before Europe, Frederic VII. had declared that the agreement of 1852 was no longer binding, and promised to comply with the wishes of his Parliament and his people.

This was the situation in the summer of 1863. The Danes on one side and the Germans on the other were roused by the royal proclamation to the highest pitch of excitement. There is no doubt, that while the former were willing to fight, they confidently expected that their threats to incorporate Schleswig would result in nothing worse than notes and protests, with the harmlessness of which they were already familiar; and it is equally certain that they looked with contempt upon the in-
efficient and inactive Federal Diet in Germany, and trusted that the controversy over the Polish question would divert from them the attention of those who had signed the treaty of 1852, by leading to war between Prussia, Russia, and the western Powers. If such a war should break out, they thought that Denmark, by joining England and France, could get what she wished as a reward for her co-operation. But the Danes had reckoned without Bismarck, who, with definite plans of his own regarding the settlement of the Danish question, had no idea of engaging in a European war. He did not believe, as he had stated in 1862, that the difficulty could be finally settled by the mere interference of the Confederation, inasmuch as that body could concern itself only with Holstein; and he saw no way to prevent the incorporation of Schleswig, save by a national war between Germany and Denmark. But for such a war, a very different thing from a federal chastisement, he was not ready in the summer of 1863; therefore, partly to gain time, partly to let the zeal of the people of Germany expend itself in a martial effort, he persuaded the Diet, July 9, 1863, to demand of Denmark the revocation of the March Patent, and in case of refusal, to follow up that request with a military occupation of Holstein. As Bismarck expected, this demand only made matters worse. Denmark, replying most arrogantly, not only refused to withdraw the patent, but, relying on support from England, where Lord Palmerston was declaring that if the Confederation attacked Denmark, England would take the side of the Danes, and on aid from Sweden, whose king had recently visited Copenhagen, on September 28th proclaimed a new constitution for Denmark-Schleswig, which definitely incorporated the latter province. In November the constitution, having passed the two Houses of Parliament, was ready for the king's signature.

Just at this time that event took place which Europe had so long awaited with apprehension, and for which the Powers had made careful preparation, the death of Frederic VII. without
an heir. The news caused a profound sensation in Europe, and in the minds of the many diplomats, who had long been drifting about in the troubled diplomatic waters, aroused grave fears as to the outcome. At once Christian of Glücksburg ascended the throne. Would the new king observe the treaty of 1852 and refuse to accept the constitution, which had been left unsigned by his predecessor? Would the duchies accept the new king as their duke, or would they turn to Frederic, Duke of Augustenburg, who had already refused to acknowledge his father's renunciation of the family claim, and was ready to call on the Germanic Confederation to aid him in winning his hereditary rights? Such were the questions that were naturally asked. When the news of the king's death got abroad, the Holsteiners, who had been long awaiting this event, rose en masse demanding separation from Denmark under the Duke of Augustenburg; but the Schleswigers waited, hoping that Christian IX. would recognise their right to constitutional autonomy, and would withhold his signature from the constitution. With the latter rested the final decision, and he was fully aware of the position in which he was placed; but in Copenhagen, away from the German influence, he was unable to resist the pressure of the Danish ministry and people, who must always bear the responsibility for the fatal consequences that followed. Christian IX. signed the constitution. At once the Schleswigers joined with the people of Holstein in demanding entire separation from Denmark under the Duke of Augustenburg. On Germany the effect was even more startling. The feeling of exasperation at this act of the Danish king was greater than at any time since the March days of 1848: princes and people, conservatives and liberals, joined in one common resolve to recognise the duke, and support the duchies against Danish tyranny, even if this should require the dismemberment of the Danish kingdom, and the incorporation of the duchies as a separate state in the Germanic Confederation.
To Bismarck the excitement and passion that attended the
discussion of this question were eminently satisfactory, because
they were creating a situation of which he could make use;
but to Austria the course of events was exceedingly disquieting.
She could not share with the rest of Germany, i. e., Third Ger-
many, its enthusiasm for the cause of the duchies, and was,
therefore, forced to hold herself in readiness to see what Prussia
would do. Bismarck had already formulated his plan, though
he was able to disclose but part of it at a time as circumstances
made its execution possible. He could not accept the recent
Danish constitution, for it was contrary to the London treaty,
by which it was convenient for him to stand for the present;
neither could he adopt the plan of Third Germany, for that
would result in adding another federal prince to the thirty-six
already in the Confederation, who would be sure to side with
Austria, and to vote against Prussia in the Diet. The goal he
had set for himself was not to be reached without difficulty and
deliberation, and upon the outcome of the first step depended
eventual success or failure. It was necessary to entangle
Austria in the Prussian policy without frightening her; and as
she was determined to stand by the terms of the treaty of 1852,
that is, to support Christian IX. as the hereditary lord of the
duchies, and to maintain the integrity of Denmark, it became
necessary for Prussia to propose a common act of which Austria
could approve. Therefore, rejecting the proposals of Third
Germany by telling the Duke of Augustenburg that he could
do nothing for him as Prussia was bound by the London
treaty, Bismarck made known to Austria that if Christian IX.
would not adhere to the agreement of 1852, he was prepared to
begin an armed chastisement of Denmark in Holstein, as a
federal act for the protection of the rights of that duchy. This
proposal Austria accepted, because it seemed to accord far more
closely with her own views than did the wishes of the lesser
states, most of whom had recognised the Duke of Augusten-
burg, or than those of the Diet, which, never having accepted
the terms of the London treaty, was unwilling to recognise
Christian IX. as Duke of Holstein. Through the combined
efforts of the two Powers, a favorable vote was at last obtained
in the Diet, authorising the immediate occupation of Holstein,
in order to compel Denmark to withdraw the charter that she
had imposed upon the inhabitants of Holstein without their
consent. The military execution of this decree was entrusted
to Prussia, Austria, Saxony, and Hanover; and before the close
of the year 1863 Holstein was in the possession of the Confed-
erate troops.

Having accomplished successfully the first part of his plan,
Bismarck was ready to carry out the second and more difficult
part, to transform the armed chastisement into a national war;
that is, to demand of Denmark the withdrawal of the November
constitution, which, it will be remembered, concerned Schles-
wig only, and if this were refused to cross the Eider,—the river
dividing Denmark from the Confederation,—for the purpose of
upholding the European agreement of 1852. But the Diet in-
dignantly refused to aid in any such undertaking, because, in
the first place, it had no right to chastise Schleswig, which was
non-Confederate territory, and because, in the second place, it
would do nothing to uphold the London treaty, which it had
never sanctioned and would never support. Bismarck had
anticipated this refusal, and had arranged for it by inviting
Austria, in case the Confederation refused to co-operate, to join
with Prussia, not as a German state, but as a European Power,
in carrying on the war. As soon as the vote in the Diet had
been announced, without a moment's hesitation he called upon
Austria to join him in demanding the withdrawal of the Danish
constitution, and, if necessary, in invading Schleswig. Austria
could not refuse; for Prussia was asking nothing revolutionary;
she was, so far as Austria could see, demanding nothing but an
adherence to a treaty to which Austria herself had given her
consent. Besides, Austria was as eager as Prussia to silence all demonstrations in favour of Augustenburg and to maintain the rights of Christian IX. in the duchies; and when she saw France threatening to aid Third Germany, which was enthusiastically supporting Augustenburg, the Prussian Parliament itself refusing a grant of supplies for the undertaking, and the Diet rejecting the motion that she had introduced jointly with Prussia, she yielded to Bismarck's skilful diplomacy, and accepted the Prussian proposal to demand of Denmark the withdrawal of the constitution. It was the beginning of the end for Austria.

But the new undertaking was entirely different from a federal chastisement; it was a European, not a German matter; it involved an attack by two European Powers upon another European state. Had Bismarck intended to do no more than did Austria, that is, to uphold the terms of the London treaty, then he might not have considered it necessary to wait for a favourable situation in Europe before acting. But Bismarck anticipated a stubborn war that would annul existing obligations, that would make it necessary to free the duchies entirely from Danish control, and so to break the very treaty that Prussia and Austria were going to war to defend. That such a war would endanger the peace and disturb the equilibrium of Europe he was aware; and he had undoubtedly considered the possibility of Austria's withdrawing at the supreme moment, and of the other signers of the treaty uniting to oppose Prussia's plan. Why, then, did Bismarck believe that the relations of the Powers at this time favoured the audacious and masterful design that he had in mind; and why was he confident that he should be able to carry out his scheme without serious interference?

That England would be hostile was the one fact upon which Bismarck could count with certainty; for though Lord John Russell in 1862 had proposed to act in concert with the German
Powers in settling the Danish problem, when, as all supposed, there existed a Franco-Russian alliance; nevertheless, a year later, when the friendship between Russia and France had been broken and Prussia had taken the side of the Czar on the Polish question, the English government returned to its traditional defence of Denmark, and threatened to support the Danes in case Germany became aggressive. "We have taken a deep interest in favour of Denmark," wrote Palmerston to Lord John Russell, May 1, 1864, "because we have thought from the beginning that Denmark has been unjustly treated, and because we deem the integrity and independence of the state which commands the entrance to the Baltic objects of interest to England." The English government would, therefore, certainly oppose Bismarck's scheme. But would the other Powers support her? Russia certainly would not, for she was still engaged in suppressing the Polish revolt, which the interference of the western Powers had only served to prolong, and grateful to Prussia for her promise of co-operation, was ready not only to remain neutral, but, if necessary, to hold back Sweden by a threat that if Sweden armed, she would mass an army on the coast of Finland. Certainly not Austria, who by her acceptance of Prussia's plan for the attack upon Denmark, had made herself participator in the very act that England desired to prevent. There remained, therefore, only France, whose Emperor, angered by England's abandonment of the Poles the year before and by her rejection of his proposal for a European congress, was not only ready to avenge himself by refusing to join her in defending Denmark, but was even inclined to throw over the treaty of 1852 altogether, and to aid Third Germany in supporting the cause of the Duke of Augustenburg. Thus England was isolated in Europe, and was wholly unable to go single-handed to the defence of the Danish kingdom. The tangled diplomacy of the period and the complete want of accord between the members of the London conference who had
signed the treaty of 1852, gave a royal opportunity to Bismarck, who knew that the solution of the Schleswig-Holstein problem depended, less upon the German people, than upon a favourable European situation. In tracing back the complicated course of events of this memorable year of diplomacy, we see that it was the uprising of the Poles that made possible the attack upon Denmark, and enabled Bismarck to score the first of that series of victories which ended, seven years afterward, in the establishment of a united Germany.

Confident that Europe would not interfere, Bismarck completed his arrangements with Austria; and that he might not be prevented from carrying his plan to completion, proposed as an amendment to the agreement which he had already made with Austria, that "in case hostilities in Schleswig ensue and the existing obligations between the German Powers and Denmark are consequently annulled, the courts of Austria and Prussia reserve the right to decide in concert with each other upon the future relations of the duchies. To promote such harmonious action they will then agree upon further measures. They will in no case determine the question of the succession without mutual consent." As this amendment provided that the disposal of the two duchies should be left entirely to the decision of the two Powers, and as Count Rechberg, the Austrian chancellor, was confident that he could easily check in time any aggressive or unscrupulous action that Bismarck might be inclined to commit, Austria signed the contract on January 16, 1864. On the same day the allies sent a despatch to the Danish government demanding the withdrawal of the constitution within forty-eight hours. On the 18th the reply was received that the Danish government would not comply; and before a week had passed, Austrian and Prussian troops had entered Holstein, and were prepared to begin hostilities on the other side of the Eider.

The effect of this action upon Third Germany was immediate:
Bavaria and Saxony were indignant at what they chose to call an infringement of the rights of the Confederation; the popular chambers and liberal associations expressed their abhorrence of such disloyalty to the German cause; the Prussian Parliament rejected the government loan; and some of the minor states thought for the moment of refusing to allow the allied troops to pass through Holstein. But to all this stir and play of anger Bismarck was entirely indifferent; his only concern was for the influence that his action would have on the Powers abroad, and he awaited anxiously to see tested a situation that he was convinced was favourable. Nor had he miscalculated. Everything stood firm. Lord John Russell, though thoroughly aroused by the aggressive attitude of the German Powers, found himself unable to act; and his proposal that Denmark be given six weeks in which to repeal the constitution in a legal manner, was rejected not only by Prussia, but by Denmark as well, for Monrad, the Danish minister, declared that the constitution would not be repealed at all. Then Lord John, declaring that the war was the most outrageous act in history, turned to France and solicited her aid. But Napoleon III. was only too ready to take his revenge on England; and, besides, he was hoping that the war would result in a quarrel between the allies that might force Prussia to turn to France for aid against Austria, and so make reasonably sure some concession of territory on the left bank of the Rhine. It is at least reasonable to suppose that some such thought was passing through the Emperor’s mind; for on January 28, 1864, he replied to England that he could not think of undertaking this war, which was sure to lead to a conflict with Prussia, unless England would guarantee him, not only her military support, but also suitable indemnity in case they succeeded. England saw at once that she was meant to help France win the Rhine as a boundary, and rejected this impossible proposal, as Napoleon, who did not wish to engage in a war, had known that she
would. Unopposed, therefore, the German Powers continued their attack upon Denmark.

In the war thus undertaken, the allies, notwithstanding the courage and determination of the Danish troops, were almost continuously victorious. Crossing the Eider on February 1st, they advanced with little opposition to the first real line of defence, the Dannewerke, where they had expected to meet with a vigorous resistance. But to their surprise, after two days of not very severe fighting, the Danes abandoned their works, and withdrew to the entrenchments of Döppel and to the fortified town of Fredericia. In spite of the most inclement weather, the allies followed their enemy through a country little adapted to rapid progress, and for three weeks, while waiting for their siege artillery, faced the Danes in their defences. Finally, on April 18th, the attack was made on the redoubts by the Prussians under Prince Frederic Charles, and before three o'clock in the afternoon of that day the works were captured, and the Danes forced to take refuge in the island of Alsen. Prussia had won her first victory since the reorganisation of her army, and almost since the battle of Waterloo; and naturally the news of it was received with great joy at Berlin. Whatever the people may have thought of the means whereby the remodelling and strengthening of the army had been effected, or however angry they might still be with the government for its administration without a budget, they were proud of this victory, and were ready to acknowledge that any reduction of the strength of the army was not to be thought of.

But the capture of Döppel and the occupation of Jutland that followed meant more than this. It meant that the treaty of 1852 had been proved useless and inefficient, that it had become a dead letter; and what was of greater importance, it meant that two of the members of the European concert had been able to overthrow a treaty that had been incorporated as part of the public law of Europe, and that, too, without the consent of
those Powers who had signed it and promised to maintain it. And Austria was guilty equally with Prussia. The Power that for fifty years had made the sanctity of treaties one of its cardinal principles, was now to agree to the dismemberment of the very kingdom that it had entered the war to defend. It is true that Austria did not depart from her traditional course willingly; but what could she do, and where could she turn for support, now that Prussia, who had made the treaty of 1852 merely a convenient pretext, was ready to declare that the war had destroyed all previous obligations? She was forced to acquiesce in Prussia's plans or lose her influence in Germany: for England was her only ally in Europe, and the verdict of France and of Third Germany was overwhelmingly against the retention of the old treaty. Napoleon, who was every day drawing near to Prussia and separating himself from Austria, now plainly stated that the people of the duchies should decide for themselves whether to form an independent state under the Duke of Augustenburg, or to vote for annexation to Prussia; and even more strongly than he did the people of Germany favour the plan for separation. Petitions and addresses circulated widely and received thousands of signatures from the people in their clubs and associations, from the deputies in the chambers, and from even the princes and the nobility. Austria did not dare to stand alone against Prussia and the Confederation; and at last, against her will, with a sense of being drawn into engagements, the issue of which she could not foresee, and sadly aware that the old standards were breaking down, gave her consent, and entered the lists of those who were opposing a treaty that not a year before she had wished to defend.

The European Powers, hoping to prevent further hostilities, now made an effort to settle amicably the difficulty between Germany and Denmark. On April 25th, England, France, Austria, Sweden, Russia, Prussia, Denmark, and the Confederation, came together at London to arrange an armistice between
the combatants and to discuss the question of the duchies. For Bismarck it was an important moment; for even if the new congress should not insist on the maintenance of the integrity of Denmark, it might impose conditions that would seriously hamper him in the carrying out of his plans. Having with some difficulty arranged for a truce from May 12th to June 12th, the representatives took up the larger questions. In the discussion that ensued, Russia and England were at first inclined to adhere to the old agreement; but when the Danish representative declared that his government would not go back to the terms of 1852, but would stand out to the end for the complete incorporation of Schleswig, all the Powers went over to the side of Prussia, and tacitly dropped the question of the integrity of Denmark and with it the treaty of 1852.

But if the duchies were not to be a part of Denmark, what was to be done with them? Two proposals were made: the first by Prussia, to the effect that Schleswig-Holstein should be established as an independent state under the Duke of Augustenburg; the second by England, who suggested that Schleswig should be divided, and the portion above the Schley be given to Denmark. These propositions aroused great excitement in the conference. Russia, who was supporting the claim of the Duke of Oldenburg, declared against the German proposal; Sweden, Denmark, France, and England supported Russia, and, to Bismarck's satisfaction, the claims of Augustenburg were rejected by the conference. This proposal in reality had not been part of Bismarck's plan; but as Third Germany had ardently supported it, and Austria had accepted it as better than to allow the duchies to be annexed to Prussia, he had recognised it as a possibility, and had presented it to the conference with the hope that the representatives would refuse to accept it. The discussion over the division of Schleswig was more bitter; for the German powers positively refused to consider so large an accession of territory as would have been made
by drawing a line at so southerly a point as Flensburg on the Schley; and demanded a northern line from Appenrade to Tondern. Every sort of pressure was brought to bear on Denmark to induce her to accept the latter boundary; but she would not even grant that the people of the disputed district should have a voice in the matter, an opinion in which she was seconded by Russia, Austria, and Sweden. Even when England proposed to submit the matter to the arbitration of Napoleon, Denmark refused; and so persistently obstinate was the Danish government, probably because it was expecting aid from England, that the conference was not able to reach any conclusion. On June 25th the meetings were brought to an end, and the representatives dispersed. Two things had been accomplished: the treaty of 1852 had been tacitly, though not officially, declared null and void; and the principle had been laid down, to which Europe still adheres, that in determining the boundary between two states, the inhabitants of the territory in dispute shall have no voice. All other questions were left undecided. Nothing was done to solve the problem of the disposal of the duchies or of the succession to the ducal throne, and no conditions were proposed to govern the action of the German Powers. To Bismarck this result was a great relief, for now he had his hands freed. He had won the battle with Palmerston, not only because of the dogged pertinacity of the Danes, and the refusal of Napoleon to support England, but also because of his moderation, and the consummate skill with which he had controlled the diplomacy of the conference.

Inasmuch as the conference had failed to effect an amicable settlement of the questions at issue, the allies renewed the war. On June 22d they put their forces in motion, and crossing the channel which separates the island of Alsen from the mainland, began an attack upon the strongly entrenched Danes. For four days the manoeuvres continued, and when on the 28th the island was captured, not a Dane remained to hold what had been con-
sidered at Copenhagen an impregnable stronghold. The way
now lay open to Fünen and even to Zealand and Copenhagen.
At this critical moment, when all were looking for the expected
aid from England, the news came that Lord Palmerston had,
by a small majority only, escaped a vote of censure in the House
of Commons; that the Queen disapproved of his course; and
that the other members of the cabinet were resolved to follow a
policy of peace. This confession that Lord Palmerston’s war
policy had conspicuously failed, coupled with Napoleon’s final
refusal to aid the Danes, broke the spirit of the Danish national-
ity. The Eider-Dane ministry was dismissed, and on July 12th
proposals for a truce were sent to Berlin and Vienna. On
August 1st the preliminaries of peace were arranged, and about
two months later, October 30th, the treaty of Vienna was
signed. By this treaty, Christian IX. renounced all his rights
to the three duchies, Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg, in
favour of the king of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria, and
pledged himself to recognise whatever disposition they should
make of them.

No sooner had the preliminaries been arranged than Prussia
demanded the withdrawal of the Confederate troops from Hol-
stein, on the ground that as the sovereignty of the provinces
was vested in Prussia and Austria, the Confederation had no
right longer to occupy the territory. Austria concurred, and
though Saxony was inclined to be obstinate, the motion to with-
draw the troops was carried in the Diet, and the duchies were
soon free from Confederate troops. The two Powers then as-
sumed full control, and by the end of the year a joint com-
misison government was organised and set in motion. But this
could not be permanent, and what of the future? The allies
were now able to dispose of the provinces as they pleased, unre-
strained by any previous conditions made either by themselves
in their agreement of January 16th, or by the London confer-
ence, or by Denmark in the treaty of Vienna. Yet were those
governments that for fifty years had faced each other as rivals in Germany, had come into conflict over numberless difficulties, and had been two or three times on the verge of war, to be able to agree as to the best manner of dealing with this territory in the present, and of disposing of it in the future? And if they could not agree, would it be possible for them to preserve harmony by a compromise, or if that too failed, would either submit to the other without a resort to arms?

The attitudes that these Powers assumed at this juncture presented striking contrasts. Austria found the situation troublesome and perplexing: as a non-German state, with interests in the centre and east of Europe rather than in the north, she would gladly have rid herself of the whole affair, if she could have done so without injury to her dignity; she would have accepted even the annexation of the provinces to Prussia, if the latter would have given her territorial compensation in return. She had, in fact, no fixed purpose, no definite plan, except that of preserving peace and retaining her pre-eminence in Germany. Before the war she had loyally supported the claims of the king of Denmark, and had approved of maintaining the integrity of his kingdom; but now that this position was no longer tenable, she saw nothing else to do than to sanction the entire independence of the duchies, and to uphold the claims of the Duke of Augustenburg as the legitimate sovereign. That this policy was in no way consistent with her former one she was aware; but forced to take the defensive, she had done so with the hope that she would be able to make impossible any aggressive action on the part of Bismarck. In truth, she was distinctly annoyed that she had the matter on her hands at all, for it was taking her attention from her plan for the internal reorganisation of which the Austrian state stood greatly in need.

To Bismarck, on the other hand, the struggle for the duchies was an integral part of his scheme for the humiliation of Austria
and the overthrow of the Confederation. He was not disposed to insist upon the annexation of the duchies to Prussia, if he could obtain his end in any other way. He was willing to accept even the sovereignty of Augustenburg, though neither he nor King William had any confidence in the duke, if the latter would accept Prussia's conditions. What these conditions were he made known to the German world on February 22, 1865. He demanded that the duchies should enter the Zollverein, and adopt the Prussian tariff system; that they should place in Prussia's hands the entire control of their postal and telegraph service, their army and navy; that they should accept the Prussian military law and recruiting system; and that their troops should take the oath to the king of Prussia as their commander-in-chief. He also demanded that Prussia should be given such control over the harbour of Kiel and the proposed canal from the Baltic to the North seas, as to enable her to guard these strategic points in the interest of Germany as a whole. These demands were made on the ground that Schleswig-Holstein was not prepared for independent existence; that her finances were in a deplorable condition; that her position as an outpost open to attack by sea made it dangerous to Germany to leave such an important coast-line dependent upon the uncertainty of an independent government; that only the acceptance of the Prussian system and a Prussian protectorate, or, if these were refused, entire incorporation into the Prussian state, could give the strength that was needed by the frontier land that guarded the Baltic.

Bismarck was looking forward to the day when there should be a common German interest, a national welfare; and he saw in such a future an answer to all the arguments based on the rights of the Schleswig-Holsteiners. From his point of view to uphold these rights would have been to sanction the reaction; to recognise the obligations of the inhabitants to the duke, whom for months they had saluted as sovereign, to accept all
their claims to an independent existence, and to admit them as a separate state into the Confederation, would have been to encourage particularism; to have made concessions to their dislike of the Prussian military system and Prussian taxes, to their dread of the economic changes that would follow their admission to the Zollverein, would have been to sanction the existence, in this remote corner of the new Germany, of institutions that were of the past, not of the future. Bismarck's remedy was a stern one, and little wonder is it that to the critics of the period it appeared to be brutal, reactionary, and anti-liberal, hostile to constitutional rights, indifferent to national distinctions, uncompromising and unyielding, and dependent for its strength, not on the willingness of the German people, but upon the power of the Prussian army.

Yet after thirty years this policy stands in another light. It was one of force, but of force applied for the attainment of a nobler end than the mere aggrandisement of Prussia; it had in view the construction of a state that was to be grander and more powerful than the Hohenzollern kingdom. It is true that the new system was to circle about Berlin; but that was better than the old system circling about Vienna. It is true that the undue attention given to the army was to affect seriously the new national life; but even with its militarism, the inevitable penalty of a policy of war, the modern Germany has rid itself of the weaknesses of the Confederation, of the denationalising influence of an all-dominant Austria, of the rivalries and jealousies of the particularistic states. To remove these obstacles from her path, to increase her influence and her prestige, to gain for her a constitutional government on a national foundation, to bring her into touch with the best that modern civilisation has had to offer, this was Bismarck's work. Yet even he would have found his task infinitely more difficult, if not impossible, had he not been supported, as had Cavour, by a sovereign, heart and soul interested in the construction of a
new state. "One would seek in vain in history," says Rothan, "for a minister and a sovereign complementing each other so marvellously; one would find it difficult to determine the exact share due to William I. and Bismarck in the work which they accomplished together."
CHAPTER VI.

THE UNITY OF GERMANY.

In tracing Bismarck's policy and the history of Prussia we have seen that Austria, forced to follow a course to which she was distinctly opposed, had been led into a situation that was both disquieting and perplexing. She had warred against Denmark in defence of the treaty of London and the constitutional rights of the duchies, but had issued from the war compelled to sanction the dismemberment of the Danish kingdom, and to accept, jointly with Prussia, rights of administration in the duchies which she certainly did not desire. Up to this time she had supported Prussia and opposed Third Germany, Holstein, and the Duke of Augustenburg; but now, aroused by Prussia's proposal to annex the duchies, or, in case the rights of the Duke of Augustenburg were sustained, to place them under a Prussian protectorate, she was driven to join the German liberals in supporting the complete separation of Schleswig and Holstein from Denmark. Thus she had entirely reversed her policy: was opposing Prussia instead of supporting her, was supporting Augustenburg instead of opposing him, and was once more in full accord with Third Germany and the Diet.

Such a course must soon have led to a conflict with Prussia, for Austria not only rejected the February conditions, but allowed her commissioner to countenance the cause of Augustenburg in Holstein, and even went so far as to put a vote through the Diet demanding the immediate recognition and coronation
of the duke. But neither party was ready for the rupture. Bismarck wanted Italy's co-operation and Napoleon's neutrality, and had still to overcome King William's dislike of the revolution so far as to induce him to consider an alliance with Italy against Austria. The latter Power was even more ready for a compromise; for she was afraid of Italy, was in the midst of her struggle with Hungary, and was uncertain of Napoleon. Furthermore, her financial condition was deplorable; she had been obliged to reduce her army and to curtail expenses, and was suffering from discord in the government, not only between the cabinet and the Chamber of Deputies, but even between the ministers in the cabinet itself.

Both Powers were, therefore, ready for a compromise, and at Gastein, on August 14, 1865, came to an agreement on the Schleswig-Holstein question. In principle, the common government of the duchies was to be retained; but as far as matters of actual administration were concerned, Holstein was to be placed under the control of Austria, Schleswig under that of Prussia. Prussia was also to receive Lauenburg in full sovereignty in return for two and a half million Danish thalers; she was to control two military roads through Holstein, to have the right to establish troops at Rendsburg, to have men-of-war in the harbour of Kiel, to construct a canal from the Baltic to the North seas, and to receive both duchies into the Zollverein. Great though these material advantages were to be for Prussia in the future, it was a matter of greater moment to Bismarck that by the treaty of Gastein he had forced Austria to a decision on one of the most important questions in the controversy, as to whether Christian IX. or the Duke of Augustenburg was the rightful lord of the duchies. In selling Lauenburg to Prussia, Austria had tacitly denied the rights of the duke; for where did she get her title to Lauenburg, Bismarck asked, if not from Christian IX. in the treaty of Vienna? And if Christian IX. had had rights in Lauenburg before he conveyed them
away, had he not had rights in the other duchies also? How, then, he argued, could Austria continue to support the claims of Augustenburg without violating the very principle upon which the treaty of Gastein was based? Clearly this treaty was in all particulars a victory for Prussia.

Having thus bound Austria to an agreement that was in every way to her disadvantage, Bismarck turned his attention to France and Italy. He needed Napoleon’s neutrality; and knowing that the Austrian party in Paris was ever urging upon the Emperor an alliance of Austria, Italy, and France against Prussia, and that an envoy had already been sent to Vienna to discuss such an alliance, he sought an interview with Napoleon at Biarritz in October, 1865. The time was favourable; for not only was the French Emperor ill and discouraged, but his government was isolated in Europe, his expedition to Mexico had proved a costly failure, the Algerian revolt of 1864 had been a heavy burden, and in parliament and the country the opposition to him was daily increasing. The Napoleon at Biarritz was, however, the same who had met Cavour at Plombières, and the second meeting was but a complement of the first. What was said in this famous interview has never been satisfactorily made known, for Bismarck’s report to King William is not so detailed as is Cavour’s letter to Victor Emmanuel: but it is probable that Bismarck asked for Napoleon’s consent to Prussia’s plan of aggrandisement and alliance with Italy, and watched for expressions from the Emperor regarding neutrality; and that Napoleon, after making clear his intention of remaining neutral, threw out hints regarding the possibilities of the occasion for France. That any definite agreement was reached regarding compensation in return for neutrality, is wholly unlikely; although it is reasonable to suppose, that Bismarck did nothing to disturb any impressions that the Emperor may have received regarding what Prussia might do for France in the future; and that Napoleon, knowing that war was out
of the question, and a military undertaking on the eastern frontier impossible, did not think it necessary to explain to Bismarck that he was making a virtue of necessity. The two conspirators separated mutually satisfied; for Napoleon saw in Prussia's friendship a possible means of obtaining new territory for France, and Bismarck felt sure that Napoleon would not only not oppose an alliance of Prussia with Italy, but would remain neutral in the forthcoming war.

Bismarck now returned to Berlin to watch the working of the treaty of Gastein. He felt confident that Austria would not adhere to the interpretation which he himself believed was the only legitimate one, and from which he was resolved that she should not depart by one jot or tittle. On the ground that the vesting of the sovereignty of the provinces in the two Powers made necessary the suppression of all Danish and provincial uprisings, all demonstrations in favour of Augustenburg, Prussia governed Schleswig as a subject province, checked all movements for independence, and enforced strict obedience to her authority. Austria, on the other hand, granted Holstein the privileges of an independent state; and in her endeavour to be conciliatory, won great popularity by giving the Holsteiners a share in the government and suppressing only the most violent of the demonstrations. Austria's laxity in controlling popular speech and movements that favoured Augustenburg, resulted in an increase in the number of Augustenburg associations and a greater boldness on the part of the Augustenburg press; and by January, 1866, so intense had become the anti-Prussian feeling in Holstein that Manteuffel, governor of Schleswig, entered complaints against the license of the press. But this protest from Prussia was met by evasions in Holstein, and by the comment in Vienna that Prussia had no business to interfere in Holstein affairs; and so bold had the followers of Augustenburg become, that on January 23d they went so far as to hold a huge mass meeting in Altona, at which they made
speeches hostile to Prussia and cheered vociferously for the hereditary duke.

These events convinced Bismarck that nothing was to be gained by temporising, and that it would be necessary to settle the question, not by compromise, but by war. Having waited three months for Austria to show a willingness to govern Holstein as Manteuffel was governing Schleswig, he had no intention of giving her any further opportunity of disregarding the Gastein agreement; and in his determination that war should come in the spring of 1866, he was ready to ride roughshod over every sentimental consideration and to do anything that would compel Austria to lose her temper, and to fight in defence of her dignity and her honour. It is hard to justify many of the acts that followed this decision, and easy to understand why Europe considered Prussia the aggressor; and only when one appreciates the fact, that war between the two states was sooner or later bound to come, and that Bismarck’s policy, though Prussian, was German also, can one defend the methods of the Prussian statesman. The issue took definite form about the middle of January, 1866, when Bismarck demanded that Austria should show her allegiance to the treaty of Gastein by banishing the Duke of Augustenburg from Holstein. In reply, Count Mensdorff declared that no cause could be assigned for banishing the duke, and that any interference on the part of Prussia in the administration of Holstein would not be permitted. This interchange of hostile notes, the first act in the drama which, six months later, terminated in actual war, brought abruptly to an end the alliance that the two Powers had made in January, 1864.

Before receiving the reply of the Austrian minister, Bismarck had applied himself to the difficult task of completing the alliance with Italy. The Italian statesmen, particularly La Marmora, the head of the cabinet, were suspicious of Prussia, and fearing that at any time a new peace agreement, similar to
that of Gastein, might leave Italy to the mercy of Austria, had been up to this time by no means ready to accept unreservedly Bismarck’s proposal to join an alliance against her. On the contrary La Marmora had been inclined to treat with Austria for Venetia on a peace basis, and, in November, 1865, when the treaty of Gastein had seemed to release Italy from all obligation to Prussia, he offered to buy Venetia for a thousand million lire. But however welcome the purchase-money would have been to the Austrian minister of finance, who was already wondering how he was going to pay Austria’s debts, Francis Joseph had refused to barter one of the jewels of his crown for money. Further discussion regarding the matter during the early months of 1866 had made it evident that Italy and Austria could not come to any agreement, inasmuch as Austria refused to recognise the Italian kingdom, and Italy would not renew the diplomatic relations with Austria unless Venetia were restored. The failure of these friendly negotiations had induced La Marmora to consider the Prussian proposal more seriously; but he was still greatly perplexed. He dared not act without Napoleon’s consent, yet he could not discover what Napoleon’s wishes were; and unable to get definite news from Berlin, he became more than ever uncertain as to the best course to follow. It is not surprising that the moment was one of doubt for the Italian minister, for Bismarck himself was embarrassed by the indecision of King William, who found it hard to enter into an alliance with Napoleon and Victor Emmanuel against his kinsman and brother monarch, Francis Joseph.

But already an event had taken place that made easier the final settlement of the difficulty. In November, 1865, when the question of a commercial alliance with Italy came before the members of the Zollverein, the lesser States, enraged at Austria for having in the treaty of Gastein deserted the Duke of Augustenburg, had lent themselves the more willingly to the persuasions of Bismarck; and in December had not only rati-
fied the commercial treaty, but had consented to recognise officially the sub-Alpine kingdom. This act won for Prussia a popularity among the Italian people which stood her in good stead later. And the commercial alliance prepared the way for the political alliance. When, in March, 1866, after further negotiations with Napoleon had elicited from him a satisfactory response, La Marmora, feeling that all the arguments were in favour of an alliance with Prussia, despatched Govone to Berlin with instructions to make definite proposals for a treaty. After a long discussion, which was not always amiable, inasmuch as the Italians were still suspicious of Prussia, the treaty was signed, April 8th, the Italian representative expressly stipulating that it was to last but three months. By this compact, Italy bound herself to declare war against Austria, when once Prussia had taken the initiative.

But strangely enough this treaty contained not a word referring to the Schleswig-Holstein question; for Bismarck had already realised, that if Prussia could furnish no better reason for declaring war than a dispute concerning administration merely or a desire to annex certain provinces, his policy, which had already aroused the indignation of the people of Germany and the western countries, would be condemned for all time. He determined, therefore, to lay bare the most far-reaching and revolutionary of all his plans, to justify his conduct by declaring at once, that the question of the duchies was but part of the larger question which concerned, not merely the leadership, but also the reform, of the entire Confederation. The text of the treaty, therefore, bound Italy to declare war only when the king of Prussia should have failed to get the approval of the other German governments to certain plans, relating to such reforms of the Confederate constitution as were necessary to the welfare of the German nation.

This scheme for remodelling the Confederation was no new one, conceived on the spur of the moment for political purposes:
for four years it had been an integral part of the larger policy of the Prussian government. As early as January 22, 1863, the Prussian representative in the Diet had advised the establishment of a national parliament that should be dependent on the suffrages of the people; in August, 1863, at the very time when Austria was bringing together the princes at Frankfort to consider the needs of the Confederation, Prussia, in a despatch sent from Berlin to Vienna, had declared that she approved of an increase of federal authority, but only on condition that the Diet’s decrees received the consent of a parliament chosen by the people; and again, on September 15th of the same year, when the constitution outlined by the princes at Frankfort was submitted to Prussia, the Berlin government had restated this principle in still more emphatic language. On the day, therefore, after that on which the treaty with Italy had been signed, Bismarck introduced into the Diet his famous motion providing for the establishment of a national assembly, that should be chosen by direct and universal suffrage in the proportion of one deputy to every hundred thousand inhabitants, convene periodically, and have a share in Confederate legislation, that is, in all matters of common interest as specified in the Vienna Final-Act, and in certain particular matters relating to citizenship, commerce, navigation, war, the navy, and the like. This motion, which contained some of the most essential features of the imperial constitution of 1848 and 1849, disclosed the nobler part of Bismarck’s scheme, and revealed the fact that he was providing, not only for the aggrandisement of Prussia and the supplanting of the house of Habsburg by the house of Hohenzollern, but also for the recasting of the political organisation of Germany with its many feudal inconsistencies in a modern mould, and for the destruction of those particularistic elements which, as a legacy from the past had hindered the development of German strength and German unity. In a word, Bismarck desired to bring about a political
revolution which should substitute within reasonable and proper limits the rights of individuals for the rights, hitherto practically unlimited, of sovereign states.

But this proposal was received almost with derision by Europe. How, it was asked, could this narrow-minded, unsympathetic Junker, who had disregarded the constitutional rights of the Prussians, had treated Schleswig like a conquered province, and denied to the Holsteiners the privileges of self-government, be in earnest in advocating a national parliament, direct and universal suffrage, and a secret ballot? Many considered the motion but a cloak for further autocratic measures, an expedient learned from Napoleon for gaining support from popular votes for a policy of blood and iron; others thought that in proposing it Bismarck was but making a desperate attempt to win popularity for a hopeless cause. That he hoped by this motion to strengthen the alliance with Italy, to gain the sympathy of Bavaria, turn public sentiment in his favour, and above all else to furnish a pretext of war which the king would approve there can be no doubt, but at the same time, as the future was to show, he was sincere in his desire that the new Germany should be constituted, as nearly as was practicable, according to the principles laid down by the National Assembly of 1848. The motion did not, however, serve the immediate purpose for which it was introduced; it did not provoke the war; for before the committee appointed by the Diet to consider the motion could act other events brought to a climax the wearisome contention between the two great Powers.

Since the breaking of the alliance between Prussia and Austria, due to Mensdorff’s refusal to banish the Duke of Augustenburg from Holstein, preparations for war had gone steadily on. Early in March Austria had begun to put her troops in readiness, to increase the number of those already under arms, and to make all necessary arrangements for placing the army in the field in the shortest possible time.
Toward the end of the month Prussia had bestirred herself; fortresses on the Hanoverian and Silesian frontiers had been manned, the regiments put on a partial war-footing, horses purchased, and on March 29th orders had been issued for mobilising the army. During the month Prussia, cool and confident, willing to postpone complete mobilisation for the sake of peace, yet certain that war was inevitable, stood in striking contrast with Austria, whose army was not ready, whose cabinet and military leaders unable to agree were equally unable to withstand the vehement war feeling every day growing more intense in Vienna. A proposal to disarm, which Prussia agreed to on April 21st, seemed about to be generally accepted, when reports came to Vienna of the mobilisation of Italy's forces. Suspecting Prussia of favouring a general disarmament that Italy might have a free hand to attack Austria, the Austrian government, without stopping to find out whether or not the reports were well founded, decided, in a great council of war held April 21st, to set in motion instantly the greater part of her forces; and convinced that the finances of the state could not long endure the strain of heavy expenditures for military purposes, declared, under great excitement, that if Prussia refused to agree to Austria's proposal for the settlement of the Schleswig-Holstein dispute, it would refer the whole matter to the Federal Diet, and would summon the Holstein estates to get an expression of opinion from the Holstein people.

By this act Austria was distinctly challenging Prussia to war, and so Bismarck interpreted it. In a note of May 7th he declared that Austria was deliberately violating the treaty of Gastein, to which the Confederation had not been a party and regarding which it could have nothing to say; that in fact she was making that agreement null and void, and placing matters once more on the footing of the treaty of Vienna, according to which the two Powers were to govern the provinces, not sepa-
rately, but jointly. Having made this explanation, he claimed
the right to interfere in the administration of Holstein; although
he well knew that Austria would consider such interference as
equivalent to a declaration of war. Italy mobilised her troops
at once; by May 3d the Prussian government had issued com-
mands for the execution of the order of March 29th, and as one
after another of the hostile states began to make prepara-
tions for war, placed on a war-foothing her entire army, including the
corps of the Rhine, Westphalia, Prussia, and Pomerania. By
the middle of May, Germany presented the appearance of a
huge armed camp; trade and commerce came to a standstill;
credit was unobtainable; traffic and intercommunication ceased;
and the western world daily expected an outbreak of hostilities.
In Germany, the lesser states were outspoken in their defence
of Austria, while the minor principalities, the moderate liberals,
and the members of the National Association showed clearly
their sympathy for Prussia.

While Germany and Europe were in a state of intense ex-
pectancy, Napoleon communicated with the Prussian ambas-
sador, Goltz, regarding what France was to receive for her
neutrality to counterbalance the gains that the other states
might make in case of war. The reply was entirely non-com-
mittal: and in the course of further negotiations, Bismarck,
refusing to answer "yes" or "no," talked rather of the diffi-
culty, than of the impossibility, of giving compensation, and
grew more and more reserved upon the subject. The discus-
sions between Napoleon and Goltz, as well as those between
Bismarck and Bendetti, came to nothing; and from this time,
Napoleon seems to have abandoned the idea of obtaining terri-
torial guarantees. Then he turned to Austria. Honestly de-
sirous of winning Venetia for Italy, convinced that it was the
part of wisdom for him to be on terms of close friendship with
Austria inasmuch as he was confident that she would win in
the coming struggle, and influenced by his minister, Drouyn
de Lhuys and the clerical party, who desired to prevent an
alliance between Prussia and Italy, he renewed negotiations
with the government at Vienna. As the result of his inter-
vention he was able to announce on May 5th that Austria had
consented to give Venetia to Italy in return for her neutrality.
This unexpected proposal stunned, for the moment, the Italian
government, whose suspicions of Prussia had been aroused only
a few days before by Bismarck's statement that there was noth-
ing in the treaty binding Prussia to take up arms for Italy.
But when Bismarck obtained from King William the promise
that Prussia would declare war on Austria if Italy were
attacked, La Marmora rejected the Emperor's offer, not merely,
it must be said, because of King William's promise, or because
Italy was bound by treaty with Prussia, but also because he
knew that an indignant people, loyal to Prussia and hating
Austria, would resent in the highest degree such a disgraceful
piece of treachery, and drive him from his place in the state.
Bismarck had won his reward for having obtained for Victor
Emmanuel the recognition of the states of the Zollverein the
December before.

Unable to settle the Venetian question in this way, Napoleon,
resorting to his old plan of calling a European congress, pro-
posed to England and Russia that they should send representa-
tives to Paris to discuss the best manner of settling all disputes
peaceably. At first, the Powers addressed would consent to
act only on the basis of the status quo; but in the end they
formulated their program more definitely, and on May 24th in-
vited Austria, Prussia, Italy, and the Germanic Confederation
to join in a congress with a view to the preservation of the peace
of Europe, proposing for discussion the cession of Venetia to
Italy, the disposal of the duchies, and the reform of the Con-
federation. Prussia at once accepted the invitation, and a few
days later Italy and the Confederation did the same. But on
May 28th Austria made it known that she would accept the
invitation on two conditions only: she demanded that the Pope be invited, thus introducing a subject of fatal significance for Italy, that of the temporal power of the Pope; and that no question of cession of territory should be presented. These conditions rendered futile the summoning of the congress, and on June 24th the project was formally abandoned. Again the Austrian government had yielded to the influence of the war and clerical parties in Vienna, and exasperated by the coolness and implacability of its enemy, had allowed to pass this last opportunity of preserving peace. "Long live the king," Bismarck is reported to have cried on hearing this news: "it is war."

In this emergency Napoleon, who had been not a little annoyed by the failure of all his negotiations with Prussia, accepted again the plan of the Austrian party in Paris and made a final effort to save Venetia for Italy and to gain concessions from Austria in return for the neutrality of France. A convention was arranged, June 9th and 12th, whereby the Emperor Francis Joseph agreed in case of Austria's success in the war to give up Venetia, to recognise the kingdom of Italy, provided no attempt were made to annex Rome, and to make no change, without the consent of France, in the organisation of Germany of such a kind as to bring it under a single administrative head. This treaty was negotiated in such a secret and mysterious manner that its details are still obscure. The statement, made at the time, that Austria promised Napoleon the left bank of the Rhine in exchange for three hundred thousand men, is certainly not true; nor can we rely on the conclusion, based on remarks made in 1869 and on a paragraph in Persigny's not very reliable memoirs, to the effect that Austria promised Rhenish territory if Napoleon would abstain from the war. Napoleon himself had given up all hope of gaining territorial compensation by any system of negotiation, and had fallen back on his plan of interfering at the proper moment and so dictat-
ing the terms of peace. For this reason he rejected altogether the proposal that Prince Napoleon made to Bismarck a few days later to form an offensive and defensive alliance with Prussia in return for either Luxemburg, the French boundary of 1814, French Switzerland, or Piedmont. This proposal has become famous beyond its deserts largely because it was made public by Bismarck at the outbreak of the war of 1870 for the purpose of turning the sympathies of Europe from France. Though Napoleon was often capricious and inconsistent and yielded too readily to his advisers it does not appear that he intentionally behaved in a deceitful or disloyal manner: his was a position that made straightforward dealing impossible. Personally he would have preferred peace, and a congress in which a fair distribution of territory might have been agreed upon; he would have given Venetia to Italy, Silesia to Austria, Schleswig-Holstein to Prussia, and have received as his share the left bank of the Rhine. But the congress was never called, and now war confronted him: one set of advisers urged a triple alliance of Austria, France, and Italy against Prussia; another one of Prussia, France, and Italy against Austria. That he would gladly have agreed definitely with either Austria or Prussia regarding compensation for France is evident; but equally evident is it that he was unwilling to exact, by threatening to throw an army on the Rhenish frontier, those guarantees from Prussia, which, had they been given, would have altered the course of European history. This decision, though fatal to France, was creditable to Napoleon; for although the financial and military condition of the country made actual war impossible, there can be little doubt that a threat to interfere would have altered the situation materially. The real cause of the disaster of 1870 was not Napoleon's failure to enter into an alliance with Austria, or to gain positive guarantees from Prussia in 1866; it is the fact, that he had already so exhausted the vitality of the Empire that a warlike policy was
impossible at the very time when his own waning prestige made brilliant deeds necessary. The fault lay partly in the Emperor's lack of ability as a ruler and a diplomat, but still more in the unnatural and adventurous character of his entire régime.

After May 28th, when Austria by her conditional acceptance had rendered useless the calling of a congress, war was inevitable between the two German Powers. On June 1st Austria carried out her threat of referring the question of the duchies to the Diet, and at the same time instructed General Gabelnitz in Holstein to call the estates on the 11th. Thereupon, Manteuffel in Schleswig, having declared the agreement of Gastein broken, prepared to invade Holstein as common administrator, and conceded to Gabelnitz the right of occupying Schleswig in the same capacity. But the latter, knowing that a Prussian invasion of Holstein meant war, withdrew to Altona, and soon crossed the border into Hanover. Then followed several important and exciting events. On June 9th, Bismarck confirmed Manteuffel's occupation of Holstein; and on the next day sent a circular letter to all the German courts to prepare them for the overthrow of the old Confederation, and the erection of a new one that should provide for the exclusion of Austria and for a national parliament elected by the people on a basis of universal suffrage. The Austrian government, deeming the occupation of Holstein a violation of the treaty of Gastein and an infringement upon federal law, proposed in the Diet on June 11th a new motion which, if passed, would bind the Diet to decree the mobilisation of the Confederate army in order to punish Prussia for her arbitrary conduct. This act was equivalent to a declaration of war, and on the next day diplomatic relations between the two Powers were broken off. Prussia waited impatiently for the vote of the Diet that should seal the destruction of the old federal system, before testing the strength of her army and taking revenge for the humiliation she had suffered at Austria's hands at Olmütz.
Three days were to elapse before the decision could be reached, and Bismarck used the opportunity to announce to the various German governments that Prussia would consider every vote in favour of Austria's motion as equivalent to a declaration of war. On June 14th the vote was taken: Bavaria, Saxony, Hanover, Württemberg, Hesse Cassel, and Hesse Darmstadt, voted with Austria; Luxemburg, the Mecklenburg curia, the Oldenburg curia, the Saxe Weimar curia, except Meiningen, and the free cities, except Frankfort, voted with Prussia. As Baden, though favouring Prussia, withheld her vote, the decision devolved upon the thirteenth and sixteenth curiae: in the first of these, which was composed of Brunswick and Nassau, the vote was divided, Brunswick agreeing with Prussia, Nassau with Austria; in the second, which was composed of six minor principalities, the vote stood three to three. In each case, however, the vote was counted for Austria, and the motion was declared carried by a vote of nine to six. Immediately, the Prussian representative declared the Confederation dissolved in the name of the king of Prussia, presented the outline of the new national system, and stating that his official duties were at an end, withdrew from the Diet; and on the same day the Prussian government informed the courts of Hanover, Hesse Cassel, and Saxony, that in case they did not at once lay down their arms and accept Prussia's plan for a new Confederation, the Prussian troops would advance against them. Each government refused to obey. On the 16th a circular note proclaiming the unity of Germany was sent to all the minor states of North Germany, requesting them to withdraw from the Confederation and join Prussia in establishing a new government that should represent the national and progressive spirit of Germany. On the same day the Prussian troops crossed the boundaries of the hostile states.

Thus was begun a war which was not merely a duel between two great Powers, but a bruderkrieg, a civil war in which nearly
all the members of the old Confederation were ranged on opposite sides. This terrifying prospect of a great internecine conflict naturally carried the thoughts of many Germans back to that time, two hundred and fifty years before, when a similar struggle, lasting for thirty years, had decimated the people of Germany, devastated the country, and given to France her grand opportunity for wresting from the house of Habsburg the leadership of Europe. But little realisation were these thoughts to find in the events that followed. The struggle, instead of lasting thirty years, was over in seven weeks; instead of bringing ruin to Germany, it brought her no injury other than that due to the momentary cessation of business and disarrangement of the economic machinery; instead of redounding to the glory of France, it prepared the way for her greatest humiliation. The Thirty Years' War had forced the old imperial Germany to withdraw from the position of supremacy in Europe, which as the heir to the realm of the Caesars, she had held for eight hundred years; the seven weeks' war prepared the way for a new imperial Germany, which under a new dynasty, newly organised on the basis of nationality, was to become the leader among the Powers of Europe.

Prussia's first attack was made on those hostile North German neighbours who had refused her command to disarm, and between June 16th and June 26th Hesse Cassel, Hanover, and Saxony were occupied by the Prussian troops, after but little resistance on the part of their inhabitants. For the attack on Austria three armies were in readiness: one in Lusatia under Prince Frederic Charles; a second in Silesia under the crown prince; and the third near Torgau under General von Bittenfeld. King William was commander-in-chief and General von Moltke chief-of-staff. Opposed to Prussia was the Austrian army of the North under General Benedek in Bohemia. On June 22d began the march southward, which carried the Prussian flag into the very heart of Bohemia. After a series of
minor victories for Prussia and her defeat at Trautenau, she fought the decisive battle on July 3d near Königgrätz and Sadowa, and such was her victory that Austria, in her crippled financial condition, could not recover from the blow. "Your Majesty has won, not only the battle, but the entire campaign," said Moltke to the king; and Bismarck is reported to have added, "Then the question at stake is decided; now we must endeavour to establish the old friendship with Austria," a remark indicative of his desire to defeat Austria, not to injure her.

But the victory at Königgrätz did not end the war: the Confederate army and the South German states had still to be reckoned with. But the reckoning was not to be a long one. Nothing could have shown better the utter inefficiency of the Confederate military system than the wretched mismanagement of this campaign. The leading generals, Prince Charles of Bavaria and Prince Alexander of Hesse, could not agree; there was no general-in-chief; and the Confederate military committee that acted in this capacity prevented, by its arbitrary interference, the carrying out of any definite plan of campaign. Bavaria was beaten at Kissingen, July 10th, at Aschaffenburg, July 14th, and Frankfort, the meeting-place of the Diet, fell into the hands of Prussia two days later. This war, the first and last that the Diet had to wage, was brought to an inglorious end by the signing of the preliminaries of Nikolsburg. But Italy was far less successful in the south than Prussia; for La Marmora, refusing to act on Prussia's advice that he cross over to Dalmatia and strike a blow at the heart of Austria, showed his inability as a commander by crossing the Mincio to Custoza, where on June 25th he suffered a defeat that cost him his command and his reputation. His overthrow, together with the defeat of Admiral Persano at Lissa in the Adriatic on July 20th, gratified Austria, but increased the wrath of the Italians, and made them less willing to consider proposals of peace.
Stunning and bewildering as was the news of Austria's unexpected defeat upon Europe in general, and upon the Viennese, the Pope, and the ultramontanes in particular, it nowhere aroused greater wrath and perplexity than at Paris. For Napoleon the situation was full of peril; for no sooner were the losses of Austria at Königgrätz seen to be irretrievable, than Francis Joseph made known at Paris his willingness to cede Venetia to Italy, and his desire that Napoleon should interfere as mediator. Thus the Emperor, who had anticipated either an Austrian victory, or a protracted campaign that would enable him to interfere and dictate the terms of peace, was suddenly confronted with the task of mediating with Prussia in behalf of a defeated Austria. What would he do? Immediately he caused to be published in the Moniteur of July 4th a note in which he accepted the position of mediator; and then, listening to the persuasions of the party of action, as those led by Drouyn de Lhuys, Gramont, and the Empress Eugénie may be called, thought for the moment of holding to his former plan of imposing his own terms upon the victor. But when Bismarck announced that although he was willing to accept the Emperor as mediator, he would never consent, except after defeat in battle, to permit him to dictate the conditions of peace, Napoleon broke with the Austrian party, and withdrawing from the aggressive position to which that party would have committed him, returned to the policy of peace with Prussia. The negotiations that followed took the form of a compromise between Bismarck and Napoleon. Before an armistice could be arranged, the terms were drafted by Bismarck and transmitted to Paris, where Napoleon, as mediator, accepted them. Austria was at first inclined to object to them; but to what end? She could not but see that in resisting she should only be courting further defeat and, perhaps, a heavier punishment, for Prussia, stopped half way in her victorious career, was far from exhausted, while she herself could command no money and
scarcely any credit, and could get no aid either from Hungary or from her own home provinces. Therefore, on July 20th, she accepted without reserve the terms agreed upon, and the armistice was at once proclaimed.

Negotiations for peace were begun at Nikolsburg on July 22d. Napoleon, knowing from Bismarck’s preliminary draft that the unity of all Germany under Prussia’s leadership was not to be effected by the victor of Königgrätz, but that the South German states were to remain outside the new confederation, showed himself indifferent to all minor matters, made no objection to Bismarck’s plan for annexing Schleswig-Holstein, Hanover, Hesse Cassel, Nassau, and Frankfort to Prussia, and said nothing about compensation to France. Bismarck, in his turn, was willing to compromise. He was extremely desirous of completing the negotiations quickly, because he had heard that Russia was about to propose a general congress, and also because he feared that the leaders at Paris, who were not at all satisfied with the Emperor’s indifference to the interests of France, might at any time cause Napoleon to change his mind. He accordingly agreed not to annex Saxony on condition that she enter the North German Confederation; and thus simplified, the work advanced rapidly.

The preliminaries were signed at Nikolsburg on July 26th and on August 23d were embodied in a treaty at Prague. This treaty provided for the dissolution of the old Confederation, and for the erection of a new organisation in Germany of which the Emperor of Austria should not be a member; it declared that Austria should remain intact with the exception of Venetia, which should be ceded to Italy, and that Schleswig-Holstein should be transferred to Prussia, with the exception of the northernmost district of Schleswig, which should be united to Denmark, if the inhabitants should so desire. The latter provision, which was introduced at the special request of Napoleon, was never carried out; for Prussia did not ask the con-
sent of the people of any of the provinces annexed to her, as had Italy and France; and when the following October she took possession of Hanover, Nassau, Hesse Cassel, and Frankfurt, she did so by virtue of the vote of the Prussian Parliament and not by virtue of any plébiscite held in the provinces themselves. Inasmuch as Austria persistently refused to give Venetia directly to Italy, claiming that it was already in possession of Napoleon, and as Italy with equal persistence refused to receive the province from the Emperor of the French, the treaty was so worded as to become, in this particular instance, a masterpiece of ambiguity.

For Austria, the treaty of Prague marked the close of a great career, and inaugurated a new era in the life of the state which had played a pre-eminently important part in the past history of Europe. It brought to an end the dominance of the house of Habsburg in Germany, and destroyed the methods of government based upon the principle of legitimacy of princes and the inviolable rights of sovereign states of which that house had been so long a representative. For Prussia, however, it marked the beginning of a larger work, which because of its greatness demanded a longer time and a second victory for its completion. It was no part of the plan of Bismarck to stop when Prussia's destiny was but half fulfilled, to establish a national government for but half of the German people, to leave the South German states outside of the Confederation, although he knew that in continuing the task he was bound to raise an issue with France, which only a trial of arms could settle. In driving Austria from Germany, and in destroying the political system that had been established in 1815, Bismarck had threatened, even more than had Cavour, the political equilibrium of Europe; and should he succeed in erecting upon the soil of Germany a state, which because of its unity and military strength, would take the leadership among the Powers, he would disturb the balance of the whole European system. This Napoleon III.
knew, and, like his great predecessor, saw in the establishment of a powerful state on the other side of the Rhine a menace to the supremacy of France. The treaty of Prague was but a truce in the greater struggle that was bound to come not for the leadership in Germany but for the leadership in Europe.

The war of 1866, in effecting a great change in the political organisation of central Europe and increasing enormously Prussia’s territory, population, and prestige, called forth two acts of interference, one from Russia, who demanded a congress, the other from France, who demanded compensation, for both of which Bismarck had prepared himself by hastening the signing of the preliminaries of Nikolsburg. Russia’s request, which was officially presented the very day after that on which the preliminaries had been signed, was rejected by King William; and Russia was induced to remain neutral by the promise that Prussia would assist her in recovering her control in the Black Sea. But France was more difficult to manage, for Prussia’s victory at Königgrätz had created a public feeling that Napoleon could not resist. Although the Emperor himself had no wish to withdraw from the position he had taken at Nikolsburg, he was seemingly powerless before the persuasions of Drouyn de Lhuys, the pleadings of the empress, and the oratory of Thiers, and in a moment of suffering and weariness, consented that Bendetti should be instructed to ask for the cession of the Rhenish Palatinate and Rhenish Hesse, including the city of Maintz. This demand was made on August 5th, but King William positively rejected it; and a few days afterward the Emperor, in a better state of health and mind, declared that the request had been the result of a misunderstanding, and on August 11th removed Drouyn de Lhuys from the ministry.

But the negotiations were not at an end. With the retirement of Drouyn de Lhuys, the men friendly to Prussia came into control of affairs; and Rouher and Prince Napoleon urged the Emperor to consider a plan, which was none other than
that suggested by them the June before, namely, that of a Franco-Prussian treaty. On August 20th the proposal was made to Bismarck, that in return for an alliance with France, Prussia should cede Landau and Saarlouis, permit France to annex Luxemburg, and promise to aid her in acquiring Belgium. To the first two conditions Prussia again answered in the negative, declaring that before an inch of German territory should be ceded, she would resort to arms. But regarding Belgium, Bismarck hesitated, and even allowed Bendetti to draft the articles of the treaty which, in justice it must be said, Bendetti vigorously maintains was written by himself at Bismarck's dictation. As to Bismarck's connection with this treaty, there is yet much to be learned; for though it has not been proved that he definitely encouraged France to believe that she should have Prussia's aid in acquiring Belgium, yet there is no doubt that here, as at Biarritz, he did nothing to destroy the hopes of France as to what Prussia might do. Wishing to keep matters in abeyance until the preliminaries of Nikolsburg should be embodied in a definite treaty, Bismarck temporised, and after August 23d, when the treaty of Prague was signed, quietly dropped the question of a Franco-Prussian treaty, and forgot to give Bendetti an answer. In the famous Lavelette circular, which was issued September 16th, Napoleon, expressing his personal opinion, showed that he cared little about the issue, and could remain on good terms with Prussia without territorial gains.

Once more the sky was clear, and Bismarck was able to turn his attention to the completion of his task at home, to the arranging of terms of peace with the South German states, and the erection of a new confederation. That he might do nothing to prevent the union of all the German states in a common confederation in the future, he demanded from the defeated governments only trifling cessions of territory and the payment of reasonable war indemnities. The treaty with Würtemberg was
signed on August 13th, and that with Baden on the 17th. Each of these states renewed its connection with the Zollverein, and made important agreements regarding railway communications; and at the same time signed with Prussia secret treaties of alliance, in accordance with which each state placed its army at the disposal of the king of Prussia and accepted the Prussian military system. Because of King William's desire to annex certain portions of the territory of Bavaria and Hesse Darmstadt, the negotiations with those states were complicated and long drawn out; but when Bismarck succeeded in modifying the king's demands, and informed the representatives of Bavaria and Hesse Darmstadt that their protector Napoleon, upon whom they were depending for help in maintaining their integrity, had already asked for the Rhenish Palatinate and Rhenish Hesse, all opposition ceased, and these states allied themselves to Prussia on the same terms as had Baden and Württemberg. On October 21st peace was made with Saxony and she entered the North German Confederation as an independent state. And in Prussia Bismarck's success was even more worthy of remark. The Parliament, which had formerly been hostile, came loyally to the support of the king and the minister, whose purposes it had so little understood; and with few dissenting voices passed a bill of indemnity, making legal the irregular financial policy of the administration.

Bismarck had now reached the end of one great period in his career. He had driven Austria from Germany, had warded off the danger of European intervention in the affairs of Germany, had silenced, for the moment at least, the demands of the French for compensation, had entered into alliances with the states of South Germany, and had gained the support, not only of the liberals of Prussia, but of those of Germany as well. Thus the ground was prepared for the new federal structure, the general plan of which had been submitted in Bismarck's note of June 10th. This outline, which may well be considered
the first draft of the constitution of the North German Confederation, arranged to include all states, except Luxemburg and those owing allegiance to the Emperor of Austria, together with the non-German provinces of Prussia in a confederation, which should have a confederate diet, a parliament chosen by universal suffrage and by secret ballot, and carefully defined functions relating to the army and navy, to diplomacy, and to matters of trade, tariff, and commerce. At first sixteen states, afterward twenty-two, entered into treaty relations with Prussia to last for one year; and at the expiration of this time, each state was to send plenipotentiaries to Berlin to model, after the plan described above, a constitution, in its turn to be submitted to a parliament made up of representatives of the people.

This plan was systematically carried out. The plenipotentiaries met, December, 1866; and in February, 1867, the final draft was submitted to a popular body which convened at Berlin, and which was made up of representatives of the people of the twenty-two states, elected according to the law of the National Assembly of April 12, 1849. By this body, the draft of the constitution was somewhat amended and returned to the council of plenipotentiaries, who accepted it on the day on which it was presented. This constitution when ratified and promulgated by the governments of the various states became law, and on July 1, 1867, the North German Confederation was legally founded. This new state with an old name included all the lands north of the Main that had been in the old Confederation, with the single exception of Luxemburg, and in addition, the eastern possessions of Prussia, together with Schleswig, which with Hanover, Hesse Cassel, Nassau, Frankfort, and Holstein had been annexed to Prussia in October, 1866. The king of Prussia was the president of the Confederation, named the chancellor, and possessed supreme military and diplomatic functions as had the king in Frederic William's plan for a Federal Union; the princes were represented by their
envoys in the Federal Council, the organisation of which closely resembled that of the Plenum of the old Federal Diet, and cast forty-three votes, of which Prussia had seventeen; and the people were represented in the Reichstag, which in no way stood for the states, but which, like its forerunner, the National Assembly, of 1848, represented the entire nation. Yet notwithstanding its retention of traditions and forms of the past, the new organisation thus established had no legal connection with the old Confederation, and differed from it in one very important particular. The old states no longer existed as sovereign governments, for they had become subordinate to a higher federal power, which drew its authority from the nation as a whole. Thus particularism had been legally destroyed; for the North German Confederation was not a league, but a state; not a federation of states, but a federal state; not a re-organised Germanic Confederation, but a new and higher form of federal government, born of a political revolution and the creature of a national will. But as a national state, it was neither democratic nor parliamentary: Prussia had won her victory not only over the other governments, but over the democrats and parliamentarians as well. Bismarck, who was willing to concede universal suffrage and a constitution, was as determined as his king that monarchy should never be curtailed by the vesting of sovereignty in the people, or that authority should be weakened by making the chancellor or ministers dependent upon a shifting majority in the lower house of the legislature.

The constitution of the North German Confederation was so framed as to admit, without amendment, the states of South Germany into the larger federation, whenever they should desire to become part of it. But for the present this was not to be thought of. Any extension of the Confederation to include the states above the Main, could have been effected only in the face of the opposition of Austria, who already considered the treaties
of alliance between these states and Prussia as contrary to the
treaty of Prague, and in the face of the bitter hostility of the
people and the political leaders of France, who were vehemently
opposed to the erection of any strong German state on the
other side of the Rhine. Furthermore, though the grand duke
and the popular assembly in Baden favoured Prussia's plan,
there was but slight evidence that the people of the South
German states wished to enter the larger organisation. Ap-
parently content with the advantages they derived from their
connection with the Zollverein and from the secret treaties
of alliance with Prussia, they seemed unwilling to assume
the burdens that a closer relationship with the north would
impose upon them, and during the three years from 1867 to
1870 held aloof, showing little inclination to make use of
even the privilege offered in the treaty of Prague of forming
a South German confederation. In 1867 Bismarck, hoping
that a closer relationship in matters of trade and industry
might familiarise the states of Germany with the thought of a
common government and a common administration, adopted
a new plan for the Zollverein, and entirely remodelled its
organisation. To take the place of treaties between the states,
he succeeded in establishing a tariff parliament, consisting of
members of the Reichstag of the North German Confeder-
ation and of deputies from the South German states chosen
by universal suffrage. On April 27, 1868, the first meeting of
this body was held and its very existence seemed to foreshadow
the larger union to come. But the particularistic forces were
still powerful in the south, and at this first meeting a strong
anti-Prussian delegation appeared which prevented the congress
from passing any vote in favour of union. In the meetings held
in 1869 and 1870, the question of politics was left untouched,
and the debate was restricted to technical questions of taxes and
tariffs. The tendencies in South Germany were not encouraging.
Bavaria was in the hands of Roman Catholics, calling them-
selves "patriots," who opposed Prussia from political, as well as religious motives; Württemberg was controlled by democrats, who wished to introduce the Swiss military system, and reduce the military expenses; while it seemed as if the national liberal party in Baden, which favoured union, was losing strength each year. In truth, Prussia's policy had not roused confidence among the South German people, who hated her harsh methods and were averse to her military system; and it was evident that unity, sought through the ordinary course of development, would be long delayed. A series of events second in importance only to those of 1866 was to take place before the German nation should become a unit.

It will be remembered that all negotiations between Prussia and France had come to an end in the summer of 1866, when Bismarck positively refused the demand for Rhenish territory, and allowed the draft of the treaty, which Bendetti had drawn up, to remain unsigned. These rebuffs, following the victory of Königgrätz, had roused public opinion in France as voiced by the Parisian press and the parliamentary leaders, and had given rise to the fear, well grounded indeed, that Prussia was becoming too prominent in the affairs of Europe for the dignity of France. Napoleon, though himself desirous of peace, and fully aware of the impossibility of obtaining a single inch of German territory, was becoming convinced that he could win the favour of the French nation only by adopting the aggrandizing policy of the Bourbons and extending the French frontier. Therefore in 1867, when the grand duchy of Luxemburg, which had separated from Germany at the time of the dissolution of the old Confederation, came, so to speak, into the market, Napoleon offered to buy it of the king of Holland, who was its hereditary sovereign. Secret negotiations were begun in March, and through the influence of the queen of Holland, who was violently anti-Prussian in feeling, the matter was successfully arranged. But Luxemburg, as a triangle of territory
bounded by France, Belgium, and Prussia, was of far too much importance from a military standpoint to be allowed to go in this way as compensation to France; and when the news of the transaction got abroad, a great outcry arose among the German people, and Bismarck was interpellated in the parliament that was discussing the constitution of the North German Confederation at Berlin, regarding this sale of a former Confederate state. His answer was conciliatory, though, as a warning to France, he took this occasion to make public the treaties of alliance with the South German states.

Notwithstanding the fact that Bismarck himself was willing to consider a compromise, a conflict seemed imminent; for the people, thoroughly irritated, were loudly expressing their hostility to the "hereditary enemy," and the military staff, which had been busy remediing the defects in the army organisation that the campaign of 1866 had disclosed, was talking of war. Napoleon, though desirous of settling the matter peacefully, feared an outburst of fury in Paris if the occasion were allowed to slip, and was even consulting with his generals regarding the military forces of France. He soon became convinced, however, in conversation with General Lebrun, that France could mobilise scarcely more than 200,000 men, and was wanting in marshals and generals competent to take the command of the army. Therefore, when King William, of Holland, in alarm withdrew his consent to the purchase of Luxemburg, Napoleon accepted Russia's proposal to refer the matter to the Powers, inasmuch as the position of the grand duchy rested upon the general treaties of 1815 and 1839. At London, on May 11, 1867, a peaceful settlement was made: Napoleon resigned all his claims to Luxemburg; Prussia consented to withdraw from the old federal fortress of Luxemburg the garrison which the French deemed a constant menace to them at one of the most vulnerable points of their frontier; and that no further disputes regarding this territory might arise in the future, the Powers
guaranteed the neutrality of the grand duchy. But the controversy and the fact that Prussia issued from this diplomatic contest clearly the victor, only made more intense the feeling of hostility in Paris for Germany.

Prussia now went directly forward in the course she had been pursuing for seven years. Under the management of Roon, she continued to improve the military system of the north and made the army of the Confederation an instrument of the highest precision. For notwithstanding the splendid tactics of the Prussian infantry, and the superiority of its needle guns and its breech-loading cannon, which had won the campaign of 1866, the authorities were of the opinion that the army was not entirely ready for the task that lay before it. The year 1867, therefore, was devoted to dividing the territory and re-organising the system of recruiting in such a way as to insure a more rapid mobilisation of the troops. The army corps were increased from nine to twelve; the military arrangements of the South German states were brought to perfection; and that the Prussian staff might have a more accurate knowledge of the French frontier, the chief-of-staff himself in 1868 examined on foot every mile of territory from Luxemburg to the Rhenish Palatinate. So definite was the information possessed by the Germans, not only of the topography of the country, but also of the condition of the French army and of the number of men France could place on the frontier in case of war, that in 1868 Moltke was able to outline accurately a complete campaign against France. When one bears in mind these facts, and remembers that Bismarck could count with certainty on the neutrality of Russia, and with reason on the friendship of Italy and the helplessness of Austria, one understands why Bismarck, Moltke, and Roon prophesied success for Prussia in case of war with France. The definiteness of purpose and the ability of these Prussian leaders contrast strangely with the vacillation and inefficiency of those who were ruling France during these same eventful years.
The condition in France had not come about from ignorance. As early as 1868, Bendetti had reported to the French court that the cabinet at Berlin was preparing at the same time for the unity of all Germany and for war with France; and stated it as his opinion that the German people would regard the war as an act of aggression by France against the Fatherland, and would take the side of Prussia against her whom they considered an hereditary enemy. During the same year General Ducrot had kept the military authorities at Paris fully informed of Prussia's preparations; and after the settlement of the dispute regarding Luxemburg, General Lebrun had made a careful examination of the Prussian military system, and pointed out its superiority, both in tactics and equipment, to that of France. Furthermore, in 1867, General Trochu in L'Armée française en 1867, a work published anonymously, had pointed out the defects of the army organisation and had endeavoured to determine the best remedies therefor. Since 1866 Napoleon had been fully aware of the need of far-reaching reforms in the French army, and for two years a commission had been busy drafting a military law. But the work of this body amounted to little, largely because the recommendations of its military members were opposed by the ministerial members, who were influenced less by the needs of the occasion, than by the fact that they should be obliged to defend their recommendations before the Corps législatif. The half-way measure, known as the military law of 1868, was passed; but it was not carried out, because the Chamber refused to grant the appropriation asked for by General Lebœuf, who after the untimely death of Marshal Niel became commander-in-chief of the army. For the same reason the motion to equip the army with repeating rifles failed to pass, as did also that to increase the number of batteries, and to introduce a cannon as precise and portable as that used by the Prussians.

All these changes and improvements were ardently desired
by Napoleon, who in 1868 drew up a plan for a thorough reorganisation of the army; but of this plan little or no account was taken. Where lay the blame? Certainly not with the Emperor, who was fully aware of the importance of reorganising the army; not with Marshal Niel, who was in full sympathy with the Emperor, as his praiseworthy efforts in the year 1868 to hasten the manufacture of chassepots, to strengthen the artillery, and to organise the garde mobile bear witness; not even with General Leboeuf, who cannot be censured for failing to make bricks without straw. The blame must fall, partly, no doubt, upon the departmental bureaux, whose devotion to routine was often destructive of progressive reform; partly on the Corps législatif, which absolutely refused to vote the necessary credit; and partly upon those party leaders and military braggarts who refused to heed the warnings of those better informed than themselves, overestimated the strength and efficiency of the French army, and in a frenzy of false patriotism cried out, somewhat as did Marshal Randon in 1866: "What! will not a nation like France, which is able to gather under its flag 600,000 men in a few weeks, has 8,000 field guns in its arsenal, possesses 1,800,000 rifles and powder to last ten years, be always ready to maintain by force of arms its honour and right?" But when all else is said the conclusion remains, that the greatest blame must fall upon the Napoleonic régime, which had destroyed all spirit and enthusiasm in the departments of administration, had roused the suspicions, as well as the hostility, of that growing party in the Corps législatif which opposed on principle any project supported by the Emperor, had destroyed the confidence of many of its own followers by an inconsistent foreign policy that had brought only ill to France, and, lastly, had so increased the national debt by its heavy expenses for internal improvements and fruitless foreign expeditions, that the representatives of the people were more concerned to guard the nation's treasury than to take steps to
maintain the nation’s honour. Thiers struck at the root of the
matter when in 1870, in reply to the constitutionalists, he said:
"I beg of you do not speak of our institutions, which, in my
conviction at least, are the principal cause, more than the men
themselves, of the evils that have come upon France."

The Emperor himself was unable to decide whether to adopt
a policy of peace or a policy of war, whether to seek alliance
with other Powers with a view to aggressive action, or to advo-
cate a plan of disarmament, which at one time strongly attracted
him: his mood changed as one influence or another affected him.
Returning to France in August, 1867, after an interview with
the Emperor of Austria at Salzburg, he excited grave appre-
hension by referring, in a speech delivered at Lille, to certain
"black clouds" upon the horizon. But as during the year
1868 both the Emperor and the king of Prussia frequently ex-
pressed their determination to preserve the peace, all fears were
calmed, capitalists were reassured, and credit rose. When,
however, in 1869, France learned that Prussia at last positively
refused to allow her to annex Belgium, and that Napoleon,
whose idea was to form a Franco-Belgian Zollverein, had been
prevented, by Bismarck, as the French government believed,
from gaining possession of certain Belgian railways, the desire
for war grew so strong in Paris that Napoleon communicated
with Austria regarding the possibility of a triple alliance of
France, Austria, and Italy.

In March, 1870, Archduke Albert, the victor of Custozza,
came to France, ostensibly to study the French army, arsenals,
and harbours, but actually to consider the project of an alliance;
and so satisfactory was this visit that in May General Lebrun
was sent to Vienna to plan a campaign with the archduke.
The draft of this plan, which has been recently published, con-
tains the proposal that the war be undertaken in the spring of
1871 with the entire forces of the three Powers; that France,
who according to Lebœuf’s estimates was able to mobilise her
troops in fifteen days, take the initiative and cross at once the Palatinate frontier; that the other Powers who, as Archduke Albert frankly acknowledged, could not mobilise their troops in less than six weeks, preserve neutrality until the expiration of this period, when Austria, having concentrated her army in Bohemia, should move westward to unite with the French, perhaps at Nuremberg, in order to detach South Germany from Prussia, and the Italian army stationed at Verona should advance by way of the Tyrol to attack Munich. The forces of the allies were estimated at 1,300,000 men, and the movement of the troops was worked out with considerable detail; but at the same time, Francis Joseph told General Lebrun plainly that Austria did not desire war, and in any case would not declare war at the same time with France, inasmuch as doing so might lead, in the new excitement regarding German nationality, to an uprising of the German population in Austria. "But," he added, "if the Emperor Napoleon, forced to accept or declare war, presents himself with his armies in the centre of Germany, not as an enemy, but as a liberator, then I shall be compelled to declare that I am going to make common cause with him."

The negotiations went no further, and there is no proof that any definite agreement was reached; but the fact of chief interest is that Napoleon should have considered such an alliance at all, inasmuch as only the January before he had openly advocated a reduction of armaments and peace with Prussia, and a month later, acquiesced in the proposal of the Gladstone government that England become an intermediary to induce the two Powers to disarm. There can be little doubt that this project of a war alliance with Austria originated with Gramont, the empress, and the other leaders of the war party, who so often before had endeavoured to draw the Emperor to the side of Austria, and had been responsible for the convention of June 12, 1866, and for Napoleon's decision to dictate the terms of peace after the battle of Königgrätz. But in the end the peace
party triumphed, the negotiations with Austria were given up, and all immediate difficulties seemed to have disappeared, when a new diplomatic incident again threw the European world into a state of excitement.

In 1868 a revolution broke out in Spain: the queen, Isabella II., was driven from the throne; a provisional government was established; and the Cortes of that year, in spite of the opposition of a strong republican element, voted for a monarchy with a liberal constitution. Then came the search for a king. Several candidates were proposed, among them the Duke of Montpensier, who had been one of the chief actors in the "Spanish Marriages" in 1846; but Napoleon would not suffer an Orléanist to mount the throne of Spain. Finally in February, 1869, Salazar, a Spanish unionist deputy, proposed Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, a brother of Prince Charles, who had been elected only three years before prince of Roumania. But when this proposal was first made in the spring of 1869, the father of the prince rejected it, as he also did a second time in November, even though Salazar came secretly to his chateau in Switzerland and offered the crown to each of the sons in turn. Discouraged by these failures, General Prim turned to Berlin for support, and sent Salazar with letters to King William and Bismarck. The king preferred to leave the decision to the prince himself, and when the prince refused, the matter seemed to have ended. But Bismarck, even at that time, desired the election of Prince Leopold "for dynastic and political reasons." It is clear from the letters of Prince Anthony to his son, the present king of Roumania, that Bismarck and his counsellors had already foreseen the importance of this candidature as furnishing, in case of need, a possible pretext for war, inasmuch as Napoleon had informed the Berlin government, as early as 1869, that he would look on the acceptance of the Spanish throne by a Hohenzollern prince as an act directed against France. And such a view of the matter was not with-
out reason; for though the prince was closely connected with
the house of Napoleon, yet inasmuch as Prince Anthony, the
father, had been the head of the Prussian cabinet in 1859, the
interests of the family were closely identified with those of
Prussia.

With the beginning of the summer of 1870, Bismarck seems
to have found excellent reasons why another experiment with
the candidature should be made. That he knew of the negotia-
tions which General Lebrun was conducting at Vienna, is not
to be doubted; and it is quite likely, that either from Florence
or Pesth he had received information regarding the plan that
the two generals had drafted of waging war against Prussia in
1871. He knew, furthermore, that the king of Prussia could
control the military forces of the North German Confederation
until December, 1870, only, for after this time its numbers and
expenses were to be controlled by federal legislation; he knew
that the army was ready, for when requested to disarm by the
Gladstone government, he had refused on the ground that the
Prussian system rendered disarmament impossible; and he also
knew that Prussia had nothing to fear from foreign Powers, for
Russia had recently renewed her promises of neutrality, Italy
was certainly friendly to Prussia, and Austria would be deterred
from openly co-operating with France by her fear of her German
population, Hungary, and Russia.

In view of these facts, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion
that Bismarck had much to do in reviving the question of
the election of Prince Leopold in June, 1870. On the 14th of the
month, the Spanish government for the fourth time offered the
throne to the prince, and on the 28th, Leopold, with the ap-
proval of the king of Prussia, gave his consent. Bismarck had
carried his first point. But even now war need not have fol-
lowed; for although Napoleon had twice declared that he
would not suffer a Hohenzollern to ascend the throne of Spain,
nevertheless, had the French government acted wisely and with
dignity, the whole Prussian scheme might have miscarried. A
 telegram of protest and inquiry was sent from Paris to Berlin
 on July 4th; but as the king was at Ems, Bismarck at his
 country-seat at Varzin in Pomerania, no information could be
 obtained, and on July 7th Bendetti was despatched to Ems to
 obtain from the king his consent that Prince Leopold renounce
 the Spanish throne. Between that time and the 12th the
 earlier interviews took place, with the result that Bendetti was
 able to telegraph to Paris that the king had consented "to give
 his entire and unreserved approbation to the desistence of the
 prince of Hohenzollern." The prudence of sending the ambas-
sador to Ems may be questioned, and the dogmatic tone of his
 instructions, which he wisely concealed, may be strongly con-
demned; still up to this time the French government had acted,
on the whole, with justice and reason. The answer of King
 William was entirely satisfactory to the Emperor, to Ollivier,
 and to the peace party; and had the matter stopped here, it
 is fair to suppose that peace might have been preserved.

But the control of the situation lay not with the Emperor,
 but with Gramont, Leboeuf, the empress, and the party
 leaders in Paris, who were doing all in their power, both
 in the Corps législatif and in the city, to bring on the war.
 Through their persistence the government at this juncture
 made an unfortunate blunder. To Baron Werther, Prussian
 envoy at Paris, Gramont suggested that King William be
 asked to send Napoleon a personal letter, "letter of apol-
 ogy," the Germans called it, in which he should state that "in
 authorising Leopold of Hohenzollern to accept the Spanish
 throne, he had desired to injure in no way the interest or to
 offend the dignity of the French nation; and that in urging
 the renunciation of the prince, he had desired to terminate hence-
 forth all misunderstandings between his government and that
 of the Emperor." About the same time, influenced by certain
 members of the Right in the Chamber, Gramont instructed
Bendetti to ask the king for guarantees for the future. Why this demand should have been made at this time is difficult to understand, for it had been refused once before, and of course would be refused again. The instructions to Bendetti, which were sent by telegraph, reached Ems before the communication from Werther, which was despatched by courier. Therefore, on the morning of the 13th Bendetti approached the king, and after a few moments’ conversation regarding the message which the king was expecting from Prince Anthony, announced that he was instructed to demand guarantees for the future. “You ask of me a promise for all time and for all cases,” the king answered; “I cannot give it”; and though Bendetti renewed his request, the king refused to consider it, adding, however, that he would summon the ambassador later to hear the contents of the telegram from Prince Anthony. Nor is there any doubt that the king intended to see Bendetti again; but Werther’s report containing the request for a personal letter which arrived meanwhile, appears to have irritated the king and exhausted his patience. Up to this time he had controlled the affair himself, had received Bendetti freely, and had treated the question of the candidature more or less as a personal matter; but he now took a different attitude. He sent his aide-de-camp to make his last communication to Bendetti, refused to receive him again, and despatched an account of the events of the 13th to Bismarck at Berlin with the permission that the chancellor might communicate it to the press, if he so desired. Thus the chances which had favoured peace as long as King William had managed the negotiations, now greatly favoured war, for the control of affairs was in the hands of Bismarck.

The telegram from Ems, a confidential despatch to the chancellor, was prepared for the press by Bismarck in the presence of Moltke and Roon; and though the actual facts were in no way falsified, they were abridged in such a way as to make possible a great many interpretations of the king’s treatment of
Bendetti. The condensed account sinned greatly in the matter of omissions, and it is not surprising that immediately the most exaggerated and contradictory reports should have spread through Europe. That Bismarck hoped to provoke war, there can be no doubt: Gramont by his insistence had thrown the game entirely into the chancellor's hands.

Bismarck's telegram to the press had the desired effect. A *furor teutonicus* seized upon the Germans, who deeming Bendetti's demand "outrageous arrogance," interpreted the press notice as an expression of the will of the nation. In France it was received as an insult. Making no allowance for the fact that this notice was not intended to be a diplomatic communication, and without waiting for any official announcement from Berlin, the war party in the French ministry and the Chamber placed upon it the worst possible interpretation, and demanded war. The decision in favour of peace, which had been approved by the cabinet even as late as the morning of the 14th of July, was reversed later in the same day, under circumstances that are still obscure, and may always remain so. On the day following, the Duke of Gramont announced to the *Corps législatif* the decision of the government, and such was the enthusiasm it created, that his request for a vote of credit for the mobilisation of the army was granted by the Chamber with but ten dissenting voices, and by the Senate, unanimously. Paris gave way to a furor for war, though it is claimed that some of the war manifestations were paid for. There is no doubt that from the 14th to the 19th of July a comparatively small band of men, composed of excited officials, swaggering army officers, members of the clerical party, deputies ready to accuse the Emperor and the whole peace party of cowardice, imperialists loyal to the empress and her son, and journalists who carried at their pen points a defence of the honour of France, were able to force France into war at a time when the country was wholly unprepared, both in allies and home forces, to carry on such a strug-
gle as this promised to be. In thus rushing headlong into war, France was guilty of a folly for which neither the Emperor, who up to the last moment counselled peace, nor the people in general, who, so far as the reports of the prefects go to show, were averse to the war, can be held accountable. Just as in 1830, 1848, and 1851 France had allowed herself to be controlled by a comparatively small body of men in Paris; so now she allowed her future to be shaped by the wrathful, revengeful and passionate members of the war and clerical parties, who committed an act which the more sober members of the cabinet condemned, and which it is doubtful whether the country, or even the legislative bodies, in calmer moments would have sanctioned by their votes. Jules Favre undoubtedly spoke the truth when, on September 17, 1870, he said: "There is not a sincere man in Europe who can affirm that had she been consulted, France would have made war upon Prussia." Yet on July 19th war was officially declared.

The war of 1870 was ostensibly between France and Prussia, two Powers equally matched; but in reality the two combatants were not equal in strength and position. France had not an ally in Europe. Russia, eager to regain control of the Black Sea and offended by the anti-Slavic policy adopted by Austria from 1866 to 1870, not only remained friendly to Prussia and threatened to arm when Austria did, but joining with England, who at once declared for neutrality, she persuaded Denmark to do the same. Even Austria and Italy, with whom negotiations were still pending, and upon whom Gramont had counted so confidently when he made his speeches to the Corps législatif, refused to co-operate: Austria, because of Hungary's determination to remain neutral, and because she feared her German population and Russia; Italy, because she believed that a French victory would prevent her from acquiring Rome. Prussia, on the other hand, could rely, not only on the neutrality of these Powers, but upon the support of the entire German nation.
No sooner had war been declared than Louis of Bavaria, faithful to the treaty of alliance, put his forces at the disposal of King William, and Würtemberg, Hesse, and Baden did the same. The new Germany was awakening, and in the cry and shock of war the dream of a common Fatherland was at last realised.

But greater even than the contrast which Europe saw between the unity and latent power of the new Germany and the discord and inefficiency everywhere discoverable in France, was that between the military organisations of the two states. In Prussia, existed a system of great armies, scientifically organised, perfect in equipment, unequalled in tactics, and recruited according to an entirely new principle of universal military service. In France, on the other hand, still existed the system of 1854 and 1859, that of small armies, badly equipped, unaccustomed to rapid marching, composed of men long in the service, and commanded by officers ignorant of topography and the science of war, of both of which subjects the Prussians were masters. Furthermore, the French system, at best inferior to that of the Prussians, had been made infinitely worse by the vices of the Empire, which had sapped the strength of the army as they had that of the state. In the final issue the conflict lay, not between France and Prussia, but between two military systems, one of the old, the other of the new régime.

The war that followed falls naturally into two parts: for during August and September, 1870, Napoleon was defending the frontier to check the advance of the invaders and to save his dynasty and the Empire; while from October, 1870, to January, 1871, France was attempting to drive the Germans from her soil and save her capital from capture. It had been the intention of the Emperor to take the offensive, to cross the Rhine somewhere on the Baden frontier, to separate South Germany from the north, and to unite with the forces which, to the last, he hoped to receive from Austria and from Italy. But
the attacking army, which moved slowly, lacked order, plan, and efficient leaders, and was numerically never greater than 250,000 men, was caught in the trap of its own preparation. By the defeat of MacMahon and the army of Alsace at Wörth, August 6th, and by the equally crushing defeat of Frossard and the army of the Rhine at Forbach on the same day, the whole course of the war was decided, and the fate of the Empire practically sealed. In consequence of this disastrous opening of the campaign, one army was completely demoralised, the other, which had been forced back to Metz, could not decide whether to fight or retreat; the Emperor, who was utterly incompetent to perform his responsible duties, was obliged to resign the command to Marshal Bazaine; and in Paris the Ollivier ministry was replaced by one under Palikao from the reactionary and warlike Right, and the radicals and revolutionists became more confident and aggressive.

All hope of aid from Austria or Italy was now out of the question; and the opinion, general in Europe, that the complete defeat of the imperial troops was only a matter of time, was confirmed by the events of the second and third weeks of the war. While attempting to retreat to Châlons the army of the Rhine, the only one capable of presenting an efficient front to the enemy, and containing the very flower of the imperial troops, lost heavily in the fearfully bloody battles of Borny, on August 14th, Mars la Tour, on August 16th, and Gravelotte, on August 18th, and was finally forced to take refuge in Metz. The end of the tragedy soon came. MacMahon and the Emperor, with an army hastily gathered together at Châlons, not daring for political reasons to turn to the defence of Paris, attempted by a northerly movement to extricate the army in Metz. But indecision again prevented the execution of the plan. This last imperial force was met by the German army of the Meuse, driven farther north, and having been surrounded at Sedan, was compelled to surrender as prisoner of war on
September 2, 1870. At the end of one short month the imperial structure had fallen, the Emperor was a prisoner, and France was left without an army.

The second great period of the war began when the Germans, leaving the army of Prince Frederic Charles before Metz, advanced rapidly toward Paris. In that city the revolutionists had repeated the scenes of 1848. The irreconcilable republicans, aided by the mob, which had broken into the chamber and dispersed the Corps législatif, had proclaimed the republic on September 4th at the Hôtel de Ville, and placed the defence of France in the hands of a provisional government. This body made every effort to provide for the protection of the city. Armies were formed from the regulars, from the garde mobile, and from all the peasantry between twenty-one and forty years of age gathered in a levée en masse. The government endeavoured to get aid from Europe, and made proposals to Bismarck, first for an armistice, and, afterward, for a peace; but all without success. Thereupon the campaign began in earnest with the siege of Paris, which, during four memorable months of cold and distress, the troops within the city and those in the provinces vainly endeavoured to raise. Though a million men were under arms, they were untrained and inexperienced, and proved no match for the tried German soldiers; from the beginning there was never a moment's doubt as to what the result would be. The siege began on September 19th, and by October 5th, when King William took up his headquarters at Versailles, the investment was complete. The Germans were strengthened by the fall of Toul, on September 23d, of Strassburg, on the 28th, and more than all else by the capitulation of Metz on October 27th, which added more than two hundred thousand men to the besieging army. On October 8th Gambetta, leaving Paris for Tours in a balloon, organised, with amazing rapidity, the military forces of the provinces, and, as some think, unnecessarily prolonged the contest and increased the sufferings in Paris.
From November to January the contest was fierce, but with scarcely a gleam of hope for France. The army in Paris failed in a series of attempts, lasting from November 30th to December 2d, to break through the German lines in order to co-operate with the army of the Loire; and after a battle, fought long and brilliantly between December 1st and 3d, the latter army was driven back, and at Le Mans, on December 16th, was thoroughly beaten. An ill-advised effort, made during the early weeks of January, to cut off the German communications with the rear by a movement on Belfort, was frustrated, and the troops were driven into Switzerland and disarmed. Finally, on January 24th, Paris, starved and in despair, and threatened with the Communists within as well as by the Germans without, gave up the struggle and surrendered. An armistice was concluded that a national assembly might be elected to ratify the terms of peace; and Bismarck and Thiers, having agreed upon the preliminaries at Versailles, signed the definitive peace at Frankfort, May 10, 1871. Its terms were simple: France gave up Alsace and Lorraine, retaining, however, the fortress and environs of Belfort, and agreed to pay five thousand millions of francs within three years, and support a German army of occupation until the final payment should be made.

The year 1871 marked the close of an important period of German history. The Prussian victory at Königgrätz, the treaties of alliance with the South German states, the adoption of a common military system in 1866, the common tariff parliament of 1868, and the military unity of 1870, were but parts of the larger movement that culminated in this year in the erection of the Empire. When, under the leadership of the crown prince of Prussia, the soldiers of Bavaria, Baden, and Württemberg marched side by side with those from Posen, Silesia, and Hesse, the truth dawned upon Germany, as upon Europe, that in the throes of conflict all distinctions and differences were vanishing, and that the common Fatherland for which all were
fighting was already become a reality. No sooner had the Sedan campaign been won, than the princes of the South German states, actuated in part no doubt by a fear of Prussia's might, but still more by a genuine enthusiasm for the common country, took that step which for four years they had strenuously refused to take. In September they entered into negotiations, which were continued during the early days of the siege of Paris, looking to their entrance into the North German Confederation; and on the 15th of November Baden and Hesse Darmstadt, on the 23d, Bavaria, and on the 25th, Württemberg, joined the northern body. Though considerable opposition was made by the national liberals in the Reichstag of the North German Confederation to concessions granted to Bavaria, such as the control of the army in time of peace and a separate postal administration, nevertheless, by December 10th, the treaties were duly ratified, and a German Confederation with King William as president came into existence. But this title was but a temporary one. Through the initiative of Louis of Bavaria, and with the consent of all the other princes, the proposal was made to change the name of the Confederation to that of Empire and to offer to the king of Prussia the title of Emperor. To this the Reichstag of the North German Confederation and the Landtags of the South German states agreed, and on the 30th of December the constitution of the new Empire was promulgated. On January 18, 1871, at Versailles, in the palace of the Bourbons and in the presence of one of the most august assemblies ever gathered, the coronation of the new Emperor took place; and on the battle-field, in the presence of the army and amid the thundering of cannon, the German Empire was born.

But the creation of a united Germany was only the greatest among the results of the war of 1870. That war is of preeminent importance, not only because it overthrew one empire and established another, and inaugurated a new military era by
compelling every important nation in Europe to recast its army; but chiefly because it brought to an end that political revolution which, in one form or another, had concerned the states of western and central Europe since the downfall of Napoleon I. It raised Prussia to the headship of the new Germany; it enabled the republicans of France to take up the work ignored by the imperial government and to establish once more the republic; it enabled Italy to invade the territory of the Pope and to complete her unity; and finally, by diverting the attention of the western Powers, it enabled Russia to set aside one of the most important of the terms of the treaty of Paris, and to recover her control in the Black Sea. When all this had been accomplished, scarcely a vestige remained of those conditions of the congress of Vienna which, for so many years, had been the anxious care of the European concert. An era in the historical development of Europe, during which the problems at issue had been to a preponderating degree political and constitutional, had come to an end; and, save for the Eastern Question, scarcely one of the difficulties that since 1815 had vexed the statesmen of the different countries remained to be surmounted. In the new era the very atmosphere was to change; peace was to reign; the interests of peoples and governments were to be social, industrial, and commercial, rather than political, and in consequence, movements making for progress were to lie more deeply hidden, and the tendencies of events were to be more difficult to discover. In thus closing one era and inaugurating another, the war of 1870 stands as the great dividing line between the Europe of yesterday and the Europe of to-day.
CHAPTER VII.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DUAL MONARCHY.

In turning our attention from the war of 1870 and its consequences to consider the movement that brought Austria into the ranks of the enlightened and liberal states of Europe, we pass back at one step from the era of to-day to that of the eighteenth century; for until 1848, Austria preserved intact her antiquated methods of government, and resisted successfully all the attempts that were made to alter her unprogressive political system.

As the bearer of an imperial title that was, in theory, not Austrian, but European, the house of Habsburg had played a more or less cosmopolitan part in the history of Europe, asserting its authority in lands outside its own borders, and often exhausting its energies in efforts to maintain its supremacy abroad. It had never identified its interests with those of any nationality, had never depended for strength upon the resources of any people or of any well-defined territory. And this is not surprising; for the people within the borders of the Austrian Empire, not only did not compose a single nation, but were possessed in common of neither race, historical antecedents, language, customs, nor religion. The hereditary lands of the archduke of Austria contained principally Germans, with Slovones, a Slavic people, in the lower provinces, and Italians in the cities of the southern border. The kingdom of Bohemia, including Moravia and Silesia, was occupied largely by Czechs, who were Slavs, and by Germans, who resided chiefly in the
cities and in the territory of the north-west. The kingdom of Galicia possessed a mixed population of Slavs of different groups, Poles in the west, Ruthenians in the east, and Romanians in the Bukovina. The kingdom of Hungary contained Germans in the west, Magyars in the centre, and Slovaks, or Slavs, in the north; in the east Germans, that is Saxons, and Magyars together with a large Roumanian peasant population; while in the south, Croats and Serbs, also Slavs, predominated. In some quarters existed a bewildering mixture of Slavs, Germans, and Magyars mingled and superimposed. These were not true nationalities; the only test in the least degree certain was language; and even those who spoke the same tongue did not always live in contiguous territories. Over such a group of races and peoples the house of Habsburg ruled, and so neglectful of all that concerned the local life of these people had it been, that in the various provinces local peculiarities and historical claims had become so pronounced as to admit of no common interest other than that in the common dynastic head.

Previous to 1848 the government of Austria, like that of the eighteenth-century monarchies, had been administered by an absolute Emperor, who, though caring little for government, was expected to concern himself with many of the most trivial details of administration; by a chief minister, who, though subject to immediate dismissal by the Emperor, was really the head of the Empire and the director of its policy; by sundry subordinate ministers and heads of departments, who with powers badly defined and often conflicting, very inefficiently performed their duties; and by a medley of boards and councils, which, given over to formalism and routine, acted with extraordinary slowness. The methods of the government were crude, unsystematic, and complicated, those in authority acting secretly and arbitrarily, neglecting the more important needs of the state in order to hasten their own advancement or to estab-
lish the absolute authority of the crown. Local government was in the hands of the nobles and the clergy. The former, preserving in full their feudal privileges, were exempt from military service, and they alone were permitted to hold large properties and important offices. They administered local justice, controlled the local assemblies and local police, and, in general, regulated the condition of the peasantry. And in this work of preventing all local interest in matters of administration, so well conducted by the officials of Vienna and the nobles in the provinces, the government itself had aided by its policy of repression and its total disregard of public opinion. It had suppressed all uprisings and discussion; had confiscated books, plays, pamphlets, and journals; had excluded from the country foreign works containing liberal sentiments; had scrutinised the words and acts of professors and students; had prohibited the organisation of societies and unions; and had opened suspected letters, demanded passports, and viewed every stranger with suspicion. At the same time it had made worship compulsory, and though tolerating all creeds, had admitted to public office no one of other than the Roman Catholic faith. This was the way in which Metternich had compelled obedience at home; and this was the form of government against which the revolution of 1848 had been undertaken.

But the administration in Austria was not a system, it was a condition; it was based on neither plan nor principle, but on tradition and habit. The dominant influence was essentially feudal, and humanity began, as Windischgrätz said, with the baron. Over feudalism, though not over the house of Habsburg, the revolution of 1848 had been successful. When the moderates in the Hungarian Diet succeeded in March, 1848, in embodying in their address to the Emperor requests for the equalisation of taxes and the abolition of feudal privileges and seignorial rights, they had won a victory over the aristocratic elements in Hungary. When the deputies to the Constituent
Assembly in Vienna, summoned after the uprising in May, 1848, voted to abolish the corvées, quit-rents, and seignorial justice, and to do away with all distinctions between noble and non-noble, they performed, as had the Constituent Assembly in France in 1789, the most important work of the revolution. And the feudal privileges thus abolished were not restored after the revolution was over. The government, established by Schwarzenberg in the years from 1849 to 1851, was wholly different from that of Metternich and the old régime. The army had won the victory over the revolution, and the new administration, recognising neither national peculiarities nor feudal rights, took on a military character—that is, became absolute and centralised. On one hand it ignored the historical claims of Hungary and Bohemia; on the other it refused to restore the privileges of the aristocracy, the old seignorial rights over the peasantry, and the old control of provincial justice and administration: feudal and popular claims were alike passed over, that the absolute authority of the Emperor might be restored.

The constitution of March 4, 1849, which inaugurated this new policy, was directed chiefly against Hungary; and by abolishing her constitution, her diet, and her county assemblies, and by placing her dependencies under the government at Vienna, it reduced her to the level of the other provinces. But that part of the constitution which provided for the representation of all the members of the Austrian state in a parliament at Vienna, and for extensive powers of self-government in the provinces themselves, was liberal enough in conception, though it proved to be too difficult of execution for a man of Schwarzenberg's indolent nature. After order had been restored, he found it simpler to ignore entirely the differences of nationality, and by abrogating the constitution, to place absolute authority in the hands of the Emperor. Therefore, by letters patent in 1851, the constitution of March 4th was withdrawn in the name
"of the unity of the Empire and of the monarchial principle"; the parliament was deprived of its functions, and became merely a council of the Empire; the ministers were made responsible to the Crown alone; and the various kingdoms and duchies were transformed into administrative or military divisions, and were governed, not by feudal intermediaries, as in the paternal system of Metternich, but directly by officials appointed from Vienna. All offices were held by Germans, the language of the courts, the schools, and official circles were German, and in general the influence of the German element everywhere predominated. Centralisation was complete; and for ten years, while this "provisional system," as it was called, lasted, a harsh and rigorous police administration was everywhere maintained.

And in carrying on this work of centralisation, the government could find no better ally than the church, which in 1849 had condemned political liberty as "impious," and had declared all national movements to be but "a remnant of paganism," and the differences of language, to be "the consequences of sin and the fall of man, traceable to the tower of Babel." On August 15, 1855, a concordat was signed with the Holy See, which granted all the demands that the Roman curia dared to make, and bound the state to carry out such regulations as the clergy desired. "The Catholic, apostolic, and Roman religion," so the concordat reads, "will henceforth exercise in the entire Empire those rights and prerogatives which it ought to enjoy according to the divine institutions and the canon law,"—a clause which freed the church absolutely from the authority of the state. In addition, the concordat declared that the bishops were to direct the youth in all departments of education, both public and private; to see that in all branches of instruction there existed nothing contrary to the Catholic religion and morality; to censure freely all books dangerous to religion and morals, and to call upon the state for aid in main-
taining such censorship; to inflict punishments upon the dis-
obedient clergy and laity with the aid of the government; to
control marriages; and to acquire property in inalienable right.
In 1856 the bishops were given complete control over the re-
ligious interests and lives of non-Catholics, and over the prop-
erty of all the clergy and churches. In fact, by this agreement,
Austria subjected herself to the control of the Roman Church
as completely as if there were in the state no interests save
those of the bishops and the clergy.

Under Alexander Bach, minister of the interior, this system
was applied in all its severity; and from 1849 until 1859 Aus-
tria and all her dependencies lay in an intellectual and political
torpor. Saved from the revolution by the army, she was now
forced to submit to its authority, as well as to that of the police,
and the clergy. Not an agitator could raise his voice, not a
journal utter a protest; at the same time intellectual and eco-
nomic activity ceased, the latent powers and great resources of
the state remained undeveloped, and Austria could only wait
for the new policy that should release her from the iron grasp
of her rescuer. And during this period the influence of the
government at Vienna began to decline. The financial condi-
tion of the state was far worse than it had been even in the
days of Metternich, when the government had seen each year a
deficit, and had sought to conceal it from public notice by loans
for extraordinary expenses. This disordered bookkeeping, relic
of the days when states did not consider themselves responsible
for their expenditures, had been thrown into hopeless confusion
by the revolution of 1848, which, in bringing misery and want
to the people, had cut off receipts, and, in calling for unusual
military expenditures, had increased the amount of the public
debt. Every year since that time the expenses had exceeded
the revenues, and it was estimated that before 1859 the debt had
risen to nearly three hundred millions of florins. Such a policy
in itself need not have been a cause of anxiety, for all European
states after 1848 had begun to contract enormous debts; but in Austria, this was not accompanied with any orderly or systematic method of financing, or with any effort to improve the economic condition of the state as a whole, in such a way as to give it a reputation for solvency as a guarantee against repudiation.

At the same time the political influence of the government was suffering, in Germany, at the hands of Prussia, in Europe at large, at the hands of Napoleon and France. During the years when her autocratic methods of suppressing liberal ideas were losing for Austria the respect of the west, her policy in the Crimean war was costing her her reputation for good statesmanship. To the liberals of Europe, she seemed no better than the reactionary states of Italy. When Lord Clarendon, at the congress of Paris, condemned in unsparing language the bad government and despotic measures in Rome and Naples, and held up to scorn the policy that sought to repress agitations by armed force rather than by remedying the causes of the discontent, it was well understood that he was attacking, not only the states of the Italian peninsula, but Austria as well.

The Italian war brought matters to a crisis, and roused the Emperor to a full realisation of the evils of Schwarzenberg's methods. Had Austria been solvent, or had she been free from the dictation of the army and the church, it is unlikely that the ultimatum which brought about the war would have been sent. But the Emperor, knowing that Austria could not long support the equipment made necessary by Cavour's military preparations, and urged by the generals and bishops, sanctioned the prosecution of this war that was to cost him one of the fairest of his provinces and the reputation of his soldiers. But this was not all. The military and autocratic methods of the court of Vienna had already aroused a spirit of disaffection among the Magyars and Slavs, many of whom openly rejoiced in the defeat of Austria's forces at Magenta and Solferino; and was
leading Magyars, Croats, and Serbs to consider a plan of joining with Napoleon in a general uprising against the Austrian government. Still another incident was significant of public opinion both within and without the Empire. After the war, when the government called for a loan of two hundred millions of florins, to be used in reorganising the army, it found itself unable to raise more than seventy-six millions, and was obliged to admit that the credit of the state was exhausted. Francis Joseph could no longer be blind to the weaknesses and defects of the system that had injured the prestige of the house of Habsburg in Europe, and provoked a war, which not only had resulted in dismembering the Empire, but had so far destroyed the loyalty of the people and their interest in the affairs of the state, as to make them either afraid to take up the bonds of the government, or indifferent to the measures which the government desired to adopt.

No sooner, therefore, had the armistice of Villafranca been agreed upon, than Francis Joseph turned his attention to the needs of his Empire, and with the earnestness and wonderful patience that characterised him and won for him in later years the love of his people, took up the task of remodelling the government. The problem which faced him was one which might well have appalled the most able of the enlightened statesmen of Europe; for it demanded that he who solved it should satisfy the claims, not only of classes, but of races, and make harmonious the many interests that for generations had been opposed to one another. But the Emperor did not flinch. Having dismissed Alexander Bach, he issued a manifesto in August, 1859, in which he declared that it was his intention to correct the old-time abuses of the Empire and to introduce reforms of a liberal character; and six months afterward, by the March Patent of 1860, he summoned some thirty-eight leading men from the different provinces to meet with the council of state of the Empire, for the purpose of considering the question
of the finances, and of expressing an opinion as to the manner in which the new reforms should be carried out.

The committee appointed by this enlarged council to report upon the subject, presented two views: one held by the centralist minority, whose leader was the advocate Hein; the other supported by the federalist majority under the leadership of Clam-Martinitz, the Czech. It was the wish of the minority to establish a central power which should have authority over the diets of the various provinces, without regard to the historical claims of the various nationalities; or, in other words, it advised that the diets be given important powers, but at the same time be made subordinate to the central government at Vienna. This, the German view, was supported by the burgesses in the cities and the industrial regions of the west, who desired a strong government for the protection both of trade and industry, and of the middle classes against the aristocracy and clergy; and also by the members of the smaller races, who looked to Vienna for defence against the larger nationalities. On the other hand, the federalist majority preferred the establishment of a federal state, in which all the nations should be equal, in which each should preserve and exercise in full autonomy the powers that it claimed by virtue of its traditions and its national unity. Owing largely to the influence and eloquence of the Magyar representatives, the federalists secured a majority in the committee, and their plan was accepted by the Emperor as the basis of his reforms. On October 20th he issued for the Empire a new law, known as the October Diploma, which showed clearly that the tendencies were in the direction of federalism and states' rights. The Diploma restored the national assemblies, granted to the Magyars the use of their old constitution, and to the other nationalities privileges determined by their old territorial regulations; it established for the common government an imperial council composed of delegates from the national assemblies, with power to legislate in
all common affairs relating to finance, the post-office, and the army; and it abolished the common ministries of the interior, justice, public worship and instruction.

But unfortunately the experiment was to have but a short life of four months, for neither the government nor the Magyars were willing to interpret the October Diploma in the spirit in which it had been framed. Goluchowski, who had taken the place of Bach, shared with the aristocracy sympathies which made it difficult for him to play the reformer. The decrees that he issued interpreting the Diploma were centralist in their character, and made clear the government’s intention of regulating the national assemblies in the interest of uniformity, and of granting them, not the right to select their deputies to the imperial council, but merely the privilege of naming certain persons from among whom the Crown would make its selection. In their turn, the Hungarian comitats or county assemblies, passing far beyond the intent of the Diploma in their exercise of the newly restored privileges, not only acted as if the March Laws of 1848 were once more in force, and as if Hungary were connected with Austria merely by the person of the Emperor; but strove to sweep away all traces of Austrian authority, and boldly denounced the whole imperial system.

The Emperor, greatly displeased by the violent words and acts of these ultra-nationalists of Hungary, and by their attempts to force his hand in this hostile and illegal manner, withdrew from the position he had taken in October; and in February, 1861, issued a patent, ostensibly to complete the previous arrangement, but in reality to inaugurate a new system. The February Patent set the current running in the opposite direction, and showed the determination of the Emperor to abandon his former federalist policy in favour of one that should be centralising. Goluchowski was dismissed, and Schmerling became the minister of the new policy. The February Patent, while preserving intact the national assemblies,
minimised their powers of self-government by strengthening the imperial council, and destroyed their national peculiarities by organising them after a common model. The imperial council was divided into two chambers, after the English fashion, and its functions were vastly increased. When the Magyar deputies were absent, it became a parliament with limited powers; but when they were present, it became a parliament with full powers, competent to discuss and to regulate the affairs of the entire country. The ministries of the interior and of public instruction were restored; and by dividing the electors into classes, and granting special privileges to the great landowners and to the inhabitants of the towns, the electoral system was so altered as to give the control of the elections, for the greater part, to the landed aristocracy and the German bourgeois classes. By this octroyed constitution, Austria was treated very much as if she were a homogeneous state, consisting of a single nationality; for but little attention was paid to the historical and national rights of her various members. It is true that the constitution was in many respects liberal; but it was unsuited to the condition of things in Austria, it pleased only the Germans and centralists, and it deeply offended the Magyars and Czechs, the aristocracies of the various nationalities, and all who supported the old régime. Such a doctrinaire constitution could not be permanent.

But the constitution was to be given a fair trial. Hungary, Croatia, and Venetia at once refused to send deputies to the imperial council, and at first Istria and Transylvania did the same; but after a new electoral system had been forced upon these provinces, they became obedient to the law. Though the Saxons did not get their representatives to Vienna until 1863, enough members were sent from the other provinces to constitute a limited parliament with power to legislate upon matters which were not Hungarian, and which did not fall within the province of the local legislatures. As the majority of this
council was German, the acts of the members and the policy of the ministry favoured naturally the interests of Vienna rather than those of Pesth, and during the period from 1861 to 1863 the council was more concerned to reform the German federal system than to effect a reconciliation between the government and the eastern nationalities. It is a striking fact that instead of showing any interest in the affairs of her non-Germanic peoples who were afterward to become her greatest support, Austria should have expended her energy during these very years in trying to reform a worn-out federal system that three years later had ceased to exist.

But in the meantime what was the attitude of Hungary? In that country were two parties, one composed of ultra-nationalists, who were bitterly opposed to making the slightest concession to Austria, and were ready at any time to resort to violent and aggressive measures; the other that of Déák, Eötvös, and the moderate liberals, who though ready to do battle for the legal rights of Hungary, were also willing to compromise with Austria. Déák outlined his position in the famous addresses of 1861, in which he had declared that Hungary’s rights dated far back in the past, but that inasmuch as the March Laws of 1848 defined these rights in a form better adapted to the requirements of the times, it would be necessary for these laws to become the basis of all agreements with Vienna. Owing to his influence, the Hungarian Diet refused to accept the February Patent, which as he declared “transformed Hungary into an Austrian province, and placed the nation under the control of a foreign majority”; and after stating that it would never sacrifice its constitutional independence, it asserted with vehemence that Francis Joseph was not the legal king of Hungary, because he had never been crowned, and that he could not be crowned until he had consented to recognise the unity of Croatia, Transylvania, and Hungary, and had restored the fundamental law of the land. The ministry at Vienna refused to negotiate with
the Magyars unless the latter would recognise the February Patent, while the Magyars, with equal persistence, refused to accept the patent unless the Emperor would recognise their historical rights: and here in 1861 the matter rested. "We can wait," said Schmerling, when he heard that the Magyars had refused to send delegates to Vienna; and for four years the deadlock continued.

But Schmerling soon found himself in an awkward position. Though he had boasted that by a liberal constitution and a common parliament he could preserve the unity of the Empire, he soon found himself powerless to overcome the resistance of the Magyars and Croats, and was forced to apply a hated policy of repression in order to control them; and so deeply did he offend the other Slav nationalities by his disregard of their interests, that gradually the Poles and Czechs grew to dislike the common parliament, and finally gained courage to withdraw from it altogether. Furthermore, the lesser nationalities, who had favoured a centralised government, were annoyed by his devotion to the Germans, the nobility by his regard for the burgher classes, and the clergy by his religious toleration. Nor was this all: in mismanaging the finances, he lost the favour of the burgher and capitalist classes upon whose support in parliament he had, up to this time, depended. The expenses of the year 1864 far exceeded the appropriations, which in their turn exceeded the revenue; and the government found itself unable to pay its debts. When, therefore, a reduction of expenses was ordered, especially in the army, the wrath of the military leaders broke forth, and the nobles sent petitions to the Emperor asking for the dismissal of Schmerling, and for the abrogation of the constitution that had reduced the defences of the country and had aroused a feeling of insecurity and discontent throughout the Empire. In 1865 the situation was only worse. The minister of finance asked for a loan of one hundred and seventeen millions of florins for arrearages and
extra expenses, but the parliament granted him only thirteen millions, for the purpose of paying interest on the public debt.

The experiment of 1861 had proved a lamentable failure. Half the subjects of the Emperor were estranged from him, and the other half were already refusing to grant the supplies necessary for carrying on the business of the state. Schmerling had not been a successful minister; his plan which was to enable Austria to maintain her position as the leading state in the Germanic Confederation, and for which many sacrifices had been made, was not prospering; his attempt to reform the federal system had failed, owing to Prussia’s positive rejection of the constitution drafted by the princes at Frankfort; and the alliance between Austria and Prussia in the war against Denmark threatened to disarrange all his plans by causing disaffection among the South German states, close alliance with whom was the very keystone of his German policy. The situation at last became so unbearable that the Emperor determined to act for himself. In June, 1865, he left Vienna for Pesth to begin the task of reconciliation with the Magyars, who, roused to enthusiasm by this unexpected mark of confidence from the Emperor, received him as a thrice-welcome guest. On July 27th, the parliament having dissolved, he dismissed the Schmerling ministry; and, on September 20th, issued a manifesto to the people of the Empire declaring that the constitution was suspended until it could be revised in the interests of the eastern nationalities, and calling on Magyars and Croats to state frankly the conditions on which they would renew their connection with Austria.

This act of the Emperor’s struck a final blow at the old policy of centralisation, and left the government face to face with the task of solving the problem with due regard to the rights of the nationalities. It was now called upon to choose between two systems, federalism and dualism, the latter of which was the older, dating back to the Pragmatic Sanction of 1713. It
was evident that the acceptance of either system would be attended with many difficulties: for the federalists would oppose dualism, which would divide the Empire between the two dominant nationalities, German and Magyar, instead of parceling it out among an indefinite number of states united by a federal tie; and the Germans, who were fearful of becoming a helpless minority in the presence of so many Slavs and Magyars, would certainly prevent, if possible, the establishment of a federal system in the Empire. During the winter of 1865 and 1866 the Emperor entered into negotiations with the Hungarian Diet regarding the acceptance of their terms, which had been drafted with care and moderation by Deák. The ultra-nationalists of Pesth wished to stand out for absolute independence, saving only the right of the Emperor to be elected king of Hungary; but Deák, with truer insight and statesmanship, willingly admitted the existence of interests common to Hungary and Austria, and while insisting on the constitutional independence of Hungary, conceded the need of a common government to regulate those interests. During the spring of 1866 the matter was under discussion in the Diet on the basis of Deák's concessions; though even at that time it had become evident, that however much the Emperor might desire reconciliation with Hungary, the aristocratic Belcredi ministry and the political leaders in Vienna were opposed to granting Hungary's demands, and were ready to advise the Emperor to dissolve the Hungarian Diet in the hope of obtaining another that would be more compliant.

But even while the Magyar committee was drafting its terms of compromise, war broke out between Austria and Prussia, and the attention of the entire Empire was concentrated upon the result. Many of the Magyars were considering the advisability of revolting, and even Deák, loyal as he was to the Emperor, would not consent that the Hungarian Diet should raise a single soldier for the purpose of prolonging the war. But the
issue was soon decided by the battle of Königgrätz, which destroyed forever any hopes that the house of Habsburg may have cherished of holding the leadership in Germany, and blotted out the last traces of those old imperial traditions that, for so many years, had served only to draw the attention of Austria away from the needs and interests of the people within her own borders. No longer entangled in the affairs of Italy and Germany, the house of Habsburg was now free to turn to Hungary, the nation which for seventeen years it had ignored, and on a new foundation to construct a state, more solid and enduring than any of the past, and more in sympathy with those newer political ideas which, as yet, had found but little place in the Austrian system of government. No sooner had the peace been signed than Count Mensdorff, minister of foreign affairs, resigned, and was succeeded by the former prime minister of Saxony, the old opponent of Bismarck, Count Ferdinand Beust, who entered Austria's service as minister of foreign affairs in October, 1866.

With the entrance of Beust into the cabinet, the conflict began between federalism, supported by Count Belcredi, minister of the interior, and dualism, which Beust believed to be the only system practicable under the circumstances. During the ensuing months the matter was vigorously debated, and when a decree was issued in January, 1867, summoning an extraordinary parliament, it seemed as if the federalists had won the victory, for the majority of the deputies proved to be committed to the federalist cause. But inasmuch as the parliament had not members enough to take definite action, because the deputies from the German provinces refused to take their seats, it was dissolved; and the Emperor, abandoning the idea of a federal government, determined to try dualism. At the same time a conflict of equal importance had taken place in the Hungarian Diet, where Déák and those advocating a compromise had won the victory from the ultra-nationalists under the
leadership of Tisza. By February, 1867, all controversy was over: at Pesth the Diet had agreed to accept the compromise that had been drafted the spring before by its committee; and at Vienna, Belcredi had withdrawn from the cabinet, and Beust had become chancellor of the Empire. On February 8th the compromise was accepted by the Emperor, and the Hungarian constitution restored; on March 15th Francis Joseph was crowned king of Hungary; and before the end of the year the new system had been legally accepted by the Hungarian Diet and the parliament in Vienna. The Dual Monarchy was established.

The new system, which was founded on the Ausgleich or Compromise of 1867, divided the Empire into two parts: Cisleithania, made up of the seventeen provinces of Austria, in which Germans predominated; and Transleithania, made up of Hungary, Croatia, Slavonia, Transylvania, Servia, and certain military frontiers, the population of which was, for the most part, Magyar and Slav. It was intended that these two parts should form separate independent states, each of which should have its own constitution and powers of self-government: but that the two states should be under one sovereign, who should be Emperor in Austria and apostolic king in Hungary, and should form a single monarchy under the title of Austria-Hungary. The essential feature of this compromise was a common government, which was to consist of three joint ministers, who were to be appointed by the Emperor and to control foreign affairs, war, and finance, and of two deliberative or regulative bodies of sixty members each, to be known as the Delegations, which were to be chosen annually from the legislative bodies of Austria and Hungary, and to have control of other affairs such as commerce, tariffs, money, coinage, the military system, and the industrial legislation. The Delegations were to sit alternately at Vienna and Pesth, to deliberate and vote apart, and never to come into joint session except in
case of a deadlock. Each was to employ its own language; all communications between them were to be made in both German and Magyar; and when they sat in joint session, the presidency was to be held alternately by each, and two journals were to be kept. Thus the Delegations were to form in no way a common parliament.

The relation thus established between the two parts of the Empire was without precedent in the history of government; and certain features of the arrangement that disclose its temporary character are interesting in view of Austria's future. According to the Ausgleich, Austria and Hungary, though remaining two states, absolutely separate in everything that concerned the individual life of each, were joined together in one monarchy, Austria-Hungary, but by bonds that might be broken at any time. In all affairs that touched the military and economic life of Austria and Hungary, harmony and unity were to depend on the willingness of the delegates to legislate according to certain common principles; should they fail to agree, and the harmony be broken, neither the state nor the Emperor was to have the power of coercion. All matters of commerce were to be regulated as between sovereign states, by treaties lasting for ten years, at the end of which time either state was to be free to withdraw, if it so desired. The most permanent bond, the common ministries, might be loosed at any time should the house of Habsburg come to an end; for the Ausgleich was not a compact between two states, but between each state and the dynasty of Habsburg-Lorraine. There was to be, in reality, no permanent bond between Austria and Hungary.

Such was the remarkable political expedient conceived by Deák, and adopted by the Emperor and Count Beust. It took no account of other than the German and Magyar nationalities, and ignored entirely the whole federal question; but it established a government, which was the result, not merely of political ingenuity, but of experience, and one that on the whole was
to be successful. Hungary became a constitutional state with power to guarantee to her people full liberty, a responsible ministry, and a legislature of two houses, one aristocratic, the other elected under a liberal franchise. Toward Croatia, the only country of importance within their borders, the Magyars were in turn generous. In 1868 a compromise was arranged which, in reserving to the Diet at Pesth only affairs of interest common to both Hungary and Croatia, gave the Croats considerable power of self-government. In the Delegations the Croats were to have always five members, and were to enjoy within their own country the use of their own language in official circles. And the constitution of Austria was scarcely less liberal: in accordance with the five statutes of December 21, 1867, citizens were to be equal before the law, all races of the state were declared equal in language and nationality, and, although she did not adopt the parliamentary methods and the broad franchise of the western governments, Austria became after 1867 a liberal constitutional monarchy. When during the year 1868 the Austrian government quietly set aside, in a manner as little offensive as possible, the conditions of the concordat of 1855, and established freedom of religion, civil marriages, and secular instruction, it completed the work of reorganisation, and Austria took her place among the enlightened governments of Europe.
CHAPTER VIII.

THE EASTERN QUESTION.

With the year 1871 came the settlement of those great political questions that had been troubling central and western Europe since 1815, and the Powers entered upon a period of diplomatic inactivity that contrasted strangely with the bustle and concern of the preceding twenty years. Italy was a united state with Rome as her capital; the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein were a part of Prussia; and Germany was an Empire under the house of Hohenzollern. France having rid herself of the last Bonaparte was taking up the problems of 1848 with the determination to solve them in the interests of the republic. Austria had withdrawn from Germany, had lifted her hand from Italy, and was at last turning her eyes away from Frankfort, Venetia, and the west to Pesth and the east. The political boundaries of the European states were fixed and except for the question of Alsace and Lorraine no further changes, save in Turkey, were likely to be made in the territorial arrangements of the states that composed the European system. In constitutional matters the end of a long struggle had been reached and parliamentary government in the west and constitutional government in the centre of Europe had become the permanent form of political life. Few traces of the old absolutism anywhere remained, for national unity and political liberty, inseparable parts of the higher intellectual and industrial life upon which Europe had already entered, marked
the close of the struggle, and became integral features of a new era.

During the five years that followed the close of the Franco-
Prussian war, European diplomacy spent its strength in en-
deavouring to adapt itself to the new situation. But it was
difficult for Europe to believe that the future was to be one of
peace. Inasmuch as three great wars had destroyed the illu-
sions of the earlier period, and for more than twenty years, war
and the rumour of war had kept the diplomatic world in a state
of constant unrest, it seemed reasonable to suppose that the new
leader, with his seat at Berlin, might continue the aggrandising
policy of the recent past, invade the adjacent German-speaking
countries, and annex them to the new Empire in order to make
complete the unity of the German nationality; or that Ger-
many, anticipating the French desire for revenge, and seeing
in the rapid recovery of that country a menace to her own in-
tegrity, might undertake a new war for the protection of the
new Reichsland, and for the purpose of obtaining new milliards
of indemnity. That such thoughts were in the minds of politi-
cal writers and thinkers of this period, there is abundant evi-
dence to prove. In 1873, alarmists predicted that Germany
would interfere in the civil war in Carthage ; in 1875, that a
conflict would break out between Germany and Belgium; and
most important of all, they felt certain of the approach of war
with France, when in 1875, after the French Assembly had
passed a military law reorganising the army, certain diplomatic
queries gave rise to exaggerated newspaper reports regarding
the relations between the two countries. But a renewal of the
war of 1870 was in the highest degree improbable; for Germany
was the head and arbiter of the new European system, and her
Emperor and chancellor, having accomplished the purpose for
which they had entered into war, had no further desire to dis-
turb the peace. In his speech of January 18, 1871, Emperor
William had struck the keynote of the new policy: "I wish to
be the champion of the German Empire,"' he had said, "not in martial conquests, but in works of peace, in the sphere of national prosperity, freedom, and civilisation"; and in his speech from the throne March 21st, he had given expression to the same feeling, in saying that Germany was to become a sure protector of the new peace of Europe.

But Bismarck, though in full accord with the sentiments expressed by his Emperor, was also alive to the importance of maintaining friendly foreign relations; and wishing to prevent any union of the two defeated countries, which had so nearly formed an alliance against Germany in 1870, and to isolate France, that she might be unable to take revenge, he strove to make, not Germany only, but all central Europe, the guardian of the peace. With Russia the friendly relations were easily maintained; for in March, 1871, Alexander II. expressed his desire for friendship with Germany and the preservation of the peace; but with Austria, to whom Bismarck at once made friendly advances in the hope of drawing her entirely away from France, an understanding was not so easily reached. It is true that the meeting of Bismarck and Beust at Gastein, in August of 1871, and that of the Emperors of Germany and Austria at Ischi and Salzburg in September of the same year, suggested the probability of an entente between Austria and Germany; but this was not accomplished until important changes had taken place at Vienna. In 1871, under the Hohenwart ministry, Austria had been experimenting with a federal, that is a pro-Slavic, policy, which was naturally looked upon with disfavour by Germany. In November, however, Francis Joseph, acting under the influence of Beust, rejected the demands of the Czechs, and held to dualism. But the triumph of Beust was a short one; as the enemy of Bismarck and the friend of France he was dismissed in November, and Count Andrásy, a Magyar, hostile to the Slavs and friendly to Bismarck, was appointed minister of foreign affairs. In his
first proclamation, Andrassy expressed Austria's desire to establish friendly relations with Germany, and to support a European peace that should be "sincere, binding, and constant." In September, 1872, the Emperors of Germany, Russia, and Austria met at Berlin, and agreed to aid one another in upholding the new European treaties; to settle by peaceful means the Eastern Question; and by a dual policy of repression and reform, to destroy socialistic movements, and to benefit the condition of the working classes.

But the new arrangement, based as it was upon the personal friendship of the monarchs for one another, and not upon any natural sympathy between Germans and Slavs, was not likely to be of long duration. The Russian minister, Gorchakov, did not share his master's sentiments of good will for Germany, nor was the Russian nation especially friendly to the Germans and the Magyars; and consequently the "alliance of the three Emperors," although ostensibly lasting until the death of Alexander II. in 1881, as early as 1874 showed signs of weakness. The marriage of his daughter to the Duke of Edinburgh in 1874 brought the Czar into friendly relations with England, and the good feeling thus produced continued until the rise of Disraeli and the war of 1877. Still more disturbing was Russia's support of the Count of Paris in France, where Bismarck favoured the republic, and of Alfonso XII. in Spain, whose cause Bismarck had distinctly opposed the year before by officially recognising the Spanish Republic, with Serrano as chief executive. In the new grouping of the Powers, Russia's place was taken by Italy, whose king, Victor Emmanuel, though at first inclined to seek closer relations with France, found himself on the side of Bismarck in the struggle against the papacy. In 1872 Prince Humbert visited Berlin, the next year Victor Emmanuel journeyed to Vienna, and afterward to Berlin also, and in 1874 the two Emperors returned the visit. The friendly feeling thus engendered united central Europe and prepared
the way for the triple alliance of 1882. Thus, in 1875, Germany, Austria, and Italy stood together, with Russia wavering, France isolated, and England, under the bellicose Disraeli, ready, if the occasion should offer, to enter once more the arena of European politics. In 1876 rumours came from the east that promised to revive the Eastern Question, and diplomacy, which had languished for five years, once more bestirred itself.

It will be remembered that by the treaty of Paris of 1856 the Powers not only had admitted the Ottoman Empire to all the advantages of the public law and system of Europe, but had bound themselves not to interfere in its internal affairs; and that they had justified this act by the hatti humayoun issued by the Sultan February 18th of the same year. This edict was a very liberal document, and had its provisions been carried out, would have transformed the Ottoman Empire into a European state. It confirmed all the old privileges of the Christians, placed Christian and Mussulman communities on a common level in religious matters, admitted Christians to all public employments, to the civil and military schools of the Empire, to seats in the council of public instruction, and in provincial boards of administration; it promised to establish mixed tribunals, the procedure of which should be public and according to law, to draw up a code of laws, to lighten corporal punishment, and to abolish torture; it decreed the abolition of tax-farming, guaranteed equality of taxes, and granted to foreigners the right to hold landed property in the Empire; it declared that steps should be taken to improve the financial condition of the country, to facilitate communication by the building of roads and canals, and to benefit the people in general by the introduction into the Empire of the art, the science, and the funds of Europe.

But grave difficulties stood in the way of any adequate execution of this decree. The Sultan, Abdul Medjid, was as inactive and vacillating as ever; the Mussulmans refused to be
associated with the despised infidels in administration, to obey them in places of authority, either in the state or in the army, and to accept their verdicts when they served on the tribunals; the Christians preferred to pay an army tax rather than serve in the army, were afraid to take their places on the tribunals, or to hold positions of prominence, and though pleased by the religious freedom that the edict conferred upon them, objected to other of its conditions that seemed to trench upon their historic rights; and the Powers, having pledged themselves not to interfere, could do nothing except issue protests, or propose that committees of inquiry be appointed to examine into the condition of the Christians. Under such circumstances it was impossible that equality between Christian and Mussulman should exist. The administration became Mussulman, because Christians occupied, at best, only subordinate positions; the army remained Mussulman, because the Christians refused to serve in it; the tribunals remained Mussulman, because Christians feared to sit on them; law was interpreted in favour of the faithful, and Christian evidence was not accepted. Furthermore, the situation was made worse by outbreaks of religious fanaticism: in the spring of 1860 an uprising of the Druses against the Maronites in the Lebanon resulted in frightful massacres at Deir-el-Kamar and Damascus, which led to the occupation of Syria by French troops, and to vigorous protests from the west against Turkey's disregard of her promises. With customary dissimulation, the Turkish authorities expressed surprise and promised reparation; but there the matter ended.

In 1861 Abdul Medjid died. Having no fixed policy during his long reign of twenty-two years, he had waivered between reaction and reform, at one time seeking to appease the wrath of the old Turkish party, who saw in his subservience to outside influence the cause of all Turkey's woes; at another trying to aid the reformers, who, encouraged by England and
Russia, were endeavouring to introduce the political ideas of the west. Abdul Aziz, his successor, was no more competent than he to govern, and like him was controlled by advisers, the old Turks, the reformers, Fuad and Ali, and the ambassadors of Russia and France. A few half-hearted experiments were tried, but the most important of them, which was made in 1864 to improve justice by establishing separate tribunals for each Turkish administrative district, failed because the Christians not only could not be persuaded to co-operate, but almost refused to make known their grievances. While justice thus remained unreformed, the finances grew steadily worse. Not only was no attempt made to introduce a budget and to square the yearly accounts, but the wastefulness and extravagance of the new Sultan increased enormously the public debt. By the end of the decade, the latter had increased more than tenfold in amount, and the taxes, farmed as before, became heavier and more burdensome. So unbearable had become the Turkish administration in 1867, that the Powers instituted an investigation into the affairs of the Empire, and showed in a published memoir that scarcely one of the important provisions of the edict of 1856 had been put in force. Various methods of reform were suggested: Russia urged the Sultan to recognise the historical rights of the various nationalities; France suggested that he entirely disregard distinctions of nationality, and establish a uniform administration throughout the Empire. For the moment, it seemed as if the advice of Napoleon were to be acted on at Constantinople; but the downfall of the Second Empire put an end to the Emperor’s influence, and, at the beginning of the new decade, Turkey remained as unregenerate as before.

At the same time, murmurs of discontent from the dependent races and frequent expressions of a desire for independence were foreshadowing that dismemberment from within which was to be the most characteristic feature of Ottoman history during the ensuing twenty-five years. The people of the north
and west, Roumanians, Servians, and Bulgarians, still cherished the traditions of their past greatness, and never forgot that their rulers, five centuries before, had been lords of empires, and their ancestors proud and independent peoples. The Greeks, by their revolution of 1820, had begun this war of the old nationalities against their oppressor; and during the period following, Moldavia and Wallachia freed themselves from the control of Turkey in affairs of administration, and the Servians became independent of the Porte, save for the presence of Turkish troops and the yearly payment of tribute. The revolution of 1848 roused anew these subject peoples, and in consequence of uprisings of the Roumanians against the hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia, the Powers in 1856, at the congress of Paris, took the principalities under their own protection. They were, however, by no means agreed as to the form that the organisation of the provinces should take. France and Russia desired that they be made into a single state; but this plan Austria, Turkey, and finally England refused to accept. Consequently, in 1858, a compromise was reached, whereby the provinces were to remain separate, but to possess a common name—the United Principalities—and to have a single commission to prepare laws touching such matters as were common to the two states. This arrangement only hastened the union which the Roumanians themselves were determined to make, and which they effected in a wholly unexpected manner. Authorized by the convention of 1858 to elect separate hospodars, the divans of each principality chose the same person, Colonel Alexander Couza. Such a vigorous expression of the national will broke down the opposition of the Powers who, in 1859, recognised the new state, and in 1861 the Sultan gave his consent to the union. But the troubles of the Roumanians were not yet over, for the new prince proved an unsuccessful ruler. After prince and nobles had been quarrelling for five years, the Roumanians discovered that government by one of
THE EASTERN QUESTION.

themselves was impossible owing to the jealousies to which it gave rise; and in 1866 they compelled Couza to abdicate, and called Prince Charles of Hohenzollern to the throne. Although still legally under the suzerainty of the Porte, the new state, with a single head, ministry, assembly, and capital, was practically independent. Its crises were passed, its future was assured; and its entire independence having been officially recognised by Russia and the Porte in 1877, and by Europe in 1878, it entered upon its career as a sovereign European state.

While Roumania was thus winning her independence, and the Ottoman Empire was undergoing dismemberment in the northeast, other movements, of no less importance, were taking place in the west and south. For some years the two branches of the great Servian race in Servia and Montenegro had been dreaming of a great Servian monarchy that should comprise Bosnia, the Herzegovina, Servia, and Montenegro. When, therefore, in 1861, the Herzegovinians, enraged by the refusal of the Sultan to grant them separate ecclesiastical privileges and a national bishop, rose in revolt, a general uprising took place, and the Montenegrins, in full sympathy with their neighbours, engaged into a mountain warfare that soon involved them in a struggle with the Porte. Servia, too, in her determination to force the Turkish soldiers from her territory, took up the cause of the Herzegovinians as well as her own, and by 1862 the Serbs of Montenegro, the Herzegovina, and Servia were at full war with the Porte. The unfortunate Herzegovinians were badly defeated; the Montenegrins, who were also defeated, were compelled to accept severe terms in the convention of Scutari; but the Servians, aided by the Powers, who met at Constantinople in 1862, were so far successful as to be able to force the Sultan to withdraw Turkish troops from all Servia except Belgrade and four fortresses. As the result of a friendly negotiation in 1867, Turkey withdrew entirely from Servian territory. Thus, before the end of the
decade, Servia, like Roumania, had gained independence in all matters military and administrative, and was ready for the entire separation from Turkey that was granted her in 1877 and 1878.

In the south, the attempts to dismember the Ottoman Empire were less successful. The Christian mountaineers of Crete, in large part Grecian in sympathy and blood, maddened by the iniquities of Turkish misrule in the island, entered upon a fierce struggle in 1866 for independence and annexation to Greece. Aided by the people and the government of Greece, whose king, the recently chosen Prince George of Glücksburg, did not dare oppose the wish of the nation, they succeeded in prolonging the struggle for three years, until it was feared that war would arise between Greece and Turkey. But in 1868 the Powers intervened, and decided that Crete should remain a part of the Ottoman Empire on condition that the Sultan grant the Candiotes a constitution. This, the organic law of 1868, which affected to redress the most serious grievances, was duly issued; but it is hardly necessary to say that, like the schemes of reform within Turkey herself, it remained a dead letter.

In Egypt, where Mehemet Ali's attempt to dismember the Empire had failed, owing to the intervention of Russia in 1832, and of the Powers in 1840, a new influence was at work. By a liberal use of money in 1867, the Pasha, a grandson of the old Mehemet, gained for himself a new title, that of Khedive, and obtained independent rights in all matters relating to police, postal and transit services, and the imposition of customs duties. In Bulgaria, the patriotic party won a notable victory in 1870 in persuading the Sultan, notwithstanding the opposition of the Phanariote or Greek bishops, who had hitherto been Bulgaria's spiritual rulers, to allow them to have an exarch of their own and a national Bulgarian church. Thus, in 1870, the Ottoman Empire was showing unmistakable signs of disintegration. By its failure to carry out the reforms, which it had so osten-
tationously promised, it had aroused the distrust of the Powers; by its concessions to European influence, it was increasing the hostility of Mussulman for Christian, and encouraging fanatical outbursts of cruelty; it was losing little by little its control of the subject peoples; while its illegal and arbitrary methods of taxation were arousing revolts, as in Crete and the Herzegovina, and its bankruptcy was making necessary the sale of privileges, as in Egypt. Turkey was fast approaching a crisis in her career, and only an increase of the discontent, a further evidence of decay in administration, a few additional instances of obstinacy in the matter of reforms were needed to effect a general uprising, and to bring down upon her, notwithstanding the conditions of the treaty of Paris, the intervention of the Powers.

During the period from 1871 to 1875 the disorders within the government steadily increased. Abdul Aziz, having lost by death his reforming ministers, Fuad in 1869 and Ali in 1871, gave himself over more and more to the pleasures of the harem, and squandered the treasure of the state in favourites and palaces. The treasury, notwithstanding frequent loans, was always empty; officials were unpaid, justice was arbitrarily dispensed; the administration was wretchedly conducted; personal security could not be obtained; and the subject peoples, burdened with corvées, crushed by violence and heavy exactions, were hopeless and rebellious. At last, in July, 1875, unable longer to endure the situation, and incited by Slavic sympathisers, the Herzegovinians again rose in revolt; the Bosniaks followed; and soon Montenegro, Servia, and even Austrian Dalmatia were aiding the movement with men, arms, and encouragement. It was a pan-Slavic protest against the arbitrary and violent methods of administration employed by the Sultan, in defiance of his many promises to ameliorate the condition of his subject peoples.

The news of this general revolt soon got abroad, and in
August the three Powers, Germany, Austria, and Russia, sent to Constantinople a note of warning. As a reply, the Sultan issued an iradél, October 2, 1875, granting abatement of taxes and extensive local privileges. But the insurgents, having no faith in the promises of the Sultan, continued their struggle. Then Austria proposed that the signers of the treaty of Paris draft a note of protest; but England, wishing to gain for the Turk a longer time in which to fulfil his promises, refused for the moment to consider the proposition. Acting on England's advice, the Sultan, on December 12, 1875, issued a firman promising further administrative, judicial, and financial reforms. But Russia had no more faith in the new promises than had the Bosniaks and Herzegovinians, who did not abate their efforts in the least. Then it was that Count Andrássy submitted the terms of a note of protest to Russia, Germany, and France, by whom they were accepted, and to England, who expressed herself as willing to give them a general support, though unprepared to commit herself unreservedly. This note, demanded that the Porte establish religious liberty, abolish farming of taxes, employ the revenues of Bosnia and the Herzegovina in the interest of those provinces, institute local assemblies, and ameliorate the condition of the agricultural classes. It was sent to the Porte on January 30, 1876. On February 13th the Sultan accepted it, and in March issued a new set of promises of the most elaborate kind relating to the government of the provinces (vilayets).

Austria now seemed to be satisfied. Thus far she had chosen to act with Russia rather than with England in the attempt to gain from the Sultan a redress of the grievances of the subject peoples; but after the Andrássy note had been accepted and promulgated, she had no desire to go further. Well aware of the danger to her own integrity of a long-continued Slavic revolt on her borders, and quite out of sympathy with Russia's desire to encourage national movements, she endeavoured to
check the insurrection and to persuade the insurgents to put down their arms. At this point appear with unmistakable clearness the diverse interests of the various governments who were engaged in the controversy. England, jealous of Russia, and threatening war if a hand were laid upon Turkey, stood for the integrity of the Ottoman Empire; Austria, caring little for the integrity of the Empire, but desirous of influence and territorial extension in the south-east, was unwilling to encourage national independence of the subject peoples; and Russia, wishing to extend her influence throughout all Turkish territory, and convinced that the doctrine of separate nationalities, which she had held before 1870, was the only one which could solve the Turkish problem, encouraged by every means in her power the pan-Slavism of the south. In consequence of Russia's support, the revolutionary movement became more menacing than ever during the early months of 1876, and the insurgents in Servia, Montenegro, Bosnia, and the Herzegovina showed little inclination to disarm; and not only did Russia advise these states to draw up a list of their grievances, but she even suggested to Austria that the Powers present the new program to the Porte, and accompany it with a statement, that if it were not carried out, they would take means to enforce it. But Austria refused, and at this juncture Bismarck issued an invitation to Russia and Austria to meet at Berlin to consider a new settlement.

It did not seem likely that these Powers could come to any common agreement, so irreconcilable were the views that they held; but an event took place in May, 1876, which forced them to act in harmony. A Mussulman mob in Salonika, roused to a murderous degree of fanaticism by the interference of the Powers and the reform projects of the Sultan, attacked the consulates of France and Germany, and murdered the consuls. This act sent a thrill of horror through the west. The two Powers concerned at once advanced their fleets into Turkish
waters, and in the Berlin conference Russia, renewing her proposal that the Powers take measures to enforce reforms, drafted a memorandum, which reproduced, in the main, the terms that the insurgents had presented the April before. The Berlin Memorandum, as it is called, was accepted by the conference on May 13th. It proposed, first, that vessels be despatched to the Dardanelles and an armistice of two months be demanded; and, secondly, that the Sultan be commanded and, if necessary, forced to rebuild all the villages that had been destroyed, to furnish food, utensils, and beasts of burden to the unfortunate peasants, and to exempt them for three years from taxation; to establish a Christian commission to distribute aid; to withdraw the Turkish troops, to authorise the Christians to remain armed until the reforms had been effected; and to permit the consuls of the Powers to supervise the execution of these reforms. These conditions were sent to Rome, Paris, and London, and answers were impatiently awaited. Italy and France accepted them at once; but England, where public opinion had not been sufficiently aroused to affect the stubborn policy of the Disraeli government, rejected them without hesitation.

For the moment events seemed to be working in England's favour. What the Powers might have done in this crisis, had not on May 29, 1876, a revolution broken out in Constantinople that destroyed the value of the memorandum and rendered futile the work of the conference, it is impossible to say. Abdul Aziz was deposed and Mourad V. established in his place, and the new government, at once adopting a vigorous policy of resistance, ordered Servia to lay down her arms. Russia, who had been foiled by England's refusal to accept the Berlin Memorandum, now worked secretly in the provinces themselves, and by encouraging the Servians in their revolt, sought to thwart the new Turkish policy. On June 30th Servia openly declared war, on July 2d Montenegro did the same, and a few days afterward the Bosniaks and Herzegovinians threw
THE EASTERN QUESTION.

themselves with renewed ardour into the struggle. The war thus undertaken resulted in victory for Montenegro, but in bitter defeat for Servia; and the new Turkish government, proud of its victory, was prepared to impose onerous terms upon the conquered state.

But already rumours were spreading through the west of a new massacre, more horrible than had been that in the Lebanon in 1860. The Bulgarians, who had suffered less in the past from Turkish oppression than had the people of the Adriatic, were little known to the world outside. Satisfied with the reforms of Midhat Pasha, with the ecclesiastical privileges that had been granted them in 1870, and with the general agricultural prosperity of their province, they had not joined in the insurrection of 1875; but a small uprising at Batak, in April and May, 1876, itself of little consequence, had brought upon them a body of irregulars, the Bashi-Bazouks, whose cruelty did more to aid the cause of that unhappy people than all the diplomacy of the Powers. During the month of May some twelve thousand Christians were massacred under circumstances that aroused the indignation of the civilised world. Gladstone, coming out of his retirement, roused not only the liberals, but the whole English people by his pamphlet on the atrocities and by his speeches. The liberal party took up the cry, and so mercilessly scored the government that the Disraeli ministry found itself painfully embarrassed, and deemed it wise to withdraw, for the moment at least, its support from the Ottoman Empire.

When, therefore, Servia appealed to the Powers to mediate between herself and Turkey, and the Powers referred the matter to England, as the government whose advice the Porte would be most likely to accept, Disraeli did not dare, in the existing state of public opinion, openly to refuse to act as mediator. He proposed an armistice of six weeks, the maintenance of the rights of Servia as before the war, and a certain amount of administrative independence for Bulgaria. But Midhat Pasha and the other
ministers of Young Turkey had on August 31st seized the control of the Empire, and after deposing the imbecile Mourad V., placed in his stead his brother Abdul Hamid II. They now sought to temporise, and hoping to rid themselves of the tutelage of Europe, by promising to transform Turkey into a modern constitutional state, they issued, on October 1st, an extraordinary edict of reform, one provision of which guaranteed a constitution to the Ottoman Empire; and on October 12th, proposed an armistice of six months and the disarmament of the Servians. This practical rejection of England's mediation, and the repetition of the old reform comedy, exhausted the patience of the Czar. Having made up his mind to intervene if Turkey should refuse the good offices of the Powers, he had secured a promise from Francis Joseph in an interview at Reichstadt in July, 1876, that Austria should remain neutral in case of Russia's intervention; and had himself promised, that in case of Bulgaria's liberation, Austria should receive Bosnia and the Herzegovina as her reward. Sure, too, of the neutrality of Germany, inasmuch as Bismarck was known to hold the opinion, which he expressed later, that the Eastern Question was not worth to Germany the bone of a single Pomeranian grenadier, Alexander, on October 15th, despatched General Ignatieff to Constantinople to demand an armistice of six weeks with the Serbs, and autonomy for Bosnia, the Herzegovina, and Bulgaria. To gain time, the Porte hesitated, while its troops, conducting the war with great rapidity on Servian soil, captured Deligrad and Alexinatz, and were ready to advance to Belgrade. Then it was that Ignatieff sent in the Russian ultimatum, namely, the acceptance of the armistice in forty-eight hours or war; and the Porte, terrified, at once submitted. On November 2d the armistice began, and for the first time in a year peace existed in the Ottoman Empire.

This act of Russia's excited the suspicion and wrath of England, notwithstanding the fact that the Czar had declared in
conversation with Lord Loftus, the English ambassador, that he desired no conquest, aimed at no aggrandisement, and had not the smallest wish or intention to be possessed of Constantinople. The "will of Peter the Great and the aims of Catharine II." became once more realities to the English people; the campaign of sentiment, which had been inaugurated by the Bulgarian horrors, began to lose ground before the fear of Russian aggression and conquest; and Disraeli, who had been losing his influence, once more became popular. On November 9th, at the Guildhall banquet, he declared that England was ready for war, and, in a righteous cause, would not end the fight until right was done. But his views were not shared by Lord Derby, minister of foreign affairs, who deeming the Czar's expressions of amity acceptable, had, on November 4th, proposed to the Powers that a conference be held at Constantinople to consider the conditions according to which the Eastern Question might be settled. The proposal was duly accepted and acted upon; and at preliminary meetings, held between the 11th and the 22d of December, the terms that were to be presented to Turkey were drafted. The Powers demanded that Turkey grant an increase of territory to Servia and Montenegro, administrative independence to Bosnia, the Herzegovina, and Bulgaria; to the latter provinces Christian governors, who should be appointed by the Porte and confirmed by the Powers, the right to a national militia, and the use of the national language in official matters; and that she herself accept an international commission whose business it should be to carry the reforms into effect. On December 23rd the formal meetings began, but without a representative from Turkey; and on January 15th, the demands were formally presented to the Ottoman government. All eyes were now turned toward Turkey, for with her lay the decision; should she refuse the terms offered her by the Powers, Russia, who was already massing her troops along the Bessarabian frontier, would try the effect of force.
For some time the Ottoman government had been in the hands of Midhat Pasha, the representative of Young Turkey, and the reformers, who loudly protested against this intervention of the Powers, on the ground that it was contrary to the terms of the treaty of Paris. Not to be outdone by their European antagonists, they had conceived a new device, a constitution, which a special commission had been engaged in drafting ever since the edict of October 1st. This constitution, which guaranteed to Turkey liberty, justice, and equality, a responsible ministry, an assembly of two chambers, freedom of speech, religion, the press, and association, and the like, was proclaimed in the midst of booming cannon on December 23rd, even while the representatives of the Powers were sitting in solemn state within earshot of the acclamations. And it served the purpose for which it had been devised. When the conference duly presented its demands on January 15th, it was informed by the Turkish minister, Safvet Pasha, that they were not only a menace to the independence of the Sultan and contrary to the terms of the treaty of Paris, but wholly out of accord with the new constitution. The position of the Turks was impregnable: their Empire was a constitutional state and could attend to its own reforms; the treaty of Paris forbade the Powers to interfere in the internal affairs of the government, and made illegal their proposal to nominate local governments, or to establish an international commission to superintend local administration. There was but one thing for the Powers to do, and that was to withdraw: and this they did, highly displeased, leaving the victory to Turkey. And as if to make more evident the hollowness of his promises and the worthlessness of his constitutional reform, within two weeks after he had rejected the terms proposed by the conference, Abdul Hamid disgraced the man and the party that had drafted the constitution, by dismissing Midhat Pasha from his post.

On the initiative of Russia, one more attempt was made to
bring the Porte to terms. In a protocol, drafted at London on March 31st, the Powers urged the Turk to put into execution the promised reforms, and declared that they purposed watching very carefully the manner in which the Ottoman government performed its task. But Safvet answered as before, that Turkey was already undertaking her own reforms, and as an independent state, would not for a moment submit to the surveillance of the Powers. Russia had now no reason for waiting longer; and having promised Roumania to recognise her independence in return for the privilege of unobstructed passage through her territory, the Czar on April 24, 1877, issued his declaration of war.

Thus far Turkey had justified her acts by the treaty of Paris, and over and over again had reminded the Powers of that unfortunate document, a lasting monument to their blundering diplomacy. But Turkey had no guarantee that the treaty of Paris would protect her now from the wrath of Russia, or that the Powers who had signed the treaty, and had been endeavouring for a year past to prevent war by means of their mediation, would intervene by arms to resist the Muscovite invasion. Of all the European Powers, England alone was inclined to oppose Russia. Largely through the influence of Bismarck, Germany, Austria, and Italy declared for neutrality; France, whose foreign minister, Decazes, was friendly to Russia, did the same; and no Power remained to aid England in defending her old ally, Turkey, and the treaty of 1856. Even if the English cabinet and Parliament had been a unit in desiring war, England could not have gone to war alone. On the contrary, Derby and Carnarvon did not support the spectacular policy of Disraeli, and Parliament needed more evidence of Russian aggression, before it would vote additional war credit. Therefore, England, too, declared for neutrality, stipulating only that her interests in the Suez Canal, in Egypt, and in the Persian Gulf should not be imperilled, and that, above
all, Constantinople should not be occupied. To these conditions, Russia agreed, but stated that the exigencies of war might demand the temporary occupation of that city, and Lord Derby replied, that such occupation would at once necessitate England's taking measures of precaution from which she had hitherto felt justified in abstaining. Thus England left herself free to take whatever course might appear to her necessary for the protection of British interests.

The Russian army crossed the frontier in April and, making use of the railway and provisioning facilities agreed upon with Roumania, advanced slowly southward toward the Danube. Its progress was so hindered by the bad roads and high waters that not until June did it reach the river. Early in July the three divisions, into which it had been divided, crossed the river, the main division making the passage at Simnitza; and meeting with little resistance from the Turks, pushed southward along the line of the Jantra to Tarnova. The advance guard under General Gourko continuing the forward movement, occupied the Shipka pass, and penetrated southward through southern Bulgaria, and so rapid was the movement and so slight the resistance that by July 25th, a part of the cavalry had entered Hermanli, but two days march from Adrianople. At the same time the left division turned to the east to operate in the neighbourhood of Rustchuk and Shumla, while the right wing, seizing Nicopoli, moved westward in the direction of the Osma and the Vid. In the Caucasus the campaign under General Melikoff promised equal success: Ardahan was taken on May 17th, and the way lay open to Erzeroum.

These astounding successes, which seemed to portend the immediate overthrow of Turkey, stunned Europe. England, who with each day of the war had been growing more suspicious of Russia, began to look to her warships; the states of central Europe were troubled; and Austria, apprehensive of what the future had in store, made preparations for defence. But the
tide of war soon turned: on June 24th a Russian division, which was advancing against Batoum in Armenia, was driven back, the siege of Kars was raised, the advance to Erzeroum checked, and the entire Russian line forced to the position that it had held before the opening of the war. And even more worthy of remark was the resistance that the Russians met in Europe. Osman Pasha, the Turkish commander at Viddin, who had been unable to save Nicopoli, established himself at Plevna, and by his genius and heroism checked absolutely the Russian advance southward. The Russian division under General Gourko was forced back gradually from Hermanli to the Balkans, the left wing near Shumla was compelled to stop operations, and all available Russian strength was brought to bear on the task of taking Plevna. Twice was the attack made, and twice were the Russians repulsed with great slaughter. General Gourko, assailed in the Shipka pass by Suleiman Pasha, narrowly escaped defeat; while the left division, driven by Mehemed Ali toward Biela, was in danger of a defeat which would have thrown open to the Turks the line of the Danube, and have made it possible for the Turkish army to attack the rear of the Russians who were fighting at Shipka and Plevna. The months of September, October, and November, 1877, were anxious ones for the Czar.

Roumania now entered the struggle, new troops were sent from Russia, and Todleben, the hero of Sebastopol, was summoned to direct the siege of Plevna. Gradually the situation altered. By November 17th, Russia had renewed her attack in the Caucasus, taken Kars, and invested Erzeroum, the latter of which fell into her hands the February following. The siege of Plevna began, and every effort was made to cut off Osman Pasha from all outside aid, that fear of starvation might force him to surrender. By Todleben's skilful management, Russia was soon in possession of all the strongholds in Bulgaria: Gourka held Shipka pass; Suleiman Pasha, who had been
transferred to the army of the east, was driven from Biela, and forced to take refuge behind the Black Lom; and finally, on December 10th, after one of the longest and bravest defences in the history of modern warfare, Plevna surrendered. Immediately the Russians pushed across the Balkans by the Shipka, Etrepol, and Trajan passes, passed steadily southward through ice and snow and freezing weather, and by January 20th had massed their main forces at Adrianople, and established one detachment at Khorlu, and another at Rodosto on the sea of Marmora. The road to Constantinople was now open.

The wrath of England, which had been gathering ever since the fall of Kars and Plevna, now broke forth. The war party in the cabinet and the Jingoists in the streets of London had been daily growing more influential; Lord Carnarvon had resigned from the cabinet and Lord Derby had done the same, though he afterward withdrew his resignation. False rumours that the Russians were in the suburbs of Constantinople, and even in the city itself, set London and the House of Commons in a ferment, and turned the current of popular favour toward Turkey. On February 15th the government sent the fleet through the Dardanelles, with orders to aid the Turks, if the Russians advanced nearer the Ottoman capital, and during the month of February, 1878, the tension was very great. But in reality Russia had no intention of giving England cause for war. Already an armistice and preliminaries of peace had been agreed upon with Turkey, and as the Czar wished merely time in which to arrange the terms of the final treaty, he willingly promised England that if no English troops were landed on the Asiatic or European coast, his troops should not occupy Gallipoli or enter the lines of Bulair. This device for delay was successful, and on March 3d Turkey and Russia signed the treaty of San Stefano.

Russia, having thus gained her point by force, was ready to see tested her plan of solving the Eastern Question by parcel-
ling out the territory of the Ottoman Empire among the various
nationalities in the south-east. The treaty of San Stefano
granted Bessarabia to Russia; guaranteed the independence of
Montenegro, Servia, and Roumania; decreed that the territory
of Montenegro should be more than trebled in size, and that
of Servia increased by extensions in the south; and most
important of all, provided for the erection of a greater Bulgaria
that should consist of territory extending from the Black Sea
to the Ægean, and westward to include nearly the whole of
Macedonia. This greater Bulgaria was to remain under the
suzerainty of the Porte, but at the same time was to be under
the surveillance of a Russian commission during the drafting
of a constitution and under the protection of the Russian army
for five years. Had this treaty gone into effect, not only would
the Bulgarians again have come into possession of land and
cities that had been the homes of their emperors and have
been freed from all direct interference of the Sultan, but the Otto-
man Empire would have been severed into four parts, Constan-
tinople and its environs on the east, the isthmus of Salonika on
the south, Thessaly and Albania on the south-west and west,
and on the north-west, Bosnia, the Herzegovina, and the Sand-
jak of Novibazar, territories so far separated as to be unable to
communicate with one another. Such a partition would have
blotted out the Ottoman Empire as a European power, and
have given the very heart of its territory to Bulgaria, a state
whose people had had little training in matters of administra-
tion and government, and were too little experienced as a race
to be raised so suddenly to a position of such importance.

The treaty of San Stefano not only pointed to a Russian pro-
tectorate in the future, but it set aside the treaties of 1856 and
1871; and such a violent attack upon the integrity of Turkey
could be allowed only when agreed to by all the Powers sitting
in a general congress. England, who had already declared that
she would not recognise any treaty made between Russia and
Turkey that might alter the conditions of 1856, no sooner heard of the treaty of San Stefano than she determined to prevent its execution. With this object in view, she announced that she would not send representatives to a general congress unless Russia would consent to submit the terms of the treaty without exception to the discussion of those governments which had signed the treaties of 1856 and 1871. And England was supported by Austria, who saw that Bosnia and the Herzegovina as independent states would prevent her territorial extension south-eastward; and by France, whose new foreign minister, Waddington, was friendly to England, and desired only that the subjects of Egypt, Syria, and the Holy Places should not be discussed by the congress. Disraeli resolved, therefore, to defy Russia; and having accepted the resignation of Derby, placed Salisbury in his stead, strengthened the fleet at the isle of Princes before Constantinople, and dispatched new troops to Malta, he declared that the treaty of San Stefano was contrary to the interests of England.

Russia would gladly have accepted the defiance, but she was unprepared for another war, and, what was of greatest importance, was without an ally in Europe. Bismarck, who had been willing to serve the Czar as long as it was politic to do so, preferred at this juncture to make advances to Austria rather than to Russia; and not only refused to bind himself to support Russia, but made it clear that he favoured the plan of submitting the entire treaty to the decision of a congress. The Czar, thus isolated, consented to treat with England, and on May 30th, 1878, secretly signed with her a compact, by which he agreed to the chief modifications that were afterward made in the treaty of San Stefano. Five days after this had been done, England, having won her first point, made a secret treaty with the Porte, and in return for a promise to protect the Turks against Russian aggression in the Caucasus, gained the consent of the Sultan to occupy the island of Cyprus. This scheme of
Disraeli's to secure for England a share in the territory of the Ottoman Empire, on pretence of protecting her, could not have been unknown to Russia, for it had been hinted at in the agreement of May 30th.

The congress opened at Berlin June 13, 1878, and just a month later the final treaty was signed. There were present the plenipotentiaries of England, France, Austria, Germany, Italy, and Russia, and on special occasions the representatives of Greece, Roumania, and Persia were admitted to present their particular claims. The object of the congress was to examine line by line the terms of the treaty of San Stefano, and to modify them in the interest of peace and the European equilibrium; and its conclusions were to form a new law for Europe in all that related to the Eastern Question. During the twenty sittings, the battle royal was between England, represented by Disraeli and Salisbury, and Russia, represented by Gortchakoff and Schuvaloff, while Prince Bismarck, as presiding officer and "honest broker," tried to calm the troubled waters. In the interest of harmony, Germany took sides with England and France, and as, in the main, the other Powers, Austria and Italy, voted against Russia, that Power on such crucial questions as the division of Bulgaria and the cession of Bessarabia, fought the battle alone. She had entered the congress in the hope, as Gortchakoff remarked in the seventh session, that the laurels of war might be converted into the olive branches of peace; but save for the cession of Bessarabia, which Russia insisted on as a point of honour, and the independence of the Balkan states, which all the Powers desired to effect, she suffered defeat at every point, and scarcely a single important condition of the treaty of San Stefano was preserved. The diplomats with Disraeli as their leader, in their determination to reduce the Russian gains to a minimum and curtail the territory of the Slavic peoples of the Balkan peninsula, divided Bulgaria, cut down the boundaries of Montenegro, favoured an extension of
the frontier of Greece, and gave Bosnia and the Herzegovina to Austria. Little wonder is it that Gortchakoff should have asked with some bitterness at the fifteenth session, after most of the work had been accomplished, that the congress make known the principles and the method according to which it meant to insure the execution of its august decrees. But he got no satisfactory answer; for at England's suggestion the congress refused to consider his proposal, declaring that the signatures to the treaty were a sufficient guarantee of its intention to watch and control the execution of its decisions.

The treaty of Berlin was signed on July 13, 1878. In accordance with its terms the greater Bulgaria of the San Stefano treaty was divided into three parts, Macedonia, which was given back without reserve to the Porte, Eastern Roumelia, which was simply a diplomatic name invented by Disraeli for southern Bulgaria, and Bulgaria proper, consisting of the territory between the Danube and the Balkans; Montenegro was cut down one third; Servia was slightly increased in size; and Turkey, though compelled by Russia to restore Khotour and its environs to Persia, received back Erzeroum, the Bajazid, and the valley of the Alachkerd. Russia received a new outlet on the Black Sea, Batoum, and retained, not only a large portion of northern Armenia, a possession which at a later time determined her attitude on the Armenian question, but, despite the bitter opposition of the Roumanian envoys at the congress, Bessarabia also, giving in return the land of the Dobrudsha, which Roumania did not wish. By other conditions of the treaty, Bosnia and the Herzegovina were placed under the military administration of Austria, and the Greek frontier was extended to include Thessaly and Epirus, though in the arrangement, as finally perfected in 1881, Epirus was left in the hands of Turkey. Furthermore, Roumania, Servia, and Montenegro, were declared independent states; Bulgaria was made independent, save for the payment of annual tribute to Turkey, and
was given the right of choosing her own prince, though the appointment was to be approved by the Powers and confirmed by the Porte; Eastern Roumelia was made autonomous in matters of administration, and was allowed a Christian governor-general, nominated by the Porte for five years with the consent of the Powers, although the province still remained under the political and military authority of the Sultan. Freedom of worship and equality before the law were proclaimed for the Ottoman Empire, and in Servia and Roumania full political rights were granted to the Jews.

The treaty of Berlin seriously imperilled the friendship of Russia and the central European Powers, and made more bitter than ever the rivalry between Slav and German. The Russian minister could not forgive Bismarck for having failed him at the congress; the Russian people were enraged that the Slavic cause should have received such humiliating treatment at the hands of Bismarck and Andrassy, the representatives of the German and Magyar races. During the winter of 1878 and 1879 the Russian officials, press, and people denounced Bismarck's policy, and charged the chancellor with betraying their friends and defending their enemy; the Russian government massed troops upon the frontier; at public meetings Russian generals made warlike speeches; and in certain quarters there was talk of war. The race feeling grew more bitter when Austria attempted to carry out her part of the treaty. Bosniaks and Herzegovinians resisted the Austrian troops; the Servians, disillusioned regarding a greater Servia, thought for the moment of calling in Bulgarians and Russians to aid them in preventing Austria from occupying Bosnia and cutting off the Slavs of Servia from those of Bosnia and Montenegro; and within Austria-Hungary, Czechs and Serbs, sympathising with the Servians regarding the Austrian occupation of Bosnia, renewed with greater determination than before the struggle against dualism.
Owing to these manifestations of the hostility of the Slavs, Bismarck proposed to Austria that she and Germany bind themselves together more firmly by a formal treaty of alliance, as a protection against possible Russian aggression. Francis Joseph, meeting the German chancellor half-way, consented as an act of amity to abrogate the clause of the treaty of Prague (1866) regarding the cession of northern Schleswig to Denmark, and in October, 1879, signed a secret treaty of peace and mutual defence. By this treaty both states were bound to assist with their entire strength, in case either were attacked by Russia, and to conclude peace only in common; or if either were attacked by some other Power than Russia, by France, for instance, the other was to remain neutral, assisting only in case Russia should give aid to the attacking Power. The dual alliance thus formed became a triple alliance with the admission, in 1882, of Italy, who, disturbed by the colonial policy of the Ferry ministry in France, deemed it wise to turn to Germany and Austria for protection.

But in forming this triple alliance Bismarck had another object in view than the preservation of peace; he wished to bring about the isolation of France in Europe: and in attaining his end, he was greatly aided by those conflicting interests which made a counter-alliance of the remaining states for the time being impossible. After the congress of Berlin, while internal reforms and territorial extensions in the east were diverting the attention of Russia from the affairs of the west, the clashing interests of France, England, and Italy were tending to diminish, rather than increase the friendship of these countries for one another. The first note of discord had been struck when England accepted Cyprus as a pourboire for the assistance she had rendered Turkey, an act that France deemed contrary to the spirit of the alliance into which they had entered at the congress of Berlin. Ferry’s scheme for the colonial expansion of France, which drove Italy over to the side of Germany and
might well have aroused alarm in England, did not disturb for
the moment the harmony, largely because Gladstone, who sup-
planted Disraeli in 1880, turned his attention to internal affairs,
and assumed a conciliatory attitude toward the Powers abroad.
But in 1883, after the revolt of Arabi Pasha and the uprising
of the Mahdi in the Soudan had involved England in a serious
war for the defence of Egypt, France, under the ministry of
Freycinet, refused to co-operate, the entente was broken, and, on
the return of Ferry to the head of the ministry in the same
year, the colonial policy was renewed more vigorously than be-
fore, and the rivalry with England began in earnest. Supported
by Germany, whose interests in colonial matters were the same
as those of France, France began to extend the sphere of her
influence in West Africa, Indo-China, and the Upper Nile, and
to provoke thereby a quarrel with England which has lasted
for fifteen years.

While colonial rivalry was thus disturbing the friendly rela-
tions between France and England, the attitude of Russia was
equally advantageous to Bismarck. Although the events of
1878 and 1879 had increased the hostility of the Slavs for the
Germans, nevertheless the "alliance of the three Emperors"
continued to exist until the death of Alexander II. in 1881, be-
because of the personal regard which he had for the Emperors
of Austria and Germany. Even then the peace was not
broken, for the new Czar, though personally disliking the
Germans, proclaimed on his accession that his foreign policy
would be entirely pacific. In September, 1884, when the three
Emperors met at Skiernevice, Alexander III., fearing the
Nihilists, who since 1881 had been unusually aggressive, and
anticipating complications with England, who was disturbed
by Russia's seizure of Merv and Pendjeh in 1884, concluded
with Germany a secret treaty, which bound each of the two
Powers to remain neutral in case either of them were attacked
by some outside Power.
Thus in 1885 Bismarck occupied a peculiarly strong position in Europe. He controlled the triple alliance and was the inspirer of its policy; by virtue of the recent treaty with Russia he was influential at the court of St. Petersburg; and he was on terms of friendship with France, with whom he was in close accord upon the colonial question. Furthermore, by his own colonial policy, which he had adopted only the year before, he had gained for Germany important possessions in Africa; and in 1885 at the international conference at Berlin, over which he himself had presided, had in the main carried his point in opposing England and Portugal upon the question of free commerce and navigation in the Congo. At no time in his career as a statesman had he seemed more influential than in 1885, and at no time for fifteen years had peace been so definitely assured as at this juncture. Then it was that events in the east attracted once more the attention of the European Powers.

Since 1878 the states of the Balkan peninsula had shown an extraordinary amount of independence and national enterprise, as each in its own way and under a constitutional form of government, strove to solve the vital questions of internal and external politics. In 1881 Roumania, by an act of her Parliament and with the consent of the Powers, had become a kingdom, and in 1885, when the Roumanian church was removed from the control of the Greek patriarch at Constantinople, obtained entire ecclesiastical independence. The management of her government during these years had been in the hands of the liberals, and the building of railways and the promotion of agrarian reforms testified to her progress. Servia, which had become a constitutional government in 1869 and a kingdom in 1881, had been kept in a state of disturbance by liberals, progressists, and radicals, who, jealous of one another, were at constant war among themselves and with the monarchy. In 1883, the National Assembly (Skupitichina) had become so radical in tone that the king, Milan I., found it necessary to effect
its overthrow by a coup d'État and to suppress a radical uprising among the peasantry by force of arms. He had then established a centralised administration, reorganised the army after the European model, adopted a high protective tariff, changed the system of taxation, and limited the powers of the communes. Thus, in 1885, Servia was in reality an absolute monarchy. Montenegro had little history during these seven years save that involved in the alteration of her boundary; and Greece was concerned, as were all the states to a greater or less extent, with the struggles of parties, the payment of indebtedness, and the acquisition of territory.

But Bulgaria had been the chief actor in events of greater importance. Rescued from the Turks as she had been by the military prowess of Russia, and governed, during the first year of her independence, by a people inexperienced in affairs of state, it is not strange that she should have accepted her constitution from Russia, should have admitted Russians to the most important administrative and military posts, and should have deferred to the wishes of Russia in selecting her first prince, Alexander of Battenberg. However, until the death of the Czar, Alexander II., in 1881, Russia interfered but little in the government of the new state, and the prince experienced his chief trouble with the National Assembly (Sobranje), which disliking Russia and desiring the annexation of Eastern Roumelia to Bulgaria, strenuously opposed his pro-Russian policy. In 1881, having become convinced that the radical leaders were aiming to get control of the real authority in the state; and unwilling to become a mere puppet in the principality, Prince Alexander suspended the constitution, and demanded extraordinary powers for seven years. Having gained this point, he formed a ministry of Russian generals, and for two years continued his government as if he were the prince of a Russian protectorate. But as this coup d'État had brought about merely a change of masters, prince and people were no
better satisfied than before. Moreover, the national party had been working secretly in the country, rousing the loyalty of the Bulgarian peasantry and encouraging them in their hostility to the Russians; while the prince, also stirred by national enthusiasm, had been growing daily more sympathetic with the cause of the patriots. Therefore, in 1883, having wearied of the intolerable insolence of the Russian officials, who were aiming at nothing less than the establishment of a regular Russian régime in Bulgaria, he answered an address of the National Assembly by restoring the constitution, an act which so enraged the Russians that they withdrew at once, not only from the Assembly, but from all administrative posts as well, and left the prince free to select his advisers from the liberal party.

Meanwhile the people of Eastern Roumelia had been conspiring to rid themselves of Turkish rule; for though they had been organised according to the plan drawn up at Berlin, with a governor, directory, provincial council, and a national militia, they had remained at heart, as they were in blood, Bulgarian. Finally, people, council, and functionaries, rose in revolt against the Turkish authorities, and in September, 1885, quietly and without bloodshed arrested and imprisoned the governor and the commander of the militia, established a provisional government, and sent to Prince Alexander to ask him to annex them to Bulgaria and to send them aid. The moment was a critical one for both prince and people: to annex Roumelia was to defy Turkey, to break the terms of the treaty of Berlin, and, above all else, to court the anger of Russia and the Czar; to refuse to annex her, was to defy the whole Bulgarian nation, to leave the insurgents to be treated as rebels, and possibly to provoke in Eastern Roumelia a civil war between Christians and Musulmans. Swayed by these reasons, Alexander chose to turn from Russia and throw in his lot with his adopted people; and on September 20th, assumed the title of Prince of North and South Bulgaria.
When the news of this event got abroad, Turkey protested, but, unable, on account of affairs in Constantinople, to spare troops for the subjugation of the province, made no effort to coerce the rebels; but the other two Balkan states, Greece and Servia, were not disposed to take the matter so lightly. Ambitious to extend their own territory at the expense of Turkey, they looked upon the annexation of Eastern Roumelia to Bulgaria as an aggression on the part of Bulgaria that was unjustifiable, in that it threatened the equilibrium of the peninsula. Greece in great excitement prepared for war, and was prevented from making a formal declaration only by the timely intervention of the Powers, who sent a fleet to Suda bay. But Servia, where jealousy of Bulgaria had been increased in recent years by disputes over frontier and tariff questions, was more successful, and on November 15th declared war. Dependent entirely upon their own resources, for the Czar, Alexander III., enraged by the defiance of Prince Alexander, had withdrawn all Russian officers from Bulgaria, the people, Christians and Mussulmans alike, bound more closely than ever to their brave leader, threw themselves courageously into the struggle. On November 19, 1885, they won a decisive battle over the Servians at Slivnitza, and had it not been for the intervention of the Austrian envoy, who in the name of the Powers forbade them to advance, they would have occupied Belgrade, the Servian capital. On December 22d an armistice was arranged; and although in the peace that followed Bulgaria received from Servia neither territory nor indemnity, she was content with having won Eastern Roumelia, and having fused all of her people into one compact national whole. The "impregnable frontier" which, at the congress of Berlin, Disraeli had erected in the Balkans as a bar to Russia's advance southward, had failed to keep apart the two divisions of the Bulgarian nation.

Nor was the European concert disposed to interfere in behalf
of the violated clause of the treaty of Berlin, and in a conference that was held at Constantinople in November, 1885, Russia was alone in opposing the annexation to Bulgaria of Eastern Roumelia. Annoyed that her plan for controlling even a small Bulgaria had been thwarted by the people themselves, she did not hesitate to withdraw from the position she had held at Berlin in 1878. England also changed her policy, and through her representative, Sir William White, declared that she would not support anyone who should attempt to drive out the prince from Eastern Roumelia. With Bismarck, however, who at this time controlled the diplomacy of Europe, the decision rested. Although he declared that the Eastern Question had no interest for Germany, and that if Russia managed the matter in a quiet and diplomatic way he should not deny her right to interfere in the affairs of the Balkan states, nevertheless, he made it clear that Germany would not aid Russia in recovering her influence, and implied, that if she should attempt to do this by force, or should in any way threaten in the Balkan peninsula the peace of Europe, Germany would reserve the right to interfere. Thus Russia, finding no support in the west, was obliged to accept such terms as were agreed upon by the conference. In a second meeting at Constantinople the Powers, who were unwilling to depart from the letter of the treaty of Berlin, consented to accept the compromise to which the Porte had agreed after the victory of Slivnitza, and recognised Prince Alexander as governor-general of Eastern Roumelia. Such an arrangement proved to be, however, but a diplomatic device to conceal the actual union of the two parts of the Bulgarian nation.

Russia was thoroughly angry, not only because Germany and Austria had not supported her, but chiefly because Prince Alexander, with the aid of the Bulgarians, had dared to defy the Czar. Unable longer to act openly, she now tried secret intriguing for the purpose of overthrowing the authority of the prince and of driving him from his throne. Once before, in
1883, an attempt had been made to kidnap him, but had failed. But in August, 1886, he was seized in his palace at Sofia, forced to abdicate under threat of death, and was taken first to Reni, on the Russian side of the Danube, and thence to Lemberg, in Austria-Hungary, where he was set free. During his absence, the conspirators, Clement the Metropolitan, Zankoff, and Gruieff, established a pro-Russian ministry, and declaring Bulgaria to be under the protection of the Czar, prepared to restore Russia's influence in the principality. But the Russian partisans had reckoned without the Bulgarian people and army, who, convinced that Russian rule meant only evil to Bulgaria, rose against the conspirators, and within five days after the abdication of the prince, overthrew the new ministry, and in conjunction with Stambuloff, president of the Assembly, established a provisional government. At the request of his people Alexander returned to Bulgaria, but fearing that his restoration would only increase the woes of his country because of Russia's ill-will toward himself, he threw himself, in a moment of weakness, on the mercy of the Czar, and offered to leave Bulgaria if the latter demanded it. The Czar did so demand: on September 7th the prince abdicated the throne, and on the 8th left Bulgaria forever.

Bulgaria, left for the moment without a leader, was governed by three regents, whom the prince had appointed before his departure. Immediately the Russian party made strenuous efforts to recover control, and through General Kaulbars carried on an active campaign to prevent the summoning of the Assembly, which they knew would certainly demand the election of a prince and the restoration of the constitution. But Kaulbars failed ignominiously, and in the elections of October, 1886, the patriots won an overwhelming victory. Having been prevented from making Bulgaria a Russian prefecture, the Czar tried the plan of rejecting Prince Waldemar, of Denmark, whom the Assembly elected, proposing instead a
Caucasian candidate, the Prince of Mingrelia. But the Assembly refused to accept the Czar's candidate, and chose, after some delay, Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, who consented to become the new prince of Bulgaria in spite of the fact that the Czar refused to recognise him. Though the European governments could not confirm the election, and so make him a legal ruler according to the treaty of Berlin, inasmuch as the Assembly that had elected him contained members from South Bulgaria, which was still legally only Eastern Roumelia, yet both England and Austria, as individual governments, were friendly to Bulgaria, and Russia did not dare to interfere openly in Bulgarian affairs.

Beaten at Sofia, Russia now vented her wrath upon Germany and Austria, who with England were opposing her everywhere in the Balkan peninsula. Caustic articles had already appeared in the Moscow press in 1886, army officers were making speeches derogatory of Austria, and army corps were massed upon the Polish frontier. These indications of hostility, taken in conjunction with others suggestive of trouble between Germany and France, such as the arrest of Schnaebelé, the efforts of Déroulède's League of the Patriots to revive the policy of "revenge," and the appearance of Boulanger as minister of war in France, gave rise to rumours of war. Bismarck, knowing that the peace would not be broken, for the Czar was still bound by the secret treaty of 1884, encouraged the war rumours in order to strengthen his own control over the Reichstag; at the same time, as a warning to the war parties of Russia and France, he made public the treaty with Austria of 1879, and in the famous speech of February 6, 1888, disclosed the policy of Germany, and declared that the Germans feared God, but nothing else in the world. Alexander, ignoring the opinions of Ignatieff and the army leaders, clung to his policy of peace; and, with the defeat of Boulanger, fears of a general European conflict disappear.
Russia's isolation among the Powers, to which Alexander referred, when in 1889 he spoke of the Prince of Montenegro as "Russia's only faithful and sincere friend," was made somewhat more complete after the dismissal of Bismarck; for Caprivi, his successor, refused to renew the treaty with Russia, and in July, 1890, entered into an agreement with England, whereby the island of Heligoland was exchanged for territory in eastern Africa. It is hardly surprising, in view of the friendly relations existing between England and Germany, and of the possible formation of a quadruple alliance, that, beginning with 1891, the two isolated Powers, Russia and France, should have drawn more closely together. A French fleet visited Cronstadt in July, 1891, and in 1893 a Russian squadron was received at Toulon with joyful demonstrations of friendship on the part of the French. The situation was a little better defined when, in the same month of 1893, England sent six warships to Tarentum, where Italy was holding a naval review, both as an expression of amity, and an indication that she meant to preserve the equilibrium of the Mediterranean. The entente between Russia and France took outwardly at least the appearance of an alliance when in 1896, Nicolas II. visited Paris, and the next year President Faure visited St. Petersburg.

After 1890 the Balkan states were no longer a matter of concern to the European concert. Roumania, with but little history to recount, continued her internal improvements, increasing the number of her railways, and encouraging literature and art. The marriage of the heir-apparent, Prince Ferdinand, the king's nephew, with Marie of Edinburgh, strengthened Roumania's position abroad, while the birth of a son, who was baptised in the Greek faith in 1893, strengthened the dynasty at home. The state was at last established, as King Charles said in his Jubilee address of 1891, upon indestructible foundations. In Bulgaria, from 1887 to 1894 the tendencies were distinctly anti-Russian; and Stambuloff, the prime minister, was remark-
ably successful in suppressing conspiracies against the government,—of which that of Panitza in 1890 was the most serious,—and aroused admiration for his statesmanship by obtaining from Constantinople important privileges both religious and educational for the Bulgarians of Macedonia. But his lack of tact in dealing with his sovereign led to an estrangement that ended in his dismissal from office in 1894; and from that time Prince Ferdinand followed a policy of his own. Having become more firmly established at home by his marriage in 1893 and the birth of an heir the year following, the prince deliberately adopted a policy of reconciliation with Russia, and in 1896 allowed his son, Boris, to be converted formally to the Greek faith and to be rebaptised in the presence of a special envoy of the Czar. The results of his policy were most satisfactory. On March 14, 1896, he received from the Porte a confirmation of his election, and during the month of April visited St. Petersburg and Paris, where he was received by the Czar and President Faure. On August 17, 1897, he visited Constantinople, and did homage to his suzerain for his principality, apparently with the hope of gaining advantages which would strengthen Bulgaria's hold upon Macedonia.

The history of Servia after 1885 had not been such as to increase her reputation as a constitutional state. Her unfortunate war with Bulgaria had not only ruined the standing of her army and burdened her with a heavy debt, but it had greatly weakened the authority of King Milan. In 1888, the radicals, who had been in the opposition since 1880, came into control, and the Russian party supplanted the Austrian at Belgrade. The first result of this shifting of party relations was a revision of the constitution, whereby the powers of the king were diminished and those of the Assembly increased. This act, together with quarrels in the royal family between King Milan, who opposed pan-Slavism, and Queen Natalie, who, as a Russian, encouraged it, led to the resignation of the king in 1889, and
the appointment of a regency to act during the minority of the
heir-apparent, Prince Alexander. But the growing strength
of the radicals, who were determined to inaugurate a full par-
liamentary régime, threatened to eclipse the royal power; and
in 1893, young Alexander, acting with the advice of his father,
declared himself of age, and took the government into his own
hands. He arrested the regents, dissolved the Assembly, and
in 1894 abolished the constitution of 1888 and re-established
that of 1869. Then, breaking entirely with the radicals, he
established an autocratic government. Friendly to Austria,
and ambitious to promote the welfare of his country along eco-
nomic and financial lines, Alexander I. made an effort to bring
to an end the party conflicts, which had hitherto hindered
Servia's progress, to come to an agreement with the radicals,
and to terminate the provisional régime, and in 1897, with
this object in view, appointed a committee to draft a new
constitution.

Inasmuch as the problems that Roumania, Bulgaria, and
Servia were called upon to solve were now no longer of a kind
to disturb the peace of Europe, the Eastern Question, after
1886, was narrowed to Turkey and her remaining dependencies,
Macedonia, Albania, Armenia, Syria, and Crete, where trouble
had recently arisen, and was certain to arise in the future. In
the affairs of Turkey herself there had been considerable
improvement. After 1878 she had concerned herself with carry-
ing out the terms of the treaty of Berlin, and had spent the next
couple years in negotiating with Montenegro and Greece regard-
ing their boundaries, with Austria regarding the occupation of
Bosnia, with Russia regarding the large indemnity owed her,
and with her bondholders throughout Europe, whose interests
had been provided for by a special arrangement in 1881. So
successfully had her finances been managed that by 1893, when
she paid punctually for the second time her annual instalment
to Russia, her financial reputation was in a large measure re-
stored in Europe, and capitalists were willing once more to consider Turkish loans. In government, Abdul Hamid II. had shown unexpected energy. In 1881 he had broken with the liberals and had banished Midhat Pasha to southern Arabia; in 1884, after effecting important changes in his ministry, he had taken the control of affairs from the hands of vizier and divan, and had become the personal governor of his Empire, with the party of Young Turkey in the opposition. At the same time he had freed himself from the influence of England and France, which had been pre-eminent in Turkey from 1877 to 1883, admitted Germans to important military and financial posts, and with the aid of von der Goltz, a Prussian officer, reorganised the Turkish army after the Prussian model. In 1890 the German influence was at its height; but after that time it declined, and the Sultan listened with more favour to the advice of Russia and France. After 1893, however, France lost her control, and Turkey showed herself more and more amenable to the wishes of Russia. This change was evinced by the recognition accorded to Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria in 1896, and by the deference of Turkey to Russia in the peace negotiations with Greece in 1897.

After 1889 and 1890 interest in the Eastern Question centred in the affairs of Armenia and Crete. Although outbreaks had occurred between Christians and Mussulmans in Syria, Yemen, Albania, and Tripolis, nowhere was the situation so serious as in Armenia, where were to be seen the beginnings of a movement for autonomy, and in Crete, where a struggle took place for entire independence from the suzerainty of the Sultan. The Armenian question had first received diplomatic recognition when, in the treaty of Berlin, the Porte promised to introduce without loss of time reforms into Armenia, and to protect the people,—Gregorian Christians,—against Circassians and Kurds. As England had made this promise one of the conditions of the Cyprus convention, it behooved the English government to see
that such a promise was kept; but during the ensuing decade nothing had been done. The growing prosperity of the Armenians, which was due to the continuance of peace, roused the cupidity of the Turkish tax collectors, who by their illegal exactions stirred the anger of the people and provoked bloody conflicts in 1889 and 1890. About this time an Armenian national party was formed, partly in Turkish, partly in Russian Armenia, which began to clamour for national autonomy and the reform of the administration of the vilayets. Thus, to the Turkish officials, the Armenians were not only Christians, but rebels. During 1894 atrocities were committed by the mountain Kurds, which were accompanied with acts of revenge on the part of the Armenians. In November, 1894, England, France, and Russia demanded the appointment of a committee of investigation, which, sitting at Mush, near Lake Van, drew up an elaborate scheme of reform. But the interference of the Powers would seem to have aroused a feeling of religious bitterness and to have given a new character to the massacres. Abdul Hamid, who had already adopted a pan-Islam policy, evaded the demands of the Powers by changing his ministers and making promises, and either he or his officials, as is commonly believed, authorized Mussulman emissaries to instigate the massacres of 1895 and 1896, which took the form of an attempt to Islamise the Armenians or to destroy them. Roused by these atrocities, the English people demanded that the government interfere; but Russia, on the ground that it was contrary to her interest to allow the consolidation of Armenia, as part of the Armenians were her subjects, declared that she did not desire in Armenia a second Bulgaria, and would protect the Porte: and in this position she was supported by Austria, France, and Germany. England, therefore, did nothing, Lord Salisbury declaring that she had not a sufficient army to occupy Turkish territory in the face of a Turkish force of 400,000 trained men and the opposition of the other Powers. The
matter was considerably complicated by the organisation in Constantinople of an Armenian revolutionary federation for revenge, and an attack by Armenians upon the Ottoman bank in August, 1896, as a protest against being abandoned by the Powers; but though further massacres took place in March, 1897, the Powers refused to act unless they could come to a common agreement in the matter.

The Cretan struggle was of a different character. Since 1868, the island, notwithstanding the reforms of 1868 and 1877, had been in a condition of perpetual unrest, and so heavy had become the burden of Turkish misrule that outbreaks occurred between Christians and Mussulmans in 1885 which culminated in the revolt of 1889 and the conquest of the island by the Turks. The Powers, however, intervened, and compelled the Sultan to raise the state of siege, abolish the war tribunals, and declare an amnesty. But attempts to reorganise justice in 1892, unrest among the agricultural population, and national discontent in 1894 prepared the way for a long and bitter struggle lasting from 1894 to 1896, in which the Candiotes, aided by the Greeks, resisted all Turkey’s efforts to suppress them. Notwithstanding the promise, finally given in July, 1896, that Crete should have partial autonomy and a Christian governor, the Candiotes were still dissatisfied, demanded independence, and renewing the struggle in July and August, 1896, defeated the Turks and established a provisional government. The Sultan in this emergency accepted the terms of the Powers, appointed a Christian governor, and promised new reforms. But during the winter of 1896 and 1897 owing to the delay in putting the reforms into execution, and to continued conflicts between Christians and Mussulmans, Greece, carried away by a pan-Hellenistic passion, though insufficiently supplied with money and with arms, entered into the struggle in defence of the freedom and annexation of Crete. During December, 1896, military preparations were begun, troops were concentrated on the
Macedonian frontier, and in February, 1897, a fleet of torpedo-boats and a detachment of men were despatched to Crete. But the Powers, who had their warships stationed at the island, refused to allow Greece to interfere; and issued a note commanding her to withdraw, and promising to confer upon Crete autonomy under the suzerainty of the Porte. During March and April the excitement in Greece was intense, for the people had no faith in autonomy and were enraged at the intervention of the Powers. Then it was, April 18, 1897, that Turkey, angered by raids of the Greek irregulars into Macedonia, declared war against Greece. The campaign that followed lasted until the middle of May, and proved disastrous to Greece, who, badly beaten, was forced to withdraw her forces from Crete, to accept the mediation of the Powers, and agree to autonomy for Crete. The remainder of the year was spent in efforts to settle the terms of peace and to secure a governor for the Candiotes. In the first particular, the Powers compelled Turkey to moderate her demands; they permitted only a slight rectification of the Grecian frontier, whereas Turkey had demanded all Thessaly; reduced by more than half the indemnity that Turkey claimed; and refused to allow the "capitulations" or special judicial privileges granted to the Greek inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire to be abolished. The terms were agreed upon September 18, 1897, but owing to a dispute regarding the evacuation of Thessaly by Turkish troops, the final treaty was not signed until the middle of December. In the second particular the Powers were less successful. Although the Cretan Assembly accepted the autonomy granted them, the Powers were unable to agree upon a governor. M. Droz, of Switzerland, was rejected by the Sultan, Colonel Schaeffer, of Luxembourg, by Russia, and Prince George, of Greece, proposed by the Czar and formally accepted by England and France, was opposed by Turkey and by Germany. In March, 1898, no candidate had been agreed upon.
At the close of the year 1897 two essentially different problems presented themselves in the east: one relating to the further dismemberment of European Turkey; the other to the position of the Christian subjects of the Porte, notably in Armenia and Crete, for whom the Powers had affected so large an interest. All the states of the south-east, Montenegro, Servia, Greece, and Bulgaria, with their eyes upon the "promised land" of Macedonia, were ambitious to increase their territory and to wield a larger political influence in the little world of the Balkan peninsula. But Greece had ruined her chances by the unfortunate war with Turkey, which cost her some of her own frontier fortresses and rendered her financially bankrupt. Bulgaria, on the other hand, though not an independent state, was stronger than either Servia or Montenegro; and possessed of a strong and well-drilled army under the leadership of a prince who had proved himself a shrewd and sagacious ruler, she stood ready to take advantage of any opportunity to gain once more the whole or a part of that land which she had lost by the decision of the congress of Berlin. In this struggle for possession of Ottoman territory Russia and Austria were Bulgaria’s dangerous rivals and were seemingly agreed that neither should act without the other. Russia, discarding her old-time solution of the Eastern Question, according to the principle of independent nationalities, desired the maintenance of Ottoman integrity, until that time should come when she might arrange a compromise with Austria regarding a partition of European Turkey; while Austria was satisfied to extend the sphere of her influence by means of her railways and her commercial treaties, and to win for herself if possible a new seaport at Salonika and a new stretch of territory in the south-east.

In all matters relating to the amelioration of the condition of his Christian subjects, the Sultan, stronger than ever by virtue of his military successes in the war with the Greeks, was determined and obstinate. That pressure from the Powers,
THE EASTERN QUESTION.

without which nothing of lasting advantage to the oppressed people of the Ottoman Empire could be gained, had not been applied, and it was evident, from the attitude of the European concert toward the Armenian, Cretan, and Turco-Greek questions, that other motives were determining the action of the Powers than a disinterested regard for the settlement of the Eastern Question. Of greater importance to the states of the west than the problem of Turkey's place in Europe and her relation to her subject peoples were the problems of colonial expansion and commercial supremacy. By 1895 England and Russia had exactly reversed the policies according to which they had acted in 1876; the former desiring to intervene to protect the Armenians, the Cretans, and the Greeks, the latter refusing to interfere, and insisting on the maintenance of the entire independence of the Porte. But the attitude of the other Powers in the European concert was no longer determined by the motives that had prevailed in the days when the concert had been a reality, and France and England had stood together in defence of liberal institutions against the members of the Holy Alliance. The natural alliances of the earlier period, based on a similarity of political ideas and principles, had given place to a new arrangement due to similarity of industrial and commercial interests. It is true that Austria, Germany, and Russia united to defend the integrity of the Ottoman Empire out of a common regard for the monarchical principle; but it is equally true that England was isolated in her defence of the Armenians and Cretans, not for any political reasons, but because of the existence of a silent commercial war in which all the other Powers were ranged against her. The fact that for two centuries England had been the great commercial Power in Europe and had in the main monopolised the carrying trade of the world made a conflict inevitable whenever the other Powers, in their desire to extend the area of their industrial activity, to open up new markets for their products, and to in-
crease their wealth, should enter the field in competition with England. Thus France, who was England's natural ally, supported the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and opposed England, not because she was especially loyal to the Ottoman cause, but rather because the settlement of the Congo and Niger questions were of greater consequence in increasing her power and extending her prestige. As in Africa the interests of Germany and France were identical, so, in China, France, Germany, and Russia stood together against England and Japan. The attitude of the European Powers toward the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire was to be determined in China, India, and Africa rather than in Europe, and in consequence the final settlement of the Eastern Question seemed to be indefinitely postponed.
CHAPTER IX.

THE THIRD REPUBLIC.

Though for fifty years previous to 1870 the political history of France had been one of revolutions and reactions; though, outwardly, the governments had seemed unstable, and political opinions without conviction; nevertheless, under the surface, the progress of education, of industrial and social reform, and of political ideas had been unbroken and definite. Held firm by that mechanism of administration which she had received as an inheritance from the first Napoleon, and which had remained almost unchanged from government to government, France had suffered but little from actual disorder in the business routine of the state; and in all that concerned the life and thought of the people, had undergone a real historical development. That this development had been in the direction of republican ideas and principles, the events of the future were to show. Notwithstanding the fact that for eighteen years France had borne the name and burden of empire, the people in 1870, particularly of those classes that had not received the imperial patronage, had no real sympathy for imperialism or an absolute form of government. The frequent appeals of Napoleon III. to the principle of universal suffrage; the various revisions of the constitution in the interest of liberal and parliamentary institutions; the existence in the Corps législatif of a strong and influential republican opposition after 1863; the activity of the radicals during 1868 and 1869; and the constitutional changes of 1870, which the Emperor had hoped would
preserve his Empire;—all these had kept alive the republican spirit, and prepared the way for a new attempt to establish a permanent government for France.

On September 3, 1870, the news came to Paris that the army of the Empire had been defeated at Sedan, and that the Emperor was a prisoner. On the same date, at a night session of the Assembly, after General Palikao had confirmed this news, Jules Favre, representing the party of the Left, proposed to the deputies the dethronement of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte and his dynasty; and though the ministry sought to preserve the throne for the empress and her son, not a voice from the floor of the Chamber was raised in her behalf. The deputies, recognising the fact that the Empire had ceased to exist, prepared to establish a provisional government to take the control of affairs; but the legislative body of 1871, like that of 1848, was not allowed to act. After declaring that the deputies were not competent to decide the question, inasmuch as they had received their warrant from the Emperor, and were, by a considerable majority, committed to the cause of the liberal Empire, the indignant populace of Paris, long since alienated from the Empire, invaded the Chamber, and demanded that the republic be proclaimed. With the control of affairs thus wrested from them, the deputies were powerless; and Jules Favre, Gambetta, and the representatives from Paris hurried with the mob to the Hôtel de Ville, and there, in the presence of republicans and socialists, Gambetta proclaimed the republic. This event was no isolated one; for already the same had been done at Lyons, Marseilles, and Bordeaux, a fact which proves that this change of the government was the work, not of a Parisian mob, but of the republican party of France.

A provisional government was at once established, composed of eleven men, who were called upon in this serious crisis to negotiate with the invading Germans, to arm the country for defence, to gain from the people at large their sanction of the
republic through a national assembly chosen by universal suffrage, and to suppress the insurrection in Paris, where already the revolutionary leaders were preparing to establish the commune and to oppose the government. In September, the republicans were inclined to advocate peace; but by October, when King William and Bismarck, who at first insisted on recognising the regency of the empress, consented to treat with the provisional government, they had changed their minds, and having postponed the elections, were making every effort to continue the war. The result was unfortunate; for the provisional government, though unauthorised and revolutionary, was forced to continue in office to the end of the war, and to leave the impression in the country that the republicans, as a party, were committed to a warlike policy.

Therefore, when the polls were opened on February 8, 1871, for the election of deputies, after Paris had finally been starved into surrender, and the armistice of January 28th had been signed, nearly five hundred monarchists were returned to the Assembly, as a reply from the country to Gambetta’s war policy. The new body, which held its first sitting at Bordeaux on February 12th, not only refused to proclaim the republic, but, unwilling to commit itself to the term ‘president,’ also elected as ‘chief of the executive power,’ Thiers, whose sympathies had always been monarchical. In his turn, Thiers ignored the revolutionary republicans when selecting his ministers, and made known his determination to work for harmony and the reorganisation of France. The Assembly, accepting his program, decreed the peace, and voted to transfer the seat of government to Versailles; but before the deputies could gather at the new capital, the commune had been erected in Paris and civil war had begun.

The first, and probably the most important, cause for this uprising against the government is traceable to the hostility that the social democrats cherished for the monarchists and
moderates, who were threatening to overthrow the republic. The socialists of Paris, fearing that the Assembly would attempt to restore the monarchy by a coup d'état, or else would establish a bourgeois republic committed to peace and material prosperity, determined to force upon France a socialistic régime that would involve a definite change in the structure of government and the relation of classes. But behind this opposition of parties lay the hostility of the great municipal centres for the provinces. The deputies in the Assembly had been elected, in the main, by the rural classes, and in the presence of this dead weight of conservatism, as the radicals called it, the thirty revolutionary republicans who represented Paris found themselves a helpless minority. The Parisians feared that this conservative majority of the Assembly would decapitalise France, take from Paris the leadership she had possessed for so many years, and silence the voice of her people who had spoken in 1830 and 1848, and were ready in 1871 to support once more the cause of the true republic. Thus two causes may be assigned for the insurrection: the hatred of the revolutionary radicals for the monarchists and the moderate republicans; and the determination of a small group of socialists in Paris to emancipate the city from the control of the country, to win communal independence and autonomy, not only for themselves, but also for all the great cities of France, and to give the management of affairs into the hands of a federal body composed of representatives from the municipalities. But honest devotion to the cause of the republic and the commune was soon overshadowed by the violence and brutality of the mob, which, dominated by passion and cruelty, revolutionary madness and love of insurrection, and driven by want, misery, and distress, took advantage of the occasion furnished by the leaders of the movement and gave to it a character almost unexampled in the history of insurrectionary uprisings.

The national guard, which consisted of some two hundred
thousand of the able-bodied men of Paris and was kept armed during the siege, became the army of the insurrection that the federal and socialist leaders were able to turn against the state. As early as October, 1870, and again in January, 1871, the Communists had risen in insurrection; and inasmuch as it was agreed that the national guard should retain its arms while the terms of the capitulation were under discussion, conditions favoured another and more serious outbreak. In February, a central committee of the national guard had been created to direct the elections, to defend the republic, and to assume control of the government of Paris; and on March 18th, when the government at Versailles attempted to seize the cannon which this committee had transferred to the heights of Montmartre, it was the national guard who repulsed the government troops, and captured and shot Thomas and Lecomte, two of the government’s generals. Without further resistance, the regular troops withdrew from the city, and left the radicals in full control. Paris was isolated in the struggle by the failure of the attempt to erect the commune in Toulouse, Limoges, Lyons, Marseilles, Narbonne, and St. Étienne, so that when after March 22d efforts to effect a reconciliation between the government and the revolutionists proved unsuccessful because neither side would accept a compromise, civil war broke out between Paris and the rest of France.

By the elections of March 26th, the commune of Paris was established. Though the central committee, the original membership of which had been almost entirely changed between February 15th and March 18th, remained to exercise supervisory functions, a general council was created made up of Blanquists, members of the International, and revolutionary republicans, which, through its ten committees, of which the general executive was the most important, was to take direct control of the communal government. The republican calendar and the red flag were adopted, and all available men in the city
were put under requisition for the military defence. But the communal organisation proved astonishingly inefficient. The executive committee was replaced on April 20th by another made up of delegates from each of the other nine; this in turn was set aside on May 1st for a committee of public safety, similar to that of 1793; and this gave way ten days later to another similar committee, which proved as incompetent as the others to govern the city and to resist the siege.

The failure of the communal organisation to control the movement was due, in part, to incompetency, and, in part, to quarrels and dissensions among the members. Either the committees did nothing, or if they issued orders and gave directions, the latter were not heeded by those who should have obeyed. The fact that the theory of the commune was held by but a minority of the leaders and vaguely understood at best, made a settled plan of action impossible; while the utter absence of serious purpose on the part of the rank and file of the Communists, the personal jealousies, cries of treachery, and unrestrained licence of the disorderly element to whom revolution was the sport of the hour, made order and discipline difficult to enforce. Furthermore, the rapid progress of the siege, which was begun by the Versaillese on April 2d and was continued without break to the end of May, drove the population within the city to desperation, and tended to throw the control of the movement into the hands of the more violent insurrectionists. The reprisals on both sides were frightful. Insurgents taken in arms were shot without mercy by the government; while the Communists, passing beyond the control of their leaders, and mad with the desire of revenge, turned on the city, and between the 16th and 22d of May committed outrages of the most violent character. The earnestness and the honesty of purpose that actuated some of the promoters of the movement are to-day lost sight of, so destructive was the vandalism of that last week of the commune, which witnessed the plunder-
ing of the house of Thiers, the downfall of the column Vendôme, and the burning of the Tuileries, the Hôtel de Ville, and others of the finest public buildings of Paris. And as the crowning act against humanity, at the time when the Versailles were entering the city, the hostages, to the number of two hundred, were shot down in cold blood at the cemetery Père la Chaise. This murderous régime was brought to an end by the capture of the city; but in its turn the revenge of the government was fearful in its severity. Many of the insurgents were shot; 7,500 were transported to New Caledonia, and some 13,000 were condemned to prison or exile. The work of the military tribunals was not completed for five years, and, until 1880, the question of amnesty and the pardoning of the condemned kept alive the bitterness engendered by one of the most bloody and costly of modern insurrectionary movements.

With the overthrow of the commune in Paris, the history of the republic begins. The Assembly, though elected for the sole purpose of concluding the peace, remained to govern the country and to draft the constitution. Convinced by the supplemental elections of July, which returned eighty-five republicans out of one hundred and fourteen deputies chosen, that should it dissolve, an assembly would be elected which would certainly proclaim the republic, it voted to confer upon itself constituent powers. But once in office, it determined to postpone as long as possible the settlement of the question of the constitution; and that the ministry might proceed at once to the consideration of measures that would insure prosperity to France, agreed to a temporary arrangement known as the "Compact of Bordeaux," and on August 31, 1871, passed the Rivet law, conferring upon Thiers the title "President of the Republic."

The first questions considered were financial; France owed more than eleven milliards of francs, of which nearly six milliards, including interest, were owed to Germany for the war indemnity. There is no better evidence of the prosperity that
had existed under the Second Empire, of the advantages accruing from the many commercial treaties that had been made between 1860 and 1866, than the manner in which this debt was paid. The two-milliard loan of June, 1871, and the three-milliard loan of July, 1872, were covered many times over by subscribers, not only in France, but in England, Holland, and Germany; and the indebtedness was paid, not by drawing on domestic capital, but by transferring to Germany credits accumulated abroad during ten years of commercial prosperity. In consequence of this rapid payment of the debt, Thiers was enabled to effect the withdrawal of the German army of occupation two years before the time agreed upon. While this important work was being accomplished, matters of great moment were under consideration in the Assembly. Among the measures passed at this time, one reorganised the communes, and conferred upon the councils of the municipalities the right to elect the mayors except in the chief places of the cantons; another established universal military service for a short term, divided the army into the actives, the reserves, and the landwehr, changed the recruiting system, improved the equipment, and introduced periodical manœuvres; while others restoring the princes of the house of Orléans, increasing the internal-revenue taxes, and improving the budget, were likewise adopted.

While Thiers, in conjunction with the Right and Left Centres, was thus freeing the territory from foreign troops, restoring credit, increasing the powers of the municipalities, and remodelling the military system, the Legitimists and the radicals were seeking to discredit the Assembly by noisy obstruction within the Chamber and by hostile agitation without. By speeches, manifestoes, pilgrimages to the shrines of their church and their leader, and by incessant denunciation of the republic, the Legitimists were trying to effect the recall of the Count of Chambord, the restoration of the temporal power of the Pope, and were showing their support of the Carlist move-
ment in Spain and the ultramontane movement in Germany and Italy. On the other hand, the radicals, hostile to the republic because of its conservatism, were demanding the dissolution of the Assembly, and the election of a new body which should really represent the sovereignty of the people. Silenced by the events following the overthrow of the commune, and by the measures taken against the republican press, they spoke through Gambetta, chief of the extreme Left, who in his tours in the provinces from April to November, 1872, appealed to the republican spirit of France, and endeavoured to arouse the men of the new social classes, who were, he declared, henceforth to control the destinies of France. Though influential and eloquent, and loyal in his devotion to his country, Gambetta was too often hasty and intemperate, and by his speeches made at this critical time, rendered more difficult the conclusion of peace and the reorganisation of France.

With the close of the year 1872 came the question which could be postponed no longer, as to what the permanent form of the government should be. Thiers, whose administration, though strictly parliamentary, had been more or less personal in character, had gradually lost his popularity with the Assembly, partly because of his dictatorial manner, partly because of his unwillingness to break with the republicans and to come out positively for a monarchical form of government. The Right Centre, though willing to support him in reorganising the country, was opposed to any compromise with the Left, and demanded a "fighting government" which should war against the republicans for the erection of the monarchy. When, therefore, Thiers made it plain that he desired the permanency of the republic, as the government "which would divide parties the least," the Right Centre abandoned him, and elected in January, 1873, Buffet, one of its own members, as president of the Assembly. Nor did Thiers have the support of the extreme republicans, who, hating his conservatism, had elected
in April, 1873, their own candidate, Barodet, in Paris, instead of de Rémusat, the candidate of Thiers. Too liberal for the monarchists and too conservative for the radicals, Thiers found himself without support in the Assembly, and on May 24, 1873, resigned. With unnecessary haste the parties of the Right, in their determination to take the control of the government into their own hands, elected Marshal MacMahon as president of the republic, and began their struggle for the restoration of the monarchy.

The character of the government now underwent an important change. A reactionary ministry, that of Broglie, came into office, whose object it was to restore to power the church and the monarchy. Instead of considering wholesome legislation for the welfare of France, it worked solely for the interests of party: on one hand as a "fighting government," it strove by every means in its power to suppress republicanism and the republic; on the other as a "government of moral order," it strove to restore royalty and to strengthen the church. During the years 1873 and 1874 it removed all republican officials, prefects, sub-prefects, commissaires, and the like, and replaced them with appointees of its own political faith; it repealed the municipal law of 1871, that it might control the appointment of mayors and so strengthen its hold upon the administration; by making use of laws that had been passed against the Communists, it undertook to repress republican demonstrations, to control the press, and to watch the plays in the theatres; and, by adopting official candidates, it interfered once more in the elections of France. At the same time it forbade the use of the word "republic," and in all official acts made no reference to the republican régime. This policy of repression was accompanied by another, the evident purpose of which was to strengthen the altar and the throne. Pilgrimages to Lourdes and La Salette were allowed and encouraged, and in 1873, special pilgrimages were conducted to Paray-le-Monial, where
speeches were made and songs were sung in honour of the Bourbon king and the temporal power of the Pope. The Jesuits were allowed greater freedom of action; and the government sought to give the church a share in the control of education by extending the laws of 1833 and 1850 to include the university, and by passing a law in 1875 which granted permission to found free universities and to establish mixed examining boards.

Such measures were of use in increasing the power of the church, but they did little to restore the monarchy. Knowing that the weakness of their cause lay in the fact that, as Thiers put it, there were three pretenders and only one crown, the monarchists adopted a policy of fusion. It was agreed that the Count of Chambord should reign as Henry V. in France, and at his death be succeeded by the Count of Paris; and that a reconciliation might be effected, the Count of Paris visited the Count of Chambord at Frohsdorf on July 5, 1873. But the Count of Chambord refused to accept the tri-coloured flag, substitution of which for the white banner of the Bourbons the Orléanists had made an indispensable part of their program, and on September 27, 1873, put an end to the hopes of the monarchists by refusing to take the throne at all. By one act he made clear the fact that real accord between the Legitimists and Orléanists was impossible, that there could be no harmony between the ideas and principles of the Restoration and those of the July Monarchy; by the other, he informed the French nation that the white banner was the symbol of principles to which France was no longer faithful, and that as he could not enter upon his inheritance unconditioned and uncompromised, he would remain forever in exile. His decision destroyed all hope of a restoration, but it saved France from the danger of civil war.

This policy of fusion having failed of its object, the Orléanists determined to extend the term of President MacMahon, hoping thereby to postpone the establishment of a permanent
government until they should be able, in the possible event of
the death of the Count of Chambord, to replace the president
by the Count of Paris as constitutional king. Aided by the
Left Centre, which willingly voted for a measure which seemed
to increase the power of the president of the republic, they
passed on November 19, 1873, a law instituting the "Septen-
nate," which prolonged the presidency of MacMahon for seven
years. But this attempt to solve the question of the form of
government in the interest of the Orléanists so enraged the
Legitimists that the following year they united with the republic-
cans and defeated a measure limiting the suffrage, which the
Orléanists were desirous of carrying in order to make more
certain their own success in the elections. In consequence of
this defeat, the Broglie ministry was overthrown, May 16,
1874; and in the confusion that followed the Bonapartists, en-
couraged by the strife between the Legitimists and Orléanists,
pushed to the front, and with General de Cissey as head of a
new ministry, carried on a campaign for the restoration of the
Napoleonic dynasty that lasted from May, 1874, to January,
1875. But their attempt failed. The events of the year 1874,
which showed that union between the Legitimists and Orléan-
ists was impossible, and disclosed the scheme for the restoration
of the Empire, prepared the way for final republican success.
The year 1875 was to decide the issue.

When Thiers in 1872 boldly advocated a republican form of
government, he showed that he understood, better than the
party with which he had hitherto identified himself, the fact
that public opinion throughout the country favoured the re-
public. And the events of 1873 and 1874 had only served to
show the soundness of his judgment. Although the famous
Wallon amendment, which definitely established the republic,
was passed by a majority of but one vote, nevertheless, it must
be remembered that the republic was in reality assured when
Thiers, committing himself to the cause that was supported by
the majority of the people of France, said to the monarchists on November 13, 1872, "The republic exists." In January, 1875, Gambetta, consenting to sacrifice some of his more radical opinions for the sake of the common cause, drew his party of the extreme Left to the aid of the Left and Left Centre, and with a small group from the Right Centre, who were frightened by the agitations of the Bonapartists, voted for a republican constitution. The Wallon amendment, which overthrew the hopes of the Orléanists by decreeing that at the expiration of seven years a new president should be elected by a joint assembly composed of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, was adopted on January 30, 1875; and in the months that followed were passed by increasing majorities, though the discussion was often acrimonious, the organic laws of 1875 which make up the present constitution of France. By these laws a president, a senate, a chamber of deputys, a responsible ministry, universal suffrage, and parliamentary methods were decreed for France, while liberty of speech, thought, and person, equality before the law, and right of trial by jury became the property of the individual. Thus, under an administrative organisation which was still that of the first Napoleon, were to be seen once more in the organic law and social structure of the state the principles of the Revolution.

Thus, an unwilling Assembly, after a fair test of party strength, had adopted at the end of four years the only form of government that was possible for France. That its choice met the approval of the nation, was proved by the first election held under the new constitution in 1876. To the Chamber of Deputies 360 republican deputys and but 170 conservatives were returned; and in the Senate, which remained for three years longer the stronghold of conservatism, the numbers were about equally divided. This important victory had been won by the republicans without a resort to illegal measures: neither revolution nor coup d'état had stained the history of this honour-
able conflict, and the early sessions of the new government were without reprisals or acts of revenge.

But at this point the Ultramontanes, who had been influential in overthrowing Thiers, and chief among those who had tried to restore the monarchy, made one last effort, now that they were able to command both the president and the Senate, to restore to religion its control over politics. Outside the Assembly they circulated petitions, organised pilgrimages, inveighed against Italy,—the lay members in speeches and the press, the clergy from their pulpits,—and acted almost in defiance of the law. In their turn the republicans, who had a large majority in the Chamber of Deputies, became more radical in their views and acts. Not only did they pass measures establishing liberty of the press, restoring to the communes the right of electing their mayors, and forbidding the government the right to interfere in elections; but they also demanded the removal of all functionaries hostile to the government, and the adoption, by the ministry, of a strictly liberal policy. At the same time they turned against the clergy, and echoing Gambetta's famous cry, "Clericalism—that is our enemy," passed on March 4, 1877, an order of the day against the intrigues of the Ultramontanes.

In the struggle that followed, the clericals for the moment seemed to triumph. Marshal MacMahon, convinced that the Chamber was becoming too radical for the good of the country, and yielding to the persuasions of his advisers, wrote on May 16, 1877, a sharp letter to Jules Simon charging the latter with inability to control the Chamber. Simon at once resigned, and Marshal MacMahon appointed another ministry under the Duke of Broglie, composed of Legitimists, clericals, Orléanists, and Bonapartists, and demanded of the Senate the dissolution of the Chamber. The joy of the reactionaries was intense, but it was short-lived. Though the postponement of the new elections to October 14th, the latest date allowed by law, gave the
clericals ample time in which to carry out their elaborate program of interference, the result of the elections was overwhelmingly in favour of the republicans, who, in the new Chamber which met in November, 1877, were able to muster 330 votes, a majority of more than one hundred. Immediately the cabinet was overthrown; and when the deputies refused to have any dealings with the extra-parliamentary cabinet under Rochefouet that MacMahon selected, on the ground that it did not represent the majority of the Chamber, the president, turning from his clerical advisers, accepted loyally the will of the country, and from the Left Centre, which was now composed entirely of constitutional republicans, selected his ministry. Within two months after the Assembly convened, the republican majority in the Chamber of Deputies had risen to one hundred and fifty, and the renewal of the third of the senators gave to the republicans in the Senate a majority of fifty-two. Thereupon MacMahon, finding himself out of accord with the legislative bodies, and unable to perform conscientiously all the acts that the Chamber demanded of him, resigned from office January 30, 1879. By a large majority Jules Grévy was chosen president of France in his place, and for the first time the republicans were in full control of both the legislative bodies and the executive.

With 1879 the era of peril was passed, for the political question had been answered in favour of a parliamentary and republican government, and all danger of monarchical and ecclesiastical reaction was in the main removed. But the real test of the republic was yet to be made: for it remained to be seen whether, on one side, France would content herself with an impersonal and parliamentary government, which less than thirty years before she had discarded for the personal and despotic rule of Napoleon III.; and, on the other, whether the new government was competent to manage wisely the affairs of the nation, its foreign relations, the colonial question, the
church, education, military defence, social reforms, and the like, to perform with despatch and without serious friction its appointed task, or, in other words, whether the republicans who had united for defence would be willing to hold together when, with victory won, the task of governing began.

Power was now entirely in the hands of the Left. The old extreme Left, under the name of the Republican Union, with Gambetta as its leader, having abandoned many of its more radical opinions, drew nearer the Left; while a new extreme Left of irreconcilable republicans, who scorned the majority as opportunists, held firmly to their radical principles. Notwithstanding the instability of ministries,—those of Dufaure to January, 1880, Waddington to February, Freycinet to December, and Ferry to November, 1881,—the republican majority remained, on the whole, intact, and the party was able to concentrate its attention upon the republican program. During 1879, 1880, and 1881 it removed conservative and reactionary officials, voted to transfer the Chambers from Versailles to Paris, and entered upon its campaign against the clergy, in part as revenge for the events of the 16th of May. The attack often passed legitimate bounds, and was directed, not against a party which had sought to influence and control politics, but against the church at large, and even against religion itself. Not content with prohibiting the exercise of many special privileges that had been allowed the Roman Catholics, with taking away from the free universities those exceptional favours which had been granted them in 1873 by the "government of moral order," and refusing them the title of universities, the ministry strove to drive from France all religious orders, such as the Jesuits, whose presence was unauthorised by law. Failing in this, because the Senate rejected Ferry's famous Article 7, it accomplished the same end by enforcing the old laws against religious congregations that had never been repealed; and when the members of the communities refused to obey,
ejected them by force from their homes. Furthermore, that the schools might become nurseries of patriotism rather than of religious prejudice, primary education was entirely reconstructed during 1881 and 1882, and instruction was made gratuitous, compulsory, and lay. The "letter of obedience," that is, the religious diploma of capacity for teachers in primary schools, was suppressed, and all instruction in religion was strictly forbidden. The resistance that the Roman Catholics made to these measures was so great as to provoke retaliation on the part of the government, whose acts now became tainted with a sectarian and political hostility. Legitimate as the object of laicising education was in principle, the methods employed to carry it out were unnecessarily severe.

But the attack on the religious houses and the free universities and the laicising of the primary schools, while rousing the wrath of the reactionists, cannot be said to have disturbed public opinion to any great extent. Of greater concern to the people at large was the foreign policy of the government. In all her relations with foreign Powers since 1870, France had conducted herself with dignity and moderation; and although her position had been largely one of neutrality and isolation, yet with each year since the war she had grown steadily stronger, and by 1879 had won once more the respect of Europe. But the election of Grévy to the presidency, the scenes of violence in the Chamber, the attack on the church, and the wholesale removals in administration had disturbed the confidence of the Powers, who construed these acts as indications of political inconsistency and a desire for revenge, belying the good work of the preceding years. The events of the year 1880–1881, the adoption of a colonial policy by Ferry, its first application in the war against Tunis, and the signing of the treaty of May 12, 1881, with the Bey, not only roused hostility and opposition at home, but destroyed the entente with Italy, which had already been strained by the agitation of the clericals regarding the
restoration of the lands of the Pope, and prepared the way for
the triple alliance, one object of which was to isolate France in
Europe. Reactionists and radicals alike scored this colonial
policy without mercy, calling it a ridiculous comedy, an electoral
device, a concession to Bismarck, and a piece of political bribery
and corruption; while radicals, in particular, deemed it an un-
worthy substitute for the policy of revenge. The battle in and
out of the Chamber was carried on without moderation; charges
and threats were freely exchanged; and in the end, the treaty
with Tunis was passed by a majority of but thirteen votes.

On November 1, 1881, the Ferry ministry was overturned,
and its place taken by one under Gambetta, who, sitting as the
wise, prudent, and influential president of the Chamber of Deput-
ties, had for three years loyalty supported the government.
But this event, which all France had awaited with expectation
and content, proved a grievous disappointment. The Grand
Ministry, so called because it was to be composed of men from
all parties of the Left, proved to be a ministry of obscure men
taken only from the Republican Union, Gambetta's own party.
Though its policy was, as its leader said, that of France, it was
unable to resist the combined attacks of those who either feared
a dictatorship or hated Gambetta for his opportunism, and in
January, 1882, was overthrown. The republican unity was
already breaking, and even Gambetta had been unable to pre-
vent it. The discord thus engendered among republicans was
increased by the refusal of the Chamber in July, 1882, to join
England in intervening in Egypt on the occasion of the revolt
of Arabi Pasha. Notwithstanding the impassioned appeal of
Gambetta in behalf of the alliance with England,—it was his
last great speech, for he died the December following,—the
deputies, by an overwhelming majority, took a step which cost
France all share in the future control of Egypt, hurt her reput-
tation abroad, and disturbed the good feeling that had hitherto
existed between herself and England.
THE THIRD REPUBLIC.

The year 1882 brought disaster to the republic: the downfall of Gambetta destroyed the faith of many in republican institutions and in parliamentary government; while his death severed the allegiance of many of his conservative friends, who had admired the eloquence and grandeur of the great republican leader. The refusal of France to co-operate with England in defending Egypt intensified party hostility among the deputies, broke up the republican majority, and inaugurated a period of parliamentary anarchy in the Chamber. The people grew discouraged, lost confidence in their electoral privileges, and fell into a political apathy which, for the moment, gave to the reactionists an unusual opportunity for winning successes in the communal elections. Industrial associations, feeling the injury to trade from this want of a durable ministry and a fixed policy, sent in addresses and petitions to the government, demanding "a ministry which should resolutely take the initiative in the social reforms that had so long been promised, and make the republic respected in Europe and throughout the world." Then Jules Ferry, as the only man able to meet the emergency, was called back to the head of the ministry, and in February, 1883, entered upon his career of two years as prime minister of France.

Instead of attempting to reconcile parties, as Gambetta would probably have done, Ferry formed a fighting ministry, gained the support of a working majority in the Chamber, and determined, despite all opposition, to carry the measures that were necessary for the welfare of the country. Abandoning many of the principles to which expression had been given in earlier radical programs, the government, depending upon the opportunist majority, which was composed of the Left Centre and the Republican Union, began an aggressive campaign for the purpose of strengthening France at home and abroad, and disregarding the effect of its policy upon the individual parties, advocated measures based on necessity rather than on principle.
On one hand it revised the constitution by suppressing life membership in the Senate, furthered decentralisation by increasing the powers of the departmental councils and making the municipal councils practically self-controlling, and giving up all idea of retrenching public expenses, extended the railway system, built schools, and increased the colonial empire by sending expeditions to Tonkin and Annam, Congo, Soudan, and Tunis. By removing from the army all pretenders to the throne, it struck a severe blow at the reactionists and made more firm the position of the republic. It opposed at every point the radical program, and increased the budget, revised the constitution, and sent the expedition to Tonkin in the face of bitter radical opposition. In the work that it accomplished it proved itself to be the most energetic ministry that France had had under the constitution; for not only did it revive the idea of parliamentary government and advance the cause of education and local self-government, but it gave to France a colonial empire and raised her prestige among the European Powers. Yet the very character of its work destroyed the majority on which it depended; its attitude as a fighting government holding a majority only by concessions and shrewd manoeuvring, did nothing to harmonise the parties in the Chamber; and finally, in March, 1885, attacked by reactionists and radicals, after the news of the defeat of Lang Son had created a panic among the deputies and had arraigned against it those who had begun to feel restless under Ferry's vigorous and dominating leadership, it was overthrown. With the downfall of Ferry, vanished the last compact majority that France was to see for many years.

With 1885 the republic entered upon a period of peril when the very question of its own existence was to be decided. It was a period during which parliamentary institutions were disgraced, when the bitterness of personal hates, the violence of parties in the Chamber, the intrigues of enemies in the country
were alienating the people at home and arousing distrust abroad: it was a period barren either of glory or good works. Deputies laboured in the interest of politics, or spent their energies in seeking personal ends and in venting personal spite. The ministers, succeeding each other rapidly, were unable to gain a homogeneous and stable majority, and instead of offering the country a consistent policy of social and economic reform, spent their time in manipulating parties in order to avoid defeat. The tendency in the Chamber was distinctly in the direction of the Left, and the early ministries, those of Brisson, Freycinet, and Goblet, in 1885 and 1886, found it necessary to gain the support that they desired at the price of important concessions to the radicals. In 1886, fearing a monarchical revival, the Freycinet cabinet expelled all the pretenders from France, and giving up a positive policy of reform legislation, did little else than attempt to reduce expenses and to establish the equilibrium of the budget. While the Chamber was profiting from these concessions to the radicals, the country was becoming conservative, a new generation of conservatives having grown up in France meanwhile. The ministry of Rouvier, May, 1887, broke from the radicals, and turned toward the conservatives with a policy of reconciliation, but the attempt did not survive the year.

Already had a new factor entered into the political life of France. For some time there had existed a League of Patriots, organised under the leadership of Déroulède, to keep alive the desire for revenge against Germany, and through its influence General Boulanger had entered the Freycinet cabinet in January, 1886, as minister of war. Around the nucleus thus formed gathered the discontented: radicals, who desired the abandonment of the colonial policy; Bonapartists, who saw in Boulanger the coming Cesar; and monarchists, who deeming him a possible Monk to their Charles II., aided him with funds and political support. The movement grew rapidly, and during
1886 and 1887 became a menace to the republic. The laicising of education, the growth of crime, the absence of great leaders and the inability of those in control, the enormous public debt, and the neglect of social reform, together with the confusion of parties and the loss of governmental authority, made possible the rise of Boulanger. The government was further compromised by the scandal arising from the sale of decorations, and the resignation of President Grévy in December, 1887. During 1888 the Boulangists appealed to the people, promising to dissolve the Chamber and to revise the constitution, with the result that, in January, 1889, they returned their leader to the Chamber by enormous majorities, and gave even sane republicans cause to fear a coup d’état and the return of a despotism. But Boulanger was not destined to be a second Louis Napoleon; wanting in courage and ability and the qualities that make for leadership, he became a warning rather than an actual danger to the republic. Stood by the election of Carnot, whose name and character were pillars of strength at this critical juncture, and by the union of the factions of the republican party, which stood together in the presence of danger, the republic weathered the storm. Boulanger, prosecuted for corruption by Constans, who showed exceptional determination in this emergency, was convicted and disgraced; and with his death in 1891 the Boulangist party disappeared as an important political factor. The Exposition of 1889, in disclosing the resources of the country and in attracting the attention and favourable criticism of the civilised world, increased the confidence of the French people and aroused their loyalty to the republic. The elections of that year, in returning a majority of one hundred and forty-eight republicans, showed that the danger to the republic had been appreciated by the nation, and that the crisis was over.

After 1890 the condition of France and the republic improved steadily. Agitation in the Chamber was considerably checked
by the substitution for political questions of others of an economic and social character which aroused less the animosities of the parties. In January, 1892, a tariff law was passed by the Chamber which brought to an end the system of treaty tariffs, which had been inaugurated by Napoleon III. in 1860, and ushered in a full protective régime at the very time, interestingly enough, when Germany was rejecting the high-tariff arrangement of 1879 and substituting for it commercial treaties. Other measures touching foreign relations, railways, and the condition of labour, were also considered and passed. In the same year the ecclesiastical opposition to the republic was broken down by the recognition accorded to it by Pope Leo XIII., and in consequence many of the monarchists—the ralliés—joined the moderate republicans and accepted the republic. Notwithstanding financial scandals, which injured the credit of the government, the elections of 1893 resulted in victory for the moderates, and gave France, almost for the first time, a homogeneous majority in the Chamber.

But these same elections, in returning to the Chamber sixty socialist deputies, the representatives of the first organised socialistic party in the history of the republic, made unexpectedly powerful the radical opposition during the three years that followed. In 1894, after the assassination of President Carnot, and again in 1895, after the resignation of Casimir Périé, the radicals attempted to elect as president of the republic Brisson, a member of their own party. In this they failed, and Faure, a moderate republican, was chosen president by a majority of seventy votes; but they succeeded in 1895 in elevating Brisson to the presidency of the Chamber, and after the fall of Ribot in October of the same year, in obtaining the selection of a radical, Bourgeois, as head of a new cabinet. At the same time that this tendency toward radicalism was showing itself, another of even greater moment, looking to a simplification of the political situation, became evident. This was
due in part to the entire failure of the Boulangists and the Bonapartists in the elections of 1893, and in part to the decision of the non-constitutional parties, the Right and the socialists, to withdraw from their attitude of hostility to the republic, the former agreeing to accept provisionally at least the existing government, the latter hoping to win over many of the radicals to their cause by adopting as a tactical manoeuvre legislative instead of revolutionary methods. Despite the Panama scandal, which brought the republic into disgrace, though it was beneficial in that it replaced many of the older republicans by those of the younger generation, the tendency toward the Left was checked in 1897, the cause of the moderate republicans in the main triumphed, and the Méline ministry entered upon the second year of office with good prospects for a long term of service. At that time the chief differences between the two constitutional parties related to policies, one desiring the maintenance of a conservative social order, the other a revision of the constitution in the interest of social reform. This political stability at home was accompanied with the raising of the prestige of France abroad, and under the guidance of Hanotaux, minister of foreign affairs in the Méline cabinet and a pupil of Ferry, a definite policy was decided on, the object of which was to restore France to her place among the Powers, "not by persistence in isolation," as Hanotaux said, "but by keeping a vigilant eye on those favourable circumstances which by giving France her place in the concert of European Powers, would permit her to prove to all, not only her reconquered authority, but also the necessity of her existence and of her power in the equilibrium of Europe and the world."

But a momentary calm in the political situation, due to the elimination of non-constitutional parties, the adoption of a policy of reconciliation, and the long tenure of a determined and tactful minister, offered no guarantee that a political equilibrium had been obtained or that parliamentary institutions had rooted
themselves in France. The people at large cared little for politics and had up to this time remained entirely indifferent to the vicissitudes of parliamentary government, to the war of parties, or the events taking place in the legislative chambers. The favourable conditions evident in 1897 rested on other foundations than those of a political or parliamentary character: they were due to the fact that since 1889 France had grown both in wealth and prestige, that the prosperity of the state had been increased by the encouragement of industry and the adoption of a protective policy, and that the confidence of the people in themselves and their government had grown steadily stronger as one event after another had helped to restore the national good-humour. The Exposition of 1889, the recognition of the republic by the Pope, the entente with Russia, and the foreign policy of Hanotaux, had done more to increase the French pride and self-esteem than had the harmony which seemed to have been attained in the legislative body in Paris. Peace and prosperity, coupled with a dignified and honourable position among the Powers of Europe, were the best guarantees that the year 1897 could offer for the permanence of the republic.
CHAPTER X.

THE GERMAN EMPIRE.

The events of the period from 1866 to 1870 had entirely changed the political face of Germany. Instead of a league of loosely united states as in the system of 1815 or an incomplete unity such as had existed after 1866, when Bavaria, Württemberg, Hesse, and Baden were still independent states refusing to enter the North German Confederation, there had been formed in consequence of the war of 1870 a single Empire, not weak and broken by internal dissension as had been the old Confederation, but strong and influential and raised by virtue of its victories and the genius of its statesmen to the position of leader among the European Powers.

But the new Germany bore indelible marks of the conditions from which it had sprung and the circumstances that had attended its establishment. The system of universal military service and the attainment of unity by force of arms gave to the state a military character and increased its interest in military affairs; while the supremacy of Prussia both politically and territorially, and the fact that her armies had led the way to victory, her king been invested with the imperial office, and her representatives were in the majority in the new government, made it inevitable that she should force her methods upon Germany, and that Bismarck, who had controlled her destinies since 1862, and become both president of the Prussian ministry and chancellor of the Empire, should be the master of the new policy. The history of the twenty years following 1870 was
THE GERMAN EMPIRE.

369

to be characterised first by the personal supremacy of Bismarck and after 1890 by that of the Emperor William II.; the form of government, though constitutional and in the main liberal, was not to be parliamentary, for the people though sharing in the government were to have but an indirect and negative influence on its policy; political tendencies were to be on the whole in the direction of monarchical and paternal government liberally conducted and away from the line of development marked out by the national movement of 1848 and the national association of 1859. As far as political events were to show, there was to be but little progress in Germany toward the attainment of the political ideals of the French Revolution; for the forces of conservatism and reaction were too great, the spirit and opinions of the people of the north, south, east, and west too diverse, the class divisions too deep-seated, and the victory of Prussia too complete to make possible the establishment of a strictly popular government.

The Empire as founded in 1871 was a federal state based in the main on a national foundation, although there were included within its limits Poles, Danes, and Alsatians. It was composed of nearly thirty autonomous principalities, each with its Landtag, or legislature, which was more than a provincial diet, and each subordinate to a higher authority, which was not, however, independent of all the states of the federal union, as is the case in the federal system of the United States, but was under the control of one of them, Prussia. The imperial government consisted of an Emperor, who was always to be the king of Prussia exercising imperial functions; a Bundesrath, or Federal Council, composed of delegates from the states as such, and so standing as the successor of the old Federal Diet; and a Reichstag, or Imperial Diet, composed of the representatives of the people, who were chosen at first for three years, but after 1888 for five, by universal suffrage and secret ballot, and served without pay. There was also a chancellor, but no
cabinet or ministry; for Bismarck was determined, not only that a party ministry and a parliamentary government should not interfere with his management of Prussia; but also that no body of colleagues should share with him the control of the Empire. Within the limits of the constitution this government, which was superior to the government of the states, was supreme; but inasmuch as the whole imperial machinery was so constructed as to throw power into the hands of the Emperor, without whose consent no measure could become law and upon whom the chancellor depended absolutely, it is evident that sovereignty was not to be found in the people or in the Reichstag. In the United States, sovereignty rests with the people; in England and France, with the popular chambers; in Germany, with the Emperor.

When the first meeting of the Reichstag was held at Berlin in 1871, the arrangement of parties was found to differ but little from that which had existed in the Diet of the North German Confederation. Instead of two great divisions, one supporting, the other opposing, the government, as in England, or clearly defined groups of reactionists, moderates, and radicals, such as were to be found in France, there were many parties, the existence of which was possible because Germany had not a parliamentary form of government. Four of these could trace their descent from the old conservative party and the old liberal party or party of progress, which had sprung into being in Prussia during the struggle over the military bills from 1861 to 1866. After the victory at Königgrätz, each of these old parties had divided: the conservatives had broken into conservatives, or reactionists, and free conservatives, who supported Bismarck and the Empire; the progressists had divided into national liberals, who accepted Bismarck's policy, and progressists proper, who demanded parliamentary institutions for both Prussia and Germany. All these parties appeared in the Reichstag, as well as in the Prussian Landtag, and upon the
middle groups, free conservatives and national liberals, Bismarck at first depended for support. But there were other parties: a remnant of the old democratic party of 1848 appeared under the name of Volkspartei, which was hostile to Prussia, and desired the laicising of education, and the entire separation of the state from the church; also a formidable set of clerical deputies, which appeared for the first time after the seizure of Rome by the Italian government, and demanded the restoration of the temporal power of the Pope and the complete autonomy of the church; three groups, Alsatians, Danes, and Poles, who were uncompromisingly hostile to the government, because of the treatment to which their countries had been subjected; one group of Hanoverians, who opposed the government as a protest against the annexation of Hanover in 1866; and, lastly, a group of social democrats, who consistently voted against the government, and were important, not so much for their numbers, as for the fact that they represented a growing discontent in the country at large.

From this statement it is evident that Bismarck was to find his support in the free conservatives and the national liberals, and his chief enemies in the social democrats, and the representatives of Alsace, Schleswig, Prussian Poland, and Hanover. But of these opponents the latter were too weak to cause him much concern; and the socialists, against whom he had declared as early as 1871 that the state and society were bound to defend themselves, were, as yet, not sufficiently powerful to be deserving of serious attention. But the appearance of the clerical party, the Centre, thoroughly irritated him; for he believed that in the presence of sixty-three clerical members he saw evidence that the Roman Catholics were organising a political party for the purpose of disturbing the religious peace of Germany, and were "mobilising their forces" that they might make the church an independent power in the state. To resist such a movement, Bismarck in 1871 entered into a con-
flict with the Roman Catholic hierarchy, which, fought out partly in the Prussian Landtag, partly in the Reichstag, lasted for six years.

The Culturrampf, or war in behalf of civilisation, as Virchow called it, began with a little preliminary fencing, in which the Catholic party made the first advance by demanding from the Prussian Landtag governmental aid in restoring the lands of the Pope, and from the Reichstag, the insertion in the imperial constitution of those articles of the Prussian constitution that guaranteed religious liberty. Both demands were refused; and in September, 1871, when the Roman Catholic bishops forbade Old Catholics to teach in the universities and gymnasia, because they had rejected the decrees of the Vatican Council, and the Prussian government supported the latter, on the ground that the decrees had never been accepted in Prussia, the Prussian bishops appealed to the Emperor. But William I. upheld his ministers and rejected the addresses of the bishops, declaring that he was determined that Prussia should enjoy entire freedom of faith. The quarrel soon spread beyond the Prussian border: Bavarian bishops and priests who supported the church, attacked the Old Catholics from their pulpits; and the Reichstag, thus brought into the fray, passed in November a law making such utterances a penal offence. Meanwhile, in Prussia, the conflict became more than ever bitter; and in January, 1872, the minister of public worship, Mühler, suspected of sympathy with the clergy, was dismissed, and in his stead was appointed Dr. Falk, a loyal supporter of the state policy. The latter began his famous career by introducing into the Landtag a measure which provided that laymen be made inspectors of schools; and in May, 1872, he removed all disobedient bishops from their posts. An attempt to negotiate with the Pope having failed, Bismarck turned to the Reichstag; and as the Roman curia continued hostile, effected the passage of a law in July, 1872, expelling the Jesuits from Ger-
many. In December of the same year, when the Pope protested against this act, in terms that were construed as insulting to the Emperor, the chancellor, forbidding the allocution to be published in Germany, recalled his ambassador from Rome, thus diplomatically declaring war. The "battle for culture" was no longer local; it was now between the Empire and the Holy See.

Bismarck had entered the struggle unprepared, with no definite plan of action, and up to this time his attack had been scattered and lacking in unity. But he now began a systematic warfare upon the church in Germany. Taking the offensive, and striking with all the power at his command, he attempted to subject the church, both Evangelical and Roman Catholic, to the authority of the state, and to make the latter supreme, not only in political things, but in spiritual things as well. Through his minister Falk he resolved to regulate the position of the clergy in Prussia, to curtail their privileges and functions, and by the imposition of certain important conditions to transform them into state officials. In May, 1873, the Prussian Landtag passed four laws, which together with others passed during the two years following make up what are generally known as the Falk or May Laws. Of these four the first compelled converts to obtain the consent of a magistrate before changing from one church to another; the second subjected all churches to the laws and to the legal inspection of the state; the third granted to the state the control over the training, appointment, and dismissal of a clergyman, exacted of candidates a three years' residence in a university, and compelled them to pass an examination in philosophy, history, philology, and the German language; and the fourth fixed the limits of the ecclesiastical disciplinary authority. These laws were supplemented by others passed by the same body in May, 1874, and 1875, which suspended all priests who had not submitted to the previous laws, placed in the hands of the state
the administration of vacant bishoprics, made civil marriage compulsory, and withdrew state salaries from the refractory members of the clergy. In 1874 the Reichstag passed a law to prevent the illegal use of the ecclesiastical offices, and the next year another making civil marriage obligatory throughout the entire Empire.

And the church returned war for war. In an encyclical to the Prussian bishops, the Pope declared all these laws null and void; bishops and clergy refused to obey the state authority; the laity co-operated with the clergy in circulating protests and appeals; and the Centre party systematically opposed the government both in the Reichstag and in the Prussian Landtag. This resistance, together with the fact that an ultramontane, Kullmann, had attempted to assassinate Bismarck on July 13, 1874, maddened the government, and prompted it to pursue relentlessly its course of coercion. Bishops were fined, imprisoned, deprived of their salaries, or exiled; the Jesuits were driven out; monasteries were suppressed and their members dispersed; and at the close of the period in 1877, eight Prussian bishoprics and more than fourteen hundred curacies were vacant. The situation was becoming unbearable: the clergy were in full opposition; the religious wants of the people were without means of satisfaction; and the laity, repelled by the methods employed by the government, remained loyal to their bishops and their faith, and showed their disapproval of Bismarck's policy by returning ninety-two clericals to the Reichstag in 1877. Bismarck had gone a step too far, and in endeavouring to drive the clergy from the domain of politics, had encroached upon the territory within which the church had a legitimate right to rule. The Culturkampf, in taking the form of a great conflict of principles between the ecclesiastical and secular powers, resulted, as it was bound to result, in the discomfiture of the state.

In this attack on the clericals Bismarck had been supported
in the main by the national liberals; but the union had not been an entirely happy one. The liberals had a definite party program,—an imperial ministry, payment of deputies, free trade, reform of local administration, and the laicising of schools in Prussia,—and in return for their support, had demanded concessions which Bismarck had persistently refused to make. Ruled by the one idea of strengthening the Empire, he presented, during these years, only those measures that promised to centralise administration and increase the authority of the imperial government: he had advocated an increase in the army, the adoption of a military penal code, uniformity in the currency and the founding of an imperial bank, the establishment of a common system of tribunals, and the adoption of common methods of procedure, and common civil and criminal codes. But the liberals, partly on principle, and partly because they wished to take revenge on the chancellor for having refused to consider their wishes, notably in the matter of an imperial ministry and the payment of deputies, forced him into frequent compromises; but with the exception of certain administrative and judicial reforms, Bismarck conceded nothing. In fact he had used the national liberals without identifying himself with them, and had received from them support, without giving them anything in return; he had treated them as allies as long as he needed their aid, but was ready to discard them if at any time he should desire to adopt a policy that was hostile to their program.

In 1878 that time had come. The Culturkampf had proved a hopeless failure and war against the clericals was no longer the part either of expediency or of wisdom. Other plans of a social and economic nature were already shaping themselves in the minds of the Emperor and the chancellor, and the two attempts made in 1878 to assassinate William I. impelled Bismarck to action. His scheme was far-reaching although simple in its main idea. He was determined to repress the socialistic
movement, which seemed to have become a menace to the peace
of Germany. This was to be accomplished in two ways: first,
by the passing of certain laws which should break up the ex-
sting organisation and drive socialistic agitators from the
country; secondly, by adopting other measures, which in
favouring the working classes should show that the state was
the workingman's best friend and the one most interested in im-
proving his condition. Ever since the beginning of his reign,
the Emperor had frequently referred in speeches and printed
statements to the obligations that rested on the state to recog-
nise the rights of labour and to provide for those who served
in its armies, and he was in entire accord with the methods that
the chancellor desired to employ in order to break up the exis-
ting socialistic organisation and to prevent its re-establishment
by reducing the number of its adherents and increasing the
loyalty of the working classes for the Emperor and the state.
To attain the latter object, Bismarck planned first to deprive
Germany of her system of tariff for revenue only, which had
prevailed since the treaty of 1861, and to adopt one of high
tariffs, in order to protect the native workmen from foreign
competition and to increase their wages; and this done, to
benefit the workingman by a system of relief and insurance.
With these objects in view, Bismarck became in 1878, first a
protectionist, and afterward a state socialist.

But Bismarck had another reason for wishing to adopt a pro-
tective policy: he hoped to improve the financial condition of
the country, and to free the government from the control of the
Reichstag in financial matters. Hitherto, when there had been
a deficit in the revenues,—and there had been one nearly every
year,—it had been customary for the Reichstag to vote special
contributions (Matrikularbeiträge) which were paid by the
several states according to a fixed proportion. To Bismarck
this method seemed to involve two disadvantages: it threw a
heavy burden upon the poorer classes, because the special con-
tributions were levied in the states by direct taxation; and it
limited the financial independence of the government, in making
the imperial treasury dependent upon the vote of the deputies
for its revenues. In thus advocating that the customs revenue
be substituted for the special contributions, Bismarck was show-
ing favour to the agricultural and working classes as against
the bourgeoisie, and was incidentally encouraging the anti-
Semitic movement, which traced its origin in part to the hatred
of the landowners and the agriculturists for the moneyed ele-
ments in the state.

With this general plan of reform in mind, Bismarck in 1878
withdrew from his conflict with the church, and entered upon
his new task by declaring war against the socialists. The
latter had been organised by Lassalle in 1863, but the new
organisation, suffering from internal dissensions, and thrust
into the background by the results of the war of 1870, had been
able to elect but two deputies to the Reichstag of 1871. How-
ever, the hard times of 1873 and 1874 had driven distressed
labourers and artisans in great numbers into the ranks of the
socialists, and so rapidly did the movement grow, and so well
organised were the labour unions, that in the elections of 1874
the socialists had cast more than 350,000 votes and elected
nine social democrats to the Reichstag. The union of the Las-
salleans and Marxists in 1875 transformed socialism into a per-
manent political force; by 1877 the party had an almost perfect
organisation with a central journal, twelve thousand subscribers,
and a corps of paid agitators; and in the third general election
of that year had cast more than 490,000 votes and sent twelve
deputies to the Reichstag. Deeming such an organisation a
menace to the welfare of the state, Bismarck demanded in May,
1878, that the Reichstag pass a bill insuring "protection
against the excesses of the social democracy." But the liberal
majority refused to obey; and the chancellor, having dissolved
the Reichstag, appealed to the country against them. The
result was favourable: in October the new body passed an anti-socialistic bill granting to the government extraordinary powers: all socialistic and communistic associations were to be forbidden; all processions, reunions, and feasts to be stopped; all agitators to be driven from the country; and all socialistic publications to be suppressed. Under Article 28, any section of the country could be placed in a "minor state of siege," during which the police were to be invested with unusual authority. This measure, which was to be operative for four years only, was twice renewed; but in 1890, when the Reichstag refused to make it permanent, it was allowed to lapse. During the period of twelve years when it had been in force, 1,400 publications were suppressed, 900 persons expelled from the country, and 1,500 committed to prison. The official organisation of the social democrats was thereby destroyed; and henceforth socialism worked in secret to prove, as a socialistic member said in opposing the measure, that as an intellectual movement socialism was not to be killed by law.

The dissolution of the Reichstag in 1878 was equivalent to the announcement that the government had broken with the national liberals and would henceforth find its support in the conservatives and the Centre, to whom it was prepared to concede the repeal of the May Laws. Consequently, in the elections of 1878, the liberals lost heavily, the number of national liberal deputies falling from 127 to 98, and that of the progressists from 36 to 25; and with their majority gone, the liberals went into the opposition. Having effected this political change of face, Bismarck began the prosecution of his plan for economic reform, which he believed was to benefit the labourer and strengthen the government. The protective régime was inaugurated by a measure which the Reichstag passed in 1879 imposing moderate duties upon all imports. In return for this support given him by the Centre, Bismarck replaced Falk by a conservative minister, and after considerable
manceuvring, succeeded in getting authority to withdraw, during the years that followed, nearly all the May Laws. Finally, in 1893, the Reichstag after a lively struggle repealed the law against the Jesuits, and the Culturrampf, in which the victory had all the time been with the church, was over.

But an important part of the chancellor's program was yet to be carried out. It was Bismarck's desire to lighten the lot of the working classes by a system of compulsory insurance, whereby provision should be made by the state for those prevented from earning their livelihood by sickness, accident, or old age. The first measure, which was passed in June, 1883, after two years of discussion, provided for insurance in case of sickness; and the next year another measure was passed, providing for those who were disabled by accident. In the following years each of these was extended to new classes of the population: in 1885 insurance in case of sickness was granted to workmen in the postal and telegraph service, in the departments of the army, navy, navigation, transportation, and the like, and in 1886 to agricultural labourers; insurance in case of accident was given in 1886 to labourers engaged in agriculture, and in 1887 to those employed in building roads, railroads, and canals, and to sailors and to others engaged in shipping. Insurance in case of old age and invalidity was established by act of May 24, 1889. Thus was made complete a system of state insurance, which the German economists believed would effect a social revolution, by relieving millions of labourers of want and drawing them to the support of the state, and which the social democrats characterised as a measure far from adequate to solve the social question, though acceptable as a step in the direction of its solution. In consequence of the experiment, more than 13,000,000 workmen were insured between 1883 and 1897 at an enormous cost to the government; but the old age and invalidity law was not entirely successful, and in spite of the fact that the accident and sick-
ness insurance worked well on the whole, the question was still an open one in 1897 whether the great cost of imperial socialism had been justified by the meagre results, in the way of benefiting the labouring classes, which had been attained up to that time.

Thus between 1878 and 1882 Bismarck had entirely reversed his political, religious, and economic policies. He had turned from the moderate liberals to the conservatives; had withdrawn from the war with the church, and entered upon a course of reconciliation with the Pope; and had substituted a protective for a free-trade policy in Germany. But so complete a change in the position of the government was unfortunate, in that it broke up the large party of moderate liberals which had been its main support from 1867 to 1878, and drove those who refused to adopt the protective policy to unite in 1884 with the progressists under the name of the Freisinnige party, which persistently voted in the opposition. The loss of the middle group in the Reichstag left the government face to face with a strong radical opposition, and forced it to become year by year more conservative and repressive.

The period immediately following the overthrow of the liberal majority was a time of discord and discouragement. The parties of the Right and Left, unchecked by any group of moderates, became more and more embittered toward each other; and Bismarck, construing the conflict of parties as a criticism unfavourable to any form of parliamentary government, became more cynical than ever regarding the advantages of a parliamentary system, and not only resisted all efforts to introduce such a system into Germany, but even tried to curtail what influence the parties already had in the Reichstag. In 1881 he proposed that the popular body should sit and should vote the imperial budget only once in two years, and through the appointment of von Puttkamer to the ministry of the interior, endeavoured to influence the elections. But such
attempts at coercion only made matters worse, and the elections of 1881 showed important gains for the radicals. The new Reichstag voted down the bill providing for a tobacco monopoly, which Bismarck especially wished to establish for the purpose of meeting the expense of his insurance plan; in 1881 so modified the first compulsory insurance measure that the Bundesrath rejected it; and when the second measure was presented the next year, held it for twelve months before passing it.

For all he had been able to accomplish by means of governmental measures since 1879, Bismarck had been indebted mainly to the support given him by the conservatives and Centre. But in 1884 a new question became an issue before the country, and made still more complicated the relation of parties. This was the colonial question, which assumed importance in Germany when certain merchants, who were established in Africa and Australia, asked for government protection. When the matter came before the Reichstag in 1880, it was voted down as contrary to all German traditions; but in 1884, when in response to certain inquiries of the chancellor the chambers of commerce of Hamburg, Lübeck, and Bremen supported a colonial policy as advantageous to trade, Bismarck decided to extend state protection to private enterprises in Africa. Once having made up his mind, he pushed the matter forward with amazing rapidity. Almost before Europe was aware what Germany was doing, she had explored territories and made treaties of cession, and by October, 1884, either possessed, or had under her protection, Damaraland, Togoland, Namaqualand, and Cameroons, a part of New Guinea, and certain islands of the Pacific. As such an aggressive policy was certain to involve Germany in foreign complications, Bismarck fortified her position by coming to an understanding with the Ferry ministry in France, whose colonial policy he had already encouraged for other purposes; supported the International Association of the
Congo, which was not favoured by England and Portugal; and entered into friendly relations with the Transvaal Republic, England's neighbour and antagonist in South Africa. Assuming at the same time the position of leader in colonial matters, he called an international conference at Berlin. From November, 1884, to February, 1885, questions relating to the occupation of Africa, the slave trade, and the commerce of the Congo were debated by the representatives of all the great Powers, and by those not only of Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Spain, and Portugal, but of Turkey and the United States as well. By virtue of her influence at this conference in obtaining a decision guaranteeing liberty of commerce and navigation in the basin and mouths of the Congo, Germany took her place as one of the most important colonial Powers in West Africa.

But this colonial policy destroyed the union between the conservatives and the Centre, drove the latter party away from Bismarck to an alliance with the progressists, and left the chancellor face to face with an adverse majority that persistently refused to vote any colonial credits, and rejected all projects for fiscal reform. Though the free conservatives and the national liberals generally voted with him, upon the conservatives alone could he count with any certainty. A test of the situation was made in 1886. During this year frequent expressions of Slavic hostility for Germans and Magyars, the agitation of the League of the Patriots, and the rise of Boulanger, gave currency to rumours of war with Russia and France; and Bismarck, seeing the possibility of using the fears thus aroused to regain his control over the Reichstag, made no efforts to contradict these reports. When, therefore, he demanded the renewal of the military law,—the Septennate,—which would expire in 1888, and the Centre, notwithstanding the wishes of the Pope, joined with the social democrats and the Freisinnige party in voting against it, Bismarck dissolved the Reichstag for the second time, January 24, 1887. The time selected for this appeal to the
country was most auspicious; for the people, terrified by the idea of war, were little disposed to favour the opponents of the military bill, and at the same time there was present in Germany a strong patriotic feeling, which actuated the three parties, conservatives, free conservatives, and national liberals, to combine for the support of the imperial government. These parties entered into an agreement called the Cartell, according to which each was to support the others in the election of their candidates; and in the new Reichstag of 1887, called the Cartell Reichstag, the government had a large majority, which not only passed the military law, but also voted a brandy and sugar tax, extended its own term of office from three to five years, and renewed the law against the socialists. Such was the situation when, in March, 1888, the Emperor William died. He had attained the ripe age of ninety-one years, had seen Prussia's abasement after Jena, had witnessed the dissolution of one great imperial institution, the Holy Roman Empire, and the overthrow of another at Leipzig and Waterloo. Yet he had lived to play his part as the king of a new Prussia, to defeat Austria and a second Napoleon, and to found a great German Empire. His successor, Frederic III., favoured a more liberal and parliamentary régime than his father had been willing to adopt, but he ruled too short a time to affect in any way the policy of the government. He died on June 15, 1888, after a reign of three months, and was succeeded by his son William II.

The new Emperor came to the throne when but twenty-nine years of age. He did not share his father's well-known predilections for English institutions; and though he took his grandfather for his model, he carried to extremes the doctrines which the latter had advocated always with simplicity and without affectation, and on every occasion, in toasts, addresses, pronunciamentos, and decrees to the army, lost no opportunity of making known his adherence to the old Hohenzollern ideas. He had no tolerance for free thought, socialism, and the revo-
lution. Devout adherence to religion and the church, devotion to the army and the military régime, unlimited faith in the divine right of kings, were the cardinal points of his creed. He had, furthermore, a sense of his mission as one responsible to God alone, entrusted by Him with the task of ameliorating the condition of the working classes according to the principles of Christian morality, of extending and strengthening the Empire to which he had fallen heir, of preserving peace among the nations, and of establishing at home respect for the church and for the law, and absolute obedience to the Crown. Statements, some impulsive doubtless, others premeditated, seemed to indicate a strong appreciation of his divinely appointed work. In his address to the German people on June 18, 1888, he said: "I have taken the government in the presence of the King of Kings, and following the example of my father, will be to my people a prince just and mild, devout and God-fearing, upholding peace, advancing the welfare of the country, aiding the poor and oppressed, and always standing as a true guardian of the right." At Coblenz, in 1897, he said that his grandfather had erected the "kingdom by the grace of God, the kingdom with its heavy duties, with its never-ending, ever-enduring toils and labours, with its awful responsibility to the Creator alone, from which no man, no minister, no Reichstag, no people, can release the prince"; and on the occasion of the departure of his brother, Prince Henry, for China in 1897, he allowed the following striking words to be spoken: "Of one thing I can assure your Majesty," said Prince Henry, "neither fame nor laurels have charm for me—one thing is the aim that draws me on,—it is to declare in foreign lands the evangel of your Majesty's hallowed person, to preach it to everyone who will hear it, and also to those who will not hear it. This gospel I have inscribed on my banner, and I will inscribe it whithersoever I go." From these utterances, and from others of a similar character spoken during the period after 1888, it is evident
that the view of monarchy held by William II. was that antedating the French Revolution, when a benevolent despotism characterised the rule of kings.

The government of a monarch holding views of this character was bound to be personal, and to have an effect upon the grouping of parties. The conservatives, impressed with the Emperor's attitude on religious matters, drew away from the national liberals and a rupture took place between the members of the Cartell. At the special request of the Emperor the Cartell was renewed; but actuated no longer by patriotic motives it proved of little avail in the elections of 1890, for the government lost heavily, the Cartell electing only 134 deputies, as against 220 in 1887. But a greater event followed: in March, 1890, it became known to the world that Prince Bismarck had been dismissed from his post as chancellor of the Empire and head of the Prussian ministry. The reasons for this important act cannot be satisfactorily determined, though, through the aid of Bismarck's own statements, they can be conjectured. The Emperor, a young man of thirty-one years, was made restless by the cautiousness and circumspection of the older statesman; and furthermore, as personal ruler of Prussia and the Empire, he could discover no place for a minister of such importance as was Bismarck, with whom he was certain to come into conflict in his determination to adopt a policy of his own. Bismarck, wishing to continue the war against the socialists, had already disapproved of the attitude of William II. toward social questions, and opposed the international conference of labour, which the Emperor called in 1890 to consider labour legislation. On his part, the Emperor had insisted that all reports of Prussian ministers should be given to him directly, instead of passing through the hands of the head of the ministry, and that all arrangements with party leaders in the Reichstag should be reported to him. Whether there were deeper reasons than these it is impossible to say; certain it is that on March 17th, after
Bismarck had refused to disclose the terms of an alliance with the Centre, of which the Emperor disapproved, William II. demanded and received the resignation of his chancellor. "The post of officer on guard in the ship of state has fallen to me," said the Emperor in his telegram of March 22d to the Grand Duke of Weimar. "The course remains the same. Forward at full speed (Voll Dampf voran)."

In fact, however, the course was not to be the same. With Caprivi as chancellor of the Empire and president of the Prussian ministry, many important changes were made. The measures against the socialists were dropped, with the dual result of quieting the radical opposition in the Chamber and of giving the social democrats an opportunity to reorganize; the commercial policy, though not entirely reversed, was altered, and a system of commercial alliances was again substituted for the high protective tariff, and between the years 1892 and 1894 commercial alliances were arranged with Austria-Hungary, Italy, Switzerland, Belgium, Servia, Spain, and Russia. The policy, of which the making of these treaties was a part, had for its object the opening of new fields for German colonisation and industry. In 1890 a treaty was arranged with England, whereby Germany exchanged Witu, Uganda, and the island of Zanzibar for Heligoland, and the boundaries between the spheres of influence of the two states in West Africa were determined. The treaty of 1884 with Russia was not renewed, and at the same time the government attempted to effect a reconciliation with the Poles by conceding to them a Polish archbishop, and abandoning Bismarck's scheme of Germanising Posen. This policy, destined to be reversed in 1897, brought to the support of the government the Polish deputies who had opposed it consistently for twenty years.

Although the change in the tariff policy had angered the conservatives, nevertheless, until 1893, the Emperor had been able, at the price of an alliance with the Centre, to get a majority vote
for his measures. The first evidence of trouble came in 1892, when the government proposed to suppress lay schools in Prussia and to provide for the religious education of children. So vigorously did popular opinion express itself against this measure that the Emperor withdrew the bill; and in consequence Caprivi resigned as head of the Prussian ministry. But this separation of the offices of imperial chancellor and Prussian prime minister proved unsatisfactory; for from 1892 to 1894 Caprivi and Eulenburg, his successor in Prussia, were at variance with each other, and the parties in the Reichstag and Prussian Landtag began once more to slip from the imperial control. In 1893 the Centre united with the radicals to defeat the army bill, which demanded an appropriation for the increase of the yearly recruits and a reduction of the three-year term of service; and in consequence of this opposition, the Emperor dissolved the Reichstag, and made an appeal to the country. On account of a division in the progressist party, the government made sufficient gains in the new election to carry the army bill; but this result, which was really due to the votes of the Polish deputies,—for the bill was passed by a majority of only eleven,—was overshadowed by the successes of the social democrats, who cast nearly two million votes, and elected forty-four members to the Reichstag. Partly on account of the situation created by these unexpected socialistic gains, and partly on account of continued disagreements between Caprivi and Eulenburg, the two statesmen were dismissed in October, 1894, and the two offices were united in the person of Prince Hohenlohe.

The years from 1893 to 1896 were noteworthy for the breaking up of party strength in the Reichstag. The conservatives were weakened by the rise of an agrarian party and by the growth of the anti-Semitic movement; the radicals were thrown into confusion by the discussion upon the army bill, and separated into two groups, one for and one against the measure; and even the Centre maintained its solidarity with difficulty.
In the south, the discontent with the Emperor's policy led to the formation of a South German people's party. In internal affairs, the agrarian unrest, due largely to the adoption of the German world-commerce policy, and the financial problems, due to the desire of the government to reduce the imperial debt, were chiefly prominent. In external affairs, the colonial and commercial expansion of the Empire, and the project to form a navy that should be commensurate with the greatness of the enlarged Empire, gained the largest share of attention. The commercial treaties made between 1892 and 1894, the opening of the Kiel Canal in 1895, the strained relations with England, due to the Transvaal difficulty in 1896, and above all the discovery of a new field of operations in China in 1897, the occupation of the port of Kaio-Chow, and the passage of the naval bill the next year, were all indications of the renewed interest that William II. was taking in the colonial policy of Bismarck, and in new measures for increasing the wealth and prestige of the German Empire.

But the most striking feature of the situation in 1897 was not the colonial policy, but the two divergent tendencies in Germany herself; one monarchical and feudal, the other democratic. The dominance of Prussia, where the methods were strongly bureaucratic, military, and conservative, and the policy of Bismarck, who during his term of office had exerted all his efforts to destroy the subversive elements in the state, had given to German political life an essentially conservative character. This tendency was furthered by William II., who in his devotion to the doctrine of the divinity of kings, in his assertion of the duty of unqualified obedience, in his hostility to socialism, in his legislation against the freedom of the press, of speech, and of action, as seen in his attempts to regulate public meetings, to control newspapers, and to impose a censorship upon privat-docents in the universities, had revived the ideas of the old régime. On the other hand there had taken place a
movement of the opposite character, which by 1897 had assumed striking proportions. The evolution of social democracy was the most impressive event which German history had to chronicle since 1870. From two members elected to the Reichstag and 120,000 votes cast in 1871, the party had steadily increased in strength until in 1893 it cast 1,786,000 votes and elected forty-four deputies, and in 1897 claimed to have over two million followers. Had a revision of the voting districts been made according to the population in 1897 and a larger representation been allowed the cities, fifteen of which had trebled in size in eighteen years, its deputies in the Reichstag would have been vastly increased. These figures are significant as showing the number, not of those who accepted socialistic doctrines, but of those who were discontented with conditions as they were. This astounding growth was due to the concentration of the population of Germany in the cities, which had become centres of a splendidly equipped socialistic organisation; to the absence of a well-to-do middle class in Germany; and to the existence of large masses of the population in a condition of relative poverty.

Thus in 1897 appeared two divergent and irreconcilable tendencies: one monarchical, ecclesiastical, and military; the other democratic, lay, and industrial. On one side stood the Emperor and the government representing both in policy and methods the supremacy of Prussia. William II. was undoubtedly sincere in his desire to act for the good of the German people, yet was adopting a policy that was only serving to increase the discontent. He was repressive in his many prosecutions for lèse-majesté; was reactionary in his doctrine of the monarchy and the state, and in his appointments to office; and was advancing the interests of the state rather than of the people at large in his determination that Germany should play a leading part in the commercial and colonial expansion of Europe, thereby substituting commercial alliances for a pro-
tective tariff, increasing the military and financial burdens of the country, and ignoring the internal needs of a land but little favoured by nature and of a people already heavily burdened by the cost of maintaining an enormous army. On the other side were the democrats, radicals and socialists, whose numbers had increased despite the efforts which the government had made to diminish them by the adoption of state socialism; who were opposed to all ecclesiastical interference in government, determined to obtain greater influence for the representatives of the people, and were hostile to the project of increasing the army or enlarging the navy as tending to depress by its weight of taxation the masses of the people. At the same time the social democrats went further and opposed the entire system of national economy; but in agreeing as they had done in 1890 that the social question could not be solved by revolution, and in recognising that a state protection of labour would be a step in the right direction, they had become in reality a democratic party working in the legislative chambers for the advancement of social reform. In 1897, radicals and social democrats, though far from an agreement on positive measures of legislation, stood side by side in opposing the reactionary tendencies of the government.
CHAPTER XI.

THE KINGDOM OF ITALY.

WHEN on February 18, 1861, Victor Emmanuel opened the first Italian Parliament at Turin and received "by the grace of God and the will of the nation" the title of King of Italy, a new state took its place among the Powers of Europe, ready to justify its existence by a career that should be both influential and honourable. But the obstacles to be surmounted were legion. The fact that the Italian peoples differed from one another in race, traditions, and social organisation, and had won their independence by diplomacy, rather than by any slow process of national fusion, made it inevitable that, even with political unity won, they should still lack that without which no newly founded state of to-day can be permanent, a national unity. D'Azeglio well expressed the problem of 1861 when he said: "We have united Italy; now let us unite the Italians."

The first great obstacle to unity was to be found in the history and traditions of the people themselves. In this respect Italy differed from Germany, who, though long disunited, had been conscious for centuries of the oneness in blood of all her peoples; and likewise from Austria, who, though possessing no national unity, had found her strength in the devotion of her peoples to a common dynasty. But from the fall of Rome to the close of the French Revolution, Italy had never possessed a single important element making for unity. Composed of separate states, and ruled by rival dynasties, who had no inter-
est either in the common name or the common country, she had been little better than a mosaic of races and governments. Feudal suzerains, municipal consuls, Renaissance despots, monarchs, and Popes had controlled, at one time or another, the different parts of her territory; while German, French, Spanish, Byzantine, Norman, and Saracenic influences had left their imprint upon the history and traditions of her various peoples. Furthermore, though designed geographically to be a single state, she had but few natural bonds drawing her people together. Lombards, Piedmontese, Tuscans, and Romagnols possessed, it is true, certain traits in common, and resembled one another in the character of their industry and social organisation; but all of them differed from the people of the south in each of these particulars. The sub-Alpine region was unlike the Neapolitan in climate, fertility of the soil, and the character of the produce, and the Lombards differed from the Neapolitans in temperament, traditions, and culture; while the Ligurians and the Venetians, trained for centuries in commerce and municipal independence, were wholly unlike the slothful, yet excitable, Sicilians, who had suffered for generations from bad government and oppression. In the north, where government had been less despotic and existence less beset with perils than elsewhere in Italy, brigandage was almost unknown, the population more dense, wealth more abundant, and industry more highly developed; while in the south, notably in such districts as Apulia, Basilicata, and the Calabrias, there existed a scattered population, which lacked energy or ambition, was content with a primitive form of husbandry, and stunted, physically by disease, and morally by superstition and ignorance, was given over to feuds, secret associations, and crime. Northern and southern Italy were as two different countries, and the welding together of these divergent parts was to be the work, not of a day or a year, but of many generations.

But there were other obstacles of an administrative and
financial character that demanded the immediate attention of the Italian government. Since the congress of Vienna, political Italy had consisted of five distinct states: Sardinia, Tuscany, Rome, Naples, and Austria acting as overlord of Lombardy and Venetia, each with its own administration, its own diplomatic service, its own financial, monetary, and judicial systems. It was necessary, therefore, first of all, to bring about uniformity in all these particulars; to choose between centralisation and some form of provincial autonomy; to provide for a common administration of the enlarged state; to establish common coinage and common postal arrangements; to abolish internal tariffs and provincial customs-houses; to make uniform the tariff dues along the frontier; to unite the budgets of the various states; to suppress old and iniquitous forms of taxation, and to supply new; and to provide for the assumption of the various state debts, which, on account of the expenses of the war, had become extraordinarily heavy. Furthermore, the new government was obliged to suppress brigandage in the south, that peace and order might be restored, and in arranging for the extension of the military organisation, to deal with those allies who, as volunteers under Garibaldi and others, had served well the cause of Italy, and now were to be received—both officers and men—into the Italian army. Lastly, there remained the question of obtaining Rome and Venice, without which the kingdom of Italy would be incomplete.

Such were the difficulties that confronted the statesmen of Italy in the first months of the year 1861, and such were the burdens that broke the health of Count Cavour. Though shaken by the irretrievable loss of his minister, Victor Emmanuel took up the task that Cavour had begun, and supported by a loyal majority, consisting of the representatives from Piedmont and central Italy, called to his aid Ricasoli of the Right Centre, and with him began the organisation of the new Italy. Having rejected all proposals of autonomy for the an-
nexed provinces, and having adopted a strictly autocratic and centralising policy, the king and his new minister divided the country into artificial administrative districts, fifty-nine in number, which resembled the French departments, and appointed all prefects and mayors from Turin, in order to destroy the spirit of particularism, to attach the people to the central government, and to increase their loyalty to Italy. After much manœuvring, during which the negotiations were not always of an amicable character, they reached an agreement with Garibaldi, whereby the volunteers were to be enrolled with the soldiers of the different states in a common Italian army. They began the extension of the railway system of Piedmont, and in November, 1861, Victor Emmanuel opened the new line from Bologna to Ancona, which was extended in 1863 to Foggia and afterwards to Brindisi, thus placing the government in communication with the old pontifical states and Naples. At the same time the king journeyed southward, visiting Naples and the southern provinces, partly to show himself to his new subjects, partly to consider important measures of unification, such as related to administration, public instruction, and the economic condition of the people.

During the four years that followed, projects were set on foot for improving agricultural lands, draining fens and marshes, transforming wild land into arable, and colonising waste regions, that the productivity of Italy might be increased and the population become more evenly distributed; and in order to bring Italy into closer economic relations with the world outside, commercial treaties were negotiated with France, England, Sweden, Holland, Belgium, and, in 1865, with Prussia and the Zollverein. But of more importance than all else were the endeavours made by the government to meet the heavy financial burdens, which were due to the assumption of the old state debts and to the cost of reorganising the administrative system and creating a new army and navy. In 1859, the debts
of the separate states were estimated at two milliards of lire, while that of the kingdom had risen by 1863 to twice that amount. In 1861, a loan of 500,000,000 lire was negotiated, and every effort was made to balance expenditures and receipts; but during the early years of the history of the kingdom, the natural difficulties of the situation were increased by the necessity of war preparations, which imposed a heavy financial burden on the young state. In 1864, a large part of the receipts was used to pay the interest on the debt, while the deficit, which had risen to 350,000,000 lire in the regular, and to more than 200,000,000 lire in the extra, budget, required new loans. The king relinquished a fifth of his income from the civil list, while his subjects bore without complaint new taxes, and in some instances paid their quotas in advance.

At the same time, strenuous attempts were made to bring peace to the land by improving the police service, suppressing brigandage, and removing the last traces of opposition in the Neapolitan and Sicilian departments. In 1861, Victor Emmanuel sent General Cialdini to check an uprising of old Neapolitan soldiers, peasants, and brigands, which was encouraged from Rome by Francis II., the Pope, and the clergy generally, as a holy war against the "robbert king" of Italy. The struggle lasted from June to October, 1861, and though, at the time, the victory lay entirely with the government, it was many years before complete security was restored. And meanwhile Italy was strengthening her position abroad. England, France, Russia, Prussia, and, in 1865, Spain and the South German states accorded recognition to the new kingdom, while the marriage of the daughter of Victor Emmanuel in 1861 to the king of Portugal brought great joy to the Italian people. Well might the king say in his speech to Parliament in 1865, that, despite financial embarrassments, the condition of Italy had vastly improved during these four years; that the relations with foreign Powers were most satisfactory; that at home the
efforts of the government had produced wonderful results in administration, in the laws, in codes, in public works, and in the army; and that with hope might he point to the future, when questions of legislative unification, of public instruction, of credit, and of public works were to engage the attention of the government.

But for Italy no satisfactory settlement of her difficulties was possible as long as the greater problem of complete unity remained unsolved. As long as Austria should remain in Venetia and the French in Rome, and so compel Italy to keep herself prepared for war, her financial difficulties were bound to grow worse rather than better, and her relations with the Powers, notably with Austria, France, and Prussia, remaining uncertain, would make impossible perfect content and concord at home. As early as March 27, 1861, in a famous declaration, Cavour had asserted that Rome ought to be, and would be, the capital of Italy; and recognising that, for the time being, it would be impossible to acquire Venice, had concentrated his attention upon the Roman question. Having failed to carry his point, either by negotiations with the papacy, or by intrigue in Rome through certain agents, Pantaleoni, Bozino, and Isaia, he had turned to France, and had proposed to Thouvenel an arrangement whereby the French troops might be withdrawn from the city, if the Italian government would abstain from any attack upon the States of the Church. The negotiations, which Cavour initiated, and which he would probably have carried to a successful conclusion had he lived, were continued by Ricasoli, until his resignation in March, 1862, and afterward by Rattazzi, his successor: and although the Pope firmly rejected every proposition, Napoleon seemed inclined to grant the request of the Italian government that he withdraw his troops from Rome.

But the party of action, chafing under the dilatory policy of the government, and believing that Rattazzi, himself a liberal,
would favour any aggressive action, the object of which was to secure for Italy either Rome or Venetia, began to collect volunteers on the Tyrolese boundary and in Brescia, for the purpose of concerted with the Magyars and Serbs in an attack upon Austrian territory. But the Italian government promptly checkmated this move by arresting the leaders; whereupon Garibaldi started for Sicily with the cry of “Rome or death!” gathering, as he went, followers for an attack upon the papal city. But as to sanction such a revolutionary act would involve Italy in a war with France, Victor Emmanuel issued on August 3d a manifesto warning his people that every appeal to arms, not emanating from the king, was an appeal to rebellion and to civil war, and bidding them await the hour for the accomplishment of the great work, when the voice of the king would make itself heard among them. But Garibaldi, refusing to heed, crossed into Calabria, where on August 24th, at Aspromonte, he was met by the regulars under General Cialdini, and, after a conflict that both sides sought to avoid, was wounded in the ankle and taken prisoner of war.

The effect of this incident was disastrous for Italy. The Rattazzi ministry at once resigned; France broke off negotiations, and instead of withdrawing her troops from Rome, increased their number. Furthermore, in September, when the government at Turin, hoping to quiet the excitement of the Italians due to the wounding of Garibaldi, declared that Italy would still persist in her efforts to obtain Rome, Napoleon, disturbed by the effect of this announcement upon the clericals, removed Thouvenel, recalled Lavelette from Rome and Bentetti from Turin, and appointed as minister of foreign affairs the ultramontane, Drouyn de Lhuys. Yet notwithstanding this act, the sympathies of the French Emperor were still with Italy; and when he found, during 1863, that his concessions to the clericals had not won for him their support, that the Pope, with his continual non possumus, was as unyielding as ever, and
that the presence of the French in Rome was a continual source of disquietude to him, owing to the quarrels between his generals and the Pope, he became more than ever ready to come to an agreement with Italy.

And in 1864 Italy was ready to negotiate with the Emperor on the basis of a compromise. Although the government under Minghetti, in carrying forward the work begun by Cavour in the interest of a free church in a free state, had suppressed many religious congregations and added their revenues to the resources of the state, yet the financial situation was but little bettered thereby, and a new loan of 700,000,000 lire was asked of Parliament in 1864 and granted. Such was the financial embarrassment of Italy, and such her despair of a speedy settlement of the Roman question, owing to the anger aroused at Rome by the recent confiscation of ecclesiastical lands, that the government determined to adopt a new policy. A compromise was reached with Napoleon, according to which the Emperor promised to withdraw gradually his troops from Rome, in case Victor Emmanuel would respect the sovereign authority of the Pope over the territory that still remained to him. This agreement, known as the convention of September, 1864, was duly ratified; and in order the better to carry out its terms, Victor Emmanuel consented to move the capital from Turin to Florence. By this convention, the Italian government postponed the solution of the Roman question; while Napoleon not only officially recognised the previous annexations of papal territory, but tacitly agreed that the eventual occupation of Rome by the Italians was inevitable.

This convention of September, though an excellent diplomatic move for Italy, drove into insurrection the people of Turin, who in losing the capital feared to lose the leadership, and outraged both Pope and ultramontanes, who looked upon the alliance between Napoleon and their enemies as an intolerable offence against the church. Despairing of temporal
support, Pius IX. issued in December, 1864, the encyclical *Quanta cura* and the Syllabus or catalogue of the errors of the age, in which he defined the claims of the papacy and the authority of the church over the state, society, and learning, and stated, in a negative way by anathematising those who accepted a contrary doctrine, the creed of the church. Not only did he condemn liberty of worship, liberty of conscience, and all laicising of education and the state, but without tolerance he inveighed against liberal Catholics, as well as Protestants and rationalists. But notwithstanding the fact that parts of the Syllabus were directed against the Italian government and that most of it was hostile to the Italian constitution, Victor Emmanuel allowed both encyclical and Syllabus to be circulated freely in Italy, and in so doing probably made easier the final settlement of the Roman question.

But the task of solving this difficult problem having thus been postponed indefinitely, the government in February, 1865, transferred its seat to Florence, which for five years was to remain the capital city of Italy, and turned its attention to questions relating to finances, to the promotion of internal reforms, and, above all else, to the acquiring of Venetia by peaceful means. La Marmora, having failed in his attempt to buy the much-disputed territory, proposed through Napoleon that Roumania be divided, and part be given to Austria in exchange for Venetia, a proposal that both Russia and Austria refused to consider. Failing in this, after much hesitation he consented to enter into an alliance with Prussia against Austria, hoping to win Venetia as Cavour had won Lombardy, through the aid of an outside Power. But before the outbreak of war in 1866, Napoleon, in the sincerity of his desire to complete the work that he had left unfinished in 1859, made three efforts to win Venetia for Italy without war. To the embarrassment of the Italian minister, he succeeded in persuading Austria to give up
Venetia in return for Italian neutrality, but this offer Italy rejected; he then proposed that a congress be called to settle pending questions, a suggestion that Austria would accept only on condition that no cessions of territory be considered; and lastly, he arranged a convention with Austria, June, 1866, whereby Venetia was to be given to Italy, in case Austria were successful in the struggle with Prussia. But the matter was not to be settled in this way. Though Italy was defeated at Custozza, Prussia’s victory at Königgrätz assured to the Italians Venetia as the reward for their alliance. On October 3, 1866, a treaty between Austria and Italy was signed at Vienna; and on the 19th of the month Venetia was formally ceded to the Italian government. By a vote of 650,000 to 49, the people of the province accepted annexation, and in November Victor Emmanuel made his entrance into Venice.

Italian unity was almost complete, but the city and territory of Rome still remained to prove a source of intense disquietude to the king and his people, and a constant annoyance to Italy, France, the papacy, and the party of action. In 1867, Garibaldi, taking advantage of the return of Rattazzi of the Left Centre to the head of the ministry, and encouraged by the final withdrawal of the French troops from Rome, announced his determination to invade the pontifical territory. Though promptly arrested by the government and returned to Caprera, he escaped; and having raised volunteers in Tuscany, crossed the papal frontier in October. The Rattazzi ministry had thus far shown no great amount of zeal in preventing the expedition; but at this crisis Victor Emmanuel issued a proclamation against the volunteers, and prepared to set in motion the Italian army, at the same time sending La Marmora to beg the French government not to intervene. But Napoleon, fearing that Italy would not hold to the convention of September, despatched General de Failly with a body of French troops, which joined the papal forces, and meeting the insurgents at Mentana, killed
and captured many of the Garibaldians in the very presence of the Italian regulars. This slaughter of their countrymen, together with de Failly’s official statement that “the chassepots had done wonders” and Rouher’s even more unfortunate remark, made the next year to the Corps législatif, that “Italy should never possess Rome—never!” destroyed all sense of gratitude on the part of the Italians to France. As the Garibalidian expedition resulted in the downfall of the ministry of Ratazzi, so the words of Rouher led to the retirement of his successor, Menabrea, because the Parliament at Florence deemed him insufficiently hostile to France.

At this juncture, when the second invasion of the Roman territory had failed, and the French were once more in the Eternal City guarding the interests of the Pope, Pius IX. made a noteworthy effort to compensate himself for the losses that he had incurred in the temporal and political world, by the prosecution of a plan that had been in his mind since the issue of the encyclical of 1864, namely, that of summoning a great ecumenical council to meet at Rome. This council, the first since the gathering at Trent in the sixteenth century, met at the Vatican, December 8, 1869, and sat until October of the following year, when it was dispersed by the events of the Franco-Prussian war. By the doctrine of Infallibility, which declared that “when the Roman Pontiff, fulfilling his mission as first teacher of all Christians, defines that which ought to be observed in matters of faith and morals, he cannot err,” the supremacy of the Pope in the church was dogmatically established. By this act, Pius IX. was raised to a height of spiritual authority grander than had been attained by any of his predecessors; and the dogma of Infallibility, in placing the Pope above the episcopate and all councils, and constituting him the sole interpreter of the faith, made inevitable a stricter definition of the doctrines of the church along the lines of the Syllabus of 1864. And the situation was the more striking, in that, before
the dispersion of the members of the council, the troops of Italy had invaded the pontifical territory, and had taken from Pius IX. the last remnants of his temporal power. He, whom the ecclesiastics assembled in the nave of St. Peter's had greeted, on July 20th, as the "Infallible Pope," became, after the 20th of September, "the Prisoner in the Vatican."

For the opportunity of thus settling the Roman question, the Italians were indebted to the Franco-Prussian war. During the years 1869 and 1870, Italy and France had had the matter of their future relations under consideration, and the latter Power had discussed the advisability of an alliance with Austria against Prussia. But Italy had made it an inflexible condition of such an alliance, that the French troops be withdrawn from Rome, and the questions placed once more on the footing of the convention of September: and inasmuch as Napoleon had refused to accept any such condition, all negotiations between the two countries had been suspended. Therefore, when the war broke out in July, 1870, there existed between Italy and France neither treaty nor understanding; and though Victor Emmanuel seems to have favoured the cause of the Emperor, neither his ministers nor his Parliament would consent to his aiding France, and the deficit of nearly 700,000,000 lire made it necessary for Italy to avoid war, if possible. But the defeat of Napoleon at Sedan put an end to all uncertainty, and the withdrawal of the French troops opened the way to Rome. On September 8th, the Italian army crossed the frontier, and before the end of the month was in possession of the city. Early in October, by a vote of more than 130,000 to 1,500, the people of the papal territory voted for annexation; and with the acceptance of this act by the Parliament at Florence, with the entrance of Victor Emmanuel into Rome in December, and with the transference of the capital to that city in July, 1871, the territorial unity of Italy was at last completed.

But one more step remained to be taken before the Roman
question could be permanently disposed of, before Italy, who was approaching the close of her period of formation, could enter upon her career as a Power, free from the disturbances to which she had been subjected by political and religious controversies in the past. By the "law of guarantees," adopted May 13, 1871, one of the most remarkable of modern documents dealing with the relations between church and state, the complete spiritual independence of the Pope was secured, and the place of the church in civil society determined. The person of the Pope was declared sacred and inviolable, and any attack upon him was to be treated as if it were an attack upon the person of the king himself. He was granted royal honours, as befitting a great spiritual sovereign, and the right of free correspondence with the Catholic bishops throughout the world; he was allowed to convene ecumenical councils, whose gatherings were to be protected by the civil authorities, to maintain his own courts, to have his own diplomatic agents and his own postal and telegraph service; and in the way of material advantages, he was to enjoy in full the Vatican and the Lateran, and the villa of Castel Gandolfo, the spring residence of the pontiffs near Lake Nemi, while the papal office, whether occupied or vacant, was to receive annually 3,225,000 lire from the Italian civil list. In all that concerned the relations of the state with the church, the government of Italy showed itself more liberal than any other Roman Catholic country in the world. The royal exequatur and placet were abolished; bishops were not required to take oath to the king; in all matters of spiritual discipline, the ecclesiastical judgment was to be final; and papal manifestoes were not to require the government's endorsement:—in fact, as far as the control or interference of the state was concerned, the church in Italy was to be absolutely independent. Yet, notwithstanding this fact, Pius IX. not only excommunicated the invaders of his territory, but, refusing all the pecuniary advantages that the "law of guaran-
tees" offered, declared himself a prisoner in the Vatican. He
decided to recognise the kingdom of Italy, or to enter into
any relations with it, and instructed loyal Catholics throughout
the kingdom to take no part in the elections, either as electors
or elected. The fact remains, however, that at no time in the
history of the papacy was the chief pontiff to be so powerful,
influential, and secure as after 1871. Though reactionary and
mediaeval in doctrine, Pius IX. and his successor became liberal
and conciliatory in tactics; and though in all official acts and
statements they expressed themselves as hostile to Italy and
unresigned to the loss of their temporal power, nevertheless, in
fact, they accepted the protection that Italy offered them, and
in time came to recognise as inevitable the permanent loss of
their territory.

Though the years 1870 and 1871 are of great importance in
the history of the territorial development of Italy and her re-
lations with the papacy, they have no such significance in the
history of her internal government and the relation of parties.
With the exception of the two ministries of Rataazzi, the offices
of state had been held since 1861 by the party of the Right
Centre, which had been recruited mainly from northern Italy,
where the work of unification had first begun, and had been
represented by such men as Ricasoli of Tuscany, Minghetti of
Piedmont, and Sella of Lombardy. This party had carried the
state in safety through the diplomatic and military experiences
already narrated, but its path had not been easy, for it had felt
keenly the heavy burden of the deficit, which in 1867 had
amounted to more than 600,000,000 lire. Consequently, in that
year the ministry had been obliged to reimpose the obnoxious
grist tax and to take up the question of secularising ecclesiastical
domains. Having expelled the Jesuits from Italy, and con-
fiscated the territory of the monasteries by the convent law of
1866, it seized in 1867, for the benefit of the state, all church
lands that were not actually in use. But as the condition of
the finances did not improve, largely owing to the obligation that devolved upon the state of maintaining a large army to ward off any attempts that should be made to restore to the Pope his territories, further measures were adopted after 1871. The convenant law of 1866 was extended in 1873 to include Rome and the Patrimonium Petri; and though modified in important particulars, a large fund was obtained by this means for schools, parishes, and hospitals. As this was inadequate for the needs of the state, specie payments were suspended in 1874, and the government found it necessary, not only to force upon the country an inconvertible paper currency, but also to levy new taxes, which created great dissatisfaction in Parliament and among the people at large. Furthermore, the deficit was increased by the attempt of the government to bring the railroads of Italy—notably the Roman and Lombardo-Venetian systems—into the possession of the state.

At the same time the young state made strenuous exertions to strengthen its position abroad, but a stable relationship with any foreign state was difficult to establish, owing to the refusal of Pius IX. to acknowledge the loss of his territory, and to the efforts of the ultramontanes in other countries to bring their governments to the support of the papal cause. For nearly ten years Italy lived in fear lest the monarchists and clericals in France should overturn the French republic, and enter upon a crusade against Italy for the restoration of the temporal power of the Pope. But in other particulars Italy’s position was better secured. In 1870, Amadeus, son of Victor Emmanuel, was elected president of the Spanish Republic, and in 1871 Count Frederic Sclopis, one of the ablest of Italy’s jurists, was chosen to preside at the tribunal of arbitration upon the Alabama claims. In 1873, Victor Emmanuel visited Vienna and Berlin, and to the joy of the Italians received a visit from Francis Joseph at Venice in 1874, and the year following, entertained William I. at Milan.
Such were the chief characteristics of the first few years of Italy's history as a kingdom. The party of the Right Centre, or Right, as it may now be called, had piloted the ship of state past many of the dangers of the period from 1861 to 1876, and with all its mistakes of judgment and want of diplomatic sagacity, it had performed a good work for Italy. But in 1876, as the result of an unobserved, but far-reaching, political revolution, it lost its control of government, and gave place to that party which twice already, in the person of Rattazzi, had sought to direct the policy of Italy—the old party of the Left Centre or modern Left. This change was due to many causes, chief among which were discontent with the grist tax and the policy of the Right Centre regarding railroads; the transference of the capital to Rome, which carried the centre of political life southward; the refusal of the loyal Catholics to vote; and, lastly, the promises of the Left to extend the franchise and to reduce the taxation. And something more than a mere shifting of party supremacy had been effected: the Right, which had stood for northern Italy, for business activity, parliamentary experience, and loyalty to France, had given way before the Left, which represented central and southern Italy and the peoples of Naples and Sicily, where radical views were more prevalent and personal rivalries more common, where parliamentary methods were little appreciated, and where regard for the constitution, for monarchy, the church, and for France, was less widely felt. Instead of Piedmont, Lombardy, and Tuscany, Naples and Sicily now took the direction of affairs; and Depretis, Cairoli, and Crispi took the place of Minghetti, Menabrea, and Sella. The effect of this change was to place the government in the hands of party leaders, who were loyal, it is true, to the constitutional monarchy, but who were committed to a program more radical than that which the Right were willing to adopt; who were destined to become, not the leaders of one great united party, but the heads of personal
groups, often hostile to each other, as well as to the conservatives and the church.

During the first few years after 1876, the disorder in the country steadily increased. Republicans and socialists were unexpectedly successful in spreading liberal ideas, while a new party, that of the Irredentists, came into existence with the program of an "unredeemed Italy" (Italia irredenta), demanding the annexation of all Italian-speaking territories which were possessed by foreigners—of Tyrol and Istria, Nice and Corsica, Malta and the canton Ticino. These demands endangered Italy's friendship with Switzerland, France, and England, and led to outspoken expressions of hostility on the part of Austria and Germany, to the effect that the radical ministry in Italy could not control the revolutionary spirit in the country. Depretis was followed by Cairoli, and Cairoli in his turn by Depretis; and while Italy was in this condition of political instability Victor Emmanuel died, leaving behind him, as the grandest monument to his memory, a grateful country and an imperishable name. A few months afterward Pius IX. died also, whose persistent non possimus of the later days tended to blot out the memory of his earlier career as a liberal pope, and whose official intolerance had too often shut from view his kindly nature. Thus, before the close of the year 1878, the leaders of Italy had entirely changed: the Left had taken the place of the Right; Humbert, that of Victor Emmanuel; and Leo XIII., that of Pius IX.

The effect of such important changes was to throw Italy for a time into a state of political confusion and disorder. From 1876 to 1882, Parliament was given over to personal rivalries and personal ambitions; the ministry, that of Cairoli as well as that of Depretis, was without a fixed policy, and the ministers seemed to lack both decision and breadth of view. In the country, agitation increased, republicans, Irredentists, socialists, and anarchists alike arousing disturbance and tumult in
the great cities. Passanante made an attempt in 1878 upon the life of King Humbert in Naples. Barsanti clubs, organised through the south in honour of an Italian corporal executed by the government for disobedience to orders, became agencies dealing in socialistic plots and conspiracies. The intrigues of the Irredentists, who were carrying on their work in Trieste and the Tyrol in the interest of annexation, finally culminated in the scheme of Oberdank for the assassination of the Emperor Francis Joseph at Trieste. Oberdank was executed by the Austrian government, but, like Barsanti, the hero of the republicans and socialists, was immediately exalted as a political martyr. All these events made difficult the establishment of a fixed foreign policy. It was the desire of Depretis to sever all connection with France in favour of an alliance with Germany; while Cairoli, loyal to France, and inclined to tolerate the Irredentists, was unwilling to assume the burdens that an alliance with Germany and Austria would entail. Gradually, however, the atmosphere became clearer, and a definite ministerial policy took shape. Ferry's aggressive campaign in Tunis, which, in 1880 and 1881, was undertaken, despite Italy's protests, for the purpose of establishing a colonial empire for France, roused the Italian press and people, and demonstrations were made in the large cities in behalf of an alliance with Germany. Cairoli at once withdrew from office, and Depretis, returning to power, inaugurated that policy, which Italy was to follow for fifteen years, that of resistance to all enemies of the monarchy at home and close alliance with Germany and Austria abroad. Having suppressed the Irredentist movement and all republican agitation, which had been rather encouraged by the Left than otherwise since their accession to power, he brought Italy into the triple alliance in 1882.

Since 1876 the financial condition of Italy had steadily improved. The efforts made to reduce expenses had so far succeeded that, even before the death of Victor Emmanuel, the
long-wished-for balance between receipts and expenditures had been obtained; and, notwithstanding expensive railroad undertakings, a slight surplus was reported in 1879. So satisfactory did the situation appear to be in 1883 that specie payments were resumed, and in 1884 the hated grist tax was abolished. During the same period, other reforms were instituted: a compulsory education law was passed in 1877, and in 1884 proposals for the improvement of higher education were made; measures were taken for improving agriculture, extending public works, and bettering the sanitary conditions of Naples. In 1882, the scheme for extending the suffrage, which had been under discussion for several years, was put into operation, and by a reduction of the age limit to twenty-one years and of the tax qualification to nineteen lire, eighty centessimi, the number of voters was increased from 627,000 to 2,049,000.

Thus far Italy had had but little desire to emulate the colonial ambitions of her more powerful neighbours by attempting to extend her colonial influence beyond the region of the Mediterranean. But the same motive that had led Depretis to form an alliance with Germany and Austria, and to keep on terms of amity with England,—that is, the increasing of Italy's importance and prestige among the Powers,—induced him to undertake a colonial enterprise on the eastern coast of Africa. Before 1881, a Genoese company had established itself on the coast of the Red Sea just north of Babel-Mandeb, and had acquired a small strip of territory about the Bay of Assab, which the Italian government had purchased in 1882. Three years later, despite the protestations of the Porte, Depretis despatched troops to Africa, seized the seaport of Massowa, and before two years had passed, Italy was at full war with Abyssinia. The Italian minister, finding himself greatly embarrassed by the unusually heavy expenditures arising from this colonial undertaking, and from increased armaments, made necessary by the fear of war in Europe in 1886 and 1887, remodelled his ministry by the ad-
mission of Crispi, and was preparing to face the troublesome situation when he died in July, 1887.

Crispi, as his natural successor, took up the burden of government, and adopted, without change, the policy which Depretis had followed. He continued the war preparations of 1886, built new fortresses, and extended the war credit of that year for the purpose of increasing the navy. He adhered rigidly to the triple alliance, supported by King Humbert, who declared that the alliance was "a pledge of that peace which not only Italy, but all states, desired as necessary to the welfare of nations, to their progress and civilisation"; and at the same time espoused the cause of the colonial empire, vigorously carried on the war against King John of Abyssinia in 1888 and 1889, seized Zula, Keren, and Asmala, and extended Italy's sphere of influence inward from the coast. In 1890, after the death of King John, he supported the claims of Menelek, and with him negotiated a treaty of friendship and commerce.

But this aggressive policy destroyed the financial equilibrium in Italy, and created deficits, which reached 191,000,000 lire in 1891, and increased so rapidly in the years that followed as to preclude all hope of a restoration of the balance. Levying of new taxes became necessary, and the additional burden thus entailed, together with local industrial troubles, made it easy for republicans and socialists to create disturbances, and to rouse such a strong feeling of dissatisfaction and discontent with the monarchy, that in 1889 riots took place in Rome, Milan, Turin, and Apulia. But Crispi was firm: having declared in the Chamber his determination to defend the monarchy and to suppress all revolutionary parties, he put down the rioters, attacked the Irredentists, abolished the committees for Trieste and Trent, dissolved the Barsanti and Oberdank societies, and in general denounced the radicals, victory for whom, he maintained, would mean "war with Europe, the
overthrow of the monarchy, and the complete ruin of the fatherland." Although supported by a large governmental majority in the elections of 1890, he was obliged to resign the next year on account of certain unfortunate remarks that he made, charging the party of the Right with servility toward foreign Powers in the years 1874 and 1875.

Rudini of the Right, who succeeded Crispi, followed his predecessor's policy, adhered to the triple alliance and the commercial treaties with Germany and Austria, but, unable to improve the financial condition of the state, resigned in 1892. Giolitti, of one of the factions of the Left, took his place, but, implicated in the Banca Romana scandal, withdrew in November, 1893, having accomplished nothing. Then Crispi, to whom all eyes instinctively turned in this emergency, was entrusted again with the formation of a cabinet. He adopted the same vigorous policy that he had followed before, but defined the ministerial position more exactly: "We belong," he said, "to no one faction of Parliament more than to another, but to a great party, whose single object is the welfare of Italy." "We only need firmness and perseverance," he added, the next year; "let us rally round the king, the symbol of unity, for only the monarchy marks the unity, and guarantees the future, of the fatherland." Thus during the three years of his second ministry, Crispi stood as the advocate of monarchy, the protector of the middle classes, the upholder of the triple alliance, the promoter of an aggressive colonial policy, and the declared enemy of all popular movements, whether led by Irredentists, republicans, socialists, anarchists, or even discontented workmen and artisans. In 1894 he carried on a campaign against the peasantry of Sicily, who had revolted because of the heavy taxes imposed by Giolitti; and while endeavouring to lighten the misery of the workmen and peasants, treated with exceptional severity all socialists or others who were engaged in furthering the revolt. When the movement in Sicily
spread to Rome, Rufo, Spezzia, Pisa, Leghorn, Carrara, where the marble-workers were largely anarchists, Lucca, and Milan, he carried through the Parliament laws against the anarchists decreeing exceedingly heavy penalties—from three to twenty-four years' imprisonment at hard labour—for all convicted of making and using bombs. As personal dictator, through the prefects of the provinces, he pursued the parties of revolution, forbade the formation of unions and the gathering of assemblies, and limited the power of the press.

Many of these measures, which were of doubtful legality, roused opposition in Parliament, and the disclosures of Giolitti in December, 1894, which implicated Crispi in the bank scandal, finally destroyed his majority. But he refused to withdraw, and after remaining five months without a majority, he dissolved the Parliament and appealed to the country. The result was favourable, and his majority was restored. But the blow fell from an unexpected quarter. Since 1893, Italy had steadily continued her advance in Africa; the army had won a victory over the Mahdi at Agordat, and in 1894 had captured Kassala, the gate of the Soudan. But her aggressiveness in lower Abyssinia and her attempt to establish a protectorate over that country led to war with King Menelek in 1895 and 1896, which, in the latter year, resulted in the overwhelming defeat of General Baratieri at Adua. Such was the excitement roused at home by this failure of the colonial policy that, in some parts of the country, riots accompanied the public expressions of disapproval of the entire African campaign, and Crispi, without waiting for the vote of Parliament, withdrew from office. Rudini, his successor, immediately announced a change of policy, declaring that the African possessions would be transformed into a civil and commercial colony, and that no further attempt would be made to extend their boundaries; and making known his determination to work for economy in expenditures, for reforms in Sicily, for an amnesty for prisoners, and
for peace with the socialists. This program was partly carried out in 1897, when a treaty was arranged with Abyssinia, and a project was presented for revising the existing method of taxing incomes and personal property; but the marked sympathy that the minister displayed for the liberal program failed to win for him the support of the socialists, and only made more intense the feeling of hostility that the clergy and the ultramontanes cherished for the government.

Thus, at the close of the year 1897, Italy’s position was full of difficulties, and many of the obstacles to her progress seemed almost insuperable. She was burdened with a heavy debt, which, notwithstanding the fact that the taxation was excessive, tended to increase rather than diminish; and the people, agricultural rather than industrial, frugal but not thrifty, patient but not persistent, and taxed out of all proportion to the productive capacity of the country they inhabited, were fast becoming republicans and socialists, less from conviction than from discontent and despair. The heavy expenditure, which was the cause of the evil, had been due not to the ordinary costs of administration, but to the subsidising of railway systems, extravagance in the civil service, greater or less dishonesty in the awarding of contracts, and in greatest part to the enormous armaments and expensive colonial expeditions which the Italian government had felt bound to support. Both the government and the people had seen the wisdom of abandoning an aggressive colonial policy; but the nation, proud of its past, and unwilling to resign its place as a Power and enter upon a period of recuperation, which was the only means whereby an economic and financial equilibrium could be obtained, upheld its ministers in their policy of supporting an expensive army and navy, in spite of the fact that the country, poorly supplied by nature with the sources of wealth, could ill afford the expense of maintaining a prominent international position, and that the attempt to do so was leading to emigra-
tion on one side and to well-organised socialistic insurrection on the other.

Yet the situation was far from hopeless or discouraging. Italy had been called upon in the short space of a generation to do what other states had taken centuries to complete; and it is scarcely surprising that in all respects she had not succeeded. To have gained territorial, administrative, and legal unity; to have built railway lines and telegraphs; to have raised the standard of education, improved the sanitary condition of the cities, and brought peace and protection to her people,—such a result was encouraging for the present and promising for the future. Should she be able to find a modus vivendi with Europe that would admit of a reduction of armaments and the lightening of the weight of taxation, and to arrive at some understanding with the church that would bring the clergy and the loyal Catholics to her support and prevent them from allying with her enemies, the socialists and republicans, she certainly would have no difficulty, as past events had shown, in maintaining her position as a strong and independent constitutional monarchy.
CHAPTER XII.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EMPIRE.

As the result of six years of struggle and experimentation, the old Austria had been entirely transformed, and a new era in the history of Hungary and the house of Habsburg had begun. By the imperial rescript of February 17, 1867, and the Austrian statute of the August following, Hungary had become an independent state; and in the place of the former single and highly centralised organisation there existed two separate governments, entirely distinct in all that concerned the internal affairs of each, and held together by no other tie than allegiance to a common dynasty and adherence to the conditions of the Ausgleich, itself a temporary arrangement demanding a renewal every ten years.

But these states, though separate and sovereign, were not homogeneous national units: Cisleithania, a territorial rather than a national state, was composed of seventeen provinces, of which each had its own diet, though some, such as Bohemia, Galicia, and Dalmatia, had the historical right to be called kingdoms, while others were simply duchies, counties, or margraviates; and Transleithania, more national than was its fellow state, contained not only Hungary, but Croatia, Slavonia, and Transylvania as well. The variety of the races and languages, the complexity of parties, the unique character of the constitutional arrangement established by the Ausgleich, and the confusion engendered by the existence of seventeen local diets in Cisleithania alone, made the working of the new machinery a matter of great uncertainty.
In studying the history of these two states, it is of importance to bear in mind that the problems which confronted Hungary were much more simple than were those which the statesmen of Austria were called upon to solve. East of the Leitha existed a compact and dominant nationality, the Magyar, and but two of the dependent states, Croatia and Transylvania, had any pretence at an organisation. Moreover, the Magyars had had years of experience in parliamentary government, and though parties existed—the Right, which supported the Ausgleich, the Left under Tisza, which desired only a personal union with Austria, and the extreme Left, which followed the republican traditions of Kossuth—yet the early struggles were those of party rather than of race, and in no way threatened the Magyar supremacy. With Croatia, by a somewhat questionable manipulation of the electoral law, a compromise was arranged in 1868, whereby the Croats were allowed extensive rights of self-government, a representative in the ministry at Pesth, delegates in the Diet and in the Delegations, and the right of employing a considerable proportion of their revenue for themselves. In 1873, these privileges were extended; Croatia received a larger representation at Pesth, additional financial advantages, and the president of the Croatian diet was named as ban by the Hungarian ministry. Toward Transylvania, however, Hungary acted harshly, incorporated that state bodily into the kingdom, abolishing the government at Clausenburg and dividing the country into mere electoral and administrative districts. Great discontent arose among Saxons and Slavs because of this treatment, but the organisation of Transleithania remained permanent, and the Hungarian state, acting without serious check, grew more and more prosperous, increased her wealth, and improved the social and economic condition of her people.

But Austria found it far more difficult to discover a modus vivendi; for her government was called upon to treat with the
church, and to adapt the concordat to the constitution, to deal with parties and familiarise herself with constitutional methods, and to face the demands of the peoples of Bohemia, Galicia, and other Crown lands, who were discontented with the special privileges of the Ausgleich, and demanded for themselves rights similar to those granted to Hungary. In 1867 the machinery of government was set in motion, with Count Charles Auersperg at the head of a liberal ministry; and the struggle with the church began. Though the concordat was not formally set aside, its provisions were rendered null and void by three laws, of which one provided for civil marriages, a second freed education from the power of the church, and a third established equality of religions and regulated the rights of children born of mixed marriages. Though these laws met with bitter opposition on the part of the Pope and the higher clergy, they were finally passed, and inaugurated a régime of religious freedom and secular instruction. At the same time, important measures touching finances, the judiciary, and the army were adopted. Though great was Austria’s need of money, the Emperor would not consent that she should follow the example of Italy and secularise the ecclesiastical estates; and it became necessary, therefore, to unify the national debt and lower the rate of interest, and to impose a tax on coupons, an act which injured the credit of Austria abroad. In judicial matters, trial by jury was introduced; and a complete reorganisation of the army was perfected by the adoption of a three-year term of service, with five years in the reserve and two in the landwehr.

But more difficult was it for the Austrian government to meet the demands of the nationalities, Czechs in Bohemia, Poles in Galicia, and Slavs in Moravia, who, feeling that they had been ignored in the Ausgleich, were asserting their right to some form of independence or autonomy similar to that which Hungary had gained. In August, 1868, the Czechs drew up a definite statement of their claims. They declared that Bohemia
was attached to Austria by no other than a personal tie; that no alteration could be made in this relation save by a new contract between the Emperor and themselves; that no Reichsrath foreign to Bohemia could impose upon that kingdom any debts or other public burdens; that Cisleithania was not an historical state; that Bohemia was not obliged to send any deputies to the Cisleithanian assembly; and lastly, that all constitutional questions pending between the Emperor and Bohemia ought to be regulated by common agreement, and that the representatives of the Czech nation should be chosen on the basis of a just electoral law and an honest election.

Encouraged by this act of the Czechs, the Slavs of Moravia shortly afterward denied the power of the Reichsrath over them, declared that the dual monarchy was founded on neither historical nor political rights, and affirmed that no arrangement was lawful that had not been made between the Emperor and the diet of Moravia. In September, the Galicians made their declaration: they asserted that their deputies could take no part in the deliberations of the Reichsrath, except on matters common to Galicia and the Cisleithanian countries, and that their diet alone had the power to decide all questions concerning the commerce of the country, its finances, rights of citizenship, health, justice, administration, and education; and they demanded a supreme court of appeal, a separate government, with a diet and responsible ministry. Nor was the movement confined to the north. In the south and east, Slovenes and Serbs met in assembly to discuss the question of separation or autonomy; and so bitter was the feeling in Dalmatia, that in 1869, when an attempt was made to introduce the new military system, a revolt broke out in the Bocche di Cattaro that lasted for two months.

This threatening attitude of the dependent peoples greatly increased the embarrassments of the government, and in September, 1868, Auersperg resigned. His successor, Count
Taaffe, unable to obtain a majority in the Reichsrath, himself resigned in 1870, and for almost a year the affairs of state were conducted by a transition ministry under Potocki. During this time great disorder prevailed, the Czechs refusing to take their seats in parliament, and the Slavs, Poles, Slovenes, Italians, and Tyrolese withdrawing from it altogether as a protest against the supremacy of the German liberals. Thereupon the Emperor, having lost confidence in the ability of the liberal German majority to conduct the government, turned to the aristocratic and national conservatives, and in February, 1871, summoned Count Hohenwart to form a new cabinet, an act that seemed to commit him to a policy of federalism and the recognition of the claims of the races. Hohenwart at once admitted two Czechs into his cabinet, and proceeded to formulate a scheme whereby the demands of the Bohemians might be satisfied. Supported by the Emperor, but bitterly opposed by the German majority in the Reichsrath, who talked of calling their victorious German neighbours to their aid, he made clear his determination to grant to Czechs and Galicians autonomous powers. In September, 1871, the Emperor called upon the Czechs to state the terms of an agreement, and declared that he was ready "to recognise the rights of the kingdom, and to repeat this recognition in the coronation oath." In response to this request, the Bohemian diet drafted the Fundamental Articles of 1871, which, had they been adopted, would have placed Bohemia in the same position as that occupied by Hungary. Moravia accepted the articles, and all the Slavs awaited with intense expectation the imperial decree which should inaugurate a federalist régime.

But the decree was never issued. The Emperor was disquieted by the vigorous opposition of Germans and Magyars, and still more by the warnings of his chancellor, Count Beust, and the Hungarian premier, Andrássy; and after his interviews with Bismarck and the Emperor William at Ischl and Salzburg,
became fearful of the effect of his policy upon Austria's relations abroad, and withdrew from the position that he had taken. In November, 1871, he dismissed Hohenwart as the enemy of dualism, and shortly afterward Beust as the enemy of Germany, and summoning first Andrassy as common minister of foreign affairs, then Adolph Auersperg as head of a new Cisleithanian cabinet, returned to the constitution of 1867. Federalism was indefinitely postponed.

With a German liberal once more at the head of affairs in Cisleithania, and maintenance of the friendship with Germany as the fixed policy of the state, the government at Vienna turned its attention to positive measures of reorganisation and reform. Thanks to the refusal of the Czechs, who were doubly embittered now that they had so nearly obtained their demands, to take their seats in the Reichsrath, and to the support of the Galicians, to whom certain concessions were made, the Germans controlled the parliament, and, under the guidance of the firm, but cautious, Auersperg ministry, were able to carry many important measures. On April 2, 1873, they amended the constitution by taking away from the provincial diets the right of electing the deputies to the Reichsrath and vesting it in the hands of the electoral classes. The former method was manifestly unjust and open to abuse, in that the deputies chosen were always of the same political party as the majority in the local body, and were not truly representative of the electoral classes. The next year they extended the ecclesiastical law of 1868 by annulling the concordat, regulating the autonomy to be exercised by the church, and determining the limits beyond which ecclesiastical interference would be an encroachment "upon the inviolable rights of the state." As an answer to the objections made to these laws by the Pope and the bishops, Francis Joseph declared that as constitutional sovereign he could not withhold his assent to laws which had been legally introduced and passed.
While these matters were under consideration, Vienna was experiencing a perilous financial crisis. At the time of the exposition held in that city in 1873 a panic occurred—famous as the Vienna krach—due to excessive speculation in the securities of banks, building societies, and railways, which caused the suspension of ninety-six banks during the ensuing three years, brought great distress to all classes of the population, and extended its disastrous consequences far beyond the Cisleithanian border. And before Austria could recover from these financial reverses and relieve the distress of the labouring classes by legislative measures, and before she could make her peace with the church, she was called upon to renew the Ausgleich with Hungary.

In the latter state, meanwhile, had taken place a political transformation almost unique in the history of parties. The ministry of Szlávé, which represented the constitutional liberals or old party of Déák, had made every effort to develop the resources of Hungary, which had been frightfully neglected in previous years, and had secured the passage in the Diet of measures that promised to build up the internal strength of the state. After the compromise with Croatia had been effected and Transylvania had been incorporated, the chief concern of the Magyars had been to improve the condition of the finances, to extend the railway systems, and to subsidise other great undertakings that would contribute to the well-being of the country. At the same time they had begun the task, so zealously continued later, of spreading the Magyar influence and language as widely as possible throughout the whole of Transleithania, and during the prosecution of these plans, a noteworthy political change took place. So deplorable had become the financial situation and so demoralised the old party of Déák that Tisza, in 1875, renouncing his opposition to the Ausgleich and his desire for separation from Austria, led his party of the Left to the support of the Déákists and formed
with them a new constitutional liberal party, which was to control Hungarian affairs for the ensuing twenty years. It is interesting to note that Deák lived to see this submission of the old non-constitutional Left, and to become an enrolled member of the new party organisation. He died in 1876.

Such was the situation when for the first time the question of the renewing of the Ausgleich came up for discussion. During the ten years of its operation no alteration had been made in its conditions, except that in 1872 the quota paid by Hungary had been raised from 30 to 31.4 per cent., owing to the incorporation into that state of the “military frontiers.” After a discussion which lasted for two years and a half, the compromise was renewed on the old basis; Hungary was to pay 31.4 per cent. and Austria 68.6 of the common expenditure. Other questions, such as the renewal of the charter of the Austrian national bank, the amount of drawbacks allowed on the exportation of brandy, sugar, and beer, excited such grave difference of opinion that not until 1878 was a final settlement reached.

In the meantime were taking place events which were destined to exert an important influence upon the relation of races and parties within the Empire at large. During the Russo-Turkish war and at the congress of Berlin, Austria had in the main supported England against Russia, and in so doing had provoked the wrath of the Slavs. This feeling of hostility, both within and without the Empire, was greatly increased when Andrássy endeavoured to carry out the terms of the treaty of Berlin, according to which Austria-Hungary was to occupy and administer Bosnia and the Herzegovina under the suzerainty of the Porte, and to keep garrisons and possess military roads in the Sandjak of Novibazar. In acquiring this territory, which he deemed of advantage to the dual monarchy in extending the imperial influence and authority in the south-east and a compensation for the loss of Venetia, Andrássy was
forced to adopt a policy which angered the Germans, because of the financial burdens it imposed upon the state, and embittered anew the Slavic nationalities. The Mussulmans of Bosnia, unwilling to be separated from their co-religionists in Turkey, so strenuously resisted the Austro-Hungarian occupation that 200,000 men were needed to overcome them; while the occupation itself, in destroying all hope of a united Slavic kingdom in the south, which had been for years the dream of Bosniaks, Servians, and Montenegrians, became a new cause of discontent for the Slavs of Austria-Hungary, and led them to unite more closely than before in their struggle against the supporters of dualism and the Ausgleich.

Upon the German liberals, however, the effects of this policy were seen almost immediately. For ten years they had controlled the majority in the Reichsrath and the Austrian delegation, and in their desire to be both independent and supreme, had got into the habit of criticising the ministry on every important occasion, and of seeming to place party interests higher than those of the Empire. In the face of the Emperor's wishes and of Austria's needs, they had prolonged for two years the debate upon the Ausgleich; they had opposed the treaty of Berlin; and now, dissatisfied that Andrassy, the common minister of foreign affairs, in causing Bosnia to be occupied, should have acted first and consulted them afterwards, they refused in the Delegation to grant the additional appropriation asked for by the government. This blocking of the plans of the imperial ministry led Andrassy to resign, November, 1878. He was succeeded first by Baron Haymerle, and after the death of the latter in 1881, by Count Kálnoky, who remained in office until 1895. But notwithstanding these changes in the office of minister of foreign affairs for the Empire, the government, in no way altering its foreign policy, adhered to the treaty of Berlin, and confirmed the friendship with Germany by the alliance of 1879.
In internal politics, however, an important change was effected. When the Germans finally succeeded in carrying through the Reichsrath a vote expressing a want of confidence in the foreign policy of the government, the Auersperg cabinet resigned, and in the May following the Emperor dissolved the legislative body. In the new elections the German liberals lost heavily, while the federalists, Slavs, and aristocratic landowners made important gains. Then the Emperor, turning from the liberals, entrusted the government to Count Taaffe, who, at first recognising no party, strove to organise a reconciliation cabinet, and invited Czechs, Poles, and Germans to aid him. But the Germans refused to comply, and on the first question that arose, that of placing the army for ten years in the hands of the government, voted in the opposition. As if to compensate for the loss of their support, Taaffe persuaded the Czechs, who during the Auersperg rule had refused to sit in the Reichsrath, to lay aside their hostility, accept the Ausgleich under protest, and come to the aid of the government. In consequence of this shifting, and of other changes that occurred between 1879 and 1881, the Taaffe ministry became entirely federalist, and the control of the government passed out of the hands of the liberals.

The ministry thus formed depended, in the main, upon a majority made up of Poles, Czechs, the feudal party, and the clericals, held together not by any common purpose or policy, but by a common dislike of the German minority, and a common determination not to allow the management of affairs to pass again into the hands of the opposition. Thus supported, the ministry pursued its policy of increasing the power and authority of the central government at the expense of the Reichsrath; and inasmuch as it was obliged to make such concessions to its federalist allies as would assure the unity of the majority, its measures were often of a distinctly federalist character. But Taaffe, as a shrewd opportunist, avoided the ex-
cesses of Hohenwart, and succeeded so well in subordinating the
demands of the dependent races in Cisleithania to the one
great object of strengthening the power of the head of the state,
that before the end of the decade the Reichsrath had declined
greatly in influence, the federalists and clericals had gained but
a small part of their programs, and the Emperor had become
absolute in everything but name.

Nevertheless, concessions to the dependent races was a
definite part of Taaffe's policy; for it was only by yielding to
the parties which followed him that he was able to hold the
majority upon which he was obliged to depend for aid. De-
serted by the Germans, who were in the opposition demanding
more stringent economy and the maintenance of the full au-
thority of the Reichsrath, he prepared to treat the nationalities
with scrupulous impartiality. Already had he conciliated the
Czechs by various measures touching their finances and schools
in 1881; but he bound them to him more closely by obtaining
the Emperor's consent in 1883 to a division of the university
of Prague into two parts—a German and a Czech—and by win-
ning for them in 1886, after a four-years' struggle, a limited use
of the Czech language in official circles. So rapidly did the
influence of the Czechs increase that when the government, in
1882, reduced the tax-qualification in the cities and rural com-
munes to five florins, altered the voting districts, and re-
modelled the electoral class of the great landowners in
Bohemia, the Czechs were able to gain control of the Bohemian
diet, and to exercise such a dominant influence therein that in
1886 the seventy German deputies withdrew as a protest
against the supremacy of their opponents. In Galicia, the
Poles with the aid of the government managed the diet, and by
a process of systematic oppression, reduced the Ruthenians to
silence. In the south the Slavs gained at the expense of the
Italians, because of the plotings of the Irredentists against the
life of the Emperor; while in Carniola, Carinthia, and Steier-
mark, the Slovenes, aided by the ministry, made notable advances, winning the control of schools, increasing their deputation from the cities, and in 1883 demanding a special language law. In the same year the clericals gained concessions from the government touching the establishment of confessional schools.

While thus in Cisleithania the Emperor and the nationalities were growing strong at the expense of the Reichsrath, the Hungarian Diet was steadily increasing its power at the expense of the king and the races. Taaffe's policy in Austria had encouraged the Slavic peoples of Transleithania to renew the movement which the Bosniaks and Herzegovinians had begun in 1875 for the independence of the Slavic peoples and the erection of a great Serb state; and in Croatia, the radical party, deeming the compromise of 1868 a disgrace to their country, had embodied in their program entire separation from Hungary. Against these movements the Hungarian Diet deliberately set its face, and in its determination to complete the Magyarisation of the whole of Transleithania, acted with vigour and thoroughness. It decreed that Magyar should be the official language in commerce and trade; forbade that the study of German be made obligatory in primary and middle schools; refused to license German theatres in Cronstadt, Hermannstadt, and Buda-Pesth; and in 1887 closed the Saxon school of law at Hermannstadt. In the meantime, it endeavoured to extend its work into Croatia, refused to give up the port of Fiume, and in 1883, when the Croatian radicals tore down the escutcheons upon the bureaus of finance in Agram, upon which the Hungarian Diet had shortly before placed bilingual inscriptions, Magyar and Croat, it sent troops into the country and put down the movement by force. Although the Magyar government was finally compelled to yield on the question of the theatre in Buda-Pesth and the bilingual inscriptions at Agram, yet it did not in the least abate its efforts, and so thorough was
the process of Magyarisation, especially in Transylvania, that it was estimated in 1886 that half the German schools were conducted in the Magyar language.

This was the general situation in the Empire in 1886 when the question of renewing the Ausgleich for the second time came before the governments of the two states. Some difficulty was experienced in coming to an agreement regarding the taxes on spirits, petroleum, and sugar, but the rumours of war, which were current during the years 1886 and 1887, made easier an understanding, and without serious trouble both Austria and Hungary renewed the compromise for another ten years.

While thus the Taaffe ministry, outwardly, at least, seemed stronger than ever, a new influence was already making itself felt in Austria that was to lead to its overthrow. The rise of anarchists, socialists, anti-Semites, and national radicals chiefly in Croatia and Bohemia, was to be the most characteristic feature of Austro-Hungarian history during the ensuing decade. Severe laws had been passed against the anarchists in 1884, 1885, and 1886, and though this party gradually lost ground, in consequence of frequent attacks made upon it by the government, the social democrats, who during the earlier years had identified themselves with the anarchists, came to the front as a separate party, and by 1888 were well organised after the German model. Owing to the different industrial conditions in Austria, however, and to the race wars, which hindered the establishment of a united and compact party, they never reached a position equal in importance to that held by the social democrats in Germany, yet their agitations in 1890 in Vienna and other towns brought upon them the state troops, and stirred up the anti-Semitic elements of the people, who attributed the social troubles to the usurious practices of Jewish capitalists. The anti-Semitic movement thus begun grew steadily stronger until the anti-Semites became sufficiently numerous to gain control of the lower Austrian diet in 1893
and the municipal council of Vienna in 1895, and to elect, in the years 1895 and 1896, the anti-Semitic leader Dr. Lüger as mayor of Vienna.

But of more immediate importance was the growth of the radical parties in Croatia and Bohemia. The radicals of Croatia, having increased in numbers after 1880, appealed to the patriotic instincts of their countrymen, urging them to demand the erection of a south Slavic kingdom, similar to that which the Illyrists of 1848 had desired. In Bohemia there had existed since 1867 a party of Young Czechs, which had been organised when the adoption of the *Ausgleich* had shut out for the moment all hope of autonomy for Bohemia. The platform of this party demanded freedom of the press and of association, the laicising of schools, and universal suffrage, as well as the recognition of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia as a separate kingdom. But from 1867 to 1887 the Young Czechs had accomplished little, having been outnumbered by the more conservative Old Czechs, who, meeting the advances of Count Taaffe and abandoning their national program, had recognised the *Ausgleich* and taken their seats in the Reichsrath. Profiting from the concessions made by Taaffe from 1880 to 1886, the Old Czechs had won from the Germans in Bohemia the control of the local diet in 1883, and were in a large majority in the delegation elected from Bohemia to the Reichsrath in Vienna. But in 1887 the Young Czechs under Dr. Gregr, adding to their party program hostility to the triple alliance and friendship for France and Russia, had entered upon a violent campaign for supremacy; and so menacing had they become by 1890 that Taaffe, fearful lest the Bohemian diet should come under the control of the socialists, persuaded the Old Czechs and feudal landowners to come to an agreement with the Germans whereby the diet should be divided into two parts—a German curia and a Czech curia—each of which should possess the full powers of a separate house, though the members of the two curiae were to
sit and debate together. This plan for effecting a reconciliation between Czechs and Germans, which involved also a duplication of governing boards and courts of appeal, and the alteration of electoral and judicial districts, destroying, as it did, all hope of a separate Bohemian kingdom, was bitterly opposed by the Young Czechs, who by demonstrations, addresses, and vehement speeches in the diet at Prague made every effort to nullify the agreement.

So complicated had become the political situation in Austria and so embarrassed the Taaffe ministry by the growth of radical sentiment, that in January, 1891, the Emperor suddenly dissolved the Reichsrath that a new election might return a body more representative of the electoral classes. The results were significant: the Young Czechs gained thirty-six seats and the Old Czechs but ten, a fact which meant that the governmental majority was bound to be seriously impaired, for Poles and Young Czechs, one hostile, the other friendly, to Russia, could hardly be expected to work together. Taaffe, therefore, abandoned his federalist policy and, supported by German liberals and Poles, adopted a simple program of social, financial, and economic reform. Commercial treaties were made with Italy, Switzerland, and Germany, important tax-reforms were inaugurated, and a far-reaching change was made in the Austrian currency system. At the same time the government became repressive: in 1892 it put down anti-Semitic tumults, forbade social democrats to hold meetings, and suppressed student demonstrations in Vienna and Innsbruck. Towards the unruly Young Czechs it was even more hostile: it prohibited the Commenius celebration in 1892, and the next year, when the demonstrations became unusually violent, placed Prague in a minor state of siege, suspended freedom of the press, of speech, the right of reunion and association, and in certain specified cases, the right of trial by jury.

As a further measure of precaution, in order to check this
growing radical spirit Taaffe proposed in October, 1893, to reform the suffrage by admitting to a share in the political life of the state the labouring classes, which with every year were growing stronger and better organised and more discontented. This project, the aim of which was to extend the franchise to nearly the entire population of the state, roused intense excitement in the country, and drove the German Left, the Poles, and the conservatives into the ranks of the opposition; and Count Taaffe, who for a quarter of a century had been the leading personage in Austrian politics, was obliged to resign. His successor, Prince Windischgrätz, was supported by the coalition that had overthrown Taaffe; and the new ministry, though generally recognised as only temporary, on account of the heterogeneous elements of which it was composed, remained in power for nearly two years. During its first year of office, political life was peaceful, for chiefly questions of finance and commerce were dealt with; and it was not until March, 1894, when the proposal to extend the suffrage was presented to the Reichsrath, that trouble again began. Prince Windischgrätz was undoubtedly forced to take this step by the continued agitation and unrest among the working classes, which had been recently stirred to new activity by the efforts of the German social democrat Bebel to organise them on an international basis and to bring them into touch with the social democrats throughout Europe. The new electoral scheme provided for a fifth class of voters which was to choose, by a system that was equivalent to one of universal suffrage, forty-three delegates for the Reichsrath. But this project was vigorously opposed during the year 1894, and in all probability would have caused the downfall of the Windischgrätz ministry, as it had that of Count Taaffe, had not there appeared a new question which accomplished the same result. In June, 1895, when the ministry proposed to establish a Slovenian high-school at Cilli in Steiermark, the German Left withdrew from the coalition, and Prince
Windischgrätz, left unsupported, handed in his resignation. A new ministry formed by Count Kielmannsegg was overthrown in October, and in the same month the Emperor summoned to the head of the cabinet Count Badeni, a Pole, who served as minister-president and minister of the interior for nearly two years.

The failure of Taaffe to bring about that reconciliation of the races in Cisleithania, which for fourteen years he had earnestly and skilfully sought to accomplish, to control the radical and anti-Semitic movements, and to carry through the electoral reform that Windischgrätz also had not succeeded in effecting, determined the character of the problems that confronted Badeni on his accession to power. In October the latter made known his program: he declared that he would uphold a government that should be in accordance with the spirit of the age, oppose anything prejudicial to peace among the races, honour all just claims, as far as they were legally, financially, and economically admissible, and were in accord with the historical and religious traditions of the state, and, at the same time, resist with all his power reactionary movements. In consequence of this broad-minded declaration, the German Left, Poles, and conservatives, both lay and clerical, came to the support of the new minister.

Almost the first matter of importance to occupy the attention of the Reichsrath at its first session was the old question of extending the suffrage, which had already aroused so much opposition when proposed by Taaffe and Windischgrätz. But interestingly enough, after about three months of discussion, the measure was passed without difficulty in May, 1896. It provided for the establishment of a fifth electoral class, which was to consist of all males twenty-four years of age who were not provided for in the other four classes, and the members of which, after residing for six months in an electoral district, were to have the privilege of voting, directly in the six largest
cities, indirectly elsewhere, for the purpose of electing seventy-two additional members to the Reichsrath. With the adoption of this reform measure, universal suffrage, conditioned only by indirect voting and the system of classes, was introduced into Cisleithania. The following winter, when the Reichsrath was dissolved and new elections were ordered, the new law gave evidence of its workings: the German liberal party, made up of the German Union, the German Left or progressists, the German people's party, and the Schönerer group, lost heavily; while the anti-Semites, or Christian socialists, and the clericals made important gains, and there appeared in the Reichsrath a small group of fifteen social democrats, who had been elected, in the main, by the newly created fifth class. This was the body, broken as never before into discordant factions—seven supporting the government, three neutral, and seven in the opposition—which found itself in 1897 face to face with the question of renewing the Ausgleich.

Just as the political history of Austria since 1887 had been influenced to no inconsiderable degree by such radicals as Young Czechs and socialists, so that of Hungary for a decade had been characterised by the growth in strength and importance of the party of the Left. In March, 1890, after a service of fifteen years, Tisza had been forced to retire, not because of any adverse vote, but because of disagreements with his colleagues, and of stormy scenes in the Diet arising from his treatment of the Kossuth cult, which the Left was endeavouring to establish. Count Szapary, who succeeded him, resigned in 1892, for as an aristocrat and Catholic he was unwilling to meet the demands of the radicals; and Dr. Werkele was instructed by the king to form a new cabinet. Adopting the program of the party of the Left, the new minister carried through the Diet, even in the face of violent opposition on the part of the conservatives, especially in the Table of Magnates, a number of radical measures touching civil mar-
riage, civil registration, freedom of worship, and the legal equality of the Jews; but so intense was the dissatisfaction aroused by these laws that he was forced to retire in December, 1894. The new minister, Baron Banffy, modified somewhat the Werkele ecclesiastical program, but in reality continued Werkele's policy by proposing in 1895 additional measures regarding freedom of worship, with especial reference to the religion of the Jews. At the same time, in the matter of the renewal of the Ausgleich, he expressed himself as dissatisfied with the existing customs and commercial treaty, hoping to obtain more favourable terms for Hungary.

But notwithstanding Banffy's attitude, the two governments were able to report to their respective legislatures, at various times during the years 1896 and 1897, that an agreement had been reached regarding such matters as excise duties, veterinary rules and regulations, the railway tariff, and the bank, the Magyars showing themselves less inclined than formerly to demand entire separation of economic interests. But regarding the percentage of the quota that each should pay, the differences of opinion seemed irreconcilable, and the commissions that had been nominated by the two parliaments in 1896 to consider the matter were unable to agree. Austria, asserting that Hungary had made great advances in wealth during the preceding ten years, proposed that the population of the two states be made the basis of computation, and that Hungary pay 43.16 per cent. instead of 31.4; but Hungary rejected the proposal on the ground that population was not a fair basis, and demanded that the calculation be made upon the amount of taxation—in other words, that the proportion remain as it had been before, 31.4 to 68.6. Here at the close of the year 1897 the matter rested. The Emperor consented to let the quota stand during the year 1898 as it had been arranged in previous renewals, and thus simply prolonged for one year the compromise, which otherwise would have expired on December 31, 1897.
The situation, already a troublesome one, was complicated by a series of events of a highly sensational character, which occurred in the Austrian Reichsrath and rendered impossible, for the time being, a ratification of the provisional draft of the Ausgleich presented by the government. Count Badeni, hoping to find his majority among the Poles, feudal landowners, and Catholic people's party, and thinking to bring over the Czechs to his support, proposed on April 5, 1897, a measure for Bohemia, and on the 22d another for Moravia, enforcing the use of the Czech language in the Bohemian civil service, with the exception of certain government offices. Immediately the Germans, notably the progressists and the Schönener nationalists, opposed the project, and not only endeavoured to impeach the Badeni ministry, but also entered upon a course of obstruction which culminated on May 25th and October 19th in disgraceful exhibitions of violence in the Reichsrath. Czechs, Slavs, and anti-Semites were drawn up on one side against Germans and socialists on the other; and so determined was each faction to yield nothing to the other, that the bill providing for the prolongation of the Ausgleich for a year could not be passed. In consequence of these disorderly scenes in the Reichsrath and of rioting in the streets of Vienna, Count Badeni resigned on November 27th, leaving to his successor, Baron von Gautsch, the task of finding some way out of the difficulty. The new minister, who had served in the cabinets of both Taaffe and Badeni, at once sought to conciliate the united German opposition by offering to suspend the language law in the pure German districts of Bohemia, and to limit its working to those districts containing twenty per cent. and those cities containing twenty-five per cent. of the Czech nationality. But this modification was not deemed sufficient by the Germans, and at the end of the year 1897 no agreement had been reached.

The situation in Austria at that time was, therefore, one of
suspense; the Ausgleich had not been renewed; the question of the compromise between Czech and German was as far from settlement as ever; the growth of anti-Semitism and socialism was introducing an incalculable factor into the political life of the state; while the confusion of parties, the racial and personal hostilities in the Reichsrath, were fast bringing Austrian parliamentary methods into disrepute. Nevertheless, the fact that the Reichsrath, as far as the actual business of government was concerned, exerted but little influence in matters of administration made it impossible to draw from its career any conclusions regarding the success or failure of the dual monarchy. Riotous scenes over questions which were older than the state itself and which had been hotly debated before in the course of Austrian history, were no indication that a dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was at hand. The provinces of Cisleithania, with all their complexity of races, were held firmly together by a common system of administration, an imperial court, and the devotion of their peoples to the house of Habsburg; those of Transleithania were united under the control of a compact nationality and a powerful diet; while the two states were joined, without likelihood of separation, by the forces of centuries, by the peculiar international position that each occupied, and by those more recent historical influences that had made the Ausgleich, not a theoretical experiment, but a political necessity.
CHAPTER XIII.

THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE.

During that period of history from 1825 to 1850, when the people of central and western Europe were striving for greater political privileges and more liberal forms of government, Russia, mediaeval in institutions as well as ideas, lay bound hand and foot by the autocratic and reactionary government of Nicolas I. During his reign of thirty years, the Czar had endeavoured to isolate Russia from the west, and to restore the old régime of orthodoxy and absolutism, which his predecessor had sought to liberalise. Under the rule of Nicolas I. Russia stood as a mediaeval despotism, protecting her territory from the invasion of foreigners or foreign ideas, restricting the movements of her people by rigid emigration laws, and repressing at home all aspirations, all expressions of interest on the part of press or people in matters of state or administration. Nicolas, himself isolated from his people as Russia was isolated from the world outside, had no intelligent idea of how his empire was governed, knew little of the life and sufferings of his people, and leaving the business of state to a venal bureaucracy, confined his own attention to his soldiers, their dress, and their manœuvres. Russia, during these years, was a land in which political independence was treason, punishable by imprisonment or death; in which sectarianism was heresy, and proselyting an act of political hostility to be suppressed by the civil authority; in which autonomy, either political or religious, was a disintegrating element to be removed by force.
THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE.

But such a system, carried out as it was with relentless energy, worked only evil for Russia. The Czar, in upholding the principles of the Holy Alliance, in destroying the independence of Cracow and Hungary, and threatening to despoil the Turk, aroused the passionate hostility of the peoples of the west, and brought upon him the Crimean war, which was undertaken by England less to defend the Ottoman Empire, than to humiliate the Czar. The war, in its turn, disclosed the demoralised condition of the Russian administration: the corruption of officials, who had misappropriated the supplies provided for the army and the fortresses; the inefficiency of the military organisation, which rendered ineffectual all the heroism of the soldiers in the Crimea; the inadequacy of the commissariat and transport systems, which left the peasantry at the mercy of the soldiers; and, finally, the want of commanding administrators and strategists competent to direct the policy of the government and to lead the army in time of war.

When the war was over, and the truth dawned upon the nation that the policy of Nicolas had cost Russia her prestige and her dominant position in Europe, and had deprived her of all the advantages she had gained over Turkey since the days of Catharine II., public opinion arose against a system that had brought only woe to the country. Confronted with defeat, humiliation, and bankruptcy, disillusioned and disenchanted by the terrible judgments that had come upon them, the people awoke from their lethargy, and during the period from 1854 to 1861, raised their voices in press, salon, and court against the inert and selfish autocracy that had brought Russia to her low estate. "Arise, O Russia," said an anonymous pamphleteer, "and stand erect and calm before the throne of the despot, and demand of him a reckoning of the national misfortunes. Russia, O Czar, had confided to thee supreme power, and thou wert to her as a god on earth. And what hast thou done? Blinded by passion and ignorance, thou hast sought nothing but power,
thou hast forgotten Russia. Thou hast consumed thy life in reviewing troops, in altering uniforms, in signing the legislative projects of ignorant charlatans. Thou hast created a despicable race of censors of the press, that thou mightst sleep in peace, and never know the wants, never hear the murmurs of thy people. Advance, O Czar, appear at the bar of God and history. By thy pride and obstinacy thou hast exhausted Russia and raised the world in arms against her.”

To these demands of his people, Alexander II., who succeeded his father in 1855, declared himself ready to respond. Convinced that the system of isolation and repression that Nicolas had adopted was weakening Russia, and that reforms in the administration and the social structure of the state were indispensable, he formulated a new policy, and turned to the intelligent men of the nobility for support in the new undertaking. Unwilling to impair his absolute authority, and fully aware of the impracticability of the constitutional changes that Alexander I. had urged in the earlier years of his reign, he sought to remedy at first only the most flagrant abuses. He restricted the censorship, freed the universities, modified the rules touching residence abroad, and this done, prepared to pass on to more radical reforms, which were destined to complete what the Crimean war had begun, the revolutionising of the internal organisation of the empire.

But regarding the nature of the proposed reform, public opinion divided, and two parties sprang into existence: the Occidentals, who advocated the introduction of the liberal ideas and institutions of the west; and the Slavophiles, who, scorning all dependence on foreign teachings, turned their thoughts to Russia’s past, and desired the revival of old Russia with its noble boyar and free village community, the mir. Side by side with these were the radicals, represented by Herzen, a refugee, who at his printing office in London published documents and pamphlets, and a journal, the Bell (Kolokol), denouncing exist-
ing institutions and the corrupt functionaries (tchinovniki), thousands of copies of which, despite the censorship, he was able to send into Russia. But all parties, notwithstanding their differences on other points, agreed that important reforms should be inaugurated, and that first among them should be that concerning the emancipation of the serfs. A wave of romanticism swept over the land. Golgo, in Dead Souls, and Turgénieff, in Memoirs of a Huntsman, began the war upon the evils of serfdom, and the condition of the serf soon became the subject of widespread discussion in reviews, journals, and salons. The intelligent classes of Russia began to see in the moujik the "natural man" of Rousseau, and clamoured loudly for his freedom from bondage.

The serfs, who thus had become the objects of the national interest, were chiefly Slavs inhabiting Great Russia, Little Russia, White Russia, and Lithuania, and of these about twenty-two millions dwelt on private lands, either bound to the soil and paying dues in labour at the will of their lords, or as artisans and merchants were detached from the soil and made payment in money; while the twenty-five million Crown serfs and the four million serfs of the appanages were more independent, living in villages which held the land in collective ownership and were collectively responsible for the revenue and for military service. To emancipate this enormous mass of the community was to strike at the very foundations of Russian society, to arouse the hostility of the nobles, who drew their wealth from the products of their estates and from the dues of their peasants, and who by their bitter opposition had rendered practically ineffectual the reform measures of both Alexander I. and Nicolas I. But the reaction against the thirty years of despotism and the indignation aroused by the disclosures of fraud and corruption in administration were to accomplish that which two Czars of All the Russians had been unable to effect: for in the last analysis of causes, it will be found that it
was the Crimean war that made possible the emancipation of the serfs of Russia.

After a discussion in committees, which lasted for a year, and the drafting of a scheme by a central committee of which Nicolas Milutine, under-secretary of the interior and indefatigable friend of the peasant, was the leader of the majority, a rescript was issued in March, 1858, announcing the principles according to which the law was to be carried out; and finally, by the solemn Emancipation Act of February 19 (March 3), 1861, serfage was abolished throughout the entire Russian Empire. All serfs became personally free, those without land remaining landless, while those who had been cultivators were permitted to purchase from the lords the soil upon which their houses stood and sufficient territory to furnish support. The amount of land that each serf might redeem varied in extent in the different parts of the country, but was equal, on an average, to eleven acres per male head. To facilitate this purchase, the state advanced four-fifths of the redemption money, upon which the peasant was to pay six per cent. interest for forty-nine years. The emancipated peasants were to hold the land, not individually, but collectively; the commune (mir) was to be the collective landholder, to receive the redemption money from the government, to be responsible for the interest, to govern itself, and to possess important administrative and police functions; while to a group of communes, the volost, were to be given extensive supervisory powers.

After inaugurating this reform, one of a magnitude unsurpassed in the history of modern times, and destined to have far-reaching economic, moral, and social consequences for Russia, Alexander turned his attention to other phases of his work, to removing the abuses of tchinovnism, remedying the vices of excessive centralisation, and introducing a more independent and righteous justice by taking the judiciary from under the control of the administration, and introducing trial
by jury. To this end, he first reorganised the ministry in November, 1862, and after some delay issued in 1864 and 1865 special ukases altering the judicial organisation and remodelling the system of local government. The ukase of 1864 created especially for the peasantry the volost court, a court of last resort, within whose jurisdiction fell cases involving less than a hundred rubles, the decisions in which were controlled by customary, not written, law; and, in addition, two sets of courts: that of the justice of the peace, with right of appeal to a higher court made up of at least three of the justices of the peace of the district sitting together in the chief city, and in many cases a final appeal to the supreme court; and the ordinary court of first instance, with appeal to a superior court, and a final appeal to the same supreme court that heard appeals from the court of the assembled justices. In the working out of this scheme, justice was to be freed from all interference on the part of the government and the tchinovniki; magistrates were to be entirely independent; all persons were to be equal before the law; justice was to be public and procedure oral; and by the introduction of trial by jury and of the popular election of judges, the people were to be admitted to a share in the administration of justice. In the January following, the ukase touching local government was issued: two local assemblies—zemstvos—were established, one for the district and one for the province, the former to consist of delegates elected by the individual land-owners, the towns, and the peasant communes, the latter of delegates chosen by the district zemstvos themselves. These assemblies were to control roads and bridges, hospitals, public instruction, and health, to nominate justices of the peace, to have a general oversight of the harvests and to impose local taxes,—a system whereby self-government was introduced, not only into the communes of the peasantry, but into the provinces as well. In the same and following years the universities were made more independent,
schools for the study of science were erected side by side with the classical schools, financial reforms were introduced, and the army was reorganised after the Prussian model.

These liberal changes established a new régime for Russia, and encouraged the more intelligent classes to hope for a constitution. But the opposition of the functionaries to the entire movement was so intense as early to make evident the fact, that the task of carrying through effectually even the measures already adopted would be one exceedingly difficult to perform. Alexander himself was disturbed by the indiscretions of the more excitable liberals, by the frequent demonstrations of the students, and at times by the very grandeur of the work that he had undertaken. Moreover, the committees to which he entrusted the execution of the measures, often composed of men of conflicting opinions, and left without adequate direction, performed their work slowly and with hesitation. A reaction seemed likely to take place, when an event occurred which imperilled the entire liberal cause: this was the insurrection in Poland, which was destined to exercise a momentous influence on the history, not only of Napoleon III. and Bismarck, but of Russia as well.

Beginning in 1860 as an agitation for reform and partial autonomy, the Polish movement had become by 1863 a revolution. Already had Alexander conceded to the Poles a council of state, a department of public instruction and worship, and elective councils in districts and municipalities; but the good effects of this liberality were destroyed in April, 1861, when the Czar dissolved the Agricultural Society in Warsaw, which had been organised in 1855, and had stood for six years as the representative of a new Poland. In consequence of this act, the anti-Russian party gained in strength; while the Czar, hesitating as always, tried for the ensuing two years alternating policies of repression and conciliation. Finally, in January, 1863, the party of independence and union of Poland, Lithuania,
and Podalia gained the upper hand, and began at first a secret, and, afterwards, an open, warfare with the Russian government. The bravery of the Poles and the brutal methods employed by the Russian general Muravieff roused the sympathies of the people of the west for the Poles, and though Bismarck supported Russia, in this crisis France, England, and Austria entered protests against the treatment of the insurgents. Disregarding the intervention of these Powers, Russia began in the summer and autumn of 1863 a systematic repression and Russification of Lithuania and Poland. Crushing opposition by pitiless war and war-tribunals, the Russian government took from Lithuania and Poland all remnants of autonomy, destroyed the independence of the Polish nobility, closed their schools and libraries, forbade the use of the Polish language, and having divided Poland into ten departments and eighty-five districts, incorporated the territory as a part of the administrative system of the Empire. In order the more effectually to shatter the power and influence of the Polish aristocracy, Alexander accepted Milutine's agrarian scheme for Poland, according to which the peasantry were to obtain a property right in the lands they had cultivated on much better terms than had been granted to their fellow-peasants in Russia in 1861; while the nobles not only lost their revenues and all their local seignorial authority, but received very inadequate compensation for the territory taken from them.

Thus the unfortunate insurrection cost the Poles their autonomy and national independence, and transformed their land into a military division of the Russian Empire. And it did more: it destroyed the good feeling between Russia and France; inaugurated that diplomatic revolution of 1863 which made possible Bismarck's attack upon Denmark the next year; and, lastly, by destroying the confidence of the Czar in the party of moderate reform, it gave to reactionists and chinoyniks the opportunity for which they had long been waiting, and
brought to an untimely end the liberal régime in Russia. To the Muscovites in 1865 who asked for a constitutional assembly, Alexander II. replied that the right of initiative in the work of reform belonged to himself alone, and was indissolubly bound up with the autocratic power entrusted to him by God; and in 1867 he dissolved the zemstvo of St. Petersburg for daring to ask for political liberties that were not embraced in the edict of 1864. As was to be expected, the reform measures fell into discredit, and were evaded wherever it was possible to do so; the self-government of the zemstvos was curtailed and its field of activity was invaded by the bureaucracy; justice continued to be administered secretly; the line which had been so carefully drawn between the judicial and administrative functions was not preserved; and trial by jury was used only when the strictest letter of the law demanded it. In 1865, Tolstoi, minister of public instruction, began his famous attack upon modern science, restored the classical schools to full power, suppressed the "real" schools on the ground that they were nurseries of anarchy and materialism, and forbade students of the universities to meet in clubs or assemblies. Not yet satisfied, the government began to denationalise the Baltic provinces by making Russian the official language, introducing Russian administration and official methods, and favouring the peasant population at the expense of the Germans and the Poles; and at the same time drove Roman Catholicism out of Poland, and aided the organisation of private societies by the Slavophiles, in the hope of drawing the peasantry of the west from the Latin to the Greek church. To this process of Russification Finland alone was not subjected; protected by the Czar himself, the Finns retained their old constitution, their orders, language, press, and national literature.

And meanwhile, during this period of reaction, from 1864 to 1879, Russia made many noteworthy territorial gains. No longer taking part in the affairs of the west, she waited, "col-
lecting her forces," as Gortchakov said, and making conquests in the south-east and east. By the overthrow of Shamyl in 1864, and the final subjection of the tribes in 1875, the government brought to an end a revolt that had begun in the Caucasus in 1859; and by the two battles of Irdjar in 1866 and Zara-Buleh in 1868 terminated the war with the Turcomans, which had been conducted intermittently for many years. In consequence of the latter successes, the Khanate of Samarkand was annexed, that of Kokand, which at first was left as a vassal state, was finally added in 1873, and Russian Turkestan was organised as a province. In the meantime, from Krasnovodsk, on the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea, an advance was made toward the south-east, by way of the desert lands of Khiva, which culminated in the battle of Geok-Tepe in 1881: the Turcomans were defeated, and the Russian frontier extended to the oasis of Merv, which was gained by voluntary submission in 1884. In the far east, by the treaty of Pekin in 1868, Russia acquired the left bank of the Amour, and founded the great arsenal of Vladivostock, and in central Asia, in 1871, made small additions of territory at the expense of China at Koudga and in the valley of Ili. In 1875, in exchange for some of the Kouriles, she obtained from Japan the island of Sakhalin, while in the west she recovered her control of the Black Sea in 1871, and received back the land of Bessarabia in 1878. Thus, before the close of the reign of Alexander II., the Black, Caspian, and Aral seas were under Russia's dominion, and she had gained a very useful terminus on the Pacific Ocean for her trans-Siberian railway.

While Russia was making these acquisitions in the east and west, the opposition to the absolute and reactionary government of the Czar was assuming a new character at home. From 1860 to 1870 hostility to the government had taken the form of a kind of non-political nihilism, due to discouragement and despair, excellently pictured in Turgénieff's Fathers
and Sons, and Pissemski's In the Whirlpool; but during the era from 1870 to 1878, an aggressive socialistic movement took place. Socialistic agitators endeavoured to make proselytes of the masses by spreading among them the doctrines of the social democracy, and roused by the writings of Karl Marx, the influence of the International, and the example of the Paris Commune, the socialists strove to bring about a political change in the government of Russia by exciting in the people a desire for revolution. But toward the end of the year 1878 this movement, checked by the arrests of its leaders and their transportation to Siberia, lost ground before another of a different character: plots, terror, and assassination took the place of appeals to the peasants and workingmen, and bombs and dynamite supplanted pamphlets, hand bills, and clandestine newspapers. The new Nihilists, differing entirely in character and purpose from those of the earlier period, and numbering, it is thought, not a hundred in all, were organised in a wonderfully efficient manner with secret press, laboratories, and weapons for assault. Beginning in 1878 with the murder of General Mezenzeff, chief of the famous "third section," they continued unremittingly their work of terrorising the government. In 1879 they assassinated Krapotkine, governor of Kharkoff; only a month later made an assault upon Drenteln, the new chief of the "third section"; and in the same year made their first attempt to take the life of the Czar. The government redoubled its energies: terrorists were seized, imprisoned, executed, or sent to Siberia, and the country was divided into five or six great military districts, the governor-generals of which were invested with dictatorial powers. At the same time the Czar, suspicious of his own councillors and fearful of new conspiracies, appealed to the country for its cooperation, but he found little encouragement in the replies of the zemstvos, some of which even dared to demand an extension of their political privileges.
But these measures quieted the Nihilists for the moment only, and the peace was not for long. In December, 1879, Hartmann and his fellows blew up the train in which the Czar was travelling from St. Petersburg to Moscow; and in February, 1880, an unknown Nihilist gained access to the Winter Palace and exploded a mine under the dining hall. The Czar, broken in spirit, invested Loris-Melikoff as 'chief of the executive commission' with absolute authority to guard the peace of the Empire; and the latter, with Alexander's consent, softened the rigours of the autocratic government, in order to try the effects of a policy of conciliation. He revised the press law, released prisoners, dismissed the obnoxious Tolstoi, suppressed the "third section," made important changes in the personale of the government, and what was of greater importance, secured from the Czar a promise to call a consultative assembly that should be composed of delegates from the provincial senatus and municipal dumas. But the order that was to establish a representative régime for Russia was never issued; for on March 13, 1881, even while the decree was in type awaiting publication, the Czar, when returning to his palace from a military review, was brutally murdered.

With this act vanished the promised liberal régime. Alexander III., who by the death of his elder brother in 1865 had become heir to the throne, was at first inclined to respect his father's wishes; but unnerved by the frightful crime of the revolutionists, and persuaded by the arguments of his old tutor, Pobedonostzeff, Procurator-General of the Most Holy Synod, he set aside the imperial decree, and in his manifesto of May 21, 1881, announced his determination to maintain his autocratic power and to preserve it from all injury. Having dismissed Loris-Melikoff, and accepted as his chief advisers Pobedonostzeff, Katkoff, an enemy of western ideas and the ablest absolutist in Russia, and Ignatieff, an intolerant pan-Slavist and advocate of an aggressive military policy, he re-
turned to a régime of centralisation and orthodoxy. Instead of the representative assembly that his father had consented to summon, he called in September a commission of thirty "experts," whose members, it is true, were men of high character and ability, but to whose consideration were submitted two questions only—drunkenness and emigration of the peasantry; and during the following year appointed similar commissions to consider merely such specific subjects as the reform of the administration and the regulation of local government. In their turn, these commissions, too often sacrificing the interests of the burghers and the people at large to those of the bureaucracy and the great landowners, accomplished a work far from liberal in character; and Alexander III. himself, while not abrogating the reforms of his father, placed such restrictions upon their operation as to render them, to a considerable degree, ineffectual. In 1889 he abolished the elected justices of the peace, except those of St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Odessa, and appointed rural canton chiefs to take their places; he curtailed the powers of the jury, taking out of its hands many important cases and transferring them to other courts; in 1892 he diminished the number of electors of the dumas, or municipal assemblies, and limited in extent the municipal franchises; and with such untiring zeal had both he and his ministers pursued the nihilistic organisation, that before the close of the year 1884 the great majority of its members were either dead, or in exile in Siberia or other countries. Yet notwithstanding the success of his autocratic measures, and the vigilance of the police which had driven the conspirators to concoct their plots in Zürich and Paris, the Czar continued to live in armed isolation, his every movement guarded by soldiery, and his imperial residences surrounded by sentries.

But whatever may have been the political character of his régime, there can be no doubt that the Czar earnestly desired
to improve the condition of the emancipated peasantry, to reform the bureaucracy, and to check the corrupt practices of the officials, which was an evil almost organic in the life of the Russian state. He curtailed somewhat the powers of the police, and modified the rigour of secret arrest, though in all that related to this branch of the administration the changes were merely nominal. But in lightening the burdens and relieving the sufferings of his faithful peasantry, he showed himself a father to his people. Not only did his government distribute seed grain after bad harvests, furnish food in time of famine, and rebuild villages destroyed by flood and fire; but by remitting arrears, advancing money, reducing the redemption dues, making redemption obligatory upon landlords who sought to avoid it, and helping the peasants to obtain larger allotments, by establishing a special real-estate bank, it furthered the reforms of Alexander II., and aided the peasants in redeeming their lands. The Czar revised the system of direct taxation in 1886 by abolishing the poll tax, substituting therefore taxes on land, incomes, and inheritances.

Yet kindly as was Alexander's treatment of his peasantry, his attitude toward the press, education, religion, and the nationalities was uncompromisingly hostile and autocratic. Under the guidance of Pobedonostzeff, he laboured for thirteen years to eradicate all disintegrating forces, both intellectual and political, and to create a Russia that should be Russian in language and faith. To that end, in 1883 and 1884 all liberal journals were suppressed, or placed under the most rigid censure; the laws regarding printing and the printing-press were despotsically enforced; and all transactions in printing materials without permit were strictly forbidden. Against foreign literature, Alexander established a rigid blockade: certain books and newspapers were absolutely excluded from Russia, and others were admitted only after part of their contents had been blotted out with printer's ink or removed altogether. That
education might not become a danger to the state, attempts were made to restore the study of the classics and to check the growing interest in physical and natural sciences; and in 1887 Delianoff, minister of public instruction, issued a series of ordinances, limiting the numbers of scholars in gymnasia and universities, and excluding from the advantages of higher education, sons of poor parents and domestics. He dismissed from the universities professors suspected of holding liberal views, suppressed certain courses in medicine that had been delivered to women, and closed the Woman's Higher Educational Institution at St. Petersburg.

But still more harsh were the methods employed by Pobedonostzeff and the Czar in their attempts to Russify the Baltic provinces and to drive out the Jews. Similar methods had been applied to Poland in 1864, and to the Baltic provinces during the years that followed; but it was not until 1885 that a systematic process of Russification in Courland, Livonia, and Estonia was begun. Then it was that a decree was issued making obligatory the use of Russian in the elementary schools, a measure that was extended to include the preparatory schools in 1886 and the private schools in 1890 and 1891. At the same time orders were sent forth commanding that governors and other officials conduct their business entirely in Russian; that both parish and district courts do the same, and employ seals bearing Russian inscriptions; that in the university of Dorpat lectures and examinations be in Russian, and that no dissertation be accepted that was not written in the same language; that Russian be introduced as the language of the village governments and the theatres; and that even the names of many of the towns be changed. While issuing these decrees, the government continued its attacks upon German and Polish landed proprietors, forbidding the Germans to acquire land in the Baltic provinces outside the ports and cities, and reviving against the Poles the old laws of 1864, which prohibited them
from purchasing land in Poland. It persecuted Roman Catholics in Poland and Lutherans in the Baltic provinces and Finland, and until 1893 carried on a relentless war against the Stundists of southern Russia, a sect which rejected the sacraments, the clergy, and the ritual of the Orthodox church. Alexander III. and Pobedonostzeff used all available means to make the Russian language, the Slavic blood, and the Orthodox faith supreme in every part of the great Russian Empire.

In conducting its campaign against the Jews, the government, guided by Pobedonostzeff and the successive ministers of the interior, Ignatieff, Dournovo, and Goremkine, seems to have been prompted by the instinct of self-preservation, and the desire to rescue the rural population from the grasp of the shrewd and persevering Hebrew. As early as 1881 General Ignatieff had issued a circular letter to the provincial governors, in which he had stated that since the emancipation of the serfs the Jews had monopolised trade and commerce, and had acquired a considerable percentage of the lands of the moujiks. Such seem to have been, in reality, the facts, and so bitter had the popular feeling become during that and the following year, that in many localities—notably at Balta in Podalia—the peasants had risen against the Jews, destroying their property and forcing thousands of them to emigrate. In 1882 the government issued the "May Laws," as they were called, rigid decrees limiting the area of residence for Jews and forbidding them to acquire landed property; and in 1887 began to exclude them from the higher-grade schools and universities, finally deciding, in 1891, that the proportion of Jewish students in the universities should be reduced to three per cent. From 1890 to 1893, owing to complaints from the provinces, and to the share taken by Jews in the nihilistic agitation, Pobedonostzeff strictly enforced these May Laws, banished the Jews from central Russia, compelled them to crowd within the Pale—the fifteen provinces of the western border—, and excluded
them from scores of useful employments. The conditions of
the Jews became pitiable: herded within narrow limits, cut
off from the great bulk of the Russian people, decimated by
famine, and exposed to the hostile attacks of peasants and
subordinate officials, they found that nothing remained to them
save death, conversion, or emigration. Out of the six million
Jews in Russia, it is estimated that more than three hundred
thousand fled from the country during these years.

In 1894 Alexander III. died, and was succeeded by his son
Nicolas II., a young man of twenty-six, who was known not
to share his father's views regarding the isolation of Russia,
and from whom a more liberal policy was expected. In his
circular of November 9th, the young Czar announced his de-
termination to maintain peace abroad and to work for internal
progress at home; but he refused to consider any change in
the existing form of government. In his speech of January 29,
1895, to a deputation from the nobility, the cities, and the
zemstvos, he said that he intended to protect the principle of
autocracy as firmly as had his father, and that he considered
any plan for the admission of the zemstvos to a share in the
government of the Empire but an idle dream. In other par-
ticulars, however, he was far more considerate and prudent
than his father had been. He promised to protect the Finns
in their rights, privileges, and religion, and in so doing
drew from the Finnish diet in January, 1897, an address of
greater friendship and loyalty that had been voted by that
body for many years. Toward the Poles the change of policy
was even more marked: in 1895, to the joy of the people of
Poland, General Gourko was removed from his place as gov-
ernor-general of that province; and two years later certain
liberal concessions were made that radically altered the position
of the Poles. The Czar consented that they should purchase
property in Lithuania and the Ukraine, that a statue should be
erected to the Polish poet Mickiewicz in Warsaw; that many
persons long imprisoned for political offences should be pardoned; that a Pole should be appointed to take the place of the Russian president of the theatre in Warsaw; that the press law should be lightened; and that the government officials should respect the wishes of the villagers in Polish districts. It is not surprising, therefore, that on his visit to Warsaw in August, 1897, Nicolas should have received a welcome, the like of which had not been known in Poland since 1861.

Toward the Powers abroad the Czar adopted his father's policy of friendship and peace. Acting with Muravieff, the successor of de Giers and Lobanof-Rostowski, as his minister of foreign affairs, he came to an understanding with Austria, Germany, and France, and during the crisis of the Armenian massacres and the Turco-Greek war, made known his purpose by expressing openly his good will toward the Powers, and his determination to work for the preservation of the general peace. During the years 1896 and 1897, visits were exchanged between Nicolas II. and Francis Joseph, and largely through the influence of Goluchowski, a Slav, common minister of foreign affairs for Austria-Hungary, a friendship was established between Austria and Russia that had, it was thought, an important political bearing upon the future of the Eastern Question. In August, 1897, the Czar welcomed William II. of Germany to St. Petersburg; while the visit of President Faure of France in the same month, and the references of Nicolas to the powerful bond of friendship and the deep sympathy that united France and Russia, roused in the world outside the suspicion that an alliance had actually been formed between these two countries. And in the east, as well as the west, the Czar made his influence felt: turning for the moment from the line of advance toward Herat and Pamir, which his father had followed in 1885 and 1892, Nicolas sought to extend Russia's territory and influence in eastern Siberia. By a treaty with Corea, October 8, 1897, Russia obtained a sort of protectorate over
that country, and in December occupied Port Arthur, by agreement with China, thereby gaining a new terminus for a branch line of her great Siberian railroad, and a hold upon the fertile land of Manchuria.

Thus the new Czar, though firmly believing in the necessity of an autocratic policy for Russia and unwilling to commit himself to any form of representative government, had in reality inaugurated a fairly liberal régime, and one essentially broader than that of his father. He had neutralised considerably the influence of Pobedonostzeff, and had checked the process of Russifying the western provinces; he had conciliated the Finns, and had lightened the burdens of the Poles; he had discontinued the persecution of the Jews and the dissenters; and had sought to reform the bureaucracy, to improve the condition of the nobility, and to aid the peasants. He had entered into amicable relations with the other continental Powers, that the preservation of peace might make possible the greater unity of the Slavic race, the intellectual enlightenment of the Russian people, and the expansion of Russian trade and commerce. Yet in all these acts, he had taken no step inconsistent with the establishment of a Russia, homogeneous and self-sufficient, which, though still in the youth of her intellectual and commercial development, was destined to become, as all loyal Slavs believed, a dominant factor in the world of the east.

END OF VOLUME II.
APPENDIX

TO ILLUSTRATE THE SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN QUESTION
DANISH ROYAL HOLL

Oldenburg or Royal Line

CHRISTIAN I. 1
1448-1481

CHRISTIAN III. 1533-1559

Sendenborg or Younger Royal Line

CHRISTIAN

Alexander

Oldenborg

Yv

Elder Sendenborg: Augustenborg Line

Emil Guntner,
Augustenborg

Ar

d. 1699

Frederick William,

L

d. 1714

Christian Augustus,

Peter

d. 1734

Frederick Christian,

Carl

d. 1704

Frederick Christian,

Fred

d. 1814

Christian,

Fred

d. 1863

Charlotte, married William
of Hesse-Cassel

Marie

Mat

Will

Frederick VIII., 1863

Duke of Augustenborg

Marie

Will

Christian VII. 1766-1808

Frederic

Christian VII. 1863-1864

Frederick, married Louisa,

Marie

Married

CH

Formerly Count of Oldenburg; chosen king by the Danish nation in 1668; acquired Norway in 1660; chose Swedish nation in 1657, and was thus from 1657 to 1681 King of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden; and in 1660, after Adolphus VII., chosen by the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein as their duke.

Under Christian II., Sweden revolted, and in 1523 placed Gustavus Wasa, grandfather of Gustavus Adolphus, on the throne.

In 1660 Denmark became an absolute monarchy, and female succession was acknowledged.

At the peace of Stockholm, in 1720, Frederic IV. gained the consent of the Powers—England and France—Schleswig, but he never incorporated it.

After 1815 the King of Denmark, as Duke of Holstein and Lauenburg, was obliged to be represented in the Germanic Confederation.

Died without children; the last of the Oldenburg line.
ND YOUNGER BRANCHES

Holstein Gotorb Line

ADOLPHUS, Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, 1544-1586

Frederick III., Duke, 1586-1597

Philip, Duke, 1587-1590

John Adolphus, Duke, 1590-1616

Frederick III., Duke, 1616-1659

Christian Albert, Duke, 1659-1694

Frederick IV., Duke, 1694-1708

Charles Frederick, = Anna, daughter of Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, 1700-1739

Peter III., Duke and Czar, 1729-1762

married Catherine II.

Paul I.,* Duke and Czar, 1762-1801

Gustavus V. Charles XIII.*

Alexander I. 1801-1825

Nicholas I. 1825-1855

Alexander II.* 1855-1881

Christian Augustus

Adolphus Frederick, Duke of Oldenburg, 1779-1785

Frederick Augustus, Duke of Oldenburg, 1869-1883

George I

Gustavus III.

Peter, Duke of Oldenburg, 1859-1883

Peter, Duke of Oldenburg, 1880-1887

Paul, Duke of Oldenburg, 1889-1891

Nicholas, Duke of Oldenburg, 1893-1895

* In 1829, Christian, Duke of Augustenburg, gave up his claims to the duchies for 2,225,000 Danish thalers, and at the time signed a renunciation for his descendants also.

* Protocol Prince; Duke of Schleswig-Holstein-Sondersburg-Glucksburg; present King of Denmark and father of the Prince of Wales, the Empress Dowager of Russia, and King George of Greece.

* Paul I. Czar of Russia and Duke of Holstein-Gottorp; resigned the latter title in 1762 in favor of Christian VIII.

* Charles XIII. adopted as his heir Marshal Bernadotte, who succeeded to the throne in 1818 as Charles XIV., thus founding the present Swedish dynasty.

* In 1858, Frederick of Hesse-Cassel, Alexander II., (grandfather of the present Czar), and Nicolas Frederic Peter, Duke of Oldenburg, resigned their pretensions to the crown of Denmark in favor of Christian of the younger Sondersburg line.

* In 1881, Augusta Victoria, daughter of Frederick, Duke of Augustenburg, married Prince William of Prussia, the German Emperor.
INDEX.

Abdul Aziz, Sultan, 1861-1876, 178, 303, 307; reform decree of, 308; deposition of, 310
Abdul Hamid II., Sultan, 1876—, 312, 314, 336; and the Armenian massacres, 137
Abdul Medjid, Sultan, 1838-1861, 301, 302
Aberdeen, Lord, 56, 63
Adrianople, Treaty of, 82
Alexander of Battenberg, Prince of Bulgaria, 327-331
Alexander I., King of Servia, 334, 335
Alexander II., Czar, 1855-1881, 178; accession of, 75; and peace proposals in 1855, 81, 82; suggests European congress in 1859, 132; and emancipation of the serfs, 438-440; additional reforms of, 440-442; and insurrection of Poles (1863), 207-211, 442, 443; desires peace in Europe (1870), 299; and Ottoman Empire, 312; and Bulgaria, 327; reaction under, 443, 444; liberal policy in 1879-80, 447; assassination of, 325, 447
Alexander III., Czar, 1881-1894, 325; and Alexander of Bulgaria, 339; policy of, toward Powers, 332; policy of, toward Russia, 448; toward peasantry, 449; toward press, education, religion, and the nationalities, 449-452; death of, 452
Alliance of the three Emperors, 300, 325
Alma, Battle of the, 71
Almonte, General, 174
Alsace and Lorraine, 275, 297
Andrássy, Count Julius, 323, 419; Common Minister of Foreign Affairs for Austria-Hungary, 299, 420; supports peace policy, 300; Note, 308; and Bosnian question, 422, 423; resignation of, 423
Anti-Semitic Movements, in Germany, 377, 387; in Austria (Cisleithania), 427-429, 431, 434; in Russia, 451, 452
Antonelli, Cardinal, 137, 138, 141, 142, 206
Armenia, 322; uprising in, 336; massacres in, 337, 338
Armies, of 1854 and 1859, 3; in Prussia in 1859-60, 198, 199; reform of, 200; in Prussia in 1867, 261; in France in 1867-70, 262, 263; in Franco-Prussian war, 272
Auersperg, Adolph, Minister of Austria (Cisleithania), 1871-79, 420, 424
Auersperg, Charles, Minister of Austria (Cisleithania), 1867-68, 417, 418
Augustenburg (see Christian, Duke of Augustenburg, and Frederic, Duke of Augustenburg)
Ausgleich, 294-296, 415, 416, 417, 421, 428; first renewal of, 421-423; second renewal of, 427; third renewal of, 432-435
Austria, territorial divisions of, 278; government of, under Metternich, 279, 280; revolution of 1848 in, 280, 281; reaction in, in 1849-51, 4; under Schwarzenberg, 281, 282; and Prussia in 1852, 46, 47, 189, 190; attitude of, toward Eastern Question and Crimean war, 58-76; agreement of, with Turkey (1854), 68, 73;
Austria (Continued).
relations of, with Prussia during Crimean war, 66-68, 191; and western Powers, 68, 73; condition of, after Crimean war, 86, 81, 89, 90, 190, 192, 284; signs concordat with church, 282, 283; under Alexander Bach, 283, 284; and Victor Emmanuel after Novara (1849), 91, 92; and Piedmont in 1855, 103; policy of conciliation in Lombardy, 112; recalls envoy from Turin, 113; sends ultimatum to Piedmont, 124, 125; and war with France and Piedmont, 125-129; after the war, 284, 285; from 1860 to 1865, 285-291; and Zollverein, 190, 203; and uprising of Poles, 207, 208; proposed alliances of, with France, 209, 264, 265; enters into convention of 1866, 244; joins Prussia, 217-219; compact of 1864 between, and Prussia, 221, 227; attitude of, toward Schleswig-Holstein question, 228, 232; supports Augustenburg, 232, 233; and agreement of Gastein, 233; government of, in Holstein, 235; refuses to sell Venetia, 237, 399; refuses to banish Augustenburg, 236, 240; warlike policy of, 241; promises to give Venetia to Italy, 243; and proposal of European congress, 243, 244; motion of, in Federal Diet, 246; after Königgrätz, 250-262; agrees to Ausgleich with Hungary, 264 (see Austria-Hungary and Austria [Cisleithania]).

Austria (Cisleithania), 294, 415, 416, 418; and concordat of 1855, 417; reforms in, 418, 420; federalism in, 419, 420; under C. Auerperg ministry, 417, 418; under A. Auerperg ministry, 420-424; under Taaffe ministry, 424-430; under Badeni ministry, 431-434; in 1897, 435

Austria-Hungary, neutral during Franco-Prussian war, 271; and Turkey in 1875, 308, 309; neutrality of, in Russo-Turkish war, 312, 315; at congress of Berlin, 321, 422; occupies Bosnia, 323, 422; and Bulgaria, 332

Austro-Prussian war, 247-249
Austro-Sardinian war, 125-129

Azeglio, Marquis Massimo d', 92, 96, 100, 101, 130, 391; Minister of Piedmont, 94-99; ecclesiastical law of, 95; character of, 96; retirement of, 99; supports Cavour, 108

Bach, Alexander, 283, 285, 287
Baden, 247, 255, 258, 272, 257, 276, 368
Banffy, Baron, Minister of Hungary, 1894—, 433
Belcredì, Count Richard, 292-294
Belletti, Vincent, 243, 245, 254
Belzoni, 259, 262, 268-270, 397
Beust, Count Ferdinand, 261, 295, 299, 300, 419, 420
Bismarck, Prince Otto von Schönhausen, 49, 116, 170; supports neutrality in Crimean war, 66, 191; and treaty of April 20th, 67; in Diet at Frankfort, 190; called to the head of the ministry (1862), 201; character and political views of, 202, 203, 212, 257, 370; foreign policy of, in 1862, 205, 260; and insurrection of Poles, 210; and Schleswig-Holstein question, 215, 217; gains Austria's co-operation, 218, 219, 221; at London conference, 225, 226; February conditions of, 230; at Biarritz, 234, 235; demands banishment of Augustenburg, 236; persuades Lesser States to recognise Italy, 237, 238; scheme of, for reforming Confederation, 238-240; consid-
Bismarck (Continued),

ers agreement of Gastein broken, 241; notes of, to German govern-
ments, 247; and battle of Königgrätz, 249; and terms of peace, 250; and Benedetti in 1866, 254, 255; makes treaties with South German states, 254, 255; at close of year 1866, 255; and Tariff Parliament, 258; and Luxembourg question, 260, 261; and Hohenzollern candidature, 266, 267; telegram of, to press, 269; signs treaty of Frankfort, 275; President of Prussian Ministry and Chancellor of German Empire, 368; diplomacy of, 1871-72, 299, 300; and political parties in Empire, 371; and Culturkampf, 371-374, 378, 379; and national liberals, 374; social and economic plans of, 375-380; compulsory insurance scheme of, 379, 380; views on Eastern Question, 312, 330; at congress of Berlin, 321; and triple alliance, 324; completely alters home policy, 380; colonial policy of, 326, 381, 382; position of, in 1885, 329; attitude of, toward Bulgarian question (1885), 339; and war rumours of 1886-88, 332, 382; speech of, 332; dismissal of, 1890, 385

Bohemia, 378, 415, 417; claims of (1868), 417, 418; Fundamentals Articles of, 419; concessions to Czechs in, by Tassaé, 425; Old Czechs in, 428; Young Czechs in, 428, 429; language ordinance for, 424; modification of language ordinance for, 434

Bonapartists, under Second Republic, 10; under Third Republic, 354, 356, 358

Boncompagni, Charles, 126, 131

Bordeaux, Compact of, 349

Bosnia, 305, 312, 313, 319, 320; uprising in (1875), 307, 309, under Austrian administration, 322, 323, 422, 423

Boulanger, General, 332; Minister of War, 365; career of, 364; death of, 364

Brofferio, Ange, 101, 108

Broglie, Duke of, ministry of, 352, 354, 356

Bulgaria, 306; massacres in, 311, 313; and treaty of San Stefano, 319; and treaty of Berlin, 321, 322; under Alexander of Battenberg, 327-331; annexes Eastern Roumelia, 328; war of, with Servia, 329; under Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, 332-334

Buol-Schauenstein, Count, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Austrian Empire, 1852-1859, 47, 123, 192; policy of, during Crimean war, 65, 66; and evacuation of the principalities, 68; and treaty of December 2, 1854, 73, 74; and revision of treaty of the Straits, 75, 76; at congress of Paris, 83, 111; despatches note to Turin, 113; opposes sending of ultimatum, 125; downfall of, 129

Canning, Stratford (Lord Stratford de Redcliffe), 43, 56, 59, 60, 84, 88

Camrobert, Marshal, 72, 76

Caprivi, Count Georg, 333; Chancellor of German Empire and President of Prussian Ministry, 386; resigns from ministry, 387; dismissed from chancellorship, 387

Carlowitz, Treaty of, 50

Carnot, Sadi Marie François, President of French Republic, 364, 365

Cartell, 383, 385

Cataldardo, Battle of, 142, 170

Catherine II., 50, 51

Cavaignac, General, 10, 11, 31, 36

Cavour, Count Camillo Benso di, 73, 94, 95, 211, 212; and d'Azeglio, 96; early life of, 97; in cabinet of d'Azeglio, 98; as Prime Minister, 99; policy of, at home, 99-104, abroad, 104; and conventual law, 102; effects of policy of, 103; final results of policy of, 104; and Eastern Question, 105; and Dabormida, 107; with Victor Emmanuel in England and France, 109; and peace proposals, 110; at congress of Paris, 85, 86, 110, 111; and Austria's conciliatory policy, 112, 113; angers Austria, 113, 114; at Plombières, 117, 163, 164; attempts of, to force Austria into
INDEX.

Cavour (Continued),
war, 118; and Russia’s proposal of congress, 122, 123; interview of, with Napoleon at Paris, 123; and proposal for general disarmament, 123, 124; and armistice of Villafranca, 129; and expedition of Garibaldi (1860), 138, 139; plot of, at Naples, 140; forestalls Garibaldi at Rome, 141-143; Roman policy of, 396; death of, 144

Centralism, policy of, in Austria (Cisleithania), 286, 287, 291
Centre (Roman Catholic) party in Germany, 371, 374; supports Bismarck, 381; and colonial policy, 382; opposes renewal of Septennate, 382; and William II, 386, 387
Chambord, Count of (Duke of Bordeaux, Henry V.), 23, 154, 350, 353, 354
Changarnier, General, 13, 14, 31; dismissal of, by Louis Napoleon, 24, 25
Charles I., King of Roumania, 305, 333
China, 167, 342, 388, 445, 454
Christian of Sonderburg- Glucksburg, 48, 213; ascends throne of Denmark as Christian IX., 216
Christian IX., King of Denmark, 217, 218, 219, 233; signs Danish constitution, 216; signs treaty of Vienna, 227
Christian, Duke of Augustenburg, 48
Clarendon, Lord, project of, 60; at congress of Paris, 86, 88, 111, 284; and Cavour, 109; and Italy, 132
Clothilde, Princess, daughter of Victor Emmanuel, 117, 120
Colonial policy of, France, 325, 359, 360, 362; Germany, 326, 351, 382, 386, 388; Italy, 409-413
Commercial treaties: Austria, 3, 49, 190; Austria (Cisleithania), 429; Piedmont, 100; France (1860), 166, 167, 205; (1862-1866), 169, 205, 350; Prussia, 205, 206; Italy, 237, 238, 394; German Empire (1892-1894), 365, 386
Commune of Paris, uprising of, 345-349, 446
Concordat of 1855 (Austria), 103, 282, 283, 296, 417, 420
Conference at, Vienna (1853-1855), 59-61, 64, 69, 70, 75, 76; London (1864), 224-226; Constantinople (1876), 313, 314; (1885), 330; colonial, Berlin (1884-85), 326, 382
Congress, of Paris, 82-87; work of, 87-89; of Berlin, 321, 322, 324
Constantinople, Treaty of, 51; conferences at, 313, 314, 330
Constitution, of 1849 in Austria, 4, 281, 282; of 1860, 286, 287; of 1861, 287, 288; of 1867 (Ausgleich), 294, 295; of 1848 in France, 7, question of revision of, 35, 26, 27; of 1852 in France, 151-153; changes in, 169, 170, 178, 185, 186; of 1875 in France, 355; of 1863 in Denmark, 215, 216; for Ottoman Empire (1876), 312, 314; of German Empire, 399, 370
Convention, of September (1864), 173, 368; of Soledad (1862), 174; of June (1866), 244, 245
Conventional law of Piedmont, 102; of Italy, 404, 405
Coup d’Etat, 158, 183; fears of, 13, 27; events leading to, 15, 19, 28; execution of, 30-34; effect of, on Europe, 46; effect of, on France, 153-155
Cowley, Lord, 121, 122
Credit foncier, 155, 156
Credit mobilier, 156
Crimean war, 70; results of, 78, 87-90; 190; Piedmont and, 104-109; consequences of, for Russia, 437, 438, 440
Crisis of 1852, 26, 28, 146
Crispi, Francesco, Minister of Italy, 138, 406; succeeds Depretis, 410; policy of, 410-412; second ministry of, 411; overthrow of, 412
Croatia, 45, 288, 289, 294, 296, 415; and Hungary, 296, 416; in 1883, 426; radical movement in, 427
Culturkampf (in Germany), 372-375
Custoza, Battle of, 249, 400
Cyprus, 320, 324
Danish war of 1864, 223-227
INDEX.

Deák, Ferencz, program of, for Hungary, 289, 292, 293; and Ausgleich, 295; party of, in 1875, 421; death of, 422

Denmark, 44, 213, 217-219, 222, 223; and war with Prussia and Austria, 223-227; at London conference, 424

Depretis, Agostino, Minister of Italy, 406, 407; policy of, 408, 409; death of, 410

Disraeli, Benjamin (Lord Beaconsfield), 300, 301, 311; defeas Russia, 320; at congress of Berlin, 321; and Eastern Roumelia, 322, 329

Dou Pacifico, the case of, 44

Drouyn de Lhuys, Edouard, 184; and Grecian difficulty, 44; note of, 60; as envoy to Vienna, 75; on Piedmont in 1854, 104; summoned to ministry, 172, 397; and Polish insurrection, 173, 207, 208; and alliances with Austria, 208, 209, 242, 243; of party of action, 250; influences Napoleon III., 253

Dualism (in Austria), 291, 293, 299, 323; established by Ausgleich, 294-296, 423

Eastern Question, 50, 58, 88, 277

Piedmont and, 104-109; after 1856, 301-335 passim; after 1886, 335, 336, 340

Eastern Roumelia, 323; annexation of, to Bulgaria, 328, 329

Egypt, 57, 306, 315, 325, 350, 361

Elections, of 1857, in Piedmont, 114; in France, of 1857, 160, 161; of 1863, 171, 172; of 1869, 183, 184; of 1876, 355, 357; of 1880, 364; of 1893, 365; of 1858, in Prussia, 195; in Germany, of 1878, 378; of 1887, 383; of 1893, 387

Em, 268, 269

England (Great Britain), and question of the refugees, 43, 44; and Greece (1850), 44; and Schleswig-Holstein question (1850-52), 45; and coup d'etat, 46; and Second Empire, 49; and Eastern Question before 1852, 52, 53; and Menchikoff mission, 59; desires to continue Crimean war, 78, 79; and peace, 80, 81; after Crimean war, 89; and Piedmont, 106, 142; attempts of, at intervention before Austro-Sardinian war, 120-123; trouble between, and France, 163; and French occupation of Syria, 168; and Mexico, 173; and Polish uprising, 207-209; and Napoleon III. in 1863, 209, 210; and Schleswig-Holstein question in 1864, 214, 219, 222; at London conference, 224; attitude of, toward Russia and Ottoman Empire, 309; rejects Berlin Memorandum, 310; wrath of, against Russia, 312, 313; and Russo-Turkish war, 315, 316, 318; and treaty of San Stefano, 319, 320; and Cyprus, 320; at congress of Berlin, 321; and France, 324, 325; and Bulgarian question, 330, 332; agreement of, with Germany (1890), 333; and Italy (1893), 333; and Armenian question, 337, 338

Eugénie, Empress of France, 157, 250, 253, 268

European Equilibrium, 45, 49, 92, 93, 133, 137, 219, 252

Exhibition, of 1851 (London), 3, 46, 48; of 1855 (Paris), 3, 100, 158; of 1867 (Paris), 178, 179; of 1889 (Paris), 364, 367; of 1873 (Vienna), 421

Falloux, Frédéric, Count de, 18

Farini, Carlo Luigi, 130, 134, 138, 143

Faucher, Léon, 9, 14, 22

Fauré, Félix, President of French Republic, 333, 334, 365, 453

Favre, Jules, 166, 168; one of Les Cing, 161; defends Orsini, 165; on declaration of war (1870), 271; and Third Republic, 344

February Patent, 1861, 287

Federal Diet, 4, 5, 190, 191, 196, 202; and Elector of Hesse, 205; and Denmark in 1857, 213; in 1863, 215; vote in, to chastise Holstein, 218; refuses to invade Schleswig, 218; votes to withdraw troops from Holstein, 227; votes to recognise Augustenburg, 232, 233; motion in, of Bismarck, 239, 240; vote in, on Austria's motion against Prussia, 247

Federalism, in Austria, 286, 291,
INDEX.

293; under Hohenwart, 419, 420;
under Taaffe, 424.
Ferdinand, Prince of Bulgaria, 332, 334, 336
Ferry, Jules, 358; colonial policy of, 324, 325, 359, 360, 381; overthrow of, 360; recall of, to ministry, 361; home policy of, 361, 362
Finland, 444, 451, 452
Four Points, 69, 70, 73, 74, 75, 83
France, under Second Republic, 6-40; and Menchikoff’s mission, 59; and Piedmont, 114, 115; and Cavour’s attack on Rome, 141; under Napoleon III., 153-188; and Schleswig-Holstein question, 220; army of, 1866-1870, 262-264, 272; and Hohenzollern candidacy, 268-270; declares war on Prussia, 271; isolation of, 271; and war of 1870-71, 272-275; neutrality of, in Russo-Turkish war, 315; at congress of Berlin, 321; entente of, with Russia, 333, 453; and England, 345, 360, 361; in 1882, 361; in 1885-1889, 362-364; in 1897, 367
Franchise, limitation of, under Second Republic, 22; extension of, in Italy, 409; extension of, in Austria, 430, 431, 432
Francis II., King of the Two Sicilies, 137, 140, 143, 165, 395
Francis Joseph I., Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary, 4, 76, 112, 113, 127, 178, 180, 196, 237, 244, 265; begins reorganisation of Austria, 265; issues March Patent, 265, October Diploma, 266, February Patent, 287; reconciliation of, with Hungary, 291; abandons federalism and accepts dualism (1867), 293, 294; crowned King of Hungary, 294; and federalism in 1870, 419; adheres to dualism, 299, 420; dismisses Beust, 299, 420; meets Alexander II. at Reichstadt, 312; and triple alliance, 324; summons Taaffe, 424; permits quota to stand for 1868, 433
Franco-Prussian war, 272-275
Frankfort, meeting of princes at, 209, 239; peace of, 275
Frederic, Duke of Augustenburg, 216-232 passim
Frederic III., German Emperor, 383; as Crown Prince, 248, 275
Frederic VII., King of Denmark, 45, 48, 213, 214; death of, 215
Frederic Charles, Prince, 223, 248, 274
Frederic William IV., King of Prussia, 5, 46, 49, 265; and Crimean war, 66, 67, 191, 192; illness and death of, 192, 200
Galicia, 415, 417; claims of (1868), 418; under Taaffe ministry, 436
Gambetta, Leon, 183-185, 274, 361; proclaims Third Republic, 344; leader of radicals, 351; and the clericals, 356; and Republican Union, 358; grand ministry of, 360; death of, 360
Garibaldi, Giuseppe, 118, 122, 131, 182, 393, 394; expedition of, in 1860, 138, 139; further plans of, 140, 141; and Victor Emmanuel at Naples, 143; attempts of, on Rome (1862), 172, 207, 397, (1867), 400, 401
Gastein, Agreement of, 233, 234, 235, 236, 245
Gautsch, Baron von, Minister of Austria (Cisleithania), 434
German Empire, establishment of, 276; fears regarding policy of, 298; peace policy of, 298, 299; under Bismarck, 368-385; constitution of, 359, 370; parties in, 370; condition of, 1893-1897, 387-390; divergent tendencies in, 1897, 388-390
Germanic Confederation, 4, 191, 201; defects in army of, 198; plans for reform of, 204, 205; attitude of, toward Schleswig-Holstein question, 216, 217-219, 222, 224; at London conference, 224; withdraws troops from Holstein, 227; Bismarck’s scheme for reform of, 239-240; and proposal for European congress, 243; and Prussia, 247; dissolution of, 251
Gioberti, Vincent, 115
Giosy, General, 126, 127
Gladstone, William Ewart, and Bulgarian atrocities, 311; policy of, 325
Gorchakov, Prince Michael, 77, 300, 445; at congress of Berlin, 321
INDEX.

Gourko, General, 316, 317, 452
Gramont, Duke of, 141, 184, 250, 265, 268, 270, 271
Greece, 44, 335; aids Cretans (1866), 306; at congress of Berlin, 321; after 1878, 327; and annexation of Eastern Roumelia, 329; war of, with Turkey, 338, 339
Grévy, Jules, President of the French Republic, 9, 182, 357, 364

Hanotaux, Gabriel, 366, 367
Hanover, 5, 218, 247, 248, 251; annexation of, 252, 256, 371
Hassenpflug, Ludwig Friedrich, 5
Hauti Humayoun (February 18, 1856), 93, 301
Hausmann, Baron, 158
Haynau, General, 45, 60
Herzegovina, 305, 313, 319, 320; uprising in (1875), 307, 309; under Austrian administration, 322, 422
Herren, Alexander, 438
Hesse Cassel (Electoral Hesse), 5, 193, 204, 205, 247, 248, 251, 275; annexation of, 252, 256
Hesse Darmstadt (Grand Duchy), 247, 255, 272, 276, 368
Hohenlohe, Prince, Chancellor of German Empire and President of the Prussian Ministry, 387
Hohenwart, Count, Minister of Austria (Cisleithania), 299, 419, 420
Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, Anthony von, 194, 201, 266, 267, 269; Leopold of, 266, 267; Charles of (see Charles I., King of Roumania)
Holy Alliance, 43, 45, 59, 60
Holy Places, Question of the, 53, 54, 57, 58
Humbert I., King of Italy, 300, 407, 408, 410
Hungary, 4, 45, 251, 294, 415; people of, 279; refuses to send deputies to imperial council, 288; attitude of, toward Austrian government (1861-1865), 289, 290; in 1866, 292, 293; constitution of, 296; and Croatia, 296, 416, 421, 426; problems of, after 1867, 416; political change in, 421; policy of Diet in, 426, 427; growth of radical party in, 432; ecclesiastical measures of, 433

Ignatieff, General, 312, 333, 447, 451
Inkermann, Battle of, 72
Insurance, Compulsory, in Germany, 379, 380
International (Association of Workmen), 182, 185, 347, 446
Irredentists, 407, 408, 410, 425
Italy, 5; establishment of kingdom of, 144, 391; obstacles to unity in, 391-393; financial condition of, in 1893, 395; in 1864, 395, 398; in 1876, 404; after 1876, 408, 409; in 1891, 410; recognition of, by Powers, 395; alliance of, with Prussia, 236-238; and proposal for European congress, 245; defeat of, at Custozza and Lissa, 249, 400; and Venetia, 237, 242-244, 251, 396, 399, 400; and Rome, 277, 396-398, 402; neutrality of, during Franco-Prussian war, 271, 402; and "law of guarantees," 403, 404; suspends specie payments, 405; history of, till 1876, 404-406; political change in, 406, 407; neutrality of, during Russo-Turkish war, 315; at congress of Berlin, 321; after 1878, 408, 409; and triple alliance, 324; colonial policy of, 409; war of, with Abyssinia, 409, 410, 412; in 1897, 413, 414

Japan, 167, 342, 445
Jassy, Treaty of, 51, 52
Jesuits, 168, 353, 358, 374, 375, 404
Jews, persecution of, in Russia, 451, 452 (see Anti-Semitic movements)
Juarez, Benito, President of Mexican Republic, 174, 179, 180

Königgrätz, Battle of, 181, 249, 293, 370, 400
Kossuth, Louis, 43, 45, 60, 129, 432
Kutchuk Kainardji, Treaty of, 51, 58

La Farina, Giuseppe, 114, 118
La Guéronnière, Arthur, Count de, 120, 133
La Marmora, Ferrero, Count de, 107, 108, 109, 111, 236-238
Lamartine, Alphonse de, 11, 15
INDEX.

Lamoricière, General, 28, 31, 138, 142
Lassalle, Ferdinand, 182, 377
Lavelle, Marquis de, 184, 254, 397
Law of General Security (France, 1858), 162
Law of Papal Guarantees (1871), 403, 404
Lebeuf, General, 181, 262, 263, 264, 268
Lebrun, General, 260, 262, 264, 265, 267
Leduc-Rollin, Alexandre Auguste, 15, 16
Legitimists, 14, 23, 26, 154, 165; under the Third Republic, 350; and Orléanists, 353; and 16th of May, 356, 357
Leo XIII., 365, 407
Les Cinq, 161, 170
Liberal Empire, the, 185-187
Liberty of Education, law regarding, 20; extension of, 353
Lombardy, 5, 94; uprising in, at Milan (1853), 105; annexed to Piedmont, 129
London Conference (1864), 224-226
London Protocol (1800), 45
London, Treaty of (1852), 47, 48, 213, 217, 233, 224, 225, 226
Loris-Melikoff, Count, 447
Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, early years of, 7; at Strassburg, Boulogne, Ham, 7, 8; writings of, 8 (footnote); in England, 8, 9; return of, to France, 9; elected President of Republic, 10, 11; and National Assembly, 12, 13; journeys of, in provinces, 17, 23, 27; letter of, to Edgar Ney, 17, 19; and cabinet, 18, 19; and Legislative Assembly, 16-32; and law of 1850, 20; and law of May 31st, 22; dismisses Changarnier, 24, 25; and revision of constitution, 25-27; coup d’état of, 27-34; attitude of, toward socialists, 34, 35; and Orléanists, 37; in 1852, 38-40; and Europe, 46; and Holy Places, 54; and Italy, 93; elected Emperor of the French, 40 (see Napoleon III.)
Louis Philippe, 23
Luxemburg, 245, 247, 254, 256, 261, 262; Napoleon III. and, 259, 260, 261
MacMahon, Marshal, President of the French Republic, 162, 273, 352; government of, 352; extension of term of, 353, 354; and 16th of May, 356, 357; resignation of, 357
Magenta, Battle of, 126, 196, 284
Magnan, General, 28, 31
Manin, Daniele, 118
Manteuffel, Baron, 192, 104
Manteuffel, General, 235, 236
Maronites, massacre of, by Druses, 167, 168, 302
Marx, Karl, 182, 446
Maupas, Charlemagne Émile de, 28, 30, 31
Maximilian, Archduke of Austria, in Lombardy, 112, 113; Emperor of Mexico, 174, 175, 179, 180, 181
May Laws (in Germany), 373, 374, 378, 379
Mazzini, Joseph, 108, 114, 122, 138
Menchikoff, Prince, 57, 58, 63, 71
Mensdorff, Count, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria, 236, 240, 295
Metternich, Prince Clement, 4, 280
Mexican Expedition, the, 173-177, 179-181, 234
Midhat Pasha, Minister of Ottoman Empire, 311, 314, 336
Milan I., King of Servia, 326, 334
Minghetti, Marco, Minister of Italy, 118, 398, 404, 406
Modena, 5, 94, 129, 130; annexation of, to Piedmont, 134
Moldavia, 69, 116, 304 (see Roumania)
Molé, Louis Mathieu, 20
Moltke, General von, 178, 204, 248, 249, 261, 269
Montalembert, Charles, Count de, 10, 20
Montenegro, 305, 307, 309, 311, 313, 335; declares war on Turkey, 310; and treaty of San Stefano, 319; and treaty of Berlin, 322, 323; after 1878, 327; Prince of, and Russia, 333
Moravia, 418, 419, 428
Morry, Count de, 19, 28, 30, 31
Mourad V., Sultan, 1876, 310, 312
INDEX.

Napoleon III. (see Louis Napoleon Bonaparte), 40, 42; character of, 147, 148, 245; political opinions of, 148, 149, 245; program of, 150, 151, 169; and constitution of 1852, 152, 153; and republicans, 154; and Orléanists, 154; and Legitimists, 154; policy of, toward French nation, 154-158; and Eastern Question, 54-56 passim; letter of, to Czar, 64; interferes in conduct of the war, 76, 77; and peace, 78, 79; at congress of Paris, 86; at the zenith of career, 90, 156-160; and Cavour, 109; policy of, toward Italy, 115, 116, 164, 165; attempt of Orsini on, 116, 117, 161; at Plombières, 117, 164; consequences of Italian policy of, 165, 166; and Baron Hubner, 119; pamphlets of, 120, 133, 145, 165, 166; and Cavour in March, 1859, 123; war of, with Austria, 125-129; effects of Magenta and Solferino upon, 127-129; and armistice of Villafranca, 128, 129, 166; position of, after treaty of Zürich, 133; pamphlet of, on Pope and Congress, 133, 165, 166; and Savoy and Nice, 135, 165; and Cavour's attack on Roman provinces, 141; interferes at Gaeta, 143; and clergy in France, 166, 170, 175, 397, 398; treaty of, with England (1860), 166, 167, 365; expedition of, to China, 167; occupies Syria, 168, 302; in 1861, 169; and changes in constitution of 1832, 169, 170, 178, 185, 186; and Garibaldi's attack on Rome (1862), 172, 207, 397, (1867), 400; and papal Syllabus, 172; and Polish uprising, 173, 207-210; and expedition to Mexico, 173-177, 179-181, 234; position of, in 1863, 210, 211; and Schleswig-Holstein question, 220, 222-224; at Biarritz, 234; and compensation for France, 243, 245, 253; and Venetia, 243, 244, 399, 400; proposes European congress, 243; convention of, with Austria, 244; rejects Prince Napoleon's proposal, 245; and battle of Königgrätz, 250; and exposition of 1867, 178, 179; and

Ottoman Empire in 1868, 303; and Luxemburg question, 259-261; and Belgian railways, 264; and military reforms, 181, 262-264; position of, in 1869, 184; and the liberal Empire, 185, 186; discusses alliance with Austria and Italy, 264, 265; and Hohenzollern candidature, 266-268; and war of 1870, 272-274; downfall of, at Sedan, 186-188, 273, 274

Napoleon, Prince Jerome, 115, 117, 119, 184; marriage of, 120; and Tuscany, 133; proposes Prussian alliance, 245, 253, 254

Napoleonic Legend, 8, 9, 11, 172, 183

National Assembly, of Germany, 5; of France under Second Republic, 9, 12, 13; of France under Third Republic, 345, 349, 350

National Association of, Italy, 114, 196; of Germany, 196, 197, 212, 242, 359

Ney, Colonel Edgar, 17, 19, 20

Nice, 117, 209; annexation of, to France, 135, 136, 168

Nicolas, Duke of Oldenburg, 48, 225

Nicolas I., Czar, 1825-1855, 55, 56, 207; and European Equilibrium, 56, 57; and Sir Hamilton Seymour, 57; and Europe in 1853, 58; rejects amended Vienna Note and issues Analysis, 61; reply of, to Napoleon III., 64; prosecutes campaign in principalities, 65; evacuates principalities, 68, 69; Russia under, 436; consequences of policy of, 437; death of, 75

Nicolas II., Czar, 1894, 333, 452; policy of, 452; and Poland, 452, 453; and Powers abroad, 453; extends territory and influence of Russia in the East, 453, 454

Niel, Marshal, 120, 181, 252, 263

Nihilists, 325, 446-448

Nikolsburg, Preliminaries of, 251, 254

Non-intervention, Austria and doctrine of, 132

North German Confederation, 251, 255, 260, 267, 368; establishment of, 256, 257

October Diploma (1861), 286, 287
INDEX.

Oldenburg (see Nicolas, Duke of)

Ollivier, Émile, one of Les Cinq, 151; opposes "law of general security," 162; attaches himself to tiers parti, 178; supports liberal Empire, 182, 184, 186; fall of ministry of, 273

Oltenitz, Battle of, 62

O’Donelists, 23, 26, 37, 154, 166, 356; fusion projects of, 23, 353; and Septennate, 353, 354; rupture between, and Legitimists, 354; and Wallon amendment, 355

Orsini, Felice, 116, 161

Ottoman Empire (see Turkey)

Oudinot, General, 14, 15

Palmerston, Lord, 166; and question of refugees, 43, 44; and Russia, 63; and Italy, 132; fall of (1859), 163; and Schleswig-Holstein question, 215, 230; failure of policy of, 227

Paris, Count of, 300, 353, 354

Parma, 5, 94, 130; annexation of, to Piedmont, 134

Pélissier, General, 77

Persano, Admiral, 139, 140, 142, 249

Persigny, Duke of, 7, 19, 30, 37, 141, 169, 171, 172, 244

Pianori, attempt of, on the life of Napoleon III., 115, 162

Piedmont (kingdom of Sardinia), 6, 73; under ministry of d’Azeglio, 94–99; under ministry of Cavour, 99–144; and church, 95, 101; in 1855, 103; and elections of 1857 in, 114; annexes central Italian states, 134, 135; becomes kingdom of Italy, 143, 144

Pius IX., 6; and Piedmont, 95, 96, 101; to be head of Italian Confederation, 129; and Napoleon in 1859–60, 133; and government of Rome, 137; and Cavour’s attack on Roman provinces, 142; and Mexican expedition, 174, 180; issues encyclical and Syllabus, 172, 399; summons Vatican Council, 401, 402; and “law of papal guarantees,” 403, 404; death of, 407

Plébiscite, in France (1851), 30, 35, 36, 151; (1852), 39, 40; (1869), 196

Plombières, meeting at, 117, 119, 164, 234; Agreement of, 117, 118

Pobedonostzefff, Constantin, 447

Poland, uprising in, 1863, 207–210, 221, 443, 444; consequences of, 173, 210, 211, 221, 443, 444; Russianification of, 444, 450; under Nicholas II., 452, 453

Press, 2; law regarding the, in France, 16; decree against the, in France, 38; under Third Republic, 352; in Austria, 280; in Germany, 388; in Russia, 449

Prince Consort, Albert, 69, 82

Privateering, abolished by congress of Paris, 85, 86

Prussia, in 1850, 43; and London Protocol, 45; and Austria, 45, 47, 49; and Czar, 58; makes treaty with Austria, 67, 193; neutrality of, 69, 191; Prince Consort on, 69; at congress of Paris, 82; results of Crimean war for, 90, 192; and Austro-Sardinian war, 128, 129, 195; and Italy, 132; and military reforms, 200; parliamentary struggle in, 200, 201, 203, 204; and Hesse Cassel, 204, 205; and admission of Austria into Zollverein, 205; recognises Italy, 206; treaty with Russia, 210, 211; position of, 1863, 211; executes federal decree in Holstein, 218; war of, with Denmark, 223–227; at London conference, 224; assumes with Austria joint control of duchies, 227, 228; and Agreement of Gastein, 233, 234; treatment of Schleswig by, 235; prepares for war, 241, 242; and proposal for European congress, 243; occupies Holstein, 248; war of, with Austria and her allies, 248, 249; and treaty of Prague, 252; makes treaties with South German states, 254, 255; and Luxembourg question, 260, 261; and army, 261; opposes Napoleon III. in Belgium, 264; and war of 1870–71, 272–275; in German Empire, 368, 369, 388, 389

Quadrilateral (Austrian fortresses in Italy), 5, 127, 129

Radetzky, General, 93

Raglan, Lord, 64, 106; death of, 77
INDEX.

Ratazzi, Urbano, Minister of Italy, 98, 99, 107, 120, 130, 396, 397, 400, 404, 406
Rechberg, Count, 221
Ricasoli, Baron, Minister of Italy, 130, 393, 396, 404
Rochefort, Henri, 184, 185
Roman Expedition, 14, 15, 18, 42
Rome, 6, 137; and Piedmont, 95; capital of Italy, 402
Roon, Lieutenant-General von, 200, 204, 261, 269
Rouher, Eugène, 19, 176, 253, 401
Roumania (Moldavia and Wallachia), 84, 364, 395; at congress of Berlin, 321; and treaty of Berlin, 322, 332; since 1878, 320, 333
Rudini, Marquis di, 411, 412
Russell, Lord John, 219, 229, 222
Russia, 42; and question of refugees, 45; and Grecian question, 44; and Schleswig-Holstein question, 45; and enlargement of Germanic Confederation, 45; and coup d’état, 46; and Turkey to 1852, 50-53; and Crimean war, 53-77; after Crimean war, 78-80, 88, 90, 437, 438; public opinion in, 438; emancipation of serfs in, 438-440; judicial and administrative reforms in, 440-442; and Cavour, 114; and Italy, 132; recognises Italy, 205; and uprising in Poland (1863), 207-210, 442-444; reaction in, under Alexander II., 444; and Schleswig-Holstein question, 220; at London conference, 224; demands congress, 253; and Franco-Prussian war, 271; resumes control in Black Sea, 277, 445; solution of, of Eastern Question, 303; recognises independence of Roumania, 305; sends note to Constantinople, 308; supports subject peoples, 308, 309; and Berlin Memorandum, 310; sends ultimatum to Turkey, 312; makes final effort to avoid war, 314, 315; declares war against Turkey, 315; war of, with Turkey, 315-318; signs treaty of San Stefano, 319; at congress of Berlin, 321, 322; relations of, with Austria and Germany, 323, 332; and annexation of Eastern Roumelia, 330; and Bulgaria, 330-332, 334; isolation of, 333; under Alexander II., 438-447; under Alexander III., 447-452; territorial extension of, 1864-1881, 445, 1881-1897, 453, 454; under Nicolas II., 452-454; and Austria-Hungary, 453; and France, 333, 453; influence of, at Constantinople, 336; and Armenian question, 337; in 1897, 454
Sadowa, Battle of (see Königgrätz)
Saint-Arnaud, General, 28, 29, 30, 31, 64; death of, 72
Santa Rosa, Count of, 95, 98
Sardinia, Kingdom of (see Piedmont)
Savoy, 117, 209; annexation of, to France, 135, 136, 168
Saxony, 5, 218, 222, 248, 251, 255
Schleswig-Holstein, 43, 197, 247; and protocol of 1850, 45; and treaty of 1852, 47, 48, 213, 223; history of, after 1852, 213-218; cession of, at Vienna, 227; arrangement regarding, at Gastein, 233, 234; annexation of, to Prussia, 252, 256
Schmerling, Anton von, Minister of Austrian Empire, 287; and Magyars, 290; government of, 290, 291; dismissal of, 291
Schwarzenberg, Felix, Prince of, 4-6, 42, 45, 47, 93, 190, 284; government of Austria under, 281, 282; death of, 47, 94
Sebastopol, 69, 71; siege of, 74, 76; fall of, 77, 78
Second Empire, 36; proclaimed, 40; downfall of, 186-188, 273, 274
Second Republic in France, 6-40, 42
Sedan, Battle of, 186, 273, 274, 344
Serbs, emancipation of, in Russia, 438-440
Servia, 69, 305, 306, 307, 309; declares war on Turkey, 310; and treaty of San Stefano, 319; and treaty of Berlin, 322, 323; history of, after 1878, 326, 327; war of, with Bulgaria, 329; history of, after 1890, 334, 335
Seymour, Sir Hamilton, 57
Sicily, conquered by Garibaldi, 139; uprising in, 411
INDEX.

Simon, Jules, 182, 356
Sinope, Russian attack at, 62
Slavonia, 45, 294, 415
Socialism, defined by Jules Favre, 14; in France after 1852, 37; after 1867, 182
Socialists, under Second Republic, 12, 13; and elections of 1850 in France, 21; and coup d'état, 34, 35; during uprising of Commune, 346; in Germany (social democrats), 371; and Bismarck, 377, 378; and William II., 385, 386; growth of, 389; in Italy, 407, 408, 410, 411, 413, 414; in Austria (Cisleithania), 427, 429, 430; in Russia, 446
Solférino, Battle of, 127, 156, 284
Spain, 300; and Mexico, 173, 174; revolution of 1868 in, 266; and Amadeus of Savoy, 405
Stundists, 451
Suez Canal, 169, 315
Syllabus, Papal, 1864, 172, 173, 399, 401
Thaâfï, Count, Minister of Austria (Cisleithania), in 1868, 418, 419; second ministry of, 424, 425; and dependent races, 425; influences leading to overthrow of, 427-429; and compromise in Bohemia, 428; and Young Czechs, 429; abandons federalist policy, 429; proposes electoral law, 430; resignation of, 430
Tschernaya, Battle of, 77, 109
Thiers, Louis Adolphe, 253, 353, 354, 355; writings of, 8, 11; and Louis Napoleon, 10; and coup d'état, 31; and Napoleonic régime, 264; makes treaty of peace (1871), 275; elected "chief of executive power," 345; house of, plundered, 349; first President of Third Republic, 349; and payment of indemnity, 350; government of, 351; resignation of, 352
Third Republic, proclaimed, 274, 344; provisional government of, 344, 345; National Assembly of, 345-355; definite establishment of, 355; under Grévy, 357-364; under Carnot, Casimir Périer, Faure, 364-367

Thouvenel, Edouard Antoine, 133, 140, 141, 172, 207, 396, 397
Tien-Tsin, Treaty of, 167
Tiers-parti (1866-1870, in France), 178, 184, 185, 186
Tilsit, Treaty of, 52
Tisza, Koloman de, Minister of Hungary, 294, 416; leader of constitutional liberal party, 421, 422; retirement of, 433; succeeded by Dr. Werkele, 432
Todleben, General, 72, 74, 317
Tolstoi, Count Dmitri, Minister of Public Instruction in Russia, 1864-1879, 444, 447
Transleithania (see Hungary), 294, 415, 416, 426
Transylvania, 288, 289, 294, 415; incorporated into Hungary, 416; Magyarisation of, 426, 427
Treaties of Straits (1841), 44, 52, 70, 75, 80; of London (1852), 47, 48, 213, 217, 223, 224, 225, 226; of Carlowlitz (1869), 50; of Kutchuk-Kainardji (1774), 51; of Constantinople (1878), 51; of Jassy (1792), 51, 52; of Tilsit (1807), 52; of Adrianople (1829), 52; of Unkai Skelesi (1833), 52; of Paris (1856), 83, 314, 315; of Zürich (1859), 130; of Tien-Tsin (1858), 167; of Vienna (1864), 227, 241; of Pragne (1866), 251, 253, 254, 258; of Frankfort (1871), 275; of San Stefano (1878), 318, 319, 320, 321; of Berlin (1878), 322, 323, 422; between Germany, Austria, and Italy (Dreibund, 1879-1882), 324; between Germany and Russia (1884), 325
Triple Alliance (Dreibund), 301, 342, 408
Turkey, dismemberment of, 50; and Russia in 1853, 58; and ultimatum of Czar, 59; defies Russia, 61, 62; and treaty of Paris, 83, 84, 87, 88; Hatfi Huseyin of, 83; under Abdul Medjid, 301, 302; under Abdul Aziz, 302-310; in 1870, 306, 307; and uprising of Herzegovinians, 307; under Mourad V., 310-312; under Abdul Hamid II., 312-339; and war with Russia, 315-318; and treaty of San Stefano, 318; and treaty of Berlin, 322; and annexation of Eastern Roumelia, 329; after
INDEX.

Turkey (Continued).
1878, 335, 336; and Armenian question, 336-338; and Cretan question, 338; war of, with Greece, 338, 339
Tuscany, 94, 115, 129, 130, 133; annexation of, to Piedmont, 134
Two Sicilies, Kingdom of, 137; annexation of, to Piedmont, 143
United States and Mexican expedition, 176, 179, 180
Unkjar Skelessi, Treaty of, 52
Varna, 65, 69, 71
Vatican Council (1869-70), 185, 403, 402
Venetia, 5, 129, 237, 242, 244, 288, 399; cession of, to Italy, 252, 400
Victor Emmanuel II., King of Italy, 73; after Novara, 91; advisers of, 92; treaty of, with Austria, 94; and Pope (1854), 101; and conventual law, 102; and Eastern Question, 105; visits London and Paris, 109; address of, 119; and war of 1859, 125; and armistice of Villafranca, 130; and Garibaldi, 143; work of, for Italy after 1861, 393-395; speech of (1865), 395, 396; manifestoes of, against Garibaldi, 397, 400; and convention of September, 398; and Syl labus of 1864, 399; and France in 1870, 300, 402; death of, 407
Vienna, Note (1853), 60, 61; treaty of, 227, 241
Villafranca, Armistice of, 128, 165; reasons for, 128, 129; terms of, 129, 131
Walewski, Count, 19, 86, 109, 111, 128, 133, 161
Wallachia, 69, 116, 304 (see Roumania)
Wallon Amendment, 354, 355
Werkele, Dr., Minister of Hungary, 432, 433
William I., German Emperor; as Prince William, 117, 192; as prince-regent, 193-200; as King of Prussia, 175, 200; character of, 193, 194; attitude of, during Austro-Sardinian war, 195, 196; and National German Association, 197, 198; and German unity, 198; and Prussian army, 199, 200; and Elector of Hesse Cassel, 204, 205; and uprising in Poland, 210; and Bismarck, 230, 231; and alliance with Italy, 237; rejects Napoleon's demand, 253; president of North German Confederation, 256; and Hohenzollern candidature, 266-268; at Versailles, 274; coronation of, as German Emperor, 276; and Culturkampf, 317; and Bismarck's social program, 376; death of, 383
William II., German Emperor, 369; character and opinions of, 383-385; and parties, 385; dismisses Bismarck, 385; and socialists, 385, 386; alliance of, with Centre, 386; influence and govern-ment of, 388, 390
Windischgrätz, Prince, Minister of Austria (Cisleithania), 430, 431
Württemberg, 5, 247, 255, 259, 272, 275, 276, 368
Zollverein, 47, 49, 169, 190, 205, 229, 233, 237, 243, 255, 258
Zürich, Treaty of, 130, 132, 133, 145, 165
WORKS ON AMERICAN HISTORY

THE LITERARY HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: 1763-1783


A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LITERATURE DURING THE COLONIAL TIME

Agawam edition, 2 vols. in one, Octavo, half leather .......... 3.00
Half calf extra .......... 5.00

THE STORY OF THE CIVIL WAR

A Concise Account of the War in the United States of America between 1861 and 1865. By John Codman Ropes, Member of the Massachusetts Historical Society, The Military Historical Society of Massachusetts; Fellow of the Royal Historical Society; Author of "The First Napoleon," "The Campaign of Waterloo," etc. To be complete in four parts, printed in four octavo volumes, with comprehensive maps and battle plans. Each part will be complete in itself, and will be sold separately.
Part I. Narrative of Events to the Opening of the Campaign of 1862. With 5 maps. Octavo .......... $1.50
Part II. The Campaigns of 1862. With 13 maps. Octavo .......... 2.50

COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW


THE FEDERALIST


AMERICAN ORATIONS

From the Colonial Period to the Present Time, selected as specimens of eloquence, and with special reference to their value in throwing light upon the more important epochs and issues of American History. Edited by the late Alexander Johnston of the College of New Jersey. Re-edited with new material and historical notes by Professor James A. Woodburn of Indiana University. Four volumes, each complete in itself and sold separately. $1.00, gilt top.
Publication now completed. Per volume .......... $1.25

G. P. PUTNAM’S SONS, NEW YORK AND LONDON.
WORKS ON AMERICAN HISTORY

THE NAVAL WAR OF 1812

Or, The History of the United States Navy during the Last War with Great Britain; to which is appended an account of the Battle of New Orleans. By Theodore Roosevelt. Seventh Edition. Octavo, $2.50

THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON

Comprising his Diaries and his Public and Private Correspondence, including numerous letters and documents now for the first time printed. Edited by Worthington Chauncey Ford. 14 vols., octavo, half leather, gilt tops. Per volume . . . . . . . $5.00. Limited to 750 sets, printed from type—not stereotyped. Now complete. A few sets still remain for sale.

THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON

Comprising his Public Papers and his Private Correspondence, including numerous letters and documents now for the first time printed. Edited by Paul Leicester Ford. 10 vols., octavo, half leather, gilt tops. Per volume . . . . . . . $5.00. Limited to 750 sets, printed from type—not stereotyped. In course of publication. Volume X. in preparation.

CORRESPONDENCE AND PAPERS OF JOHN JAY

Including all his important writings, addresses, and decisions, and letters from Washington, Hamilton, Adams, Jefferson, and others, many of which are now printed for the first time. Printed from the Jay Papers in the possession of Hon. John Jay. Edited by Henry P. Johnston. 4 vols., octavo, half leather, gilt tops. Per volume . . . . . . . $5.00. Limited to 750 sets, printed from type—not stereotyped. Now complete. A few sets still remain for sale.

LIFE & CORRESPONDENCE OF RUFUS KING

Comprising his Letters, Private, and Official, his Public Documents, and his Speeches. Edited by his grandson, Charles R. King, M.D. 6 volumes, octavo, cloth. Per volume . . . . . . . $5.00. Limited to 750 sets, printed from type—not stereotyped. In course of publication. Volume VI. in preparation.

THE FEDERALIST


G. P. Putnam's Sons, Publishers, 27 West 23d St., New York
THE BORROWER WILL BE CHARGED AN OVERDUE FEE IF THIS BOOK IS NOT RETURNED TO THE LIBRARY ON OR BEFORE THE LAST DATE STAMPED BELOW. NON-RECEIPT OF OVERDUE NOTICES DOES NOT EXEMPT THE BORROWER FROM OVERDUE FEES.

STALL-STUDY
CHARGEED

WIDENER
FEB 29 1996
BOOK DUE
CANCELLED